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THE ACT OF EXPLANATION IN A CLASSROOM CONTEXT WITH PART-
ICULAR REFERENCE TO THE TEACHING AND LEARNING OF SCIENCE  
ABSTRACT 
The thesis is concerned with the act of explanation in class-
room contexts, with emphasis upon secondary teaching part-
icularly in science. Over one hundred explanations in eight 
subjects (Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, English, 
History, Geography, Foreign Languages) are analysed and 
some fifty teachers, teaching more than one thousand pupils, 
are involved in studies which are cross-sectional, analytic 
and descriptive, utilising four instruments, namely, rating 
sheets, experiments, typologies and models to investigate 
the concerns of ten hypotheses. 
The rating sheets used with teachers and pupils in relation 
to Hypotheses H1 and H2 reveal explaining as the most central 
and important activity of teaching and learning, especially 
in science. 
Typologies employed for Hypotheses H4, H5 and H7 reveal 
respectively: 
relationships between question type, concept type, comm-
unicated meaning and subject origin of an explanation, 
understanding by pupils of their teacher's explanation 
shows wide variety and ranges from satisfactory to 
fragmentary. 
Experiments conducted in relation to Hypotheses H6 and H8 
give results that show respectively: 
the gap between intended meaning and received meaning 
to be wider than teachers realise, 
unfamiliar, non-technical terms block pupil understanding. 
Models used in analysis for Hypotheses H3, H9 and H10 reveal 
respectively; 
two-thirds of explanations given by teachers meet 
philosophical conditions for deeming them to be such, 
contextual features influence the success of an act of 
explanation, 
conceptual features influence the success of an act of 
explanation, 
and unfamiliar non-technical words as blocking 
pupil understanding. 
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1.0 	 INTRODUCTION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Educational theory is normally in advance of general 
professional practice but given a period of change of the 
order experienced over the past forty years and it is 
impossible not to come across in schools resources and 
practices of one kind and another that were not in evidence 
at the beginning of the period. The reverse is also true. 
There are things that occur but rarely now, if at all, that 
were once common practice. To assess the influence upon 
day-to-day teaching and learning at this time is a difficult 
task. In the first place, the period of change is an 
extensive one and though there are signs that the rate of 
production of new theories and methods is slowing down there 
is something of a backlog of schemes and innovatory ideas 
that it is only just catching up with many schools. At the 
same time, a substantial number of schools have tried out 
some of the innovations and are either continuing with them 
or, having found them wanting, have discarded them. 
One change that schools have in common, regardless of 
an individual school's response to change in general, is 
their willingness to admit as 'teaching' a much wider range 
of activities than was the case forty years ago. This is 
not to say that individuals necessarily make use of all or 
any of the newer activities in their own teaching. There is 
still great variation among teachers over what they accept 
and reject in relation to their own organisation, methods 
and performance. 
The focus of this thesis is explaining, but the context 
in which it is examined is that of teaching and learning. 
Therefore, it is necessary and potentially useful to consider 
the characteristic behaviours that go to make up the activity 
of teaching with the object of revealing the position of 
explaining within teaching. It is likely that not all the 
activities of teaching are seen by teachers to be of equal 
importance and that some consensus of opinion exists concerning 
which activities are perceived as central, irrespective 
of ideological persuasions. These matters will be 
discussed within the context of teaching behaviours with 
the object of establishing explaining as one of the central 
activities. It will also be necessary to examine the 
features that teaching and explaining have in common and to 
identify distinctions. This task is more difficult because 
of the range of activities that are covered by the term 
teaching and the fact that explaining and explanation are 
not straightforward concepts. 
Teachers are concerned both with the activity of 
explaining and with the communication of ready-made 
explanations. It is therefore necessary to define the verb 
'to explain' and make clear how it is used in teaching. It 
is also necessary to identify the different kinds of 
explanations that teachers will be expected to handle and 
justify the choice of explaining something to someone as 
being the most relevant for teaching and learning. Exam-
ination of the conditions necessary for deciding that 
explaining something to someone is taking place will be 
undertaken and because the activity is being considered in 
the context of teaching and learning it will involve the 
discussion of philosophical and pedagogical factors. 
There is all the difference between obtaining a set 
of conditions that account for explaining something to 
someone and achieving the objective of an explaining episode, 
which is understanding for the receiver of the explanation. 
The problem of understanding and the associated problem of 
the communication of meaning will demand discussion in the 
light of philosophical consideration and theories of 
language use and communication. Even so there may be other 
factors that are not covered by these theories which are 
influential in relation to accounting for the gap that can 
exist between a teacher's intended meaning and that which 
is received by the pupils. 
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An associated problem that needs to be included in a 
discussion of the 'gap' concerns differences among teachers 
in respect of their effectiveness in explaining something 
to their pupils. Certain research findings will be cited 
that reveal a variety of variables from categories that 
are broadly linguistic or strategic in character. These 
and the conditions identified from philosophical and 
communication theory will be used as a foundation for 
converting the questions that the thesis seeks to answer 
into hypotheses to be examined through a number of practical 
studies. The questions arise from the three major issues of 
the theoretical discussion, namely, the extent to which 
explaining (rather than telling) is a central activity of 
teaching; the nature of the gap between a teacher's intended 
meaning and the pupils' received meaning and, finally, the 
dentification of some of the features that cause confusion 
of meaning and others that appear to facilitate under-
standing. 
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1.0 THE ACTIVITIES OF TEACHING 
Teaching is essentially a practical activity and, in 
attempting to arrive at conclusions about what is involved 
in it, it is useful to observe the behaviour of teachers 
as they go about their normal every-day work. Among the 
information gained in this way will be many items that 
can be eliminated because they occur when the teacher is 
not engaged in teaching. Those items that do occur during 
teaching sessions will be unequal in respect of their 
generality and of variable importance from one session to 
another. 
1.1 The Concept of Teaching  
Green (1971:4) in an analysis of the activities of 
teaching suggests three major categories into which the acts 
of teaching may be placed, namely, logical acts, strategic 
acts and institutional acts. 	 He offers 
of each category as follows: 
an expanded version 
The Logical Acts The Strategic Acts The Institutional Acts 
1. Explaining 1. Motivating 1. Collecting money 
2. Concluding 2. Counselling 2.  Chaperoning 
3.  Inferring 3. Evaluating 3. Patrolling the hall 
4. Giving reasons 4. Planning 4. Attending meetings 
5. Amassing 
evidence 
5. Encouraging 5. Taking attendance 
6. Demonstrating 6. Disciplining 6. Consulting parents 
7. Defining 7. Questioning 7. Keeping reports 
8. Comparing 
For the purpose of this work it is not necessary to take 
account of institutional acts and, indeed, Green himself 
(ibid:5) states that 'there is no inconsistency in the idea 
that teaching may go on even when the institutional acts of 
teaching are not going on.' As a major concern of the thesis 
is with explanation, the activity of 'explaining', which 
Green places at the head of his logical acts, will be discussed 
in relation to other items included in this category and also 
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with reference to 'questioning' which appears under the 
head of strategic acts. Presumably, Green's choice of the 
strategic category for questioning is informed by the use 
teachers make of the activity as a strategy for eliciting 
a range of distinctive responses from pupils, which include 
the giving of reasons or explanations. However, questioning 
is more closely involved with explaining than is suggested 
by its categorisation as a strategic act. The relationship 
has to do with the notion that contained within the concept 
of explaining (and, indeed, explanation) is the implication 
that there exists some underlying question that has set the 
activity in motion and to which the explainer addresses 
himself. Furthermore, the question need not be formulated 
explicitly before, during or after the explaining episode. 
This view, which is popular with philosophers concerned with 
explaining and explanations, will be given fuller discussion 
in the next chapter. 
Although Green (ibid:6) does not see the institutional 
acts of teaching as essential for believing that teaching is 
going on he takes up a different position in respect of the 
logical and strategic acts. The absence of either would, he 
believes, 'count heavily against the view that teaching was 
going on' while, in the absence of both, it would seem 
'impossible to maintain that we have considered a case of 
teaching.' He suggests that differences do exist between the 
logical acts and the strategic acts of teaching which are 
largely to do with their evaluation. He maintains that the 
'performance of the logical acts of teaching is appraised on 
logical grounds' and that in the case of strategic acts of 
teaching, it is appraised by its consequences for learning. 
Thus, a logical act of teaching, such as giving reasons, 
can be evaluated independently of its result for the learning. 
It can be deemed well done even though no one learns, because 
the criteria for appraisal are to do with the subject to 
be taught, the ways of knowing and the laws of thought. 
Strategic acts of teaching on the other hand are concerned 
with succeeding in getting someone to learn and thus demand 
of the teacher an understanding of human development, 
motivation and learning theory. In practice, the 
distinctions between logical and strategic acts of teach-
ing are not apparent. This is because logical acts rarely 
appear other than in the context of some teaching strategy. 
There is support for Green's view that teaching need 
not necessarily entail learning in the writings of 
B. Othanel Smith (1969:108) who contends that 'just as one 
can learn without being taught, one can be taught without 
learning.' Smith (ibid:109) takes the view that teaching 
is everywhere fundamentally the same and that a theory of 
teaching will consist in: 
(a) a statement of the variables comprizing 
teaching behavior, 
(b) a formulation of the possible relations 
among those variables, and 
(c) hypotheses about the relations between the 
variables comprizing teaching behavior and 
the variables descriptive of the psychological 
and social conditions within which teaching 
behavior occurs. 
He is at pains to point out that when using the term teaching 
he is not thinking of it as an activity that can be carried 
on without talking nor as one that can be described through 
reference to books on methods. He views teaching as 'a 
system of action involving an agent, a situation and an end-
in-view.' Within the 'situation' he identifies two sets of 
factors - one set cannot be controlled by the agent (for 
example, size of classroom, age of pupils, etc.) while the 
other set can be modified by the agent with respect to the 
end-in-view. (For example, asking questions, giving home-
work, etc.) 
The sets of factors under the control of the agent are 
the means whereby the end in view is reached. Smith (ibid: 
109-10) claims that the means consist in two types of factors. 
Type (a) which he identifies as subject matter and instruct-
ional paraphernalia, he calls material means and type (b) 
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which are ways of manoeuvering type (a) factors, he calls 
procedural means. 
This division may appear to be similar to Green's 
logical and strategic categories and, indeed, Green's 
strategic acts and Smith's procedural means are concerned 
with activities that are of the same kind. However, logical 
acts and material means do not match up readily. Most items 
classified under logical acts would qualify as procedural 
means. Smith does not engage in a full discussion of what he 
means by material means, his investigations being solely con-
cerned with procedural means. 
In his discussion of procedural means Smith (ibid:110), 
like Green, makes use of the term 'strategy'. For him, it 
is a large-scale manoeuvre, which he distinguishes from the 
smaller tactical elements of strategies that he calls 
'episodes'. He expands the meaning of the term strategy with 
a statement about it referring to a 'pattern of acts that 
serves to attain certain outcomes and to guard against certain 
others' and identifies a number of general objectives towards 
which a strategy may be directed. Among these are: 
to ensure that certain learnings will be acquired 
in as brief a time as possible; to induce students 
to engage in exchange of ideas; and to minimize the 
number of wrong responses as the student attempts 
to learn a concept, principle, etc. 
Smith further agrees that strategies are often used by 
teachers to ensure the attainment of certain content object-
ives and are not confined to ways of thinking or open-ended 
discussion. Episodes are described as 'pedagogically sig-
nificant units of classroom discourse' consisting of two or 
more utterances, where an utterance is what an individual 
says at a given time. The simplest form may be A asks a 
question of B, B responds with the answer and A acknowledges 
the response. In short, episodes are verbal exchanges 
involving at least two persons and this distinguishes them 
clearly from monologues which are solo acts. The example 
of an episode, given above, involves two persons (A and B) 
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who are alternately responding to one another; this kind 
of episode Smith (ibid:ll1-12) refers to as a reciprocat-
ing episode. Where the episode involves more than two 
people, response is to the entry rather than to one another 
so that the responses are co-ordinated, which gives the 
unit the name of co-ordinating episode. He suggests that 
from a psychological standpoint an episode represents 'a 
gap to be filled with information.' A subject is offered, 
or a piece of information given at the opening of the 
episode - or entry - in which some specific outcome is more 
or less implicit. The behaviour that is stimulated by the 
entry fills the gap between the entry and the closing of 
the episode. 
Smith (ibid:113) contends that it is possible for episodes 
to be viewed as logical operations because of their similar-
ity to ideal logical operations whose performance is rule-
guided. From his studies of teaching behaviour he identifies 
twelve logical operations as follows: 
defining, describing, designating, stating, 
reporting, comparing and contrasting, 
substituting, classifying, opining, valuing, 
conditional inferring and explaining. 
A comparison of these operations with Green's logical acts 
(see p.12) finds half of Green's items (explaining, inferring, 
defining, comparing) present in Smith's list. Furthermore, 
seven items cited by Smith but absent from Green's analysis 
(describing, designating, stating, reporting, substituting, 
classifying, opining) and three items in Green's logical acts 
not identified by Smith (concluding, giving reasons, amassing 
evidence), appear to be activities of the same order. 
Two discrepancies are present that are worthy of further 
examination. In the first case, demonstrating is not identi-
fied by Smith as a logical operation. This may be because 
on many occasions the activity will involve non-verbal 
behaviour when, for Smith, all episodes are defined as verbal. 
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However, there are numerous instances in teaching when 
demonstrating is verbal and rule-governed, and thus would 
qualify as a logical operation and its non-appearance in 
Smith's list may be nothing more than an omission of the 
kind that commonly occurs when attempts are made to identify 
and categorise all the behaviours that qualify for inclusion 
in a complex activity such as is the activity of teaching. 
The same point can be made in respect of Green's logical 
and strategic acts and, indeed, he makes no claim that either 
list is exhaustive. 
The other discrepancy is found in the categorisation of 
valuing and evaluating. If we take them to be different terms 
for the same activity, Smith categorises the activity as a 
logical operation and Green as a strategic act. Examination 
of the use of evaluation suggests that categorisation under 
both heads is justifiable. The reason for this is that the 
function of evaluation varies, as does the subject to be 
evaluated. 
A teacher evaluating an argument in support of a content-
ion, the force of a theory, or conflicting interpretations of 
a problem arising in a specific subject area is engaging in 
rule-bound activity, or in Green's terms, a logical act, 
requiring a knowledge of the methods of knowing, the perform-
ance of which will be appraised on logical grounds. On the 
other hand, if the teacher is using evaluation to place pupils 
(placement evaluation)(1) 
 obtain feedback for himself and the 
pupils (formative evaluation)(2) identify gross learning 
problems (diagnostic evaluation)(3)  or to attest a pupil at 
the end of a course (summative evaluation)(4) 
 he is engaging 
in a strategic act that will be appraised by its consequences 
for learning. 
(1-4) The terms are those used by Airasian P.W, and 
Madaus G.F. in their paper 'Functional Types of 
Student Evaluation' in Mehrens W.A. (ed) (1976) 
Readings in Measurement and Evaluation in Education 
and Psychology. 
Holt, Rinehart & Winston. New York. 
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Before passing from attempts to analyse the activity 
of teaching to closer examination of certain operations 
within this activity one further example of a classificat-
ion is worthy of note. Komisar (1969:73) from a standpoint 
that distinguishes teaching from non-instructive activities 
by viewing it as 'an end-chasing performance, takes learn-
ing as the end being chased.' He (ibid:76) distinguishes 
between intellectual acts and teaching acts, as follows: 
Intellectual Acts 	 Teaching Acts  
introducing 
demonstrating 
citing 
reporting 
hypothesising 
conjecturing 
confirming 
contrasting 
explaining 
proving 
characterising 
justifying 
explicating 
defining 
rating 
appraising 
amplifying 
vindicating 
interpreting 
indicating 
instancing 
questioning 
elaborating 
designating 
comparing 
For the performance of an intellectual act to count as 
teaching, the teacher is committed to putting and keeping 
the learner in 'a perceiving - and - learning - able state 
r 
and rendering the subject matter teaching - comprehend. 
Although this model offers many items that appear in 
the two already examined (see p.12 and p.16) and the simila-
rity between Komisar's intellectual acts and the logical acts 
and operations of Green and Smith is marked, the comparison 
needs to be made in the light of an important distinction that 
lies in Komisar's contention that intellectual acts do not 
automatically count as teaching acts simply because they are 
addressed to the learners. The qualifications he makes with 
regard to the state of the learners and the treatment of the 
subject matter come close to offering support for the notion 
that teachers cannot be said to be engaged in teaching unless 
learning is going on as a result of the activity. If it does 
not do quite this there is no dodging the implication that 
teachers are to be held accountable for their performance 
as well as for the subject matter they choose to teach. 
19 
The attempts of Green, Smith and Komisar to arrive at 
an adequate description of the activity of teaching are of 
use primarily because they draw attention to the number and 
variety of acts that pass as teaching, through their 'lists'. 
They further attempt to impose some order upon the items 
included by categorising them on the basis of defining 
attributes that have to do with the nature of the act. This 
is also helpful, as far as it goes, but it leaves unsolved 
the problem of interpreting the exact nature of an act. The 
finer the categories become, the more difficult interpretation 
becomes, until in cases where there is a high degree of 
similarity, for example, 'explaining' and giving reasons, it 
becomes a matter for personal judgement. It is also true 
that the lists offer no information about the status of any 
one act compared with another in the same category. 
The discussion of the concept of teaching attempted here 
is, of necessity, nothing more than a brief introduction to 
the factors involved but already it can be seen that teaching 
is best understood as a 'family' of activities certain of 
which are central and highly significant, while others are 
peripheral and of less importance. 
1.2 The Status of Explaining as an Activity of Teaching 
It has been suggested although teaching is best under-
stood as a family of activities, some activities occupy a 
more central and important position than others. The com-
parison of the categories of Green, Smith and Komisar 
reveals certain activities that are common to each analysis 
within the category of logical acts. An activity of which 
this is true is that of explaining, a revelation that 
probably would come as no surprise to members of the general 
public who regularly offer evidence of their belief that 
school learning involves explanation and that they expect 
teachers to be involved in explaining as and when the need 
arises. 
Teachers also appear to recognise the central position 
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of explaining in teaching and learning. The evidence 
obtained by the present writer from an exercise in which 
some sixty teachers were asked to rank a combination of 
Green's logical acts and Smith's intellectual acts(1) in 
order of importance as activities of teaching found that 
over three-quarters of the sample placed 'explaining' first 
in the order and no teacher placed it lower than third 
position. Pressed to give reasons for their selection, most 
perceived explaining as giving answers to questions, clearing 
up perplexities, resolving uncertainties of the sort that 
pupils would be unlikely to settle for themselves. As one 
put it, 'explaining removes the blocks to understanding.' 
While we could argue that certain of the other activites 
included in the list have a similar function it is true that 
the relationship with understanding is very clearly marked 
in the case of explaining. 
1.3 The Relationship of Learning with Teaching and Explaining 
Teaching as a concept has a special status in education 
although it can equally well apply in more informal contexts, 
involving parents and children, friend and friend, specialist 
and group sharing a leisure interest. 
It is also possible to identify the prime objective of 
all teaching as a quest for understanding which provides the 
strongest link with the concept of learning. Indeed, some 
writers discuss teaching and learning as though they are 
inseparable elements of the same concept. There are weak-
nesses in this position for, as has been mentioned earlier, 
teaching can occur without promoting learning and learning 
can occur in the absence of teaching. Attempts to define 
teaching come up against its characteristic conceptual vague-
ness - a problem that does not occur in defining learning. 
(1) The combination used is as follows: defining, describing, 
designating, concluding, classifying, comparing and 
contrasting, explaining, demonstrating, inferring, 
opining, reporting, stating, amassing evidence, valuing. 
However, once the behaviours that qualify as teaching are 
agreed its overt nature ensures that there are no difficult-
ies associated with deciding when it is taking place. This 
is not so in the case of learning where it is necessary to 
identify a change in behaviour as evidence for deciding that 
learning has occurred. 
Their conceptual independence is suggested further by 
what Green (1969:12) refers to as an inability to discover 
in the concept of learning 'any principles sufficient to 
distinguish those kinds of learning aimed at in teaching from 
those which are not.' It seems reasonable to interpret the 
notion of 'learning that is not aimed at teaching' as 
including: (a) learning desirable and otherwise that may be 
acquired within the school or elsewhere but which is not 
perceived of as a goal towards which teaching is directed, 
and (b) undesired learning outcomes in which the learning 
interpretation of a teaching episode has been confused, 
idiosyncratic or erroneous. 
Both desired and undesired learning outcomes may owe 
their genesis to an explaining episode. These episodes, 
which are much in evidence within subject teaching throughout 
the child's education, have as their goal, understanding, 
which in turn is normally a necessary outcome in the process 
of learning. In the case of desired outcomes it can be 
argued that as learners become involved in tasks that are 
more demanding in respect of their complexity, conceptual 
level and the range of cognitive activity called for, the 
more crucial to effective understanding is the act of explain-
ing. Pupils appear to be well aware of this for among studies 
of their perceptions of the 'good' teacher are those who find 
'the ability to explain things well' as the most frequently 
identified characteristic, many ranking it higher than 
affective qualities such as fairness, warmth and friendliness. 
Teachers show awareness of their pupils'  expectations 
for without exception the sample used to assess the status 
of explaining within the activities of teaching, interpreted 
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explaining as a 'task' verb.(I) 
 Many view the task as 
among the most challenging for the teacher and admitted 
that by implication there is no guarantee that understanding 
and, thus, learning will follow an act of explaining. This 
position is helpful when looking for reasons for the appear-
ance of undesired learning outcomes from an explaining 
episode and, when appraised on logical grounds, meets the 
criteria satisfactorily. To use the distinction drawn by 
Green (1971:6) the performance as a logical act of teaching 
can be deemed well done but it has failed as a strategic act 
of teaching because strategic acts are concerned with getting 
someone to learn. In real life the situation is rarely as 
simple as this. More often a teacher will perform satisfact-
orily in a logical sense while explaining something to a 
class but the understanding and subsequent learning that 
arises out of the episode shows considerable variation from 
one pupil to another. Some of the possible variations (and 
the list is not intended to be exhaustive) are as follows: 
acquires a sound understanding of the kind intended 
by the teacher; 
will acquire a sound understanding with the addition 
of a small amount of information to clarify certain 
points; 
acquires understanding of part of the explanation but 
has a distorted perception of the remainder of which 
he is unaware; 
interprets the entire explaining episode inadequately 
and attempts to proceed on the basis of a false premiss; 
makes no contact with the reasoning contained in the 
explaining episode, thus inhibiting the codifying and 
storage of information coming in to a degree that may 
result in total loss of the message. 
With this small but distinctive range of outcomes in 
mind it is anything but a simple task to evaluate the per-
formance of a teacher engaged in explaining something as a 
strategic act of teaching. Indeed, it appears unlikely that 
(1) 'Task' refers to Gilbert Ryle's distinction between 
task and achievement verbs, which will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
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anyone would wish to defend a position where a necessary 
condition for judging a performance successful is that 
all pupils receiving the explanation understand it. 
In the main teachers do show some awareness of the 
discrepancy between the result desired from an explaining 
episode and what occurs in reality. It is important to bear 
this in mind when attempting to interpret the kind of expect-
ations teachers have of the responses they will receive from 
pupils in answer to what could be described as 'checking up' 
questions posed immediately after an explaining episode. 
For example: 
Has everyone understood that? 
Are you all with me? 
Before I go on, is anyone not clear? 
Any questions before you start work on the examples? 
Most of these questions, which are common enough in both 
primary and secondary classrooms, tend to give the impression 
that the teacher expects that all but one or two pupils will 
have grasped the explanation and that the exceptions will 
need only a little additional information to reach a state 
of understanding. In the case of some teachers the impres-
sion is an accurate one and they will confidently assure one 
that 'the third year, top set, know all about the process of 
osmosis' because they'explained it in detail the previous week.' 
Most teachers show greater awareness of the problems associat-
ed with getting an explanation understood than this. They may 
expect their pupils to perceive that the questions are giving 
them opportunities for seeking clarification of confusions, 
reiteration of crucial points or simply additional information 
in order that sense may be made of the message. In other 
words, the teacher is prepared to elaborate further, change 
forms of expression, offer more exemplars, etc. in response 
to cues from pupils regarding the gaps in or blocks to under-
standing that still exist. 
Being prepared to respond in the manner suggested above, 
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important though it is in teaching and learning, will not 
necessarily prevent a teacher from making assumptions about 
the success of explaining episodes that do not match the 
facts. A familiar response to questions asked after an 
explaining episode is not a battery of demands for further 
explanation but a steady silence that remains unbroken even 
when the questions are repeated. When this happens there will 
be occasions where teachers are tempted to interpret the 
silence as positive feedback. On rare occasions they will be 
right but, more often, the assumption is false. A mistake of 
this kind will be corrected later, if conscientious teachers 
check pupils' work based on the explanation, against clearly 
defined criteria for deciding how well the explanation has 
been understood. However, the difficulty of this task when 
some thirty pupils are involved, is very considerable and 
certain practices (getting pupils to mark their own or each 
other's work) prevent it taking place at all. 
It is, of course, possible for teachers to ask for pupil 
responses in a manner that promises psychological rewards for 
asking questions in order to gain understanding, and still be 
met with silence. In this case, teachers are more justified 
than in the previous example in interpreting the silence as 
meaning that every pupil has understood the message, but it 
is doubtful that this state of affairs occurs as often as 
do the silences. 
What then prevents pupils from responding? Setting 
aside those teachers who ridicule pupils when they fail to 
pick up immediately the explanation being proffered, we still 
cannot say with any certainty that teachers who are approach-
able and willing to discuss difficulties will be successful 
in getting pupils to admit to some lack of understanding. To 
do so is to ignore the degree to which pupil responses are 
inhibited by their perception of how their peers will react 
to their public admittance of a learning deficiency. While 
their perceptions can be inaccurate for reasons associated 
with each individual pupil's self concept, they can sometimes 
be based upon information communicated by other pupils who 
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have not, themselves, failed to understand. Examples 
include overt expressions of impatience to get on with the 
next stage, contempt for what is deemed the stupidity of 
the pupils having difficulty understanding the explanation 
and expressions of superiority that reflect a state of mind 
that is likely to be in direct contrast with that of those 
pupils still confused. It is also true that the pupils who 
are confident that their peers perceive them as able in 
the subject show a greater willingness to admit to a degree 
of ignorance than those who are known, and know themselves 
to be struggling. 
Several of the last points are worthy of fuller 
examination and this will be undertaken when problems of 
understanding are discussed in Chapter 4. At this stage 
they are mentioned in order to draw attention to the way in 
which 'learner' factors become crucial to the success of an 
explaining episode when explaining is evaluated as a strategic 
act (to use Green's terms) or procedural means (to use Smith's 
terms). What is necessary before proceeding further is some 
exploration of the concept of explanation with a view to 
arriving at an interpretation of its nature that is helpful 
to a consideration of its function in teaching and learning. 
2.0 EXPLANATION AND EXPLAINING IN TEACHING 
Explanation is a concept about which there are various 
theories. A selection offered by Taylor (1970:1) is sum- 
marised as follows: 
To tell us the purpose of things; to describe; to go 
beyond description and give in terms of laws an 
explanation of the behaviour of matter; to have as 
its aim understanding; the ability to predict and 
control events. 
Within each of these propositions can be recognised both common 
and unique elements but, in the main, the concern is either 
with finding or discovering knowledge, or, with imparting 
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or communicating knowledge. The distinction draws attention 
both to 'explaining' which is active and a matter of pedagogy 
and to 'explanations' which are neither action nor process, 
but products of investigatory activity to be gained, found, 
given, listened to, ignored, etc. 
2.1 Explaining Something as an Achievement and a Task 
The distinction that has been suggested above has much 
in common with that recognised by Ryle (1949) in respect of 
the verb 'to explain'. Ryle proposes that there are contexts 
in which it is an 'achievement' verb and other contexts in 
which it is a task verb. A context likely to call forth the 
former interpretation is that with which the researcher is 
familiar. In seeking to provide an explanation of a 
phenomenon for which no satisfactory explanation is known 
he is concerned with the discovery of new knowledge and the 
testing of hypotheses. His problem is one of deciding the 
appropriate kind of enquiry that will produce the information 
he needs to provide an explanation. When he succeeds in this 
it can be said that he has 'explained' something in the 
achievement sense of the verb. 
One who explains in the task sense is not trying to find 
something out. He is concerned with imparting knowledge 
rather than seeking it. His problem is not one of deciding 
a method of enquiry, but of communication, of getting someone 
to understand a message. Martin (1970: 16) using Ryle's 
achievement/task interpretations reminds us that, ultimately, 
both are connected with knowledge and that both have as their 
goal, understanding. She goes on to say, however, that one 
who explains something (in the achievement sense) is a 
producer of explanations which constitute the raw material 
used in explaining something (in the task sense) to someone. 
Martin (ibid: 17) also points out that, 
.... the problems associated with how to get someone 
to understand something, which take one into the 
areas of psychology and pedagogy are not problems 
with which one who is seeking explanations of things 
must necessarily deal. 
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Clearly, studies in child development, learning theory, etc. 
which can inform the giver of explanations are not of use to 
the producer of explanations, unless they happen to be his 
area of research. Nor do we expect the giver of explanat-
ions to add to the body of public knowledge. His pre-
occupation is with enabling a person to understand something. 
The practical activity he engages in is not to do with con-
trolled research but with finding effective ways of present-
ing explanations without loss of accuracy and with motivating 
people to come to grips with the notions they contain. 
While teachers can be said to handle explanations in the 
achievement sense of 'explain', that part of teaching activity 
that would be categorised as explaining is clearly of the 
task kind, i.e. they are concerned with explaining something 
to someone. Although the essential differences between 
explanations that are for someone and those that are not may 
seem to be of small importance, if clarity is to be attained, 
and in a tutor-tutee relationship this is essential, the 
differences are of prime importance. 
2.2 Explaining as Teaching and as Distinct from Teaching 
In thinking of explaining something to someone as a 
tutor-tutee activity it is necessary to bear in mind that 
tutoring (or teaching), though it may involve explaining, 
is different from it. Reason and rationality are given a 
central role in explaining: that the same can be claimed of 
teaching is a view that has considerable support, including 
that of Scheffler (1960:57) who maintains: 
To teach in the standard sense, is at some points 
at least to submit oneself to the understanding 
and independent judgement of the pupil, to his 
demand for reasons, to his sense of what constitutes 
an adequate explanation. To teach someone that such 
and such is the case is not merely to try to get 
him to believe it: deception, for example, is not 
a method or mode of teaching. Teaching involves furt- 
her that if we try to get the student to believe that 
such and such is the case, we try also to get him to be-
lieve it for reasons that are within the limits of his 
capacity to grasp and are our reasons. Teaching, 
in this way, requires us to reveal our reasons 
to the student and, by so doing, to submit them 
to his evaluation and criticism. 
This view is typical of what is commonly referred to 
as rationality theory. The theory postulates that ration-
ality and reason enter into teaching in at least two distinct 
ways; the one relating to the manner in which teaching 
proceeds; the other to the learning at which teaching aims. 
As in the case of explaining, not every way of getting some-
one to behave according to some norm would qualify as teach-
ing. Hempel (1965:465) suggests 'a general constraining 
principle on manner governing teaching', namely, whatever 
method you use the pupil's reasoning must be acknowledged or 
you will not be teaching. A criticism of this notion is that 
a method could take account of the pupil's reasoning and not 
be rational or that it could acknowledge pupil reasoning but 
be ineffective in achieving goals. 
Another interpretation of the theory is that dialogue 
or conversation must take place in the course of teaching. 
While this is the case in explaining, it again poses problems 
for teaching. It is possible to teach without language and 
to speak not as dialogue or conversation, for example, 
lecturing. Indeed, asking and answering questions is not 
necessarily dialogue. Martin (1970:96-9) also rejects the 
proposal that dialogue or conversation must take place at 
some points in the lesson on the grounds that if teaching 
containing no dialogue or conversation has been effective in 
promoting learning it seems irrational to label it wrong. 
She suggests that a dispositional interpretating of the rat-
ional constraint on manner is more useful (i.e. the pupil's) 
reason must be acknowledged if the appropriate situation were 
to arise) because it allows more things to qualify as teach-
ing than the categorical. However, this is not necessary in 
the case of explaining. 
The rational constraint on learning suggested by ration-
ality theory which is seen as independent of the rational 
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constraint on manner does not constitute a recommendation 
of what students ought to learn, but a criteria against 
which specific aims and objectives are tested. The theory 
proposed that whatever you want your pupil to learn you 
must intend him to achieve a level of learning or mastery 
such that his reason is acknowledged; or you will not be 
teaching. Furthermore, teaching must aim not simply at the 
acquisition of belief but that, plus proper backing for them. 
This would seem a wholly reasonable constraint were it not 
the case thatEr22er backing is not to be the authority of 
the teacher or the textbook. In other words, pupils should 
not be asked to believe things merely because teachers and 
textbooks say so. 
In the usual sense of 'teach' this constraint is un-
helpful and does not take account of the possibilities that 
a teacher could set his sights this high and not be teaching, 
or, in the activity sense of teaching, one whose role is 
that of a teacher could be prevented from engaging in teaching. 
While there is likely to be considerable support for 
attempts by proponents of rational theory to distinguish 
teaching from indoctrination and brain washing, many involved 
with education and teaching would draw the line at taking up 
a position that would rule out methods involving lectures, 
assignments concerned with reciting, television teaching and 
machine approaches. In the case of the rational constraints 
upon learning, much of the activity engaged in by teachers 
would not qualify as teaching and, thus, to be at all accept-
able this part of the theory would have to be interpreted as 
applying to teaching as a whole. Indeed, as Martin (ibid:101) 
points out the narrow interpretation suggested builds into 
the definition of 'teach' - 
a decision which ought to be backed up by arguments 
showing that the sort of learning in question really 
is desirable. 
She suggests that the assumption implicit in this analysis 
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of teaching is that shared by people who advocate learning 
with understanding as opposed to what they claim is rote 
learning. While there may be a case to be argued during 
curriculum planning, etc. she does not accept that it 
qualifies as a conceptual point about teaching. Indeed, she 
contends that: 
An analysis of teaching should be open enough to 
include as teaching those cases in which for good 
reasons something less than learning with under-
standing is aimed at. 
(ibid:102) 
In the light of the range of criticisms that she offers, Martin 
(ibid:104) contends that her loosening up of the definition of 
teaching offered by writers presenting the rational theory of 
teaching is justified and that if, indeed, teaching involves 
acknowledging pupil rationality, the sense in which it must be 
acknowledged 'is a good deal weaker than their writings at 
times lead one to believe.' 
All the points that have been raised in the brief exam-
ination of the rational theory of teaching are applicable to 
explaining something to someone. When the theory is applied 
to explaining, the rational constraint upon manner governs 
explaining strictly. The explainer is expected to proceed on 
the assumption that the explainee is rational regardless of 
the explainee's actual state or the explainer's view of that 
state. In requiring the explainer to shift the question in 
an explaining episode over to the explainee it, in effect, 
requires that he acknowledges the explainee's reason. A 
further constraint is that a tutor in an explaining episode 
must try to answer an underlying question and at least one 
other question which, in his view, is helpful in ministering 
to the basis of the state the tutee is in. 
The question and answer approach although it raises pro-
blems in teaching, and to work, must include in answering, 
pointing and demonstrating, etc. affords no such problems 
when applied to explaining. Nor is it necessary to apply the 
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dispositional interpretation that Martin considers necessary 
in teaching (i.e. subsidiary question and answer only re-
quired in teaching episode if appropriate occasion occurs) 
to explaining. Explaining something to someone does involve 
both a particular division and a kind of discourse. In this 
respect it diverges markedly from teaching. 
In the case of rational constraint on learning it is 
generally true that someone who is explaining something to 
another is trying to get that person to understand something 
and therefore more than the acquisition of beliefs is involved. 
The continuous series model (which will be discussed in the 
next chapter) requires backing of a belief to be of a partic-
ular nature, namely, from the relevant subject matter. Thus, 
although we may conceive of explaining as question shifting 
(between tutor and tutee) the aim for the underlying question 
is understanding. However, the aim for subsidiary questions 
may be more modest and give greater opportunities for ack-
nowledging the reason of the tutee. The prime reason for 
revealing how it is possible for explaining to be a central 
activity of teaching and yet distinct from it, has to do with 
perceiving explaining as a phenomenon that is governed by 
specific conditions, a number of which apply to teaching in 
a weaker sense and a number of which do not apply to teaching 
at all. Thus, although explaining is being considered in the 
context of teaching and, indeed, learning, it will be treated 
as an independent concept during the discussion that follows 
which attempts to illuminate the crucial general features of 
explaining something to someone. 
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1.0 KINDS OF EXPLANATION 
In the previous chapter, in considering explanation 
and explaining within the activity of teaching, it was 
suggested that teachers can be described as 'handlers' of 
explanations but that their major concern is with explaining 
something to someone. In order to understand the former 
activity better it is necessary to examine the kinds of 
explanations which may be their concern. 
1.1 A System of Classification Applied to Explanations  
Taylor (1970:2-3) distinguishes three major kinds of 
explanation, namely: what-explanations, reason-giving or 
why-explanations, and scientific. 
He sees what-explanations as making clear what some-
thing or some sequence of events is. They can either relate 
events and objects to scientific theories, or be connected 
with decisions about actions. 
Reason-giving explanations explain why something had 
to happen and may attempt to influence the assessments or 
evaluations others make of our beliefs and actions. 
Scientific explanation involves hyothesising a law of 
nature. Such an explanation will only be correct if the 
hypothesis is true and since hypothesis or law may, on 
further investigation, turn out to be false, this type is 
always open to correction. These three are in common use 
by writers in the field, with some admitting how-explanations 
as another category. There are also those who consider that 
correct answers to why-questions are the only explanations, 
although when this position is taken an attempt is made to 
define what is meant by a why-question. 
How-questions have no difficulty in calling forth a 
response. The problem is that the responses to these 
questions that qualify as explaining rather than telling or 
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describing are more readily categorised as what- or why-
explanations. An example of this is, 'How do I set up my 
apparatus?' It could be argued that in responding to this 
question the teacher is doing no more than telling or showing  
the pupil a pattern of joins that will fit the apparatus 
together. On the other hand, it can be argued that telling 
and showing are functioning as explaining in the example. 
If this is the case it cannot be denied that the purpose of 
the explanation is to tell the pupil what he must do. 
Furthermore, should the teacher explain the reason for join-
ing a to b and not to c he will be utilising a why-explanation. 
It is not difficult to identify one of the central 
confusions here. Most how-questions are asking, by what 
 
means something comes or came about, and thus could be seen 
as a particular kind of what-question. As a philosophical 
point the matter is unlikely to be of concern to teachers 
but as how-questions occur very frequently during lessons 
it could be of pedagogical interest. To know more about the 
way in which teachers interpret such questions would shed 
light upon their conceptions of the appropriate response. 
Is it generally accepted that a description is called for 
rather than a what-explanation? How general is the feeling 
that implicit why-questions should be identified and 
answered with why-explanations? These are matters that will 
be considered again later in the study. 
What-explanations may simply say what something is, or 
be related to scientific explanation, often as a preliminary 
to it. Taylor (1970:35-6) suggests the following types: 
(1) There are what-explanations which are attempts 
to satisfy a theoretical or scientific interest. 
These explanations are redescriptions in terms 
which link the thing or event to scientific laws 
from which the event or the behaviour of the thing 
could be deduced, and future events or behaviour 
predicted. Such explanations may or may not have 
consequences for the actions of hearers. 
(2) There are what-explanations which are not attempts 
to satisfy a theoretical interest but do supply 
information which satisfies our curiosity and 
which may affect practical decisions 
in ordinary life. 
He warns that it is easy to make the mistake of thinking 
that a what-question has a scientific interest when it has 
not. For example, an explanation that predicts on the basis 
of past experience, or one that is based on generalisations 
may be regarded as acceptable but they are not scientific. 
An analysis of the questions asked by teachers during 
lessons, typically, would identify what-questions as the 
main stock in trade of many subjects and very popular with 
the rest. Both Barnes (1969) and Richards (1978) showed 
that they dominated questioning sessions although not all 
were concerned with what-explanations. Further examination 
of this phenomenon will be undertaken later in the study. 
Why-questions always call for explanations involving 
the giving of reasons but there are a number of different 
kinds of why-questions each calling for a specific response. 
Green (1971:147) suggests: 
There is the "why" that asks for a causal 
"because" and the "why" that asks for a 
motive. There is the "why" that searches 
for a purposive "because" and the "why" 
that calls for an historical narrative. 
There is the "why" that is asking for a 
priori proof and the "why" that is looking 
for a moral reason. 
He thinks that,though there exists no generally accepted way 
of classifying these different kinds of questions and their 
respective explanations, some attempt to offer an orderly 
classification should be of use to teachers and to a 
philosophy of pedagogy. 
Green sees why-explanations in general, as providing 
a reason for something, so that we can see why it happens 
or is done. He (ibid: 148) stresses the point that, in 
this sense, a good explanation is a good reason even when 
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it is not a true reason. He justifies this further by 
contending that the connection between a thing to be 
explained and explanation 'is not that the explanation is 
true but that it explains.' This view is similar to that 
of Taylor (1970: 51) who having placed scientific questions 
in a separate category from other why-explanations, sees 
the latter as giving reasons to explain both why we did, 
are doing, or will do something, or to advise others how 
to act, or decide our own course of action. He points out 
that: 
Whether when a man gives something as his 
reason, he is properly said to have this reason 
is a matter of what beliefs and views he holds. 
This is a question of fact about himself. No 
matter how bizarre the beliefs or views he 
expresses in giving his reasons if he has them 
(or thinks he does) he would be correctly 
described as having these reasons. 
(Ibid: 55) 
It follows from the above position that though a man 
may not be able to accept the evaluative views behind an 
explanation offered by another he can still concede that 
the other has a reason though he need not accept it as being 
the reason he would put forward. It is not difficult to see 
why Taylor does not include scientific explanations in the 
same category as the why-questions described above and 
why one(1)  view of the relationship between scientific exp-
lanations in terms of reasons, is that they are incompatible 
The reasons for this view will be examined in the discussion 
of scientific explanations but, before moving to this 
category, it is useful to consider the analysis of why-
explanations attempted by Green (1970: 148) in which 
(1) Collingwood R.G. (1961) 
and Winch P. 	 (1958) 
The Idea of History O.U.P. 
The Idea of Social 	 R. & K.P. Science 
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scientific explanations are accounted for under specific 
heads that indicate the kind of procedures that have been 
carried out in arriving at them. 
1.2 A Typology of Why-Question Explanations  
1.2.1 Deductive Explanations form the first group identified 
by Green. These are explanations in which that which is to 
be explained is logically deduced from statements that explain 
the phenomenon in question, a necessary requirement being 
that the explanandum (what is to be explained) is shown to be 
a logical consequence of the explanans (the explanation). 
The deductive argument is a form of proof or demonstration. 
The purpose of the proof goes further than to show that it 
is a necessary claim. Green (ibid: 149) says: 
In this case the request to give a reason why 
will elicit a demonstration that the explanandum 
is true, and true a priori. 
He identifies distinctions within the category of deductive 
explanations that have to do with necessary claims and con-
tingent claims. In the case of the former the mode of ex-
planation coincides with the method of proof, i.e. to have 
explained the proposition is to have established the truth. 
This is not so for contingent claims, the truth of which can 
be established without necessarily explaining them. Nor is 
it necessary to establish that the deductive mode of explana-
tion in question is a necessary claim. In short, for both 
types, the explanandum is a necessary consequence of the exp-
lanans, but only in necessary claims is the explanandum it-
self a necessary statement. According to Green this position 
corresponds to distinctions that exist between the empirical 
and formal sciences. He cites Nagel(1) as follows: 
Few, if any, experimental scientists today believe 
that their explananda can be shown to be inherently 
necessary. Indeed, it is just because the propo-
sitions (whether singular or general) investigated 
(1) Nagel E. (1961) The Structure of Science Harcourt, 
p. 21 	 Brace & 
World, 
New York. 
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by the empirical sciences can be denied without 
logical absurdity that observational evidence 
is required to support them. Accordingly, the 
justification of claims as to the necessity of 
propositions, as well as the explanation of why 
propositions are necessary, are the business of 
formal disciplines like logic and mathematics 
and not of empirical inquiry. 
This statement of Nagel serves as a reminder that there are 
other conditions to be satisfied where the deductive pattern 
of explanation is used in scientific studies. These will 
be elaborated when scientific explanations are under con-
sideration. 
1.2.2 Probabilistic Explanations is the next category that 
Green (1971: 152) recognises in his analysis of why-explan-
ations. These are explanations in which the truth of the 
explanans does not guarantee the truth of the explanandum, 
but offers an account that is probable and, characteristical-
ly, some implicit reference to the degree of probability in 
the explanans. This type can occur in the sciences and are 
thought by some, for example Hempel (1966), to be scientific 
when certain conditions are met. Probabilistic explanations 
differ from deductive explanations, in which cause is 
related to the truth of the explanans being a sufficient 
condition for the truth of the explanandum, because no such 
correspondence exists in their case. Their ability to 
explain obtains through the establishment of some kind of 
statistical invariance between the explanandum and the 
explanans. 
Frequently, in every-day life, probabilistic explanat-
ions are used in the same way that causal explanations are 
used even though they do not qualify as such. This is not 
very surprising when it is borne in mind that causal 
explanations set forth regularities which is exactly what 
probabilistic explanations attempt to do. 
1.2.3 Green (1971: 154) suggests that, in addition to 
deductive and probabilistic why-explanations, a type exists 
that occurs 'whenever ideas of development or evolution 
play a large explanatory role.' For these he suggests 
the name genetic-explanations. This is not because they 
occur only in the biological sciences, but because they 
are concerned with genesis or the coming into being of 
something, for example, the sort of inquiry with which 
geology and history are commonly concerned. The kind of 
'because' they require is one that describes how a state 
of affairs developed or by what process it came about. 
Green (ibid: 155) mentions two points that are usually made 
about genetic explanations: 
... in giving a genetic explanation, not all 
events in the past will be selected as pertinent 
to the explanandum. Secondly, what is selected 
will usually be chosen on the basis of some 
assumptions about the causal links these events 
have in the development to be explained. Thus, 
although genetic explanations are not causal in 
any strict sense, nevertheless they will make 
use of causal assumptions and sometimes explicitly 
so. 
He suggests that it may be helpful to think of genetic 
explanations as responding to a 'why' that looks back in 
time, but it would be misleading to think of this feature 
as a defining characteristic. The reference back is not 
concerned with an event in the past but with a process of 
development, because what is sought is to explain some 
present or past state of affairs in reference to its genesis. 
Gallie (1970: 158) describes the characteristics of 
genetic explanations somewhat similarly in his discussion 
of explanations in history and the genetic sciences. The 
points are summarised below, each referring to a character-
istic genetic explanation: 
(1) Seeks to establish or at least helps to 
indicate some kind of continuity between 
one or a number of temporally prior 
conditions and a subsequent result. 
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(2) Does not pretend to predictive power: 
the prior event is not taken in con-
junction with certain universal laws, 
to constitute a sufficient condition of 
the occurrence of the subsequent event. 
(3) Emphasizes that what came earlier explains, 
in the genetic sense, what came before and 
not vice versa. i.e. The prior event is 
not taken, in conjunction with certain 
universal laws, to constitute both a 
sufficient and a necessary condition of 
the occurrence of the subsequent event. 
Green (1971: 156) argues that genetic explanations may 
be used for explaining future expectations and, thus, an 
answer to the question 'Why do modern societies tend to 
require a great deal of education?' might call for a 'kind 
of explanation framed in genesis but not in terms of history.' 
It seems a reasonable response to say that the example he 
gives is somewhat doubtful in respect of the way it could be 
interpreted and that others he cites, for example, 'What 
might be the necessary and sufficient conditions under which 
a society would require a great deal of education of all 
its citizens?', although genetic in character would qualify 
as a what-explanation in Taylor's categories (see p.28) and 
not as an example of a why-explanation. 
1.2.4 The final category of why-explanations that Green 
(1971: 156) identifies are, typically, forward looking. He 
calls the category teleological and functional explanations. 
By teleological he means purposive or goal directed and, thus, 
answers to this kind of why-question will refer to the future. 
The contexts he has in mind are those in which there is 
reference to certain consciously held goals or purposes 
for which such actions are taken. Green (ibid: 157) points 
out that in the biological sciences the notion of intention 
or purpose has to be replaced by function, (hence the title 
of the category) as, for example, in asking 'What is the 
purpose of the lungs?' Clearly, it is not an explanation of 
interest that is demanded but of function within an organic 
system. Green suggests that a feature of functional explana-
tions is that they presuppose the presence of a system while 
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remaining outside the system. Thus, they describe 
consequences and effects rather than intentions and goals. 
This last category completes his analysis of different 
kinds of why-questions. 
1.3 Scientific Explanations  
As would be expected Green's discussion of deductive 
why-explanations (see p. 37) contains statements that are 
much the same as those found in Taylor's description of 
scientific explanations. Taylor (1970: 4) takes as his 
model Hempel's view of explanation, known as the 'covering 
law model of explanation'. He considers it to be 'especia-
lly clear and elegant', giving a correct account of what 
explanation is and ought to be in the field of science. 
Taylor argues that the chief questions to which scientific 
explanations address themselves are: 
Why did this happen? Why have things changed, 
or developed in this way rather than that? 
Why, when things happen, does that happen? 
He says that these questions tend to be thought of as causes, 
i.e. events that bring about certain others which are called 
their effects and he warns that thinking of scientific expla-
nations in this manner produces problems as the event picked 
out as a cause of an event will almost certainly be one of 
a set of others, all of which are necessary for the event to 
take place. He maintains that though scientists do try to 
discover how events are connected and how given a particular 
set of facts the occurrence of an event is necessary, they 
do so by looking for universal propositions and general laws 
rather than for causes which both precede and necessitate 
their effects. Thus, an explanation of why an event occurs 
shows how the event is related to others by general laws. 
Using the covering law model of explanation Taylor 
(ibid: 8) contends that a scientific explanation of an event 
(which he calls event 'a' consists of three elements: 
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(1) a universal generalisation, or law statement: 
whenever an event of type 'b' happens, an 
event of type 'a' happens; 
(2) a statement of initial conditions: 
'b' happened; 
(3) a statement of the consequent conditions; 
'a' happened. 
He points out that the relationship between (1), (2) and (3) 
can be stated another way, namely, 'If the generalisation 
in (1) is true then, given the facts stated in (2), the event 
mentioned in (3) must occur.' 
This model works equally well for explaining laws, the 
laws and definitions. Two features are worthy of note. 'The 
statements in the explanation logically entail(1)the state-
ment that the event being explained occurred', and the explan-
ation must contain a universal generalisation. The reason for 
these respective stipulations is that, in the former case, in 
any valid argument, 'the premises taken together entail the 
conclusion', and in the case of the latter, explanations with-
out universal generalisations will not entail what they are 
supposed to explain.(2)  
Hempel, himself, in conjunction with Oppenheim (1970: 
8-10) makes clear that the general agreement that exists about 
what constitutes the major objectives of science is not carried 
into opinions concerning the function and essential character-
istics of scientific explanation. - Their own pattern of 
scientific explanation divides it into two constituents, 
namely the explanandum(3) and the explanans,(4)  the latter 
(1) Entail - a term used by logicians that refers to the 
relation between propositions when the step from one to 
the other is a valid deductive inference. 
(2) There are very exceptional circumstances in which this 
would not be the case. 
(3) By the explanandum, they understand the sentence des—
cribing the phenomenon to be explained - not the 
phenomenon itself. 
(4) By the explanans, the class of those sentences which 
are adduced to account for the phenomenon. 
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being divided again into those containing sentences that 
cite particular antecedent conditions and those sentences 
representing general laws. For an explanation to be sound, its 
constitutents have to satisfy logical and empirical conditions 
of adequacy, as shown in the summary below: 
I. 	 Logical conditions of adequacy: 
R1 The explanandum must be logically deducible 
from the information in the explanans. 
R2 The explanans must contain general laws 
which are actually required for derivation 
of the explanandum. 
R3 The explanans must have empirical content, 
i.e. must be capable, at least in principle, 
of test by experiment or observation. 
II. Empirical condition of adequacy. 
R4 The sentences constituting the explanans 
must be true. 
Hempel and Oppenheim (ibid: 11) reject the notion that 
it would be more appropriate to substitute 'highly confirmed 
by all the relevant evidence available' for 'true' on the 
grounds that this leads to difficulties when an explanation 
made earlier on the basis of available evidence is shown to 
be wrong in the light of new evidence. They favour the con-
clusion that the soundness of the explanation had been probable 
but the fuller evidence now available suggests that the original 
explanans was not true. Certain of the requirements demanded 
are to be found in Green's why-explanation category. However, 
Hempel and Oppenheim offer a more demanding set of requirements 
because they are not concerned with why-explanations in general 
but those that qualify as scientific explanations. They, too, 
include what they term motivational and teleogical approaches 
as a separate category, which corresponds in some respects to 
Green's teleological and functional category of why-explanations, 
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described on p.40. The kind of phenomena they include in 
this are the various types of behaviour of animals and humans 
that, for example, are explained in psychology: 
.... by subscription under laws or even general 
theories of learning or conditioning; and while 
frequently the regularities involved cannot be 
stated with the same generality and precision 
as in physics and chemistry, it is clear at least, 
that the general character of those explanations 
canformsto our earlier characterization. 
(ibid: 13) 
Not all scientific explanations are based on laws of 
strictly universal form. Hempel (1966: 58-9) recognises a 
type that he calls probabilistic explanations, again a 
category included by Green in his analysis of why-explanations. 
Hempel contends that probabilistic explanations share certain 
basic features with corresponding deductive-nomological 
explanations. Both explain the event in question by referring 
to other events with which the explanandum event is connected 
by laws. The first major difference is that in the deductive 
type the laws are of universal form and, in the other type, 
of probabilistic form - hence the name for this type of ex-
planation. The second, that going on information contained 
in the explanans of a deductive explanation, the explanandum 
was to be expected with deductive certainty. On the other 
hand, an inductive explanation, of the kind necessary in 
probabilistic explanations 
shows only that, on the information contained 
in the explanans, the explanandum was to be 
expected with high probability, and perhaps 
with "practical certainty"; it is in this 
manner that the latter argument meets the 
requirement of explanatory relevance. 
(ibid: 59) 
Being scientific is to do with making statements that are 
based in some way on evidence but as can be seen from the 
brief examination of scientific explanations, the precise 
nature of the relationship between statements and evidence 
is a controversial topic in the philosophy of science. 
1.4 A Conceptual Classification Applied to Explanations  
A dimension that could be used as an analytical base 
for identifying different kinds of explanation cuts across 
the categories that have been arrived at through the systems 
of classification discussed thus far. It has to do with the 
nature and level of the concepts embodied in explanations of 
one kind and another and is well exemplified by the distinction 
that Vygotsky (1962) makes between spontaneous and non-
spontaneous (or scientific) concepts. The former, he thinks, 
can be acquired by an individual before he is conscious enough 
of them to be able to define them in words. On the other hand, 
scientific concepts which are usually non-spontaneous start 
their development with a verbal formulation and their use in 
non-spontaneous operations. In other words, they start their 
lives in a child's mind at a level which a spontaneous concept 
reaches much later. 
Within the context of explaining something to someone, 
questions concerning the kind of concepts to be found within 
specific explanations are very pertinent and could lead to the 
identification of distinct categories. One such category 
would be for explanations that are to do with phenomena that 
can be understood in terms of spontaneous concepts and, 
another, that would accommodate explanations that involved 
scientific concepts that can be acquired only through specific 
teaching. However, categorisation would not be as clear cut 
as this for some explanations demand both spontaneous concepts 
and scientific ones. Furthermore, a stage between the two 
extremes can be recognised in which a spontaneous concept 
reaches a level in an individual at which it is possible for 
a related scientific concept to be absorbed. It is possible 
to think of these concepts as intermediate, which indicates 
that they have started out as spontaneous concepts but are 
developing into scientific concepts as a result of further 
experience and learning. Vygotsky (ibid: 109) describes the 
process as follows: 
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In working its slow way upward, an everyday 
concept clears a path for the scientific 
concept and its downward development. It 
creates a series of structures necessary for 
the evolution of a concept more primitive; 
elementary aspects which give it body and 
vitality. Scientific concepts, in turn, 
supply structures for the upward development 
of the child's concepts towards consciousness 
and deliberate use. 
It is likely that at different stages in an individ-
ual's life one or other conceptual category will dominate the 
explanations he seeks to have and those which others consider 
necessary for him to understand. This is certainly true in 
school where, at the primary stage, explanations based upon 
spontaneous concepts abound and at higher secondary level 
most explanations utilise scientific concepts. But perhaps 
the concepts with which most explanations are concerned in 
school learning will be those in the intermediate category. 
This view is supported by Carroll (1964: 81) who goes on to 
say that they are usually acquired through the study of verbal 
formulations and the practice of recognition of instances and 
non-instances. In this they have more in common with scien-
tific concepts than spontaneous concepts and the same is 
likely to be true of the explanations that embody them. 
It is not the case that different subjects demonstrate 
any common consistency in their use of the different concept-
ual categories of explanation and thus in the intellectual de-
mands they make upon pupils through their explanations. Certain 
subjects early on at the secondary stage deal in explanations 
that contain scientific concepts, both those which start life 
as such and others which have grown out of spontaneous ones. 
For example, the first year of a chemistry course set for C.S.E. 
or G.C.E. ordinary level, involves the employment of scientific 
explanations on a large scale. Geography, on the other hand, 
can utilise spontaneous concepts in the explanations it is 
concerned with at this level. 
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A possible effect of these conceptual distinctions is to 
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place some constraints upon the number of options open to 
a teacher as a means of putting across an explanation. More 
particularly, it may influence choice when it comes to deciding 
between practical procedures in which first-hand experience 
of the phenomena is possible and procedures that rely upon 
verbal formulations. Indeed, certain explanations, by their 
very nature, lend themselves to one rather than other kinds 
of procedures. An attempt to classify the concepts they 
utilise can provide some guidelines for deciding how best to 
organise the explanation, other things being equal. 
It would be illuminating to discover the extent to which 
teachers are aware of the specific characteristics of satisfact-
ory scientific explanations or, indeed, of the variety of types 
of explanation that they encounter, each type with its own 
peculiarities and requirements. As they will be called upon 
to handle explanations it could be pedagogically useful to 
know which types are dominant in specific subject areas and 
at different stages of pupil development. Questions concerned 
with the positive advantages of knowing more about the 
characteristics of explanations will be discussed in relation 
to explaining and understanding in education which is under-
taken in Chapter 4. At this stage suffice it to say that 
unless the various notions of explanation are kept distinct 
it is very easy to move from one to another without realising 
it and it is difficult to understand general claims about the 
function of explanation in education. 
2.0 THE NATURE OF EXPLAINING SOMETHING TO SOMEONE  
It is now the turn of the notion, explaining something 
to someone to be examined with the object of identifying the 
conditions necessary to the success of this activity. As in 
the case of explanation, there are a range of models to 
choose from, each seeing 'explaining' as a distinct kind of 
activity. 
2.1 Explaining Something to Someone as Gap Filling 
Dray's (1957) continuous series model directs attention 
to the fact that for someone to understand something it is not 
enough for him to be given an item of information, the 
information must be connected or linked up with the topic in 
question so clearly that he can go from the information to the 
topic without coming up against large gaps, thus it is possible 
to see explaining as gap-filling. 
Dray (1957: 73-5) contends that an explanation breaks 
down an event into sub-sequences which lead up to that event; 
a continuous series of happenings in which the series may be 
but need not be temporal and the happenings may be, but need 
not be observable. He insists that his model provides 
objective standards for judging whether or not something is 
an explanation but offers no clear conditions for judging the 
adequacy of a series. He (ibid: 69) states that the sum of 
sub-sequences must 'raise no further demand for explanation 
in that particular context' a pragmatic condition of adequacy 
since what is acceptable for one person need not be for another. 
Pragmatic standards can be objective, in cases where there is 
wide agreement for example, but this is not to say that they 
can replace logical and empirical standards. 
In arguing the case for his model, Dray offers it as 
an alternative to Hempel's covering law model which was 
discussed earlier (see pp. 41-44). It is important to note 
that he accepts the Hempelian model as a theory of explanation 
in science but suggests that, in certain other areas and 
particularly where the thing being explained is a human action, 
it is inappropriate. Speaking of explanations in history he 
maintains that many sound historical explanations do not 
require laws. 
Dray (ibid: 70) argues that a general law does not 
necessarily offer an explanation for the fact that something 
happens, though it may explain the cause of the happening. 
It is indeed true that the covering law model does not purport 
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to offer an account of the explanation of non-causal facts 
that must contain the explanation of causal facts, as grounds 
for adequacy. Furthermore, attempting to do so will result 
in a shift in the explanandum events and, thus, to a shift in 
the question. Dray appears to think that the continuous 
series model does not encounter the phenomenon of question 
shifting because it refers to a series of facts contributing 
to the story of what happened. However, if the 'story' 
contains elements in which it is first necessary to answer 
'why' with an explanation that establishes cause and then to 
answer a 'why' that explains the way in which the effect came 
about, it can be argued that a shift in question has occurred. 
Martin (1970: 46) supports the view that a question shift is 
embedded in the model but suggests that if it is viewed 
from the standpoint of a theory or analysis of 
explaining something to someone instead of 
from the standpoint of a theory of an explanation(1) 
of something, Dray's shift in question takes on 
special significance. 
By this she means that the aim of explaining something to someone 
is understanding and that although she rejects the idea that the 
question shifting implicit in the continuous series model is a 
necessary condition for understanding she thinks Dray is on 
the track of something important involving some kind of shift 
in question for explaining something to someone. 
Whatever the limitations of Dray's model in giving an 
account of explanation it makes some useful contributions to 
an analysis of explaining something to someone. For instance, 
it takes account of the explainer and the explainee, concerning 
itself with questions like 'what must a person do to get someone 
to understand something?' It draws attention to the crucial 
role of understanding in explaining, emphasising the importance 
of seeing connections, as 	 necessary for understanding. It 
(1) 	 Martin uses explanation. to indicate that she is referring 
to Ryles notion of explanation as a successful outcome of 
research, etc. and not to explanation in the task sense. 
brings to light the considerable differences that exist 
among people in respect of their ability to connect an event 
and an item of information: a situation that, in turn, 
influences the length of the series needed before the explanat-
ion in question is attained. 
Martin (ibid: 59) suggests that the most important 
contribution of the model is its underlying conception of 
explanation as filling in: 
It is assumed that for explaining to take place 
there is some gap and that explaining involves 
filling that gap. It seems to me that this view 
of explaining something to someone is essentially 
correct. 
2.2 	 The Philosophical Conditions Governing Explaining  
If Dray's account of explaining something to someone as 
gap-filling lacks systematic criteria for deciding just what the 
gap to be filled is in between, the same criticism cannot be 
levelled at Bromberger (1965) whose analysis takes account of 
this phenomenon as well as certain other aspects of the problem. 
Indeed, his detailed discussion of the characteristic features 
of explaining episodes, finally arrives at a set of conditions 
that must be met by all explaining episodes, in order to 
qualify as such. 
He describes an explaining episode as one in which a 
tutor answers a question, that may or may not have been actually 
put, for his tutee. He works on the assumption that there is 
some question that the tutor addresses himself to, even though 
it is not always clear what that question is. In certain 
respects these episodes are similar to the episodes identified 
within the procedural means of teaching by Smith that were 
discussed earlier (see pp. 14-15). Although Smith does not 
require the presence of an underlying question, he does 
suggest that from a psychological standpoint the episodes 
represent gaps to be filled with information. 
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A concept that has not been introduced before, but 
which is important in Bromberger's (1965: 82) analysis is 
that of 'predicament'. He identifies two kinds: 'p' -
predicaments and 'b' - predicaments. A person is in a 
'p' - predicament with regard to any question that he 
thinks has a right answer, but for which he can think of no 
answer to which he, himself, cannot see objections. A person 
is in a 'b' - predicament with regard to any question that 
has a right answer, but the answer is beyond what he can 
conceive of. Bromberger points out that it is possible for a 
person to be in either one of the predicaments or both at 
the same time. The importance of the predicaments to his 
view of explanation is that they indicate the state of mind 
of the tutee. His concern with this factor and certain others 
that will be discussed later, is demonstrated in his fourth 
hypothesis which is given below. 
The essential characteristics of explaining episodes 
are the following: 
(a) the question is sound, i.e. admits of a right 
answer; 
(b) the tutor is rational and knows the right answer 
to the question at the time of the episode; 
(c) during the episode the tutor knows, or believes, 
or at least assumes that at the beginning of the 
episode, the tutee was in a 'p' - predicament 
with regard to the question, or that, at the 
beginning of the episode the tutee was in a 'b' -
predicament with regard to the question, or that 
at the beginning of the episode, the tutee was in 
either a 'p' - predicament or a 'b' - predicament 
with regard to the question; 
(d) in the course of the episode the tutor presents 
the facts that, in his opinion, the tutee must 
learn to know the right answer to the question; 
(e) in the course of the episode the tutor also 
provides the tutee with such instruction as he 
(the tutor) thinks necessary to remove the basis 
of whichever of the states mentioned in (c) he 
deems the tutee to be in: 
(f) at the end of the episode all the facts mentioned 
in (d) and (e) have been presented to the tutee 
by the tutor. 
(ibid: 94-95) 
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Martin (1970: 63-65) criticises certain aspects of 
each of the proposals offered in the above hypotheses. In 
the first instance, she takes up the truth requirement ((a) 
and (b)) on the grounds that if it is applied too strictly 
it rules out too many potential explaining episodes and if it 
is applied too loosely 
it allows the tutor's views about the truth of what 
he says to prevail over the view of someone who 
describes the tutor as having explained to his 
tutee. 
Martin (ibid: 67) maintains that the latter example 
could not be allowed to qualify as explaining something to 
someone unless the tutor's views of the soundness of the 
question are justified. Certain explanations would founder 
on a too strict application of the truth requirement. For 
example, a tutor's judgement of soundness of question and 
correctness of answer would be justified when the explaining 
episode took place but in the light of later knowledge shown 
to be wrong. Furthermore, there could be occasions when the 
tutor decides not to present all the facts to the tutee, 
because he considers them to be beyond the tutee's under-
standing at his current stage of development. This situation 
calls for a loosening up of the truth requirement to allow the 
tutor to present to the tutee an account that diverges some-
what from the tutor's view of the truth. Martin (ibid: 70) 
is prepared to press the point that there are occasions when 
explaining something to someone involves some simplification, 
possible omissions where material is too difficult and 'even 
something very much like fabrication and myth' on the grounds 
that it is necessary to take account of pedagogy if we are to 
be able_to say truly that someone has explained something to 
someone. She suggests that what is being sought are logical 
conditions, and distinguishes between conditions that have to 
do with the 'logic' of a term or concept and those that are 
formal, specifying relations holding between statements. 
Martin (ibid: 73) insists that: 
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There is no reason, in principle, why some of the 
"logical" conclusions of explaining something 
to someone may not be "pedagogical" in the 
sense that they incorporate into the analysis 
of explaining something to someone what might 
normally be called pedagogical conditions. 
The truth requirement contained in (a), (b) and (d) 
of Bromberger's conditions is not the only requirement that 
Martin objects to. She questions both the tutee's predica-
ment, condition (c) and the need to provide such instruction 
as is thought necessary by the tutor (e). 
In the case of the tutee's predicament she thinks the 
'p' - predicament and 'b' - predicament do not cover the 
range of possible predicaments that a tutee could find him-
self in. 
Martin (ibid: 74-78) suggests the following additional 
predicaments in which the tutee: 
can think of an answer which is not correct but 
to which he can think of no decisive objections 
- ('m' - predicament); (1) 
can think of two answers, one correct, the other 
not correct but can think of no decisive objections 
to either - ('a' - predicament); (2) 
can conceive of the right answer to the question 
without objections and conceive of no other to which 
he does not have decisive objections - ('r' -
predicament); (3) 
thinks that the question is unsound although, in 
fact, it is sound, and can conceive of no answer 
to it - ('f' - predicament). (4) 
(1) 'm' - predicament - intended to remind one that the per-
son in the predicament is mistaken. 
(2) 'a' - predicament - the person in the predicament can-
not choose between alternatives. 
(3) 'r' - predicament - the person in the predicament has 
the right answers to the question. 
(4) 'f' - predicament - the person in the predicament is 
under a false presupposition. 
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In the case of the last predicament the tutor would, 
during the explaining episode, have to convince the tutee 
that the question was a sound one. 
In view of the range of predicaments identified, and 
the list is not considered to be exhaustive, Martin (ibid:80) 
is persuaded that it is more useful to replace Bromberger's 
(c) requirement with one that is opened up to include 'some 
rational predicament with regard to the question.' 
Condition (e) is criticised both for its requirement that 
instruction be given that is necessary to remove the basis of 
the state the tutor deems the tutee to be in and, indeed, 
that instruction should necessarily have to be provided. 
While appreciating Bromberger's wish to distinguish explaining 
something to someone from just telling something to someone 
Martin points out that situations arise in which a tutor 
can explain without there being any need to offer instruction, 
for example, in cases where to remove the basis of the state 
a tutee was in, it would take a personality change; or where 
a value judgement is involved that makes it necessary to 
change a tutee's attitudes in order to remove the basis of 
his predicament. 
Bromberger's analysis conceives of explaining episodes as 
answering a single, underlying question. Giving instruction 
along the lines Bromberger indicates in condition (e) could 
well impose a shift in question somewhat similar to that 
discussed earlier when Dray's continuous series model was 
under consideration. 
Martin (ibid: 82) proposes that the instruction required 
by this condition 
be viewed along the lines in which Bromberger views 
an explaining episode as a whole, namely, in terms 
of question answering. The question or questions 
answered in what Bromberger has called instruction 
would be subsidiary to the underlying question. 
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Use of this proposal would entail a shift in question, i.e. 
from the underlying question which it is the primary task 
of the tutor to answer, to answering such subsidiary 
questions as are seen by the tutor to be necessary to the 
tutee's predicament. How the tutor tackles the subsidiary 
question or questions is a matter for pedagogy and not a 
matter that need be included as an essential characteristic 
of explaining episodes. This last statement could be 
challenged on the grounds that effective explaining is as 
much influenced by pedagogical considerations as by the 
philosophical ones being presented here. There appears to 
be no clear reason why the latter are considered to be 
essential and the former not. Indeed, because the objective 
of explaining episodes is understanding, it could be that 
certain pedagogical considerations are essential character-
istics. These points will be raised again during the 
discussion of understanding something that takes place in 
Chapter 4. 
Martin (ibid: 84-85) takes account of many of the 
objections to Bromberger's conditions that have been raised 
by offering her own modified form of Hypothesis Four, which 
includes the modifications she proposes in her discussions 
relating to individual characteristics. By and large, the 
effect is to loosen up the requirements and conditions some-
what while retaining all the points identified by the an-
alysis. She calls her modified account Hypothesis Five, a 
version of which is given below: 
The essential characteristics of explaining episodes 
are the following: 
(a) the underlying question is sound, i.e. admits 
of a right answer, or the tutor believes, or 
at least assumes, that the underlying question 
is sound, i.e. admits of a right answer; 
(b) the tutor is rational and knows the right answer 
to the underlying question at the time of the 
episode, or thinks, or at least assumes he knows 
the right answer to the underlying question at 
the time of the episode; 
(c) during the episode the tutor knows, or believes, 
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or at least assumes that at the beginning 
of the episode the tutee was in some 
rational predicament with regard to 
the underlying question; 
(d) in the course of the episode the tutor 
presents the facts or some of the facts 
or what he believes or at least assumes 
to be the facts or some of the facts, 
that, in his opinion, the tutee must 
learn to know the right answer or the 
answer the tutor believes or assumes is 
right; or he presents material that he 
knows, or believes, or at least assumes, 
is not the facts but that, in his 
opinion, is sufficiently related to the 
facts and is pedagogically helpful to 
the tutee in learning an answer to the 
underlying question which the tutor 
knows or believes or at least assumes, 
is not the right answer, but which is 
sufficiently related to the right 
answer, or the answer he believes or 
at least assumes is right, so that it is 
pedagogically justified. 
(e) In the course of the episode the tutor 
also provides or attempts to provide 
the tutee with answers to such 
subsidiary questions as he (the 
tutor) thinks are necessary to 
remove the basis of whichever of the 
states mentioned in (c) he deems the 
tutee to be in; or are effective 
in removing the basis of whichever of 
the states mentioned in (c) he 
deems the tutee to be in; or are 
helpful in removing through the basis 
of whichever of the states mentioned 
in (c) he deems the tutee to be 
in. 
(f) At the end of the episode all the 
facts, or what the tutor believes or 
at least assumes to be facts, 
mentioned in (d) or the material 
that, in his opinion, is related to 
the facts in the way outlined in 
(d) have been presented to 
56 
the tutee by the tutor and the answers 
or what the tutor takes to be answers 
mentioned in (e) have been provided. 
Martin (ibid: 86) warns that it is possible that 
neither Bromberger's hypothesis nor her own modified form 
contain a necessary set of conditions for explaining some-
thing to someone. She suggests that both are an improvement 
on Dray's continuous series model because they impose some 
kind of truth requirement, recognise the importance of taking 
account of the explainer's view of the explainee's state in an 
explaining episode and require some instruction to be given. 
2.3 
	 Explaining as Reason Giving 
In order to understand the claim that a tutee's 
rationality must be acknowledged in explaining something to 
someone, it is useful to undertake the discussion of explain-
ing as reason-giving. 
There is no general agreement about the claim that the 
tutee's rationality must be acknowledged and, thus, that 
explaining something to someone involves giving and having 
reasons. 
Green (1971: 159F) differentiates between explaining 
and giving reasons particularly where the subject is human 
behaviour. He suggests that explanations have to do with the 
causes why someone did something, and reasons, with the 
justification for doing something and makes a point of citing 
history, as a subject in which this kind of distinction is 
useful. A confusing aspect of this view is that it is quite 
usual to believe that explaining something to someone may 
involve logical and empirical reasons as part of the explanat-
ion. Green attempts to meet this by pointing out that in 
common usage explaining and reason-giving are used as though 
they are one and the same. 
It is difficult to quarrel with this point or with 
his view that the giving of reasons does not, in itself, 
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qualify as explaining; whether the reasons be those he 
refers to as ones offered because they are publicly accept-
able, or the real reasons. Furthermore, neither Dray's 
continuous series model nor Bromberger's fourth hypothesis 
emphasise reason-giving in their conditions governing ex-
plaining episodes. On the other hand, there emerged in 
previous discussion the knowledge that explaining something 
to someone shares certain features with the concept of teach-
ing, one such being, that they are both subject to rational 
constraints on manner and learning. Thus, there is a view 
that one who is explaining something to someone must acknow-
ledge the reason of the explainee or the activity will not 
be deemed explaining. In other words, the process involves 
reason giving and reason having in order that the end product 
of an explaining episode be, understanding. 
Martin (1970: 104) supporting the above view argues 
that the major question left in doubt by both Dray and 
Bromberger is whether or not they acknowledge the tutee's 
rationality. As has been mentioned earlier, she subscribes 
to rationality theory in relation to teaching while warning 
that the sense in which the pupil's rationality must be 
acknowledged is weaker than the proponents of rational theory 
contend. In the case of explaining something to somebody she 
maintains that there is a strong requirement for the explainer 
to acknowledge the explainee's rationality. Like teaching, 
the activity is governed by both a rational constraint on 
manner and on learning. 
In looking first at the rational constraint on manner, 
Martin (ibid: 104) points out that in the hypothesis she 
offers as a modification of Bromberger's fourth hypothesis 
(see pp. 55-57) condition (c) places a rational constraint 
on manner by requiring the explainer 'to treat the explainee 
as being in a rational predicament' with regard to the under-
lying question. It is important to bear in mind that this 
requirement does not imply that the explainee is rational, 
nor that the explainer knows or believes the explainee to be 
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rational. It requires only that the explainer proceeds on  
the assumption that the explainee is rational. She refers, 
also, to condition (e) in her hypothesis as another rational 
constraint on manner requiring, as it does, that the explainer 
shift the question during an explaining episode. She suggests 
that, in effect, 'it requires that he acknowledge the ex-
plainee's reason.' Bearing in mind that the condition to which 
she refers requires the tutor in an explaining episode to 
try to answer the underlying question of the episode and 
at least one other subsidiary question that, in his view, 
is necessary, effective, or helpful in removing the basis of 
the state the tutee is in, the point she makes is a valid one. 
One last point worthy of note is that in relation to 
explanation Martin (ibid: 107) rejects the possibility of a 
dispositional interpretation of the constraint on manner, 
of the kind she advocates for teaching, on the grounds that 
the constraints govern explaining more strictly than they 
do teaching. She argues that 'if teaching is closely connect-
ed with acknowledging the other's reason, how much more so is 
explaining.' 
The rational constraint on learning governs the whole 
activity of explaining something to someone because in this 
case learning is related to understanding the underlying 
question of an explaining episode. A desire to get the tutee 
to know the right answer to the underlying question in an 
explaining episode is implicit in Bromberger's analysis, but 
he does not go as far as requiring that the tutee be able to 
make the connection between the right answer and the under-
lying question. This last condition would be necessary where 
a learning objective for the episode is understanding. 
Martin (ibid: 108) is careful to point out that although 
she sees explaining as an activity involving question shifting 
she sees it aiming at understanding 'only in relation to the 
underlying question of an explaining episode.' In other 
words, the explainer does not have to aim at understanding in 
relation to the subsidiary questions included in an episode. 
In accepting the rational constraint on learning in relation 
to explanation, she makes clear that, as with the rational 
constraint on manner, it governs explaining strictly and 
once again must not be construed dispositionally. 
Agreement with a contention that explaining acknowledges 
the pupil's rationality in a stronger way than does teaching 
leads to some dissatisfaction with Dray's continuous series 
model and Bromberger's Hypothesis Four for failing adequately 
to take account of the central role of reason giving and reason 
having in explaining something to someone. This is not to de-
value the contributions made by their models to our under-
standing of the activity in question but to point out that it 
has been necessary to turn to a theory of teaching to illuminate 
one essential aspect. Still to be examined is the notion of 
explaining as a particular use of language. This again demands 
insights from a theory of teaching as well as looking to 
semantic and communication theory for helpful contributions. 
2.4 	 Contributions from Linguistic Theories of Teaching  
The linguistic theory of teaching has a number of 
different versions and that of B. Othanel Smith (1961: 87), 
whose concept of teaching was examined earlier, (see pp. 14-16) 
emerges as a moderate in respect of the role he assigns to 
language in teaching. Starting from the position that, by 
teaching, he refers to 'ways of making something known to 
others' he offers these definitions: 
Teaching: arrangement and manipulation of a situation 
in which there are gaps or obstructions which an 
individual will seek to overcome and from which he will 
learn in the course of doing so. 
(Brubacher 1939: 108) 
Teaching: intimate contact between a more mature 
personality and a less mature one which is designed 
to further the education of the latter. 
(Morrison 1934: 41) 
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Teaching: impartation of knowledge to an 
individual by another in school. 
(Adapted from common usage) 
Smith criticises each of these for incorporating a particular 
view of how teaching is to be carried on. The first he 
thinks argues that the individual learns by engaging in 
problem solving and, thus, to teach is to engage and direct 
the pupil in problem solving activities. The second suggests 
that education is the development of the individual through 
an adaptive process, i.e. through learning. The intimate 
contact required appears to be more suited to tutoring 
than teaching and is again associated with a specific theory 
of education. The last definition sees teaching as the 
impartation of knowledge and, thus, views the function of 
education as the cultivation of the mind. Within this defini-
tion teaching would adopt the features of lecturing. 
In rejecting the biases that attempt to suggest how 
the actions of teaching are to be conducted Smith (ibid: 38) 
suggests the acceptance of the genetic sense of teaching, 
namely, that it is a 'system of actions intended to induce 
learning.' This definition carries with it acceptance of the 
fact that 
these actions may be performed differently from 
culture to culture or from one individual to 
another within the same culture, depending upon 
the state of knowledge about teaching and the 
teacher's pedagogical knowledge and skill. 
A point brought out in the first chapter of this thesis 
is that Smith (ibid: 90-91) sees teaching as one thing and 
learning as another, thus learning does not necessarily issue 
from teaching. He thinks this is significant for pedagogical 
research because it makes the analysis of teaching a less 
complicated task. Teaching has its own forms, constituents 
and regularities. Indeed, under specific conditions, for 
example the context of the classroom, the teacher tends to 
behave in characteristic ways. The activities involved could 
be called 'a system of actions directed to pupils.' 
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To see how language functions within the concept of 
teaching offered by Smith (ibid: 91) it is useful to reproduce 
his pedagogical model:(1)  
A Pedagogical Model 
I 
	
III 
	
II 
Independent 	 Intervening 	 Dependent 
Variables 	 Variables 	 Variables 
(Teacher) 	 (Pupils) 	 (Pupils) 
(1) Linguistic 
behaviour 
(2) Performative 
behaviour 
(3) Expressive 
behaviour 
These variables consist (1) Linguistic 
of postulated explana- 	 behaviour 
tory entities and pro- 
cesses such as memories, (2) Performative  
beliefs, needs, infer- behaviour 
ences and associative 	 (3) Expressive 
mechanisms 	 behaviour 
From the model it can be seen that teaching acts appear in the 
first category as independent variables, pupil acts, as 
dependent variables in the second, while the third category 
contains a variety of events and processes which are the 
intervening variables. The teacher cannot see the intervening 
variables in the pupil, such as learning, he infers them from 
the behaviour of the pupil which appears in the second category. 
Smith (ibid: 92-93) says that the model fails to depict the 
ebb and flow of teaching or to give a complete picture of the 
cycle of giving and taking instruction. If extended it would 
show pupil behaviours generating the teachers intervening 
variables which would then lead to teacher action, thus start- 
ing the cycle 
Pt - Dt 
-P 	 -D 
again. 
- Rt  
-R 
He symbolises the 
- P 	 - D 	 - R 
- Pt 	 Dt 	 Rt 
cycle as 
- Pt - Dt 
- P 	 - D 
follows: 
- Rt  
- R 
achievement, 
Where, Pt is the teacher's perception of the pupil's 
(1) The model draws upon the psychological paradigm developed 
by Tolman. 
See - Tolman E.C. (1952) 'A Psychological Model' in Toward  
a General Theory of Social Actions Parsons T. and Shils E.A. 
(eds.) pp.279-302. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
behaviour; Dt is the teacher's diagnosis of the 
pupil's state of interest, readiness, knowledge and 
the like, made by inference from the behaviour of 
the pupil; and Rt is the action taken by the teacher 
in light of his diagnosis; and where P is the 
pupil's perception of the teacher's behaviour; D 
is the pupil's diagnosis of the teacher's state of 
interest, what he is saying, and so on, as inferred 
from the teacher's behaviour; and Rp  is the reaction 
of the pupil to the actions of the teacher. 
Each unit marked off by the double vertical lines is 
an instance of the teaching cycle. 
From this can be seen that the cycle is made up of two 
sub-units; Pt - Dt - Rt is the act of teaching, and 
Pp  - Dp  - Rp  the act of taking instruction. 
Although Smith (ibid: 94) includes as independent 
variables linguistic, performative and expressive behaviour, 
he is of the view that teaching acts consist largely in verbal 
behaviour 'in what is done with and to people through the 
medium of words.' However, he contends that, more important 
than knowing language to be the primary medium of instruction, 
is knowing what is done with language in teaching, in other 
words, the variety of actions that are carried out linguistic-
ally. 
All the logical operations identified by Smith (ibid:95 
-96) and included earlier in the discussicn of the activities 
of teaching (see p. 16) are considered by him to be performed 
through a particular use of language in the classroom. From 
the examples he gives, the two categories that have some 
bearing upon explaining something to someone are classifying 
and, as would be expected, explaining. He suggests that 
teachers clarify automatically when they define, describe or 
explain and that the logic of the activity is more complex 
than the verbal act of saying what something is. The logic 
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is made apparent when a teacher tells why he clarifies as 
he does for, in doing so, he will be required to set out 
the criteria. Of explaining, he says, it sets forth 'an 
antecedent condition of which the particular event to be  
accounted for is taken as the effect.'  (1)  It can also offer 
rules and facts in support of decisions, judgements or actions 
taken. 
It is clear from the comparisons that Smith makes 
between logical actions of the sort described above, and what 
he calls directive actions, that he sees the former as involv-
ing expository uses of language. Moreover, the pupil is 
expected to remember what has been said by the teacher and to 
be able to repeat the message in his own words as and when the 
situation demands. 
The linguistic role of the pupil is more than that 
of a passive receiver. As can be seen from the model the 
dependent variables parallel the independent ones. Thus, 
in the instruction-taking part of the cycle the pupil performs 
linguistic actions that are very much the same as those of 
the teacher. He may perform these actions voluntarily or at 
the invitation of the teacher but, in doing so, he is not 
instructing anyone. His role, according to Smith (ibid: 98), 
is to 'bear witness that he is taking instruction, that he 
understands what is happening or that he is taking part in 
(accepting or dissenting from) what is going on.' 
It is not an easy matter to decide how this theory of 
teaching adds to a knowledge of the necessary conditions for 
explaining something to someone. The cycle of teaching 
with its pupil and teacher interaction fits the dialogue 
aspect of an explaining episode quite neatly, but leaves open 
the question of whether or not it is possible to offer an 
interpretation of the teacher and pupil behaviour patterns 
described and still take account of important requirements 
(1) The underlining is that of the present writer. 
identified in the other models of explaining that have been 
discussed. An attempt to offer an interpretation may be 
helpful here: 
From observation of pupil behaviour the teacher (in 
the role of explainer) perceives that the pupil (in the role 
of explainee) is in some kind of rational predicament. (Pt). 
The teacher identifies the underlying question and proceeding 
on the assumption that the pupil is rational (Dt) offers what 
he sees to be the relevant facts, taking account of the 
previous diagnoses. - End of first sub-unit, which could be 
deemed an act of explaining. 
The sub-unit which could be called an act of taking 
explanation is offered yet more tentatively: 
From observation of teacher behaviour, the pupil 
perceives that the teacher is aware that he, the pupil, is 
in a rational predicament (Pp). The pupil judges the teacher 
to be offering an explanation, attempts to diagnose what:he is 
saying, i.e. make contact with the 
	 (D p) and responds 
in one way or another that is related to his diagnosis (R p). 
The cycle that follows may involve a shift in question but 
this will depend upon the teacher's perception of the pupil's 
response. The process goes on until the underlying question 
has been answered which, in an ideal cycle, will coincide 
with the pupil achieving understanding. 
As can be seen, it is possible to take Smith's theory 
of teaching as a theory of explaining mainly because it is 
not specific about the nature of the elements that make up 
the sub-unit acts and thus allows the inclusion of conditions 
and requirements that have been identified in other models. 
What his model does not do is lay down precise guide-lines 
as to what is involved in explaining something to someone. 
The points he does make are: that explaining is a logical 
operation to be performed linguistically; that the pattern 
of explaining episodes is a dialogue between teacher and 
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pupil in which the language use of the teacher is expository, 
its purpose instruction. The language use of the pupil 
parallels that of the teacher, its purpose to bear witness 
that he is taking instruction. 
This summary makes clear that the pupil side of the 
model is as important to the successful conclusion of explain-
ing cycles as the teacher's side. Furthermore, the teacher 
is required to diagnose the pupil's state of interest, readi-
ness and knowledge before proceeding with his action which, 
in turn, will be influenced by this diagnosis. Thus, not 
only is the pupil given a more active role in the explaining 
cycle, his motivation and state of knowledge are to be 
assessed in order that the explanation may be modified to 
accommodate these factors. The position of the pupil as 
explainee is given greater prominence with these conditions 
than in the case when the explainer is required to proceed 
on the assumption that his pupil is rational. They also 
serve to remind the teacher as explainer of factors to be 
taken into account in what is now the pedagogical as well 
as logical problem of presenting whatever answers are 
necessary to remove the basis of whatever states the pupil 
is in with regard to the underlying question and any necessary 
subsidiary questions. 
The theory that has just been discussed is cautious 
compared with the somewhat extreme views to be found in the 
linguistic theory offered by Price (1958). This shares some 
features with rationality theory but differs from it over 
what it takes to be the most crucial feature of teaching. 
In Price's theory, the use of language by the teacher is as 
central and important to it as the teacher's acknowledgement 
of the pupil's rationality is to rationality theory. 
Price (ibid: 326) contends that teaching involves four 
uses of sentences which are: an assertive use, a clarificatory 
use, an explanatory use and a supervisory use. It is important 
to note that he is not suggesting that teaching only involves 
67 
these four uses of language. Indeed, he suggests that in 
different situations many things are done which are not the 
four uses in question but which supplement them in the 
teacher's attempt to promote understanding. Nor is he saying 
that every case of teaching involves the use of all four 
sentences but that, in any specific case of teaching, one or 
other use will dominate. However, from the example he 
utilises to illustrate the assertive use, it would appear 
that very few cases of teaching would fail to use sentences 
in at least an assertive way. He also distinguishes an 
c 
active and an aquiescentA 	 use of sentences, the former being 
attributed to the speaker in a communication and the latter 
to the listener. 
Relating these points to teaching, Price (ibid: 327) 
maintains that teaching sentences are always used in an active 
c 
or aquiescent way. As the speaker, the teacher employs a 
A 
use of language that is assertive, classificatory, explanatory, 
supervisory and active. On the other hand, the hearer, who 
learns, i.e. the pupil, is expected to employ a correspond-
ingly acquiescent use. Thus, the role ascribed to the pupil 
is totally passive to a degree that allows Price (ibid: 327) 
to say that teaching succeeds 'when the students use of 
sentences corresponds in a acquiescent way to that which the 
teacher puts them.' 
2.5 	 Explaining as a Use of Language 
It will come as no surprise to find that Price's theory 
of teaching has been shown to be totally inadequate(1)and 
that it fails for being altogether too narrow in its aims, 
namely, the promotion of understanding-that and understanding-
how, and in the manner of proceeding that it demands of 
teacher and pupil. Martin (1970: 114) while rejecting it 
on the grounds that it is an extreme linguistic theory of 
teaching, suggests that it may have something to offer the 
theory of explaining something to someone. She points out 
that the overall objection to the theory, i.e. that its aims 
(1) Notably Israel Scheffler (1958) 'Comment' in Harvard 
Educational Review 28: 1958 pp. 337-339. 
and manner of proceeding are too narrow, may not be upheld 
in the case of explaining. 
There is no doubt that the aims of explaining something 
to someone are considerably narrower than those of teaching 
and include understanding-that and understanding-how. 
However, it has emerged from earlier considerations of 
kinds of explanation (see pp. 33-34) that there are explanat-
ions whose respective goals are understanding-what and under-
standing-why. This raises the question of whether or not 
Price's aims accommodate these. There is a sound reason for 
suggesting they are accommodated, which utilises a point 
raised earlier (see pp. 33-34) for which it is argued that 
answers to how-questions that require an explanation rather 
than mere telling can only be given with reference to what 
or why, although the linguistic form of the original 
question obscures this. 
If it is accepted that the aim of Price's theory is 
the promotion of understanding this is highly acceptable in 
a theory of explaining something to someone because explaining 
is not concerned with the 'whole child' or directly with 
establishing norms and beliefs, as is the case with teaching. 
Indeed, bearing in mind Green's notion that explaining and 
reason giving are different activities (see p.57) it is 
possible to view explaining as a much more intellectual 
activity than teaching. This is an important point, for 
Price's theory is often justifiably criticised on the grounds 
that its view of teaching as an activity is too highly 
intellectual. 
Martin (ibid: 115) raises various other objections 
to Price's theory as a theory of teaching and discusses them 
in relation to explaining. One of these is the statement 
that one who has received education believes he has been 
taught. Taken in conjunction with learning this is a some-
what odd notion. Presumably, the anticipated result from 
being taught is that the pupil has learnt and one would 
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expect a pupil to know this rather than to believe he has 
been taught. However, in explaining how, to someone, the 
position is rather different as believing what has been said 
is highly relevant in this case. Thus, another valid object-
ion loses its force. 
An objective that may be a bigger stumbling block in 
Price's theory still has to be resolved, namely, that in a 
successful teaching episode the pupil's use of sentences 
shall correspond in an acquiescent way to the teacher's. 
Whether or not this objection can be overcome will depend to 
a great extent on the interpretation of 'correspond in an 
acquiescent way.' If it is interpreted to mean an echoing 
of the teacher's views, it is as unacceptable in a theory of 
explaining something to someone as it was in a theory of 
teaching. However, if what is meant has more to do with 
accepting and believing what the teacher says this is an 
important aspect of explaining because, here, the teacher is 
trying to promote a specific understanding of the underlying 
question and in relation to the underlying question only this 
carries the seal of success. Substitution of the pupil's 
views, for example, will not count as success for a number 
of reasons. In the first instance, an explaining episode 
that meets the conditions of a theory of explanation requires 
a sound underlying question that admits of a right answer, 
it further requires that the tutor be rational and, lastly, 
that the tutor (within the limits of current knowledge) 
knows the right answer to the question. If these conditions 
are met substitution of the pupil's views must carry the 
implication that he refuses to accept the explanation or that 
he has failed to understand the answer - a state that can be 
remedied perhaps through a shift in question. In neither 
case can the response be considered a successful outcome as 
understanding has not been achieved. 
Moving in from objectives and applying Price's theory 
of the manner in which teaching proceeds, to explaining, 
requires the examination of certain linguistic features. 
In maintaining that in teaching sentences are used by the 
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teacher in at least an active and assertive way Price's 
(1958: 327) requirements are clearly at variance with a 
great deal of teaching behaviour. The question to be answer-
ed is whether or not the same is true in relation to explaining 
something to someone. In other words, can the teacher explain 
something to the pupil without using sentences in the manner 
described? The answer depends upon what is involved in the 
use of active assertive sentences. One requirement is that 
the teacher takes on the role of explainer and does not get 
the pupil to work out the explanation for himself. This 
is no problem for, if the pupil was working out the explanation 
for himself, the teacher would not be engaging in explaining 
and an explaining episode would not be taking place. Thus, 
it is the case that in explaining something to someone 
sentences are used in an active way. 
A more difficult objection to meet concerns the need  
to involve an assertive use of sentences in an explaining 
episode, particularly if this is construed as a strict require-
ment. An explanatory use of sentences has been identified 
by Price as one of the four uses of sentences involved in 
teaching. He also maintains that individual uses can operate 
at one and the same time in a sentence although one use will 
dominate. Bearing this in mind, it would be reasonable to 
assume that within the context of explaining something to 
someone the explanatory use must dominate and the assertive 
use, at best, take a relatively unimportant role. However, 
this does not meet his requirement that sentences be used 
in at least an assertive way and suggests that it is necessary 
to know more about the nature and function of an assertive use. 
Martin (1970: 119) maintains that if Price has in mind 
the user's purpose in making a statement, he is 'justified 
in differentiating an assertive use from his other uses.' 
This being the case, an explanatory use would dominate in an 
explaining situation, for the user's purpose would be to 
explain. In this sense of assertive use Price's requirement 
does not hold true for explaining something to someone. 
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On the other hand, as Martin (ibid: 119-20) points out, 
explaining something to another does involve using sentences 
that state or assert something about something. If Price 
means by an assertive use of language that when certain 
sentences are used they state or assert things about the world, 
then this use should not be contrasted with the other uses. 
She argues that this feature 'is independent of the speaker's 
general objective in using the sentences.' This means that 
a speaker could achieve his objective, for example, clarifying, 
because he uses sentences that assert things. Thus, it can 
be said that when someone is using sentences in an explanatory 
way, the sentences must assert something about the issue in 
question. Martin contends that in this case the requirement 
holds true for explaining something to someone. 
In referring to the assertive use Price speaks of 
employing sentences to assert facts. It is clear that he 
assumes the statements made will be true or at least consider-
ed to be true at the time of the explanation. Martin (ibid: 
121) would have the notion of a fact construed broadly so as 
to include value judgements, theories and moral judgements. 
She also includes statements that the explainer takes to be 
false but uses for good pedagogical reasons. This last 
condition, which Martin includes in her modified form of 
Bromberger's Hypothesis Four, (see pp. 55-57) is one that 
calls for strict control. For while it would be difficult to 
disagree with the view that there may be sound pedagogical 
reasons for a tutor to give his tutee facts that are not the 
true facts but are sufficiently related to the true facts to 
be helpful to the tutee in learning the answer to the under-
lying question, an objection could be raised on the grounds 
that the tutor has not given an explanation of something to 
someone. He may have prepared the ground for an explanation 
of the underlying question at some later date or stimulated 
ideas and actions in relation to the tutee such that the tu-
tee works out the correct answer for himself but in neither 
of these instances is it possible to say that the tutor 
has explained the underlying question to the tutee. 
The peculiar contribution of Price's theory of 
explaining something to someone cannot be left as being 
merely an emphasis upon the need for the tutor to state or 
assert the facts of the matter being explained. This 
emphasis is a major part of what he has to say but he goes 
further than this by ruling out the notion of a simple 
citation of relevant facts upon which no linguistic work 
has been done to organise them coherently or relate them 
to the underlying question, as being adequate. In other 
words, the task of organising, relating and finally present-
ing the explanation must be undertaken by the explainer. 
There will be occasions in teaching and learning when 
the function of explainer is taken on by a pupil. The 
majority of occasions will involve two pupils and, more 
rarely, a pupil explaining something to a teacher. It is 
important not to confuse the latter situation with one in 
which the teacher asks a pupil to explain to him something 
that he, the teacher, already knows. In this case, although 
he may use the word 'explain' the teacher is really asking 
the pupil to demonstrate to him what he, the pupil, knows 
or doesn't know, as the case may be. More commonly, where 
the activity of explaining something to someone is going on 
in a classroom it is the teacher who takes on the role of 
explainer. 
Price assigns to the explainee a passive linguistic 
role that corresponds to that of the explainer. It would be 
a mistake to interpret this as meaning that the explainee 
remains inert or that he is expected to parrot whatever the 
explainer says. Passive here refers to mood and thus carries 
the implication that the explainee is expected to respond 
 
as one who has received the action. The condition that re-
quires that his reason be acknowledged affords him opportuni-
ties to accept or reject what is offered or to respond in a 
way that may trigger a shift in question, making necessary 
the answering of subsidiary questions before understanding 
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is achieved. In the ideal episode the explainee will be 
striving to come to terms with the explanation being 
offered and, thus, his linguistic behaviour will demonstrate 
a preoccupation with acts that 'correspond to those of the 
explainer' because their major objective is understanding of 
the 'something', i.e. the underlying question that is being 
explained to him by 'someone', i.e. the explainer. 
Although, initially, the conditions that Price proposes 
appear to be extreme and terms like 'active and assertive' 
in relation to language use almost persuades one to reject 
them out of hand, closer examination has shown that they 
have some contribution to make to explaining. If 'active' 
and 'assertive' are used to mean that the explainer must be 
prepared to take on the role of the one who organises and 
presents the explanation as best he can and, in doing so, 
to make clear statements of fact as and when appropriate, 
Price is demanding no more than is usually necessary if an 
accurate explanation is to succeed in promoting understand-
ing. However, this does not prevent the demand from being 
deemed totally ludicrous in respect of many other activities 
that qualify as teaching and, indeed, in the case of certain 
other methods and ways of getting pupils to arrive at 
explanations which are not the specific kind of explaining 
with which this thesis is concerned. 
2.6 
	 The Essential Characteristics of Explaining Something  
to Someone 
If Price's model draws attention to the existence of 
a linguistic condition on explaining something to someone and, 
in doing so, differentiates explaining from teaching by requir-
ing a certain use of language, it is necessary to include 
other requirements that have been proposed and discussed. 
The attempt to define the philosophical nature of explaining 
with sufficient sensitivity to enable it to be distinguished 
from related activities like telling and informing considers 
six conditions, which are: 
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(1) A linguistic condition that requires the explainer 
to use language actively and assertively.(1) 
 
(2) A rationality condition that requires the explainer 
to be rational with the implication that he will 
conduct his manner of explaining rationally. 
(3) A rationality condition that requires the explainer 
to acknowledge the explainee's reason. 
(4) A truth condition that requires the explainer to 
present the true facts or what he perceives the true 
facts to be and not to misrepresent them for any reason. 
(5) An understanding condition that exerts pedagogical 
constraints upon the way in which an explainer proceeds. 
(6) A question-shifting condition that requires an explainer 
to answer the underlying question and at least one 
subsidiary question. 
Martin (1970: 128-29) contends that the above conditions 
have logical status and that each one must be met before it 
can be said that someone has explained something to another. 
She embodies all these conditions in yet another model which 
she refers to as Hypothesis Six, which is given below: 
The essential characteristics of explaining episodes 
are the following: 
(a) the underlying question is sound, i.e. admits 
of a right(2) answer or the tutor believes, or 
at least assumes, that the underlying question 
is sound, i.e. admits of a right answer; 
(1) Actively and assertively is used in the sense that is 
discussed on pp. 69-71 and 73. 
(2) It is appreciated that the notion of 'right' affords 
philosophical problems, which are not the concern of 
the present writer. The term is used in this thesis 
to mean one or a limited number of responses that, 
within the bounds of available knowledge, are generally 
held to be acceptable as the answer to a specific 
question. 
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(b) the tutor is rational and understands W(1) 
at the time of the episode, or thinks, or at 
least assumes, he understands W at the time 
of the episode; 
(c) during the episode the tutor knows, or believes, 
or at least assumes, that at the beginning of 
the episode the tutee was in some rational 
predicament with regard to the underlying question; 
(d) in the course of the episode the tutor states 
the right answer, or what he believes, or at 
least assumes, to be the right answer to the 
underlying question, or that part of the right 
answer, or what he takes to be the right answer, 
that in his opinion the tutee must learn in order 
to understand W or, for good pedagogical reasons, 
he states what he knows, or believes, or at least 
assumes, is not the right answer to the under-
lying question but is, in his opinion, sufficiently 
related to the right answer so that it will not 
prevent the tutee from understanding W at some 
later date; 
(e) in the course of the episode the tutor also 
provides or attempts to provide the tutee with 
answers to such subsidiary questions as he (the 
tutor) thinks necessary or effective or at least 
helpful for removing the basis of the predicament 
he deems the tutee to be in; 
(f) in the course of the episode the tutor encourages 
or allows the tutee to exercise, or at least does 
nothing to prevent the tutee from exercising, his 
reason and judgement with respect to the under-
lying and subsidiary questions and the answers 
to them given the tutee by the tutor; 
(g) at the end of the episode the tutor has organised 
for the tutee and stated to him the answers men-
tioned in (c) and (e). 
This modified hypothesis of Martin's appears to answer 
most of the criticisms that have been made of the other models 
and, from a purely philosophical standpoint, is the most 
satisfactory in relation to the kind of explaining episodes 
to be found in the context of teaching and learning. However, 
an account that is concerned only with philosophical aspects 
(1) 'W' here occupies a position taken up by an indirect 
question whose corresponding direct question underlines 
the episode. 
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cannot do full justice to all the factors present in the 
problem. It tends to place its emphasis upon the definitive 
and logical characteristics of the act and the explanations 
rather than upon the dynamic aspects of episodes. Influential 
factors rooted in contextual, cultural and behavioural 
considerations are either ignored or given only cursory 
attention. 
The contention that a complete account of the character-
istics of an explaining episode cannot be said to have been 
given while gaps of the sort described exist is one that can 
be defended, utilising support from social, psychological, 
linguistic and pedagogical theories. Indeed, within class-
room contexts, matters such as the perception of a tutee's 
predicament, question shifting and organisation of present-
ation are complex problems which will be informed by events 
that have occurred before the episode and by those that arise 
from within the situation in which the episode occurs. 
Cultural and conceptual distinctions between explainer and 
explainee being examples of the former; social interaction 
and role relationships examples of the latter. 
Another omission in Martin's modified hypothesis is any 
consideration of how an explaining episode arises within and 
is inserted into the broader context of the lesson. If this 
would seem to be a simple matter, a glance at transcripts 
of lessons containing explaining episodes soon dispels this 
belief. 
Starting from the position that a pupil's predicament 
in relation to some underlying question prompts the teacher 
to engage in an act of explaining, the context in which this 
information is received by the teacher is itself varied and 
may have implications for the conduct of the ensuing 
explaining episodes. 
It is possible that a teacher may perceive his pupils' 
predicament while marking their work and, as a result, plan 
and take an entire lesson as an explaining episode. Most 
frequently, explanations are evoked within the dynamic 
situation of the lesson itself by a pupil's question to 
the teacher, uncertain and incorrect pupil response to 
questions asked by the teacher, and questions asked by 
pupils of pupils when working in groups. 
A teacher may decide that the subject matter of his 
lesson is new and difficult and may choose to open the 
lesson with an act of explaining. He may find it necessary 
to continue to ask subsidiary questions that have a bearing 
on the underlying question at intervals throughout the entire 
lesson in his attempt to promote understanding. This raises 
the problem of deciding where the explaining episode begins 
and ends. If it begins and ends with each separate sequence 
of dialogue it is likely that many sequences will not achieve 
understanding of the underlying question. Indeed, in the case 
just described, it is only achieved within the final sequence 
of the string of sequences that have taken place within the 
lesson and which are directed at the underlying question. 
A teacher may choose to explain something to someone by 
telling a story. This raises the question of whether the 
episode can be regarded as dialogue. If the story contains 
an explanation and at some stage the teacher asks the pupil 
a subsidiary question that has a bearing on the underlying 
question and receives a response that satisfies the condition 
concerned with acknowledging the pupil's reason, it would 
appear that it does satisfy Martin's conditions. But this 
situation is another that makes it difficult to decide what 
constitutes the explaining episode, i.e. is the whole story 
to be taken as the teacher's explanation of the underlying 
question? For good pedagogical reasons, such as maintaining 
interest, the teacher may have included much material 
that does not contribute anything to the explanation but is 
bound in with those statements that do. There is nothing in 
Martin's hypothesis that informs problems of how an explanat 
icn is inserted into the broader context of the lesson. 
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Conceiving of an explaining episode as a sequence or 
sequences of dialogue concerned with answering an under-
lying question and at least one subsidiary question that 
has bearing on the underlying question carries the implicat-
ion that the length and complexity of episodes demonstrates 
considerable variation. Indeed, an explaining episode will 
share certain characteristics with Halliday's (1978) 'text-
in-situation' which he regards as a unit of semantic structure 
which has no connotations of size. As such, it seems unlikely 
that specific conditions or procedures can be found for 
defining the duration of an explaining episode. A more fruit-
ful approach appears to be one that examines each episode 
within the situation in which it arises and takes account of 
dynamic and contextual factors in coming to decisions about 
it. 
In concluding the discussion of Martin's Hypothesis, 
of the six conditions it reveals, the one pertaining to under-
standing requires further clarification. The understanding 
that explaining something to someone aims at goes beyond 
merely having an answer to the underlying question. It has 
affinities with knowing and believing and its nature is that 
of a cognitive verb. However, although understanding is what 
every explaining episode aims at, it does not necessarily 
follow that if all other conditions are satisfied it will be 
achieved. For in the same way that a teacher may teach and 
a pupil fail to learn, so an explainer may give an 
explanation and the explainee fail to understand. Problems 
of this sort will be examined in the next chapter, together 
with the closely associated and equally complex notion of 
meaning. 
Before leaving this discussion of the characteristics 
of explaining episodes it is worth looking at certain 
situations which require careful interpretation. One such 
situation involves the asking of a why-question that is 
rational but cannot be deemed to have a 'right' answer. 
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A useful notion when considering questions of this kind 
concerns the distinction drawn by Green (1971: 159-162) 
between explaining and giving reasons. He points out that 
answers to this 'why' have to do with justifying views, 
opinions, attitudes and behaviours. In these cases, a pupil 
may legitimately decide for himself whether to accept or 
reject the teacher's position. He may substitute his own 
views and even try to persuade the teacher that he (the 
pupil) has a better case than that offered by the teacher. 
Using Green's distinction, these activities are all to do 
with 'reason giving'and not with explaining something to some-
one in the sense that it is used in the thesis. Open-ended 
questions would tend to fall into this reason-giving category 
as it is impossible to conceive of explaining without incorp-
orating the notion of an explanation. As has been made clear 
in the discussion of kinds of explanations, implicit in the 
concept of an explanation is that, characteristically, it 
carries the correct answer to an underlying question. 
Another situation requiring special interpretation is 
one in which a why-question which has a right answer is posed 
by the pupil but in responding the teacher does not initiate 
an explaining episode. Instead, he meets the pupil's 
question and subsequent questions with questions of his own. 
The objective of this, meeting a question with another quest-
ion, is the setting up in the mind of the pupil a conceptual 
and cognitive set that is potentially useful for working out 
the answer to the underlying question. In this case, as with 
the last example, the teacher is not explaining. He is, for 
good pedagogical reasons, drawing from the pupil information 
that is already known and indicating ways in which it may be 
used to advantage. Although the activity is concerned with 
arriving at an explanation, the teacher does not take on the 
job of explainer, instead he attempts to manoeuvre the pupil 
into a position where he can find the explanation himself. 
Thus, this situation does not qualify as an example of 
explaining something to someone in the sense that has been 
defined by the present writer for the proposed investigation. 
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Nor would a situation qualify where the pupil had 
obtained the explanation by carrying out relevant experiments 
or by sifting through experimental data supplied by another. 
For this reason, the so-called Discovery Method makes, or 
should make when utilised effectively, less use of the activity 
of explaining something to someone than do traditional methods. 
This tendency is not only to be found in the teaching situation. 
Texts written for use with courses like Nuffield Science tend 
to guide pupils by asking questions rather than by offering 
explanations, while those geared to a more traditional 
syllabus contain a great many explanations. However, obtaining 
understanding of an explanation through reading it in a book 
does not qualify as an example of explaining something to some- 
one any more than do the previous two examples. The reason 
why this is so, involves the conception of an explaining 
episode as a dialogue between explainer and explainee, in 
which it is possible for the explainee to ask and receive 
answers to subsidiary questions that have a bearing upon the 
underlying question. While the writer of a book may attempt 
to emulate this feature by providing hypothetical questions 
that may be in the mind of the reader, he cannot set up the 
sort of exploratory interaction that is possible in the face- 
to-face situations characteristic of explaining episodes. 
One last situation that causes problems in deciding 
whether or not it qualifies as an explaining episode, is one 
in which a why-question has been asked by the pupil which has 
a right answer that is known to the teacher. The teacher 
offers some of the facts that are necessary to explain the 
underlying question and having done so suggests to the pupil 
that he can now work out the rest of the explanation for 
himself. Whether or not the pupil succeeds in working out 
the explanation from the new position he is in as a result 
of being given some of the facts is not a matter which helps 
very much with deciding if this situation is one in which the 
teacher has explained something to someone. It is doubtful 
that it would qualify. However, as it contains some activity 
which appears to go beyond reason-giving and as this 
particular kind of episode occurs quite frequently in 
teaching in relation to both Discovery Method and Traditional 
Methods it will be examined as a special case of explaining, 
thus taking account of it but differentiating it from what 
normally passes as explaining something to someone within 
the context of this thesis. 
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1.0 UNDERSTANDING SOMETHING 
The discussion of the previous chapter identified a 
variety of conditions that are characteristic of an explaining 
episode. Of only one of the conditions is it possible to 
say that it must be an objective but that the explaining 
episode is no less an explaining episode if it falls short 
of achieving this objective. The objective in question is 
that of understanding which, in this respect, is very much 
like learning. It can be achieved without the activity of 
explaining taking place and not attained after every effort 
has been made by the explainer to promote it. A variety of 
acts and strategies going on in the classroom may have under-
standing as an objective but have nothing to do with explain-
ing something to someone. Indeed, when discussing understand-
ing it should be borne in mind that it is very much an open 
question whether explaining is the most effective way to 
promote understanding even though by definition explaining 
has understanding as its goal. 
Initial discussion will be concerned with the essential 
characteristics of understanding, as a first step towards 
identifying some of the problems involved in its attainment. 
It is also thought necessary to consider it both from the 
position of promoter, which in classroom contexts is most 
commonly the teacher, and the position of the one trying to 
achieve understanding, that is, the pupil. As the focus for 
examining the act of explanation is that of explaining some-
thing to someone, a degree of consistency is achieved if the 
focus of this examination is 'understanding something'. 
The understanding that explaining something to someone 
aims at has nothing to do with being understood. It has some 
affinity with knowing and believing and when a person is 
said to understand in the sense in question, the verb 'under-
stand' is cognitive in character. Bearing this distinction 
in mind a negative thesis of Ryle (1949: 170-71) offers 
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further illumination. He rules out feelings and flashes 
of insight on the grounds that they are neither necessary 
for, nor a guarantee of, understanding, and contends: 
Even if you claimed that you had experienced a 
flash or click of comprehension and had actually 
so, you would still withdraw your other claim to 
have understood the argument if you found that 
you could not paraphrase it, illustrate, expand 
or recast it; and you would allow someone else to 
have understood it who could meet all examination 
questions about it, but reported no click of 
comprehension. 
In short, Ryle is claiming that the true test of understanding 
is some kind of appropriate performance in which the knowing 
that is achieved through understanding is demonstrated. 
This leaves open to interpretation the question of what 
counts as an adequate demonstration or performance. The 
knowledge required for understanding certain things involves 
knowing how. In these cases some degree of competence in 
performance is clearly necessary but it is doubtful whether 
the requirement demands competence in executing the task. It 
is possible to say that a person understands the game of cri-
cket though he is not a competent player cr does not choose to 
play or had never had the opportunity to play. It is true 
that there are aspects of the game that can only be appreciated 
and thus understood at first hand, i.e. as a player. However, 
the fact that the understanding of the game that the person 
in question has acquired does not incorporate the experiences 
of a player will not prevent him understanding the game from 
the perspective of spectator. Furthermore, his understanding 
can be tested by asking him to explain the laws and strategic 
concepts of the game; to comment on the state of play and even 
to make judgements concerning the merits of specific bowlers 
or batsmen. Recognising that different aspects of under-
standing can be had of one and the same thing may well be an 
important step towards a clearer understanding of something 
and another may involve accepting that one sort of under- 
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standing of something may be deeper and better informed 
than another. 
Martin (1970: 150-51) offers her own explanation of 
why it is possible to accept that a variety of different 
sorts of understanding exist in relation to the same thing or 
class of things. She maintains that the verb to understand 
shares with the verb to explain the propensity for sometimes 
being followed by an indirect question and sometimes not: 
Thus we say that the assistant mechanic under-
stands why the engine seized up but also that 
he understands the engine seizure; that the 
critic understands how the work of art hangs 
together, but also that he understands the 
work of art. 
She claims that where someone is said to understand something 
and no indirect question is implied it does no harm to the 
'initial attribution of understanding' to supply one or more 
such questions. This would then allow the verb understand 
to take a variety of indirect questions, i.e. 'that given 
any object of understanding, more than one indirect question 
may be applicable to it.' She admits when offering this 
proposal that in certain contexts an indirect question may 
have a special status. By this she means that, in a given 
context, it may be possible to understand something only in 
terms of a particular indirect question. 
Martin (ibid: 150) draws attention to the view held 
by some that it is possible to distinguish the theoretical 
disciplines from one another 'in terms of the questions 
they ask and purport to answer about phenomena.' She is not 
prepared to dismiss this view out of hand on the grounds that 
much asking and answering of characteristic questions does go 
on in the disciplines making it necessary for the learner to 
understand things in terms of certain other indirect quest-
ions. However, it is also true that there are other quest-
ions which are shared by more than one discipline and indeed 
aspects of one discipline that can be understood only in 
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terms of another. For example, the digestive system in 
Biology cannot be fully understood without reference to 
the chemical actions involved. Thus, the questions to be 
asked and answered in relation to these phenomena will, 
in this case, be those found within the discipline of 
chemistry. It would seem, therefore, that no discipline 
has sole rights over the phenomena it studies and that they 
share questions, vocabulary and other things. 
A notable feature of understanding is that it lacks 
the characteristic of being complete. That is to say, in 
absolute sense it is open-ended. It is possible to have 
in mind some accepted standard when judging one's own or 
another's understanding of a particular phenomenon, but 
there are always new ways of viewing things and new 
knowledge can effect changes in what have been previously 
accepted as good explanations. 
1.1 Understanding as Seeing Connections  
Understanding is often viewed as involving connections 
or relationships. The continuous series model of Dray 
(discussed in Chapter 2) with its emphasis upon gap filling, 
is based upon this assumption. Thus, to understand why 
something happened or is the case, it is at least necessary 
to see the connection between cause and effect. In other 
words, it is not enough to know the cause and the effect the 
requirement is that the relationship between the two must be 
perceived and understood. Bearing this claim in mind it is 
reasonable to suggest that seeing connections plays a 
crucial role in understanding. Martin (1970: 153-54) takes 
this position and points out that the sort of connections 
to be seen will differ depending on the sort of under-
standing involved. She suggests that there are two sorts 
of connection that depend upon the manner in which the 
thing to be understood is treated, as follows: 
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On the one hand X may be treated as a whole, 
a unity, and may be connected or related to 
something else, something apart from it; let 
us call connections of this sort external. On 
the other hand, X may be taken in isolation -
that is to say, without relating it to other 
things - treated as a composite, and parts or 
aspects of it may be connected or related; 
let us call connections or relations of this 
sort internal. 
Martin offers works of art as examples of the latter type of 
connection. A work often has its parts singled out for 
attention and relationships sought. It is possible for two 
people to have internal understanding of the same thing and 
their understanding to be very different. For as Martin 
(ibid: 155) points out we 'never understand a thing per se; 
rather, we understand it under some description.' The issue 
is made more complex by the fact that different sorts of re-
lationship can be seen as a result of selecting certain parts 
for attention. However, the connection or relationship must 
be there to be seen, where 'seen' is used to mean, become 
aware of, and not to imagine, fancy or visualise. 
Examples of external connections are numerous and 
include causal relationships, i.e. a relationship between two 
distinct entities is pointed to. Martin (ibid: 158) maintains 
that saying that someone has external understanding of some-
thing 
is, in effect, to say that he understands something 
under some description as bearing some relation to 
something else which is, itself, under some 
description. 
A common form of external understanding involves classifying 
something in an illuminating way. In other words, understan-
ing by classifying involves a redescription of something, a 
change in its original classification, that relates it to a 
_ - 
different class of things. Martin admits that it is not poss-
ible to set limits on the way in which something can legiti- 
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mately be redescribed nor can one do more than hope that re-
description will lead to understanding, for so much depends 
upon the experience, knowledge, competence and purposes of 
the person involved in doing the understanding. However, 
this does not argue against the practice which is effective 
if only because the process of looking around and beyond 
something in an attempt to understand that something, is, 
in itself, to some degree illuminating. It is also possible 
to look within something in an attempt to understand it, 
thus analysing is an alternative to classifying. This tends 
to be particularly effective in relation to internal under-
standing, but not exclusively so. 
Within the notion of seeing connections as a case of 
understanding lies the implication that the 'seeing' is some-
thing that a person must do for himself. Help can be offer- 
cG 	 others through the giving of relevant information, the 
development of a conceptual repertoire and breaking down 
the explanation into simpler units but, in the end, the work 
has to be undertaken by the receiver of the explanation and 
this involves him in an intellectual confrontation with the 
relevant facts. Use is made of this phenomenon by proponents 
of Discovery Methods when making claims in respect of their 
effectiveness in promoting understanding. They point out 
that the pupil has to confront the available evidence in 
trying to work out an explanation for himself. It is true 
that the pupil is not in this position when something is 
being explained to him by another but it is still essential 
that he be involved actively with the information being offer-
ed to him. Indeed, by whatever means the information comes 
to the pupil, be it an explaining episode or through his own 
experimentation, some sort of active engagement is necessary 
if understanding is to be achieved. Thus, setting aside 
rote learning, which has to do with telling rather than 
explaining, it is a mistake to assume that active assertive 
use of language by the Teacher precludes active confrontation 
of the material by the pupil. It is also necessary, as has 
been mentioned above, to differentiate questions concerning 
the method of obtaining information from those associated 
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with what the pupil does with the information when he has it. 
1.2 Promoting and Achieving Understanding 
In attempting to promote understanding the teacher is 
thrown back upon his ability to use language in a way that 
is intelligible to the pupil. For, though all the conditions 
governing an explaining episode are taken account of prob-
lems associated with communication may interfere and be part-
icularly resistant to attempts to overcome them. There is 
nothing new about this problem for as far back as the Seven-
teenth Century, Locke (1690) in his translation theory of 
understanding claimed that understanding is dependent upon 
finding the right words in order to communicate our ideas 
to another without 'the inconvenience of obscurity or un-
certainty in the signification of words.' A particular 
version of the theory is offered by Steiner (1975: 28) 
who, in attempting to describe the processes that have to 
go on before an individual can receive communication and 
respond to it, arrives at an interpretation that claims 'a 
message from a source language passes into a receptor 
language via a transformational process.' In other words, 
an individual understands what is said to him in his own 
language in much the same way as he understands one that 
speaks to him in a language that he has some knowledge of 
but which is not his mother tongue. Steiner sees the 
translation occurring from private language into public 
language and vice versa, where public language is 'speakers' 
language. 
That Steiner's theory is altogether too exaggerated 
is a view supported by Parkinson (1977) and Stewart (1977). 
Parkinson (1977: 11-12) is highly critical of Steiner's 
(1975: 198) view that that with which a word is associated 
is the meaning of the word and although associations will 
vary greatly from one person to another, such that no 
dictionary could include them, nevertheless, it is in this 
manner that individuals 'put meaning into meaning'. He 
points out that on Steiner's theory understanding of another 
will be well nigh unattainable for it would be quite 
impossible to know all the private associations that a word 
has for another person. Stewart (1977: 29-30) also takes 
up this point and says that if syntax and vocabulary with 
private nuances and associations are deemed to be a person's 
idiolect, then: 
translating into my idiolect with my associations 
could do nothing for my understanding of your 
idiolect with your associations, since it is 
just because they are different that Steiner 
says we must translate in the first place. If, 
alternatively, he means that we keep the 
associations and change the expressions into 
our own personal idioms, to match, then it is 
simply false that we do anything of the kind. 
For one thing, even if we tried, we would already 
have to understand the other person's words first, 
or at least have learnt the translation rules 
which, again, carries some kind of prior under-
standing with it. 
It should be stressed tnat both Parkinson and Stewart do 
not dispute that there are aspects of privacy of association 
and of intention in a person's use of language. However, as 
he, Stewart, (ibid: 41) points out there are problems about 
speakers meaning, i.e. connotations and implications, 
commentator problems concerned with why someone should have 
said what he did and 'problems of utterance meaning, problems 
of simply saying what the original said'. Thus, in answer 
to a question concerned with how one understands the meaning 
of x and y, one can only reply in the same way that one 
understands anything, i.e. through familiarity with the 
language and thought of the appropriate milieu. Furthermore, 
there are no theoretical obstacles to doing this, those that 
do exist are of a practical or a special nature in contexts 
where there is little opportunity to engage in dialogue. In 
a sense, problems of understanding and problems of translation 
are the same problem but, unlike Steiner's view, problems of 
translation are seen as problems of understanding and not 
the other way around. 
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It is advisable for a teacher to take account of the 
practical and special obstacles to understanding, that Stewart 
mentions, when seeking to promote understanding as the end 
products of an explaining episode for both are likely to be in 
evidence in a context of this nature. Something as fundamental 
as finding the right words will force him to take account of a 
variety of factors. Gurney (1973: 92-93) suggests that a 
'sender' in this situation will make an assessment of the age, 
intelligence and state of knowledge of the receiver with a view 
to selecting the right conceptual level of the message. He 
will note the motivation, interests and state of readiness to 
ensure attention and, finally, select a suitable register(1) 
 
with a view to accomplishing maximum information flow and the 
easing of the listener's task in understanding what is being 
said, both of which optimise the chances of the sender accom-
plishing his purpose. Gurney (ibid: 94) adds the warning 
that having taken account of all these factors there is 
likely to be 'all the difference in the world between our 
intention to communicate and what we actually achieve.' 
Doughty and Thornton (1973: 60) call that which takes 
place during the process of understanding an aspect of the 
activity of languaging. They contend that a self consistent 
symbol system is used to derive meaningfulness from the 
'meaning potential'(2) 
 encoded in the utterances of others. 
They include among their postulates about language as a 
form of behaviour unique to human beings, one that offers 
the view that a particular language is learnt by human beings 
through continuous interaction with others who already have 
an operational command of that language, and another that has 
much to do with activities involved in understanding. They 
claim that acquiring a capacity to 'language' is the same 
as acquiring a capacity to make meanings. Therefore, it is 
possible to say: 
(1) Register, a term associated with M.A.K. Halliday that is 
defined as any variety of language distinguished accord-
ing to characteristics of use. 
(2) Meaning - potential, a notion associated with M.A.K. 
Halliday. (1975: 8) 
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that an individual uses language to discriminate 
between one experience and the next; he calls 
upon the categories of his language for classifying 
and recording what he experiences; and he makes use 
of the resources of the symbolic system in his 
possession to understand what it is that he has 
experienced. (ibid: 61) 
The points raised here have implications for explain-
ing episodes, having, as they do, understanding as their 
desired goal. The implications suggest that for a teacher to 
obtain the desired goal he must pay attention to certain 
linguistic features that are influential in the task of get-
ting over what he wants to say. In doing so, he may well be 
faced with questions concerning the degree to which his own 
use of language is clear and direct and the way in which he 
will try to utilise the existing command of language in the 
pupil. In other words, as the teacher prepares to explain 
something to someone he is confronted with the problem of 
meaning and its communication. 
2.0 MEANING AND ITS COMMUNICATION IN EXPLAINING SOMETHING TO SOMEONE 
It is possible to ask two kinds of questions about 
meaning. The first kind can be thought of as what-questions, 
for example, what is meaning? The second kind are how-questions, 
for example, How do I know what words to use to convey meaning? 
Within the context of understanding an explanation given by one 
person to another, communication of meaning is an essential 
feature and thus the second kind of question is more useful. 
Causal theories of meaning appear to get over the problem by 
having something to say to both. 
2.1 
	 Learning the Meaning of Words  
Causal theorists affirm that every word that is learnt 
comes to produce a mental image of or about the corresponding 
thing in the 'real' world. A process akin to conditioning 
is seen as going on as words acquire meaning for an individual. 
Two distinct aspects, namely, the physical content and the 
psychological content are present in the situation in which 
learning the meaning of a word is going on. A person comes 
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to understand another by a process in which one person's 
thought is associated causally with certain words which 
when uttered cause the other person to have the same or sim-
ilar thoughts. This view has some weaknesses as a theory of 
meaning. Perhaps the most obvious is its pseudo-scientific 
character. It gives the impression of following from sci-
entific discoveries largely because it is known that words 
stimulate the nervous system and produce effects and that 
communicating behaviour can only occur because these proces-
ses are taking place. What does follow is that science can 
explain how certain sounds serve as vehicles of communication. 
Indeed, questions about what it is for a word to have a mean-
ing and what the meaning is of a particular word are not pro-
per questions for scientists. Taylor (1970:120-23) attacks 
the errors in causal theory convincingly. He rejects the no-
tion that communication consists in uttering words which 
cause effects on the thoughts of another as implying something 
like a reflex action or an automatic response that, in his 
view, is the last thing we would say is true of understanding. 
He asserts that a distinction must be drawn between causal 
relations and meaning relations and also points out that in 
communication words convey thoughts not because 'they are 
causally related to the things thought about but because 
they are related by convention.' 
Taylor (ibid:123-26) not only believes that the causal 
theory misinterprets the concepts of understanding and comm-
unication, he thinks it fails altogether in its attempt to 
define the meanings of particular words in terms of their 
effects on hearers. He maintains that learning the meaning 
of words is learning to use them in regular and correct ways. 
Thus, there are rules implicit in their use which give a 
word its meaning. He (ibid:127) maintains that these rules 
are prior logically, and that: 
A word's having a meaning can be likened to its 
having consequences in use which are determined 
by such rules. 
In trying to answer the question concerning the mean-
ing of a word, Taylor (ibid:130-31) offers four suggest-
ions: 
(1) particular objects, events or situations (this 
chair, this red thing); 
(2) classes of objects, events or situations 
(chairs, red things); 
(3) universals, properties or essenc es (redness, 
chairness); 
(4) mental states, ideas, images or thoughts. 
He points out that at different times we accept one or other 
of these suggestions. The first three correspond to the 
pattern and order that the world displays, the fourth 
reflects what we have in mind. Of course, what one has in 
mind and conveys through speech may not correspond to the 
real world but to personal perceptions of the world. It is, 
therefore, possible to think of meanings as: 
1. independent and real characteristics of the world; 
2. things in the mind; 
3. what we use words to talk about. 
Taylor (ibid: 149) rejects all three of these as a possible 
theory of meaning(1) and offers the view that: 
Understanding and knowing the meaning of words is 
using them correctly and responding appropriately 
when others use them. The concepts of under-
standing and knowing the meaning of a word refer 
to patterns of behaviour, in particular, skills 
exhibited over fairly long periods. 
This account does appear to pay more attention to cultural 
and contextual features than is the case in causal theory 
although it does not elaborate upon their influence. It 
is also pertinent in relation to explaining as an activity of 
teaching. The point raised in it could be incorporated into 
(1) For the purpose of this study it is not necessary to 
discuss the philosophical reasons offered by Taylor 
in rejecting the proposed theories of meaning. 
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criteria to be used by the teacher in making a realistic 
assessment of the state of knowledge and linguistic 
competence of the pupil. He could also bear these in mind 
when selecting the words of his explanations, making sure 
that within the demands imposed by the subject matter he 
utilises words most likely to be those with which the 
receiver of the explanation is familiar. 
There are problems associated with deciding how 
long must a word be used before it can be assumed that its 
meaning is understood by the user, even from a position in 
which one is able to concentrate attention on the language 
used by a particular individual over a period of time. For 
the teacher meeting hundreds of pupils for a relatively short 
time during each week it could be an impossible task to make 
such judgements with any degree of accuracy. He probably 
gets round the problem by making judgements that are related 
to his perception of what, typically, can be expected of a 
pupil at a given age and stage of conceptual development. 
Taylor's theory of meaning draws attention to the need for 
awareness on the part of teachers that the assessments they 
make of the linguistic competences of their pupils are at 
best crude and in cases involving individual pupils, very 
wide of the mark. The difficulties associated with making 
assessments of linguistic competences may be exacerbated by 
other factors. One example is the ability of some pupils 
to speak words after a very slight acquaintance with them. 
Studies of classroom dialogue such as those of Barnes (1969 
and 1976) and Richards (1978) support this observation and, 
further, claim that pupils can habitually use words 
appropriately in specific contexts while having little or 
no understanding of their meaning. 
There are also problems associated with both 
private and restricted meanings. An example of the former 
is the idiosyncratic experiences associated with a particular 
word that influence an individual's conception of its meaning 
and of the latter, those meanings which arise within the 
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context of social, ethnic, interest and occupational speech  
networks,(1) 
 contained within a speech community, and 
which are shared by their numbers. 
2.2 Communicating Meanings and Understanding Communications  
Within the context of explaining something to someone 
the complexity of the problems described above tends to 
increase. It is highly likely that the notions within the 
explanation consist of 'compounds' of concepts or that 
conceptually they are of an order of difficulty that will be 
found demanding by the pupil. The need to operate within the 
limits of the receivers linguistic competence in order that 
the intended meaning is conveyed as accurately as possible, 
cannot be over-stressed, particularly where there is new 
material that the receiver has to match with existing mental 
structures or sets in order to make sense of the explanation. 
Yet another difficulty is encountered when attempting to 
define new words, particularly those deemed to be technical, 
with reference to other words. Again, the teacher's selection 
of words to convey the meaning of the new word is dependent 
for its success upon the accuracy of his assessment of the 
pupil's vocabulary. Evidence from studies of Barnes (1969 
& 1976) and Richards (1978) finds that teachers are on the 
whole aware of the problems posed by technical vocabulary,(2)  
but in their attempts to re-define such terms through the use 
of non-specialist vocabulary, they demonstrate less awareness 
of the limits of the vocabularies of their pupils than could 
be hoped for. If, in fact, a non-technical word is totally 
unfamiliar to the receiver, i.e. he has not encountered it, 
used it correctly or responded to it or another's use of it, 
on some earlier occasion, the re-definition is no help at all. 
(1) The term speech-network is that used by Fishman (1970) 
in his discussion of the nature of the language varieties 
to be found in a speech community of even moderate 
complexity. 
(2) A technical term is seen as a word or phrase which, when 
used in the context of a specific subject, carries a 
single scientific meaning. 
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Another view that offers insights into the function 
of language in communicating meaning in cognitive discourse 
is that of Harrison (1972: 153-155). He sees language as 
a system of linguistic devices(1)  where linguistic devices 
are characterised as 'systems (of rules), each of which 
determines or is determined by a certain sort of social 
discourse.' In discussing the function of these devices 
within the activity of giving information he maintains that 
informative discourse is highly complex involving the inter-
play of a number of linguistic devices. These points are 
relevant to a consideration of explaining something to some-
one where the giving of information is a necessary condition. 
The view of understanding is similarly useful. Harrison 
(ibid: 161-162) rejects the idea that understanding can be 
interpreted in terms of a certain picture preferring to 
believe that a learner possessing linguistic competence can 
be said to know the 'rule-licensed procedures appropriate 
to a given utterance' and the 'experienced-licensed 
implications that an utterance possesses.' He qualifies 
the latter aspect further by adding - 'in the event that 
it is taken as trustworthy, in virtue of the fact that it 
generates certain rule-licensed procedures.' 
Harrison (ibid: 162) suggests, that if his view is 
correct, it must follow for a given information utterance 
(which he symbolises as 'U') that when someone understands 
'U' 
the fact that he knows how to generate the rule-
licensed procedures appropriate to 'U' is always 
prior to, and is the ground of, his knowledge of 
the experience-licensed implications of 'U'. 
Thus, to say of somebody that he understands 'U' 
may mean simply that he possesses the strictly 
linguistic capacity to carry out the rule-licensed 
procedures appropriate to 'U'. Or it may, or may 
also, mean that he has seen, or is capable of 
seeing a greater or smaller number of experience, 
(1) 	 He uses the phrase 'linguistic devices' to replace 
'language game' on the grounds that 'Language games' are not, 
as has often been pointed out much like games. In general any 
phrase which ties our conception of linguistic rules to a 
particular metaphor is to be avoided. 
(Ibid:8) 
licensed implications of 'U'. 
The distinction that is made here between rule-licensed 
procedures and experience-licensed implications are implicit 
in Taylor's model (see pp. 82-83) as 'the ability to use 
words correctly and respond appropriately when others use 
them', on the one hand, and the reference to 'patterns of 
behaviour, in particular skills exhibited over fairly long 
periods', on the other. The distinction also appears to 
account for it being possible to say of someone that he 
understands what is being said without understanding the 
significance of what is said. 
Harrison (ibid: 166) warns that the distinction in 
question cannot be used to clarify distinctions between tell-
ing and revealing, pointing out that it is possible to exhibit 
the cognitive content of an utterance by producing other 
utterances that state it. In the case of distinctions between 
what is told to another and what the utterance reveals (con-
sidered as an inductive sign) to that other it is only 
intelligible, 
by virtue of the fact that we can state what it 
is that we have been told and, thus, can distinguish 
what we have been told from what we have assumed, 
inferred, invented, imagined, and so forth. 
Thus, to say that someone understands the meaning of 
an informative utterance is to say, at the very least, that 
he can perform the rule-licensed procedures appropriate to 
the utterance and can say what the speaker responsible for 
the utterance told him in uttering the utterance. 
Katz (1972 : 3-4), discussing semantics, points out 
that linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal 
speaker and listener unaffected by grammatically irrelevant 
distractions, such as, shifts of attention and characteristic 
errors in applying his knowledge of the language in actual 
performance. In accepting the view that the basic function 
of natural languages is to serve as vehicles of communication 
for their speakers he maintains that it is not function that 
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distinguishes one language from another but differences in 
the range of information that can be commanded. He cites 
(ibid: 69) the principle of expressibility associated with 
Frege (1963) which postulates that anything which is thinkable 
is communicable through some sentence of a natural language 
and the principle of universality of Tarski (1956) that 
natural languages can express whatever can be meaningfully 
spoken about. This latter view is shared by Searle (1969) 
who also argues that whatever a speaker might want to mean 
can be said. 
Rommetveit (1969: 166) argues that Searle's principle 
of expressibility should be 'conceived of as a basic pragmatic 
postulate of verbal communication.' He rejects the contention 
that everything that can be meant can be said on the grounds 
that it ignores the function of dynamic residuals(1) in acts 
of verbal communication. He maintains that an encounter 
between a restricted and elaborated code(2) may, in part, be 
described as a mismatch of presuppositions. Lack of inter-
subjectivity is caused by a failure to adopt the role of the 
other, i.e. 
to the "restricted" speaker's failure to engage 
in the kind of decentered categorization and 
attribution characteristic of the listener's 
approach and to the "elaborated" listener's 
incapacity to share the engagement and more 
restricted perspective of the speaker. 
Mismatches of the sort Rommetveit describes make it difficult 
for the interpretive and 'filling in' procedures that promote 
the meaningfulness of an utterance to operate. Cicourel 
(1) Residuals - Tacitly taken for granted commonalities 
with respect to interpretations (ibid: 164). 
(2) Rommetveit is referring to Bernstein's notion of 
restricted and elaborated codes. 
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(1973) has more to say about these procedures which will be 
discussed during the examination of sociosemantic factors 
in communication that takes place in section (2.3) of this 
chapter. 
At this stage, the points raised by Rometveit serve as 
A 
a clear reminder that in the accounts that have been offered 
many statements refer to ideal states and appear to be con-
cerned with that aspect of language that Chomsky (1965) 
identifies as linguistic competence. He finds it necessary 
to distinguish linguistic competence which he perceives as 
a system of rules that formally represent the ideal linguistic 
structures that underlie the utterances of natural speech from 
linguistic performance perceived as the principles speakers 
use in producing and understanding rational speech. The 
diagram below shows Chomsky's attempt to relate utterances 
to their underlying meanings. 
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A theory of the ideal speaker's linguistic competence to 
relate accoustic signals to meaning is broader than a theory 
of language and in real life situations, where conditions and 
individuals vary so much more, factors from a variety of 
distinct fields and disciplines are introduced. Chomsky's 
model serves as a reminder that in producing an utterance 
with the intention of communicating meaning there must be 
congruence between the phonological, grammatical and semantic 
dimensions of language. If to this requirement are added 
those factors associated with interaction processes, 
perceptual sensitivity and conceptualisation, it would seem 
to be something of an accomplishment to be able to hold an 
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intelligible conversation. 
Clearly, the key to holding intelligible conversation 
lies within the notion of communication, but it would be 
wrong to think of language and communication as one and the 
same. Language is one powerful medium for communication 
but not the only one. It is also widely accepted that 
language is used for thinking about things in the absence 
of any wish on the part of the thinker to communicate his 
thoughts to another. It could be argued that subsequently 
these thoughts may form all or part of a communication but 
it seems highly unlikely that this happens to all thoughts. 
Some are likely to be stored in the thinker's mind or 
totally discarded. 
Communication is not necessarily concerned with supply-
ing new information. Many conversations only confirm what is 
already known or partially known. Even so, there may be a 
gap between what an individual intends to communicate and 
what he actually achieves. The fact that this problem arises 
in ordinary conversations carries the implication that in 
everyday situations it is necessary to add to the dimensions 
of linguistic competence and linguistic performance that of 
communicative competence. There is considerable support for 
this view. For example, Greene (1977: 88) argues that whether 
competence is thought of as a neutral linguistic description 
or as rules actually used by a speaker there is still the 
question of whether, in principle, it is possible to give an 
account of the linguistic meanings of utterances without 
taking into account the way they are used to communicate in 
particular situations. 
This position is similar to that expressed by Halliday 
(1973) although Halliday argues against Chomsky's notion of 
linguistic competence on the grounds that it is more concerned 
with 'knowing' than with 'doing' things with language. Greene 
does not support Halliday in this for she interprets Chomsky 
as claiming that native speakers behave as if they follow 
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linguistic rules and not that they know the rules. Perhaps 
more important to explaining something to someone is the 
implication that the ability to communicate depends on the 
speaker behaving as if he is following the rules for using 
language appropriately. Greene (1977: 89) suggests that 
a competent speaker needs to be equipped both with 
a systematic knowledge of the mapping rules 
between linguistic forms and potential 
meanings (the domain of Chomsky's theory)(1)  
and equally with a systematic knowledge of 
how to map potential linguistic meanings in 
the actual meanings appropriate to their use 
in specific contexts (as Halliday is trying 
to do.) 
Competence and performance theories appear to account for 
different stages in the communicative function of language. 
There appears to be little doubt that one alone cannot do 
so and in no situation involving language use is this more 
true than that of explaining something to someone. 
One further distinction that may have relevance for 
explaining arises from the role of intentions in the theory 
of language use. Platts (1979: 86) suggests that 'a 
sentence has meaning because people give it meaning by 
uttering it with certain intentions' and goes on to 
claim that it is not necessary to consider a range of 
intentional theories as that of Grice (1969: 147:77) is the 
most plausible. This makes a crucial distinction between 
sentence-meaning and utterers-meaning, where the utterer's-
meaning is defined in terms of utterers-intention. The final 
stage of the theory attempts to define sentence-meaning in 
terms of uttererls-meaning. 
Platts (1979:92) on the basis of a requirement that 
there is no intention on the part of the speaker to conceal 
his meaning, argues that it is possible to maintain that: 
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(1) The brackets are those of the present writer. 
1. An utterance is a piece of linguistic 
behaviour only if it is intentional. 
2. Sentence meaning can be defined in terms of 
utterers intentions. 
3. The meaning of any sentence in a language 
can be determined by reference to the 
intentions with which it is uttered. 
This view raises some problems in certain contexts 
but in explaining something to someone it appears to be both 
relevant and acceptable. It clarifies the position when, as 
commonly occurs in explaining, the meaning of an utterance 
is taken by the explainee to mean something other than that 
intended by the explainer. The theory has implications for 
explainer and explainee that have to do with the need to build 
in adequate checks, possibly through a shift in question, 
so that discrepancies between the utterers-intentions (i.e. 
the sentence-meanings) of the explainer and the interpret- 
not 
ations of these by the explainee will go unnoticed. 
The problem of misinterpretation is discussed by 
Saugstad (1977: 208-9) in his theory of communication and use 
of language. He reminds the reader that individuals partici-
pating in communication must be capable of perceiving, 
thinking, imagining and remembering. He (ibid: 221) argues 
that understanding involves specifying because for an 
individual to understand what another is communicating he 
must understand the communication as concerning the represent-
ation of some specific category. It follows, therefore, that 
two individuals engaged in communication must be capable 
of selecting the same category represented, otherwise it would 
not be possible to correct interpretations that were not in 
agreement with what was communicated by the first person, nor 
for the first person to ascertain whether or not the receiver 
of the communication had understood him correctly. 
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Saugstad (ibid: 230-31) maintains that more than one 
interpretation can be given by an individual who is to under-
stand that something is being communicated to him, therefore 
the reaction on the part of the organism must be seen as a 
selective reaction. Thus, it would appear that the four 
activities involved in communicating (perceiving, thinking, 
imagining, remembering) must be subject to some direction of 
attention. He argues (ibid: 247) that understanding should 
not be seen as always present in an individual even though 
the individual consistently demonstrates that he is 
capable of understanding communications. In cases where 
an individual does not understand what is being communicated 
Saugstad (ibid: 250) suggests that the reason may be to do 
with: 
(1) category represented 
(2) whether sign used to make reference to the 
category represented is actually being 
used for this particular reference. 
A point worthy of note is that if the sign in (2) is lacking 
it cannot be assumed that (1) has not been faulty. 
2.3 	 Sociosemantic Factors in Communication 
The points that Saugstad makes concerning first the 
need for speaker and receiver of a communication to select 
the same category represented and, secondly, that under-
standing that something is being communicated involves a 
selective reaction, draws attention to those aspects of 
communication that are not revealed through a philosophical 
examination of the activity that is concerned only with ideal 
states. Rather, it is a social-functional approach to 
language that is likely to be the more fruitful, particularly 
in relation to the activity of explaining something to some-
one. Halliday (1978: 56) has just this approach to language. 
He argues that language can be considered from two main 
perspectives. The intra-organism perspective is concerned 
with what goes on inside a person and the inter-organism 
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perspective with what goes on between persons in communica-
tion. He concentrates his attention upon the latter but sees 
them as complementary. Thus, mental operations concerned with 
an individual's retrieval of past learning, for transfer to 
relevant contexts as they arise, make possible the communica-
tive facility that Halliday (ibid:61) has in mind when he 
contends that 
a text(1)is meaningful not so much because the hearer 
does not know what the speaker is going to say, as in 
a mathematical model of communication, but because he 
does know. He has abundant evidence, both from his 
knowledge of the general (including statistical) pro-
perties of the linguistic system and from his sensi-
bility to the particular cultural, situational and 
verbal context; and this enables him to make informed 
guesses about the meanings that are coming his way. 
In everyday speech participants take for granted their 
sharing of a common interpretation and their 'filling in' of 
what is necessary to promote meaningfulness (the et cetera 
assumption) will have a high degree of success. However, an 
explaining episode is potentially a situation where the hear-
er lacks abundant evidence about the meanings coming his way. 
It will be more difficult therefore for 'informed guesses' to 
be made but this need not prevent the hearer who is 'sensible' 
to the situational and verbal content, from doing so. Indeed, 
an explaining episode is rarely a novel and isolated incident. 
It usually occurs within a specific situation and is linked 
to all that is going on in that situation, and to earlier ex-
periences in which the same, or related concepts, that are 
present in that situation, have arisen. But it is likely 
that there will be more strain upon perception and memory 
than is the case in ordinary conversation. 
Where the situation is one involving teacher and pupils, 
factors associated with status have to be taken into account. 
Teachers are in an authoritative position by reason of their 
specialist knowledge and ascribed power, they control the 
functions, the interaction and thus the language in episodes. 
(1) Text - The concept of a text, with particular reference to 
the text-in-situation is regarded by Halliday as the 
basic unit of semantic structure. It has no connotations 
of size and may refer to speech act, exchange, narrative, 
episode, etc. 
(ibid: 60) 
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The characteristic demands upon communicative competence 
are in their hands and it is highly likely that the communiptions 
in subject explanations will present pupils with more problems 
to overcome than do ordinary conversational communications. 
To make a more sensitive comparison it is necessary to 
employ an approach such as Halliday's (ibid: 60-61) in which he 
uses situational factors as determinants of the text which 
identifies categories of field, tenor and mode. He defines 
the first two as follows: 
Field refers to the ongoing activity and the particular 
purposes that the use of language is serving within the 
context of that activity; tenor refers to the inter-
relations among the participants (status and role 
relationships) 
	  
Mode is not confined simply to the medium of communication, 
i.e. spoken or written to be spoken, it also reflects the kind 
of speech by monologuing or conversation. 
If the categories are used to analyse the determinants 
of a number of explaining episodes certain of the situational 
features tend to conform to a common pattern. This is to be 
expected, as explaining something to someone is a specific 
language activity governed by sets of conditions which con, 
strain it relatively strongly. The actual form of an ex-
planation can vary from one episode to another and certain 
features, as for instance, procedural strategies, or style 
of discourse, reveal clear distinctions. 
A number of these distinctions reflect the explainer's 
procedural options, the selection of which may have been in-
fluenced by the nature of the explanation or informed by what 
the explainer perceives to be the state of the explainee. 
Thus, an explaining episode could incorporate the telling of 
a story, use of an analogy, a breakdown of the underlying 
question into simpler parts, or a logical sequence, for 
example, from familiar material to new material. 
Halliday (ibid: 68) also offers a model of language that 
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brings together linguistic, social and cultural systems. In 
doing so, he centres attention upon those components of a 
sociolinguistic theory that enable him to view text as a 
semantic unit that is realised through grammatical units such 
as sentences. He argues 
a child learning his mother tongue is constructing 
a meaning potential: that is, he is constructing a 
semantic system, together with its realizations. 
The number and variety of sociological factors that 
appear in Halliday's model are intimidating, the more so 
because of their potentiality for influencing an individual's 
semantic interpretation of communication. The schematic 
representation is given on page 108. 
This view of language as social semiotic makes an im-
portant contribution to a discussion of the factors involved 
in communicating meanings not least because it represents 
the child's mode of access and, in doing so, raises questions 
about conceptions of correspondence between what is offered 
as a stimulus and the responses that pupils are able to make. 
One such question concerns the 'differencesthat exist 
between teachers' theories of learning and systems of 
knowledge and the constructs that are possible for pupils 
within the constraints of their experience of the world and 
their mental development. Moreover, teachers, having the 
authority to control and initiate action, are in a position to 
present their constructs to pupils who, in turn, in the role 
of learners, are under pressure to accept and conform to 
them. 
The issues raised have important implications for 
explaining because its central activity is the communication 
of meanings by one who understands something to another or 
others who do not. 
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The need to find a frame of reference that can be shared 
by teacher and pupils alike, especially at the outset of an 
explaining episode where mutual understanding is at its 
lowest level, is a first priority. 
It is also the case that meanings are largely 
communicated through words and, thus, language functions 
provide the key to all that is going on. Moreover, as the 
developmental aspect of Halliday's model reminds us, 
language itself cannot be taken for granted. The phases he 
identifies in learning a native language draw attention to 
the distinctive nature of the respective systems, i.e. child 
and adult. The implications for the communication of meaning 
generated by this distinction are far reaching. Within the 
context of explaining something to someone an important 
implication is that certain procedural options will fail 
to work because a young explainee is being treated as 
though he has an adult system. Being at one or other of 
the earlier phases of language development he is more 
dependent than the adult upon situational constraints. 
Moreover, if understanding the explanation is dependent 
upon the re-interpretation of context at the deeply abstract 
level typical of the adult system, he will be unable to 
meet this requirement. 
The importance of the developmental perspective in 
communication interaction between adult and child is 
stressed also by Cicourel (1973: 49) who maintains 
that 
adults are continually supplying children 
with lexical items or categories whose 
meaning can 
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be decided only partially by reference to 
adult oral and written dictionaries, and where 
instructions by adults to children about mean-
ing are not equivalent to an adult's use of 
written dictionaries. 
He suggests that alongside the acquisition of grammar and 
surface rule competence the child learns interpretive 
procedures which play an important role in verbal inter-
action and which are best understood through a discussion 
of their characteristics from the standpoint of adult 
competence. Cicourel (ibid: 52-56) offers a number of 
these, which are summarised below, warning that the list is 
not necessarily a complete one. 
a. The reciprocity of perspectives!1) The taking 
for granted by speaker and learner that they 
share a common interpretation of the features 
of the immediate scene. The speaker assumes 
that the hearer expects him to emit recognisable 
and intelligible utterances, that the account 
he (the speaker) offers is intelligible and 
that the hearer will receive it as such. The 
hearer assumes that the speaker has made the 
assumptions outlined above and expects to 
comply with what is expected of him (the hearer), 
namely, to appear to understand. 
b. The et cetera assumption.(2)  The 'filling in' 
by speaker and hearer of what is necessary to 
promote the meaningfulness of an utterance. 
This allows things to pass in verbal inter-
action despite their ambiguity or lack of 
clarity. 
c. Normal forms. The efforts made by speaker and 
hearer, when the reciprocity of perspectives is 
in doubt, to normalise the discrepancies with a 
view to achieving congruence. 
d. Retrospective sense of occurrence. The assump-
tions made by speaker and hearer that what is 
said by each to the other will at some subsequent 
time clarify what at the time is an ambiguous 
utterance, despite the fact that a later 
utterance that would have this effect may not 
occur. 
(1) Cicourel attributes this property to Schutz (1953; 1955). 
(2) Cicourel associates this property with the work of 
Garfinkel (1964). 
e. Talk itself as reflexive. The expectation of 
participants in verbal interaction that talk 
will occur because it is fundamental to the 
scene and because it is seen as a necessary 
way of communicating recognisable and 
intelligible elements of the scene. Talk is 
continuously folded back upon itself so that 
the presence of 'proper' talk and further talk 
provide a sense of well being and 'a basis 
for members to describe the arrangement success-
fully to each other.' 
f. Descriptive vocabularies as indexical expressions. 
Members take for granted their reliance upon the 
existence and use of these vocabularies for 
'handling bodies of information and activities 
where the vocabularies themselves are consistent 
features of the experience being described.' 
The significance of these are that they provide 
'instructions' for retrieving the 'full relevance 
of an utterance' by suggesting what must be filled 
in to obtain the meaning. 
If, as Cicourel contends, these interpretive procedures per-
form the important function of facilitating communication in 
ordinary everyday verbal interaction, and the evidence points 
to this being the case, this raises the question of their 
function in the specific context of explaining something to 
someone with a view to promoting understanding of that some-
thing. 
Explaining, in whatever situation it occurs, is thought 
of as a dialogue involving explainer and explainee. There is 
therefore nothing to be gained from setting up an explainer -
explainee relationship that fails to accommodate the effect of 
the explainee who, because he lacks understanding of some 
particular phenomenon, is in the weaker position. 
Where the explaining episode occurs in the context 
of the classroom teaching and learning, the problems are 
likely to be more complex and possibly more numerous. 
The pupil is exposed to considerable demands of one kind 
and another during routine learning and, unfortunately, 
few studies of the acquisition and use of language throw much 
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light upon how information is exchanged and how pupils 
process information in classroom settings. These matters are 
particularly relevant to explaining for, in the interest of 
accurate communication, the teacher must avoid taking for 
granted the pupil's understanding of verbal inputs. In 
relation to this last point Cicourel (1974: 325-326) makes 
a pertinent statement in claiming that, 
We are not clear about how continuous feedback 
mechanisms operate so that contextual informa-
tion about sound patterns, their intonation and 
intensity, knowledge of grammatical rules, visual 
appearances and stored information interact with 
competing sources that may interfere with the 
child's performance in the classroom 
	  
He goes on to say that grammatical context is crucial for 
the perception of speech. Thus, teachers who are not aware 
of their pupils' abilities and capacity to recognise, receive 
and process information, are unable to make accurate estimates 
about the nature and degree of the interference that can occur 
because of 'inputs' from unattended channels of information, 
or supply information, that works with the grain of the pupils 
understanding by utilising structures formed by his conceptual 
and social learning. 
Problems of pattern recognition and attention Cicourel 
links with: the quality and availability of the sensory 
information about current events, what the short term memory 
can extract from this transient sensory image and, finally, 
the storing of information in the long term memory. Bear-
ing these in mind he argues that the presentation of new 
material to children should be organised to coincide with 
the existing information that it is presumed the child 
possesses. A view that has been expressed often by develop-
mental and other psychologists in relation to concept learning. 
The consequences of this theory apply to all children, 
but not uniformly so. For example, a major problem in the 
translation of verbal material has to do with the receiver's 
ability to recognise and comprehend the incoming information. 
Thus, pupils who are less accustomed to hearing and using 
formal language will have difficulty in understanding 
explanations that are couched in a formal style of dis-
course. 
Cicourel (ibid: 328) contends that they would have 
difficulty processing the information because rehearsal of 
unfamiliar material and linkage to the long-term memory 
becomes something of a major problem. He justifies this 
point with the statement: 
I am assuming that if memory is organized 
according to storage of dialect-relevant 
information and storage of syntactic 
structures sensitive to their contextual 
usage, then relying on the perception of 
several sources of information would 
complicate the processing of instructions 
whose organization and lexical items 
presumed standardized rules and meanings. 
(ibid: 328-29) 
It is true that much of what Cicourel contends in relation to 
interpretive competence refers to use of language in everyday 
communication and does not deal specifically with explaining 
something to someone. However, it has been argued that 
explaining occurs within the wider context of everyday 
communication and, thus, his views do throw light upon that 
activity. 
Cicourel faces up to the problems of communication 
raised when real speakers with differing life experiences 
engage in dialogue for specific purposes, in a way that most 
philosophical accounts fail to do. It is tempting to explore 
in greater depth, through studies from the field of cognitive 
psychology, the conceptual matters and intellectual processes 
that he mentions but this is neither possible nor seen as 
necessary within the limits of the thesis. His succinct 
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integration of sociolinguistic factors with cognitive 
ones is of particular value to the work in hand. His view 
of the manner in which social experience influences the 
organisation of the intellectual operations(1) involved in 
an information processing model of thinking and learning 
is one that 'explainers', the more so if they are teachers, 
need to understand and take account of in their explana-
tions of something to someone. 
2.4 	 Context and Situation in Communication 
It has been argued that language users are fallible 
information processors for reasons that can be understood 
with reference to psychological and sociological theory and 
that attempts to describe language in communication, which 
fail to take account of this, are inadequate. Rommetveit 
(1979: 163) makes the point succinctly when he affirms: 
The notion of linguistic competence we encounter 
in early generative-transformational theories of 
language may be conceived of as a heavenly 
version of a basic common code, a version devoid 
of dialectical variations, stripped of ambiguities, 
and dyed in pure Cartezian reason. Socio-
linguistics, on the other hand, is by definition 
a study of human discourse under conditions of 
social, cultural and linguistic variation. 
A similar criticism can be levelled at accounts that 
fail to respond to Wittgenstein's(2) claim that an utterance 
has meaning only in the stream of life. In this case, the 
remedy would appear to involve paying attention to context 
and situation. The preceding discussion of sociosemantic 
factors in communication makes frequent reference to these 
notions which are of major importance where the approach to 
(1) Operations is a term used by Guil ford (1963) which re-
fers to the following: cognition, memory, divergent 
productions, convergent productions and evaluation. 
(2) In Malcolm, N. (1967) Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Memoir, 
O.U.P. Oxford 
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language is a functional one. As the present thesis is 
concerned with language in use in a specific situation, 
namely, an explaining episode, it would appear to be 
advantageous to examine how and to what degree contextual 
and situational factors influence the communication of 
meaning. 
A useful starting place for a discussion of context 
and situation in the issue of dynamic residuals in human 
communication, or to use Wittgenstein's terminology (1962: 
247), the bottom level of interpretation. Rommetveit (1979: 
164) interprets this as meaning that whatever is meant and 
understood by participants in a communication, a prerequisite 
is that something else is taken for granted. This is a 
position argued by ethnomethodologists such as Garfinkel 
(1972: 28) who maintain that, 
no matter how specific the terms of common under-
standing may be - a contract may be considered 
the prototype - they attain the status of an 
agreement for persons only in so far as the 
stipulated conditions carry along an unspoken 
et cetera clause. 
An et cetera clause is one of the basic features of social 
interaction that Cicourel (1973: 53) lists and which has 
been discussed in the section 2.3 (see p. 110). He discusses 
at some length the problem of participant interpretation in 
differing situationally bounded sequences and claims that 
a great deal of performance 'depends upon the unfolding 
situation that cannot be automatically pre-programmed by 
built-in competence.' (Ibid: 71) 
Cicourel (ibid: 165) contends that a problem for chil-
dren is the expectation of adults that they will utilise re-
latively context free communication although in reality during 
maturation a child may equate a range of images of previous 
experience with a specific context which to an adult would 
appear unrelated. He suggests that in order to achieve adult 
115 
interactional competence the child must acquire a facility 
with certain properties, which are summarised below: 
1. Reflexive thinking about informational particulars 
selectively available from multiple sources in 
an emergent context provide participants with 
a basis for creating continuous instructions 
for programming their activities in socially 
acceptable ways. 
2. Despite cultural differences and different spatial 
arrangements in the setting, participants must 
behave as if they share the same social setting 
and are receiving and processing the same infor-
mation. Various appearances and utterances (signs) 
must be treated as 'obvious' despite the 
possibility that the participants are aware that 
differences exist and are being communicated in 
subtle ways. 
3. In addition to assuming tacitly that they are 
oriented to the 'same' environment of objects 
and thoughts despite cultural differences and 
the use of a particular dialect or standardized 
(oral or sign) language, the participants must 
also be familiar with normative constraints 
about who can speak first, or next, what topics 
are considered socially relevant and acceptable, 
how to terminate an exchange, when someone's 
talk (or signs) is being insulting, distrustful 
or 'odd'. 
4. Participants expect each other to possess 
'normal form' repertoires of possible appearances, 
behaviours and utterances (signs) which can be 
expressed or 'understood' when emergent in con-
textually organized settings. Participants also 
assume that each will normalize discrepancies 
to sustain the social interaction. 
5 The previous points imply that the participants 
must be able to go beyond the information given 
to recognize appearances, behaviours, utterances 
or gestures as meaningful activities, while 
filling in appropriate information where relevant 
by linking present informational resources to 
prior sources and future possibilities. 
6. The ability to go beyond the information given and 
thus retrospectively and prospectively link 
immediate information to past and possible future 
objects, events or thoughts is central for the 
articulation of idealized normative (signs) 
rules (like conversational rules or linguistic 
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rules as applied to model sentences) with 
contingent social settings. 
7. Participants must be capable of articulating 
immediate settings with idealized rules and 
general informational particulars of a 
substantive nature under the assumption that 
this is a routine feature of the interactional 
setting, yet simultaneously may or may not 
recognize that much of what transpires may 
not be accountable in standardized or colloquial 
expressions. 
(ibid: 168-169) 
Cicourel (ibid: 171) considers the elements of inter-
pretive procedures to be minimally relevant for every-day 
interactional competence. He claims that in the classroom 
modification of the child's interactional competence is 
continually taking place largely because he has to contend 
with a system of representation that is different from the way 
he learns to process recognised information. To understand 
how language works in communications such as those occurring 
in an explaining episode, it is necessary to know how 
the participant's knowledge of the world and his perception 
of what is going on in the immediate situation influence 
what he says and understands. 
Rommetveit (1979: 164-165) takes up the position that 
semantic potentialities in discourse can be conceived of as 
a 'draft of a contract concerning categorization' that is 
bound to a 'scheme of attributes' of a more comprehensive 
nature and that, together, they constitute 'a minimal 
constant residual of sustained shared world knowledge.' 
However, he stresses the point that semantic potentialities 
in discourse are not static components of such knowledge, 
mediated linguistically, but potentially shared strategies 
which are used to catalogue and achieve 'cognitive-emotive 
perspectives' of what is being discussed. Moreover, in the 
'Here and Now' of a dialogue only very tiny pieces of 
shared world knowledge will enter the episode. Institutions, 
rituals and situations provide interactional frames and thus 
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determine 'which more restricted subsets of semantic 
potentialities are intended within different kinds of con-
texts'. These points support the view that no communication 
is entirely context free and suggest that dependency varies, 
some communications being more dependent than others. 
Bearing in mind the evidence from studies by Olson 
(1970) and Deutsch (1976) which show that explicitly intro-
duced referential domains can affect linguistic coding and 
decoding it is clear that contextual factors play a major 
part in determining what goes on in a dialogically establish-
ed 'Here and Now'. However, Olson (1972:143-144) warns that 
language can reorganise only to a limited degree the infor-
mation from other sources that are on hand and maintains 
The manner in which words and sentences derive their 
meaning from perception and the ways in which per-
ceived context determines both the production and com-
prehension of utterances are aspects of the primary use 
of language for communication and instruction. 
He (ibid:147-148) cites the work of Glucksberg and 
Krauss (1967) in making the point that conflicts between 
what is perceptually salient and what is informative to a 
listener result in the former being dominant. He too 
maintains that children's use of language is not tied to 
immediately perceived cues but quickly reflects alternatives 
in the context as a whole within the limits of their process-
ing ability. Descriptions are cumulative and words used in 
them come to reflect as the perceived context a wider con-
text that is both the present and the historical context. 
In this way sentences eventually reflect the accumulated con-
text which allows a minimum number of sentences to be mapped 
upon the largest number of perceived contexts. 
Thus, contexts are multi-layered and, indeed, concen-
tric in character and in any situation the perceived con-
text with which a particular communication is associated 
is, in fact, a class of contexts, some of which are salient 
and others irrelevant. 
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Olson tibid: 148) claims that sentences change less 
than do situations, any elaboration being dependent upon the 
intention of the speaker, the knowledge of the symbolic system 
that he shares with the listener, the assumptions he makes 
about the listener's background knowledge and the differentia-
tions that have import within the culture. Bearing in mind 
the suggested relation between perception and language he 
offers five preliminary hypotheses about how sentences are 
comprehended in a variety of contexts: 
1. A sentence is comprehended (or miscomprehended) 
relative to a context. This context is specified 
either by a perceptual situation or by preceding 
sentences. These contextual events may be con-
sidered as the presuppositions of an utterance 
in that they determine the form of utterance that 
will be permissible. 
2. Sentences compatible with their contexts, that 
is, sentences which do not violate their pre-
suppositions, are more readily processed than 
those that are not. 
3. Sentences which are not compatible with their 
contexts must be brought into such a corres-
pondence either by recoding the context or 
recoding the sentence. 
4. In the case of an incompatibility of an utterance 
and its context, the perceptual or contextual 
events are more readily recoded than are the 
sentences. 
5. Ease of comprehension depends upon the number of 
alternatives among which the subject must choose. 
Olson (ibid: 149-154) used these hypotheses as the 
basis for a series of studies,(1)evidence from which suggests 
that: ease of comprehension of a sentence depends on the 
perceptual coding of any preceding event; that comprehension 
proceeds on the basis of the surface structure; and that 
the complexity of the processing involved reflects the 
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(1) Olson and Filby (1972) 
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number of alternatives among which a subject must choose. 
In order to appreciate the nature and range of 
variables that are present in the perceived context it is 
helpful to employ a model that purposes to reveal contextual 
categories within everyday sequences of linguistic inter-
action. For this purpose the sentence may not be as useful 
a unit as Halliday's (1978:135F) semantic unit 'text'. 
Reference to this notion has been made in section 2.3 but 
it may be helpful to mention again that texts are 'instances 
of linguistic interaction in which people actually engage.' 
Thus, an explaining episode is a text whether it be composed 
of one or several sentences. 
Halliday (ibid:142F) suggests that a particular 
situation type can be interpreted as a semiotic structure 
that can be represented as a complex of the dimensions of 
field, mode and tenor.(1) 
 He claims that these dimensions 
are more than components of the speech setting, they are 
conceptual frames within which meanings are exchanged. Text 
varieties embedded in situation he calls registers, describing 
register as the configuration of semantic resources that 
the member of a culture typically associates with a situation 
type. 	 It is possible to describe a situation and its 
associated register but the degree of specificity varies. 
The more stereotyped the situation, the more restricted will 
be the range of options from which selections in field, mode 
and tenor can be made. 
Registers reflect individual experience and, thus, 
the capacity to mean while also reflecting the on-going 
activity within the situation itself. Thus, register can 
be said to be the selection of meanings that constitute 
(1) Field, mode and tenor are defined in section 2.3 
see p.106. 
the variety to which a text belongs and also a particular 
selection of words and structures. 
Control of a range of registers facilitates under-
standing in discourse and, indeed, the ability to communicate 
meanings. Being able to shift from one register to another 
as necessary indicates conscious, or unconscious but 
intuitive awareness of linguistic forms. This kind of skill 
can be promoted by the demands of formal education although 
the variety of different life experiences that an individual 
enjoys is also highly influential. 
The relevance of these notions for the situations 
with which this thesis is concerned cannot be over-stressed. 
So many philosophical considerations of the act of explaining 
concern themselves solely with topic and subject matter, or 
view the participants as 'ideal' thus under-estimating the 
part played by purposive role; the relationship of the 
language-user to the medium of transmission; the relationships 
among participants in language events and, particularly 
important where teaching and learning are involved, the 
functional addresser/addressee relationship and functional  
tenor of discourse, both a constant source of situational 
and linguistic variation. 
It may be fruitful to speculate how often problems 
of meaning and understanding arise in explaining episodes 
not so much because the explanations lack logical form, or 
the explainer fails to present the relevant facts in an 
'orderly' manner but for reasons to do with reciprocity. In 
other words, the pupil is under-represented both in setting 
up of a mutual context in which explaining can take place 
and in the part he is enabled to play within the context. 
It is all too easy to make it impossible for the explainee to 
contribute what he knows by establishing functional relation-
ships and tenors of discourse of a kind that inadvertently 
incapacitates him with regard to activities like question 
shifting the success of which depends upon genuine inter- 
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action between addresser and addressee. 
It is important, of course, not to underestimate the 
difficulties that are of a psychological nature. The in-
ability of a participant in an explaining episode to grasp 
the essential aspects of a notion because the conceptual 
level is too high and he lacks prerequisite concepts, or 
because the subject is outside his experience. However, 
it is likely that in many cases the explainer's awareness 
of these problems will be dependent upon his understanding 
how social and cultural contexts influence the explainee's 
facility for interpreting his (the explainer's) communicat-
ions. Moreover, this knowledge can then inform any 
attempts the explainer makes to remedy the matter. 
2.5 
	 The Influence upon Communication of What is Explained 
The examination of factors influencing the communication 
of meanings up to this stage has been concerned with natural 
speech in everyday contexts. Implications for explaining 
episodes have been drawn and it has been argued that certain 
conditions govern the activity of explaining something to 
someone and, similarly, that of understanding something. It 
seems an opportune moment to focus attention upon the 
'something' that is to be explained by the explainer and 
understood by the explainee. The objective is to establish 
what influence, if any, is exerted upon the activity of 
communication by factors that have to do with the nature of 
the something to be explained, i.e. the explanation. 
The subject of an explanation may arise from any 
context of what we perceive as the known world. It may 
arise from a very common everyday occurrence and be capable 
of being explained in familiar everyday language. Never-
theless, however simple and familiar the language is called 
upon to be while remaining adequate and appropriate, factors 
associated with perception, organisation, interpretation, 
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level of interest and human interaction remain to 
influence accurate communication of intended meaning. 
The problems increase when the context from which 
the explanation is generated is not one that occurs 
spontaneously in daily life. Such contexts are often 
concerned with specific disciplines and situations which, 
in contrast with those that commonly occur from day to day, 
are highly specialised with respect to their notions, 
relationships and language forms. The concepts contained 
within these explanations are likely to be abstract rather 
than concrete; or, to use Vygotsky's (1962) terms, 
scientific rather than spontaneous. Compound and complex 
concepts demanding a higher order of intellectual activity 
will occur more frequently than is the case in everyday 
contexts and many of these will be totally unfamiliar 
because they do not normally arise spontaneously in people's 
lives. A great deal of formal learning in school involves 
explanations of this kind although clearly there is a gradual 
development in their conceptual level. 
The typology of explanations discussed in Chapter 3 
has prepared the ground for arguing that while a particular 
explanation type may arise in any lesson context, typically 
certain types are dominant in specific disciplines and 
areas. Thus, probabilistic explanations occur frequently 
in psychology, the teleological and functional category 
of explanations in biology. (1)  
If it is accepted that, initially, the nature of a 
discipline to some degree determines the kind of explanat-
ions that will be offered, it seems equally likely that 
the something to be explained exerts an influence upon the 
act of explaining. 
(1) The explanations are usually thought of as functional 
rather than teleological, because asking the purpose 
of an organ implies its function and not its goal. 
The phenomenon water can be the subject of an 
explanation in several subject disciplines to be found in 
schools because the things to be known and understood about 
water are very numerous and varied. In an art lesson, 
the significance within a painting of reflections on water 
is likely to give rise to a very different kind of explain-
ing episode than is the case in deciding if water is a 
compound or a mixture within the context of a science lesson. 
In the former, an open-ended reason-giving explaining episode 
that utilises actual paintings as reference points is a 
likely option and in the latter a deductive statement that 
draws upon practical evidence or a deductive argument that 
is a form of proof. 
It does appear that the fundamental character of the 
explanation has a constraining effect upon the options open 
to the explainer for conducting the act of explaining. For 
example, genetic explanations cite the way in which a state 
of affairs come about, which is why they abound in History 
teaching. In these explanations the explainer directs the 
explainee's attention to events in the past. To afford the 
explainee first-hand experience of the events in question 
is not an option that is available to the explainer. At best, 
he can attempt to reconstruct the situation for the explainee. 
On the other hand, a teacher offering a deductive 
scientific explanation can choose to refer to an act that 
has taken place or is taking place before the eyes of the 
explainee. However, he is constrained by empirical and 
logical conditions of adequacy and, thus, in most instances, 
is unable to resort to open-ended reason-giving. 
It seems probable that more often than is commonly 
perceived, the nature of what is to be explained is largely 
responsible for the noticeable degree of consistency that is 
to be found in the way teachers go about their acts of 
explanation within their subjects. This is particularly true 
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of subjects in which the exact nature and procedures are 
sharply defined and the concepts highly specialised as 
in the teaching of science. 
It is also the case that the language with which 
scientific concepts are discussed tends to be different 
from that which passes as natural speech and for this reason 
alone become a barrier to understanding. For example, Katz 
(1972: 364) maintains that with the growth of theory within 
scientific fields, ordinary everyday language that once 
served as a descriptive vocabulary has been replaced by 
a system of technical constructs specially 
designed to make description more precise and 
explanation more encompassing. Often the 
phenomena to be described and explained by the 
theory are not homogeneous but break up into 
several kinds, each kind having its own 
structure. In such cases concepts from the 
everyday language are found to contain an 
admixture of features from phenomena of different 
kinds. Sometimes such mixed concepts can survive 
with a bit of polishing, to serve as descriptive 
apparatus for the areas of interconnection. But 
more often it is necessary to replace ordinary 
concepts by technical ones, each referring 
exclusively and unequivocally to aspects of one 
kind of phenomenon in order to sort out such 
admixtures. 
The effects of this move is felt in the teaching and learning 
of school subjects and not only those subjects that are 
clearly scientific in character but in others, particularly 
where they have changed from a descriptive approach to one 
employing quantifying or scientific methods.(1)  
It was claimed earlier (see p. 21) that teachers are 
not usually concerned with arriving at scientific explanat-
ions, but with handling them, in the sense that they try to 
communicate them to others. It is reasonable to assume that 
(1) A typical example is Geography. 
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from the mid-primary stage onwards the communication of 
scientific explanations will be a common occurrence. 
Some aspects of the scientific explanations considered 
in schools, for example, their closed nature make them 
appear easier to handle than more open-ended kinds that 
have to do with justification, evaluation or probability. 
However, the conceptual level and complexity of many 
scientific explanations tends to challenge the intellectual 
and cognitive faculties of the individual and understanding 
is dependent to a large extent upon the ability to perceive 
relationships including causal relationships. 
Taking account of the points raised by Katz and 
evidence from studies of language in teaching of science,(1)  
it is clear that a phenomenon to be reckoned with in the 
communication of meaning in scientific explanations is that 
of the appearance of technical constructs to replace every-
day language. In order to assess the nature and size of the 
problem that faces an explainer who is himself a specialist in 
a science subject but who is attempting to explain something 
to someone who is not a specialist, it is helpful to examine 
briefly the nature of scientific language with the object 
of understanding its characteristic features and identifying 
how it is different from ordinary everyday language. 
In the first place, because science is a specialised 
activity, it requires accurate communication between those 
involved in it. This leads as Katz has claimed to the 
production of technical terms and locations. Bloomfield 
(1947: 42) writing on the linguistic aspects of science, 
enlarges upon this: 
The exact response and the careful and often 
complex calculations of science, enforce an 
unusually meticulous style of speech. The 
(1) Notably those of Taylor (1968), Barnes (1969 & 1976) 
and Richards (1978). 
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syntactic scope of forms and the domain of 
substitutes have to be clearly indicated. 
This with the elimination of personal factors, 
produces a general scientific style of utterance. 
The sentence may extend to great length and 
may awake an immediate response only in hearers 
or readers who are favourably predisposed by 
training; on the other hand, the message once 
grasped is unmistakable. 
He draws a sharp linguistic distinction between formal 
and informal scientific discourse. The informal uses 
ordinary language to which is added technical terms and 
phrases and certain syntactic and stylistic restrictions 
which help to produce uniform response in a qualified 
listener. Formal scientific discourse uses 
a rigidly limited vocabulary and syntax 
and moves from sentence to sentence only 
within the range of conventional rules. 
In general it can be carried only in 
writing. 
(ibid: 43) 
Bloomfield discusses the general character of scientific 
language. A brief summary is given of some of the points 
he would mention: 
(1) The utterances made by scientists are part of 
scientific procedure. 
(2) Linguistically,as well as in handling, science 
is a public activity. The participants learn 
to ignore private factors of meaning, so that 
the grammatical, stylistic and lexical features 
of their informal discourse become indifferent. 
(3) Scientific discourse is translatable. 
(4) A postulational form, an explicit statement of 
what is taken for granted, is used to avoid 
the effect of changes in meaning. 
(5) The hypothesis and any suppositions related to 
the work in hand are stated. 
(6) All new terms are rigidly defined. 
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(7) Sentences often consist either of a statement-
phrase, or of several such in co-ordination. 
In large sentences statements figure as sub-
ordinate parts. 
(8) Science speech follows ordinary language in 
designating sets of similar phenomena, but a 
more systematic determination (such as 
provided by existence statements) is required. 
(9) The language is specialised in the direction 
of forms which successfully communicate handling 
responses and lend themselves to elaborate 
re-shaping. 
The character of scientific language is manifested 
linguistically through certain lexical, syntactic and semantic 
features. These have been investigated by linguisticians 
largely through the analysis of written scientific texts. 
Barber (1962: 21f) describes a piece of small scale 
research and compares his findings with those of similar 
studies by Rumszewiz and Siddiqui respectively. He and 
Siddiqui used texts from different fields of science. 
Rumszewiz used samples from four text books of agriculture 
and four passages of recent prose drama. The results obtained 
by the three researchers showed a high degree of agreement 
and some examples of these are tabled below. 
Feature Investigated 
	 Scientific Prose 
text Drama 
Length of sentence - (a) average 
in no. of words 	 (b) most numerous 
Sentences containing (a) 	 statements 
(b) 	 questions or 
requests 
Presence of non-finite verbs as a 
percentage of all verb forms 
Presence of finite verbs with modal 
auxiliaries 	 (a) 	 passive 
(b) 	 non-passive 
27.6 
16-20 
97% 
3% 
39% 
28% 
72% 
7 
1-9 
66- 2 5% 
331% 3 
17% 
3% 
97% 
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The figures do show impressive distinctions but it 
should be borne in mind that modern prose drama is a some-
what unusual text to use for this comparison and it is 
possible that it was selected largely because its character-
istic features polarise at the opposite end from those of 
scientific texts. Whatever the reasons for the choice it is 
unwise to assume that the shorter sentences of the prose 
drama passage are easier to comprehend than the longer ones 
in the scientific texts. Problems of interpretation and 
meaning are just as likely to arise in the former as the 
latter. Indeed, in terms of meaning a short sentence is no 
guarantee of clarity. 
Perhaps the features that most increase the degree 
of difficulty are associated with lack of personal character-
istics of style, increased formality or high concentration 
of unfamiliar words and constructions. 
Barber does distinguish a number of other features 
of scientific texts. Subordinate clauses (in the traditional 
sense of strings containing finite verbs) are very sparingly 
used. The majority of sentences contain 1 main clause and 
0-2 subordinate clauses. 
Non-finite verbs are of three kinds:- 
ing endings 47% 
past participles 34% 
infinitives 19% 
An analysis of the lexical items was carried out by 
Barber to find out the number of texts in which a word 
appeared and the frequency of occurrences. Using such 
indicators as Zipf's Law and Thorndike's Teachers' Word 
Book, a measure of word intensity was obtained which revealed 
that the appearance of certain words in all the texts is due 
to the particular type of text selected. A wide range of 
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scientific and mathematical terms were represented, some 
technical, but many non-technical that have not qualified 
for general service lists. One last point made by Barber 
is that a student of technical reading requires a large 
passive vocabulary of synonyms. 
If, as seems likely, scientific explanations call 
forth some limited use of scientific language, a pupil will 
need to learn to use the scientific language of the subjects 
he studies. This may well present difficulties not unlike 
those which face adult students of a science, for whom 
English is the second language. Thakur (1966: 5f), 
discussing programmes for teaching scientific English in 
India, describes the difficulties facing Indian students. 
The points stressed by him and considered by the present 
writer to be relevant to the situation of the young learner 
of scientific English are listed below: 
(1) Generating complex sentences by embedding 
one base structure into another. 
(2) Defining concepts in appropriate English; 
this generally requires a recursive structure. 
(3) Discriminating the way a word is used in a 
scientific text and its entirely different 
use in day-to-day language. 
Further evidence that school children encounter and, 
indeed, must come to terms with the difficulties of scien-
tific English is provided by Taylor (1968: 136-137). This 
rigorous study of deep structure in an elementary chemistry 
textbook prompted the conclusion that: 
Pupils will find chemistry difficult in the 
early stages because the combinations of 
categories are unfamiliar and their assignation 
of linguistic units to the correct conceptual 
categories is uncertain. That is why a good 
deal of illustration from everyday life is 
necessary. But there are limits to how far 
this can be done, so that when the learner is 
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trying to codify for himself the relation 
between various phenomena he is increasingly 
thrust back upon the purely symbolic operations 
of the language. The sorts of relationships 
with which any discipline deals are different 
in various ways from those of everyday life. 
That is why we can say with full seriousness 
that to learn chemistry is to learn the 
language of chemistry 	  
Through the textual analysis made by Taylor are exposed the 
demands which the language of chemistry makes upon the pupil. 
He must find the language with which to organise his 
experience into valid scientific concepts. Much of the 
language of science concerns hypothetical and ideal states, 
it being possible to demonstrate the relation between them 
only verbally. The pupil must recognise a definition, 
a criterial attribute when it occurs and in Taylor's view: 
This demands purely linguistic skills: since 
criterial attributes often appear in identical 
surface syntactic constructions to the noisy 
ones, he has to be able to recognise the 
linguistic cues which, through transformation, 
enable him to differentiate. 
(ibid: 10) 
A final example, this time concerned with a lexical 
feature of scientific English, is an investigation into the 
relationship of the technical vocabulary of Human Biology 
to the development of the appropriate scientific concepts. 
In this study Evans (1972: 12) defines a technical term 
as 'a word or phrase which when used within the context 
of the subject carries a single scientific meaning.' He 
concludes that in studying school biology the pupil is 
presented with an enormous number of such terms, around 
2000 being typical of G.C.E. ordinary level. 
There are clearly language problems facing the teacher 
and learner in subjects that are dealing largely with 
scientific constructs and probably never more so than when 
the teacher becomes an explainer. Here the teacher is 
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forced to consider how to put over scientific phenomena 
in language that can be understood by the explainee. 
This poses the question of whether it is generally 
the case that teachers do take account of this problem 
in explaining and other activities of teaching. Stubbs 
(1976: 10) speaking of language use in schools accepts 
that the subject specific language of an academic student 
has an intellectual function, but points out that a problem 
that stems from this is that of the academic specialist 
who has a natural propensity for thinking about his subject 
in its specialist terminology and when explaining something 
to a non-specialist seems unable to utilise ordinary 
language even in those cases where this can be done readily. 
He suggests that the reason for this is, 
it is easier to use one technical term to 
explain another, using terms like counters 
to be shuffled around, rather than thinking 
about what they actually mean and relate to 
in real experience. 
(ibid: 14) 
He identifies a related problem that has to do with teachers 
failing to recognise a valid idea offered by a pupil because 
the language used by the pupil is 'homely'. He illustrates 
this point with an example offered by Keddie (1971), in which 
a pupil looking at a diagram of a foetus in the uterus 
asks the teacher how it goes to the toilet. The teacher 
reprimands the pupil for being silly because he fails to 
recognise that the question is a perfectly valid biological 
concern and that, in asking it, the pupil demonstrates 
awareness, interest and thought. 
Stubbs (ibid: 76) refers to the work of Bellack et 
al (1966)(1)  on language in the classroom, in claiming that 
(1) This work will be discussed later in the chapter. 
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teacher-pupil dialogue has an underlying structure and 
pattern which with remarkably little deviation is followed 
by teachers and pupils. Within the pattern the teacher is 
most active in the sense that he structures the cycles 
and is primarily the solicitor of the interaction that 
takes place. The pupil's role is that of a responder. 
Stubbs appears somewhat critical of this pattern and this 
is hardly surprising when it is borne in mind that he is 
talking of the activities of teaching and not just of 
explaining. Within the context of teaching this regular 
pattern of communication does appear to be somewhat one-
sided, whereas, within the context of explaining something 
to someone, it can be more readily accepted without raising 
value-loaded questions about the respective merits of 
particular pedagogical strategies and styles. Furthermore, 
as has been argued earlier, although the pupil is in a 
responding role in an explaining episode he cannot be 
inactive. For, to achieve understanding, an active en-
gagement with the meaning of the explanation is necessary 
and, in the end, this is something that the pupil must do 
for himself. 
3.0 EFFECTIVENESS IN EXPLAINING SOMETHING TO SOMEONE 
It has been possible to identify a range of philosoph-, 
ical and pedagogical conditions that govern or influence the 
activity of explaining something to someone but it is also 
possible that within the pedagogical dimension of explain-
ing lie factors that are to do with personal qualities, 
strategies, organisation and style, which may play a large 
part in the effectiveness of the communication of meanings. 
3.1 
	 Verbal Actions in Relation to Communicated Meanings 
A useful starting point in considering the factors 
listed above is to have some idea of the range of different 
133 
kinds of meanings that teachers attempt to communicate to 
pupils. The study of Bellack (1965: 97-98) cited earlier 
by Stubbs looked at the communication of meanings in second-
ary level teaching and attempted to define operationally 
the various dimensions of meaning identified. 
Having examined transcripts of classroom discourse 
he was able to identify basic verbal actions, which he refers 
to as pedagogical moves, and classify them in terms of their 
pedagogical functions in relation to the discourse of the 
classroom. The four pedagogical moves he revealed are 
described as follows: 
Structuring: Structuring moves serve the 
pedagogical functions of focusing attention 
on subject matter or classroom procedures and 
launching interaction between students and 
teachers. They set the context for subsequent 
behaviour or performance. For example, teachers 
frequently begin a class period with a structuring 
move in which they focus attention on the topic 
or problem to be discussed during that session. 
Soliciting: Moves in this category are designed 
to elicit a verbal response, encourage persons 
addressed to attend to something, or elicit a 
physical response. All questions are solicitations, 
as are commends, imperatives and requests. 
Responding: These moves bear a reciprocal relation-
ship to soliciting moves and occur only in relation 
to them. Their pedagogical function is to fulfil 
the expectation of soliciting moves. Thus, 
students' answers to teachers' questions are 
classified as responding moves. 
Reactirg:These moves are occasioned by a structur-
ing, soliciting, responding, or another reacting 
move, but are not directly elicited by them. 
Pedagogically, these moves serve to shape or mold 
classroom discussion by accepting, rejecting, 
modifying or expanding what has been said previously. 
Reacting moves differ from responding moves, in 
that while a responding move is always directly 
elicited by a solicitation, preceding moves serve 
only as the occasion for reactions. Rating by 
a teacher of a student's response, for example, 
is designated a reacting move. 
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As we proceeded with the analysis of the data 
in terms of pedagogical moves it became evident 
that these moves occur in classroom discourse 
in certain cyclical patterns or combinations, 
which we designated 'teaching cycles'. A 
teaching cycle begins either with a structuring 
or with a soliciting move, both of which are 
initiating maneuvers; that is, they serve the 
function of getting a cycle under way. In 
contrast, responding and reacting moves are 
reflexive in nature; they are either solicited 
or occasioned by a preceding move. 
(ibid: 97) 
Teaching cycles were revealed which begin with an 
initiating manoeuvre that is always a soliciting or structur-
ing move. Responding and reacting moves have to be solicited 
by a preceding move and are reflexive in nature. One typical 
cycle according to Bellack (ibid: 98) begins with 
a soliciting move by the teacher in the form 
of a question, continues with a responding 
move by the student addressed and ends with 
a rating reaction by the teacher. 
Using the concepts of pedagogical moves and teaching 
cycles he is able to describe classroom discourse in terms 
of specific kinds of meaning that reflect a dimension 
concerned with 'the pedagogical significance of what teachers 
and students communicate' and another concerned with the 
'meaning represented by the content of the messages 
communicated.' His analysis of what teachers and pupils 
communicate revealed the following functionally distinct 
types of meaning: 
(a) substantive with associated - refers to the 
subject matter of the class. 
(b) substantive logical - refers to the cognitive 
process involved in dealing with the subject 
matter. 
(c) instructional with associated - involves 
routine classroom procedures that are part 
of the instructional process. 
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(d) instructional logical - refers to 
distinctively didactic verbal processes 
such as explaining procedures and giving 
directions. 
The data obtained by Bellack (ibid: 103: 5) from 
the observation and analysis of classroom language revealed 
a very consistent and stable pattern of pedagogical 
discourse, a summary of which follows: 
1. Teachers dominate the verbal activities of the 
classrooms studied. The teacher-pupil ratio of activity 
in terms of lines spoken is approximately 3 to 1; in terms 
of moves, the ratio is about 3 to 2. 
2. The pedagogical roles of the classroom are clearly 
delineated for teachers and pupils. Teachers are responsible 
for structuring the lesson, soliciting responses from pupils 
and reacting to pupils' responses. The pupil's primary 
task is to respond to the teacher's solicitations. Occasion-
ally, pupils react to preceding statements but these reactions 
are rarely evaluative. Pupils do not react evaluatively to 
teachers' statements, and they evaluate other pupils' 
responses only when the teacher asks them to do so. 
Pupils infrequently solicit responses from the teacher 
about substantive meanings. Pupils seldom spontaneously 
structure the discourse; their structuring moves are almost 
always presented in fulfilment of specific assignments made 
by the teacher, and usually involve debates or reports. 
3. Structuring accounts for about six per cent of the 
moves spoken, soliciting, responding and reacting each 
account for approximately 30 per cent of the moves. 
4. Analysis of discourse in terms of teaching cycles 
centres on the dimensions of rate, source and pattern. 
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Analysis in terms of these three dimensions indicates 
that the basic verbal interchange in the classroom is the 
solicitation-response. Teachers shape and frame this 
verbal unit most frequently with reacting moves, although 
teachers differ in the extent to which they use both 
structuring and reacting moves. 
5. In approximately two-thirds of the moves and about 
three quarters of the line speakers referred to or talked 
about substantive material. Of all the categories of 
analysis, classes varied most widely in the substantive 
meanings expressed. 
6. By far the largest proportion of the discourse 
involved empirical meanings. This includes fact stating 
and explaining, which accounted for between 50 and 60 per 
cent of the total discourse in most of the classrooms 
studied. Analytic (defining and interpreting) and evaluative 
(opining and justifying) meanings were expressed much less 
frequently, each of them accounting for less than 10 per 
cent of the discourse in any class. Thus, most of the 
experimental unit was devoted to stating facts and explaining 
principles and problems of international trade, while 
considerably less of the discourse was concerned either with 
defining terms or with expressing and justifying personal 
opinions about economic issues. 
7. In almost one-half of the moves and approximately 
one-fourth of the lines of the discourse, speakers conveyed 
instructional meanings. It was chiefly the teacher who 
expressed the instructional meanings. 
8. Paralleling the instructional category, the analysis 
of instructional-logical meanings indicated that the most 
frequent statement in this area involved teachers stating 
facts, usually about procedures, assignments and other in- 
structional matters. A substantial proportion of statements 
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in this area also dealt with teachers directing pupils 
to perform various actions; and almost all of the remaining 
instructional-logical entries involved some form of rating 
reaction by the teacher. 
	
9. 	 Teachers can be characterised by a relatively stable 
emotional style, insofar as the dimensions of potency and 
activity are concerned and, to a lesser degree, in terms 
of valence. 
The implications for explaining something to someone 
of item five is very clear and is the more worthy of note 
when it is borne in mind that the major restriction placed 
upon teachers by the research procedures was specification 
of the particular substantive meanings to be covered. 
	
3.2 	 Studies of Teacher Effectiveness in Explaining  
Further evidence from classroom studies is supplied by 
Gage (1971: 177-181) and his associates, their concern being 
effectiveness in explaining. Viewing explaining as 'the 
skill of engendering comprehension - usually orally, verbally 
and extraneously - of some process, concept or generalization' 
they were able to arrive at an operational definition of 
effectiveness in explaining. Not being concerned with 
explaining as defined by philosophers but with the kind 
discussed by writers(1) 
 as pedagogical explaining, effective-
ness is defined as 'the ability to present ideas in such 
a way that the pupils would be able to respond to questions 
testing the comprehension of the idea.' 
The sample used in the study consisted of forty-eight 
experienced teachers in the San Francisco area and their 
mixed ability classes of between ten and thirty-one pupils. 
Lesson procedures were standardised, all teachers teaching 
lessons based upon identical material which they were asked 
to explain to their classes. The term explain was operation- 
(1) Notably Swift (1961) Thyne (1963) Meux and Smith (1964) 
Bellack et al (1966) Nuthall and Lawrence (1965) 
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ally defined as 
the process whereby a teacher's fifteen-
minute lecture on the prescribed curriculum 
material would enable his students to answer 
ten-multiple choice questions on the content. 
(ibid: 179) 
After certain adjustments aimed at controlling the experiments 
the pupils' mean adjusted score on the test was taken as the 
index of the teacher's effectiveness. In addition to taking 
the test after the lesson pupils were asked to complete 
an adapted form of the Stanford Teacher Competence Appraisal 
Guide which deals with the following dimensions: 
(1) clarity of aims 
(2) organisation of the lecture 
(3) beginning the lecture 
(4) clarity of presentation 
(5) pacing the lecture 
(6) pupil attention 
(7) ending the lecture 
(8) teacher-pupil rapport 
(9) amount of learning 
For each dimension, the ratings were made on a seven-point 
scale ranging from "truly exceptional to weak". 
They also completed a self-report sheet of attention. 
The data collected from the experiment were used by the team 
to investigate independently three specific problems. 
3.2.1. The first study(1) entitled 'Effective in Explaining: 
Evidence on its Generality and Correlation with Pupil 
Ratings!,(ibid: 182) found that: 
(1) The teachers' effectiveness in explaining had 
some consistency across different topics and 
different groups of pupils. 
(1) The first study is that of M. Belgard, B. Rosenshine 
and N.L. Gage. 
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(2) Student ratings of teachers and student 
attention over two different topics and two 
subsets of students are fairly consistent. 
(3) Teachers whose classes scored high on the 
comprehension test received more favourable 
reports on the appraisal guide and the self-
rated attention report. 
3.2.2 The second study (2) 
 entitled 'The Modality and Validity 
of Cues to Lecture Effectiveness'(ibid: 191) found that 
using a total of sixty-eight judges to rate effective explain-
ing as they perceived it: 
(1) Comparison of independent judges ratings with 
student ratings suggested that students could 
rate the teacher with reasonable validity. 
(2) Student free responses to categories of teacher 
characteristics (see p. 139). 
1. was organised and had planned well; 
2. spoke at an appropriate cognitive level; 
3. was serious and did not openly display a 
sense of humour; 
4. had and used an outline effectively, and 
5. had a good introduction in the sense that 
he stated objectives clearly and provided 
adequate background information. 
It appears that consistent factors in the ratings 
are to do with preparation and presentation particularly in 
relation to cognitive aspects of these activities, for 
example, structuring and organising lesson materials to make 
the subject more meaningful. Non-cognitive aspects worthy 
(2) The second study is that of W. Unruh. 
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of note include vocal quality, seriousness, enthusiasm 
and vitality. It can be assumed that these contribute to 
the level of interest promoted. 
(3) Judges responses to two check lists are given 
in the tables below: 
F-Ratios and Levels of Significance for 27 Seven-Item 
Scales for Four Yugoslavia and Four Thailand 
Teacher-Lessons 
Scale 
No. Scale Description 
Yugoslavia Thailand 
F-Ratio F-Ratio 
1. businesslike vs. slipshod 
	 12.87** 
	 25.99** 
2. clear vs. obscure, vague 
	 7.97** 	 14.13** 
3. dynamic vs. phlegmatic 	 12.63** 
	 2.87* 
4. emphatic vs. unemphatic 	 12.28** 	 1.93 
5. enthusiastic vs. unenthusiastic 
	 17.97** 	 6.25** 
6. energetic vs. lethargic 	 30.08** 
	 10.57** 
7. friendly, vs. unfriendly, aloof 	 27.13** 	 6.50** 
8. fluent in expression vs. halting 
in expression 	 3.49* 
	
8.39** 
9. humorous vs. dull 	 31.97** 
	
4.94** 
10. interesting vs. boring 
	 13.02** 	 6.12** 
11. imaginative vs. unimaginative 	 18.43** 
	 2.53 
12. interested vs. uninterested 
	
12.21** 	 2.35 
13. poised vs. awkward 	 1.29 
	 11.33** 
14. positive attitude vs. negative 
attitude 	 6.35** 	 1.59 
15. stimulating vs. dull, unstimulating 	 10.38** 	 2.56 
16. Skillful vs. inept, unskillful 	 15.78** 	 11.88** 
17. warm vs. cold 	 13.75** 
	
4.68** 
18. knows and understands subject vs. 
	
does not know and understand subject 10.56** 	 13.42** 
19. lesson is well planned vs. lesson is 
not well planned 	 11.11** 
	 14.45** 
20. English expression good vs. English 
expression not good 	 .61 
	
14.74** 
21. states objectives of lesson clearly 
vs. does not state objectives of 
lesson clearly 	 2.06 
	 7.45** 
22. makes relationships clear vs. does 
not make relationships clear 	 3.70* 
	
4.09* 
23. clearly indicates when moving from 
one topic to another vs. does not 
clearly indicate when moving from 
one topic to another 
	 2.75* 	 3.64* 
24. makes effective use of voice vs. 
	
does not make effective use of voice 9.03** 	 2.34 
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Scale 
No. 
Scale Description Yugoslavia Thailand F-Ratio 	 F-Ratio 
25. points out clearly what should be 
learned vs. does not point out 
clearly what should be learned 	 4.03** 
	
2.98* 
26. gives adequate amount of detail vs. 
does not give adequate amount of 
detail 	 1.46 	 2.07 
27. summarizes and reviews frequently vs. 
does not summarize and review 
frequently 	 1.47 	 2.37 
* p .05 	 ** p 	 .01 
(ibid: 199) 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients and 
Estimates of Monotonic Relationships for Four 
Yugoslavia and Four Thailand Teacher-Lessons 
Scale 
No. Scale Description 
Yugoslavia Thailand 
(N = 
Mon.
38)
a 
(N = 38) 
r 	 Mon .a 
1. business like vs. slipshod 
	
.20 
	 + 	 .55** + 
2. clear vs. obscure, vague 	 .35* 	 + 	 .45** + 
3. dynamic vs. phlegmatic 	 .32* 	 + 	 -.18 	 - 
4. emphatic vs. unemphatic 	 .32* 	 + 	 -.15 	 - 
5. enthusiastic vs. unenthusiastic 
	 .35** + 	 -.33 	 - 
6. energetic vs. lethargic 
	
.42** + 	 -.35 	 - 
7. friendly vs. unfriendly, aloof 	 .07 	 - 	 -.28 	 - 
8. fluent in expression vs. halting 
in expression 	 .14 	 + 	 .39* 	 + 
9. humorous vs. dull 	 .05 
	 - 	 -.20 	 - 
10. interesting vs. boring 	 .29 	 + 	 .02 	 - 
11. imaginative vs. unimaginative 	 .22 	 - 	 .03 
	
- 
12. interested vs. uninterested 	 .27 	 + 	 -.16 	 - 
13. poised vs. awkward 	 -.03 	 - 	 .43** + 
14. positive attitude vs. negative 
attitude 	 .21 	 + 	 .05 
15. stimulating vs. dull, unstimula- 
ting 	 .24 	 + 	 -.02 	 - 
16. skillful vs. inept, unskillful 	 .40** + 	 .43** + 
17. warm vs. cold 	 .04 	 - 	 -.19 	 - 
18. knows and understands subject vs. 
does not know and understand it .28 	 + 	 .44** + 
19. lesson is well planned vs. lesson 
is not well planned 	 .26 	 + 	 .49** + 
20. English expression is good vs. 
English expression is not good 	 .05 	 + 	 .47** + 
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Scale 
No. Scale Description 
Yugoslavia Thailand 
= 38)
a 
(N = 38) 
a r 	 Mon. 	 r Mon.  
21. states objectives of lesson 
clearly vs. does not state 
objectives clearly 	 .06 	 .35* + 
22. makes relationship clear vs. does 
not make relationship clear 	 .21 	 .25 + 
23. clearly indicates when moving from 
one topic to another vs. does not 
clearly indicate 
	
-.02 	 .23 + 
24. makes effective use of voice vs. 
does not make effective use of 
voice 	 .32* 	 -.02 
25. points out clearly what should be 
learned vs. does not point out 
clearly what should be learned 	 .02 	 .21 + 
26. gives adequate amount of detail vs. 
does not give adequate detail 	 .09 	 .16 + 
27. summarizes and reviews frequently 
vs. does not summarize and 
review frequently 	 .05 	 .01 - 
Multiple R 	 Multiple R 
= .69 	 = .74 
* p 	 .05 	 ** p 	 .01 
aMonotonic relationship as described above is indicated 
here by a plus sign (+). A minus sign (-) indicates that 
such a relationship was not found with reference to the means 
of the rater-assigned scores. 
(ibid: 200) 
The descriptions of good and poor explainers arrived 
at by means of these scales agree in general with those of 
the raters free responses. They indicate that the good 
teacher is skillful in presenting material, makes the content 
of the lesson clear, knows the subject matter thoroughly and 
has successfully planned his lesson. The opposite is seen 
to be true of poor teachers. 
3.2.3 The third study(1)entitled 'Objectively Measured 
Behavioural Predictors of Effectiveness in Explaining' 
(ibid: 201) aimed at determining objectively measured 
teacher behaviours that discriminate between the degree of 
success of explanations. The variables investigated are 
the stimuli from verbal and non-verbal teacher behaviour 
that were received by the pupils during the explaining 
periods. 
An analytic grammar specially constructed of variables 
developed from twenty-seven categories in four areas 
(linguistic, instructional set, presentational categories, 
multivariate studies) was used to analyse thirty lectures. 
Three were divided into three groups each containing five 
high scoring and five low scoring groups. The Hypothesis 
Group and the Validation Group had covered material on 
Yugoslavia while the Cross Validation Group had covered the 
Thailand material. The variables and the indication of their 
power to discriminate are given below: 
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Area Category 
Linguistic Categories *1 
*2 
Word length 
Word relevance 
*3 Independent clause length and 
structure 
*4 Prepositional phrases 
5 Readability estimate 
6 Personal references 
7 Negative sentences 
8 Passive verbs 
9 Awkward and fragmented 
sentences 
Instructional Set 10 Structuring sets 
11 Focusing or arousing sets 
Presentational Categories**12 Rule-and-example pattern 
13 Number of examples 
14 Organisation of topics 
15 Use of enumeration 
**16 Gesture and movement 
*17 Breaks in speech 
*18 Use of map and chalkboard 
*19 Rate of speech 
20 Repetition and redundance 
(1) The third study is the work of Barak Rosenshine. 
Area 	 Category 
Multivariate Studies 21 Verbal hostility 
22 Non-verbal affect 
23 Reference to pupils' interests 
24 Expansion of pupils' ideas 
25 Ratio of acceptance and praise 
to criticism 
**26 Explaining links 
27 Conditional words 
Variables in this category discriminated between high and 
low lectures in the hypothesis group, but not across the 
three groups. 
** Variables in this category discriminated between the high 
and low lectures across the three groups. 
The rule-example-rule pattern of discourse requires 
some delineation. According to Rosenshine (ibid: 203) 'the 
term rule refers to the use of a summary statement before or 
after a series of examples.' The implications of the results 
suggest that an effective explaining pattern is one that 
opens the explaining episode with a structuring statement, 
continues with details and concludes with a reiteration of 
the structuring statement. 
The, perhaps, unexpected significance of gesture and 
movement may be accounted for by reference to the arousing 
and focussing of attention function that they have. On the 
other hand, potential attention rousing verbal variables 
only discriminated in the Hypothesis Group. 
It appears that words such as explaining links can 
function to link phrases within and between sentences such 
that a phrase or clause containing a link expands upon another 
phrase and clause. The words chosen as explaining links are, 
according to Rosenshine, (ibid: 207) often grammatically 
dissimilar but perform the same function. He describes 
them as introducing 'a clause or phrase which states a means, 
reason or consequence for the main clause.' He considers 
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that the significance of explaining links may account for 
some of the inconsistent findings in studies of instruction 
set suggesting that: 
The use of instructional sets may decrease in 
relative effectiveness as the number of explaining 
links in the instructional material is increased. 
If so, explaining links may provide the same sort 
of linkage and organization within the lecture as 
the instructional set gives in the introduction to 
the lecture. 
Taken together these three studies afford a great 
deal of thought provoking data, including much that is 
puzzling and which arises from exploratory work. There is 
a methodological weakness concerned with the use of the 
same teacher in two lessons and, moreover, that these 
teachers were teaching their own classes. Anything that 
happened during the experimental period could have been built 
up before. For example, scores on the attention report 
may be reflecting established teacher-pupil relationships 
and not the quality of the explaining going on in the lecture. 
There are certain confusions in category description, 
for example, 'awkward and fragmented sentences.' This could 
refer to syntactic or semantic features, or both. Thus, it 
could be that a sentence is syntactically fragmented but 
contributes to the communication of meaning. On the other 
hand, if the awkwardness of style (which need not be 
syntactically incorrect) obscures meaning and confuses the 
pupil it is a very different matter. 
In spite of the weaknesses, the studies make a 
contribution to a consideration of explaining something to 
someone not least because they draw attention to the large 
range of variables that have been obtained by the researchers. 
In addition to being useful for future research the number 
and variety of categories involved reveals the inadequacy 
of a strictly philosophical account of explaining within 
the context of teaching and learning. 
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Abbreviations Used in Presenting the Results  
Sci 	 - Scientific 
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How 	 - How or by what means 
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Geo 	 - Geography 
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1.0 ARRIVING AT AND JUSTIFYING THE HYPOTHESES 
1.1 Category 1 The Status of Explaining as an Activity 
of Teaching and Learning  
In the previous chapters a case has been argued for 
viewing explaining as a common and central activity of 
teaching that has as its goal understanding both as a long-
term aim and as the immediate objective of an explaining 
episode. 
In relation to the last point it has been accepted that 
explaining need not be necessarily the best way of arriving 
at understanding although it is likely that in certain 
contexts this could be claimed and in others it would be 
clear that some alternative activity would be more effect-
ive. It is possible to be in sympathy with the view ex-
pressed by Gallie (1964) that 'explaining plays too import-
ant a part in teaching' and with the implication this car-
ries that pupils are not given enough opportunities to find 
things out for themselves. Nevertheless, it is true to say 
that a teacher is there to answer, or at least be prepared 
to answer subsidiary questions should the occasion arise. 
It is also true that time, previous knowledge and 
experience, interest, and motivation put their own con-
straints upon the activities that go on in teaching and 
learning within a school. A useful example is the teaching 
of science where the constraints mentioned are encountered 
in attempting to utilise Discovery Methods as represented 
in Nuffield Scheme Courses. The problems of experimental 
scatter and reliability (how many times can a pupil repeat 
an experiment to check the consistency of his results?) 
make the production of accurate data something that, 
in the main, is not feasible within the time allocated 
to science subjects. If the experiment does 'work', to 
use a homely expression, there is still all the differ-
ence in the world between what can be perceived through 
the senses and reported upon, for example, a change of 
colour, or bubbles, and being able to infer what has taken 
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place. Again, a question to be asked is concerned with 
the number of times a pupil would have to carry out an 
experiment before he could infer with a degree of certainty 
any abstract laws and causal relationships involved. A look 
at the work of research scientists and engineers should serve 
to convince educationists that the process of arriving at 
hypotheses, let alone laws, is long drawn out and demands 
highly repetitive activity. It thus seems somewhat naive 
to believe that more than a small amount of knowledge within 
the cognitive areas associated with formal learning can be 
learned at first hand, without a great deal of verbal 
information being provided. 
In making these criticisms of Discovery Methods it is 
not the intention to undervalue the contribution to effective 
teaching and learning that they can undoubtedly make nor to 
suggest that they are better or worse than any other teaching 
method. The intention is to reveal those limitations that 
are a barrier to it being the 'complete' alternative to 
explaining something to someone, in the sense that the latter 
is defined in this thesis. 
The argument can also serve as some justification for 
maintaining that there will be occasions when learning is 
enhanced and promoted by acts of explaining, particularly 
when explaining takes account of gaps in knowledge and under-
standing in a manner that is both effective and acceptable. 
Unfortunately, there is also the fair criticism to 
answer, that education would be that much better if pupils 
and not teachers were the active ones in teaching episodes. 
Martin (1970: 204), while agreeing that teachers often do 
talk too much and do work that they could get their pupils 
to do argues that 'explaining in requiring an active teacher, 
does not deny an active role to the student.' It seems likely 
that those strongly opposed to reception learning may be 
thinking of telling rather than explaining when they make 
their criticisms, a confusion encountered by Ausubel (1961) 
when individuals confused his notions of verbal information 
and reception learning with rote learning. 
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Whatever is the right balance between first hand 
experience and received knowledge, and it is not the purpose 
of this thesis to argue this issue, it cannot be denied that 
if Discovery Methods can claim to harness man's curiosity 
drives, asking for explanations and getting them is an 
equally natural way of making sense of experience. It is an 
activity that with the increasing ability to use language 
gets under way from a very early age. It seems altogether 
foolish to deny this activity a place in formal learning, 
particularly at the stage when defined or scientific 
concepts, rules and principles are more in evidence than 
concrete or spontaneous concepts,(1)thus, increasing the 
need for verbal formulations. However, it is conceded that 
setting aside brain washing and indoctrination, teaching is 
an open activity and there is no one way of teaching that a 
teacher should be forced to adopt. This does not mean that 
explaining something to someone may not play a crucial part 
in teaching or that it ought not to play such a part. It 
means that, whether to explain something to one's pupil, or 
not, is a strategic decision to be made by the individual 
teacher, but explaining would seem to be a bona fide cand-
idate for inclusion among the activities of teaching. 
It has been argued within the theoretical background 
to the thesis that explaining is not the same as telling and 
describing or other similar activities. One of the best 
reasons for distinguishing explaining from activities that 
appear on the surface to be similar is the element of what 
Peter 	 (1966) has called 'the norm of respect for persons.' 
Explaining is certainly a highly appropriate way of meeting 
this norm and comes about through the requirement that one 
who is explaining something to someone must take account of 
(1) Defined concepts, rules and principles are terms used 
in a number of psychological models of learning. In this 
case they are associated with the model offered by Gagne 
(1977): Spontaneous & scientific concepts, the terms used by 
Vygotsky (1962) that were discussed in Chapter 3. 
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the other person's rationality, which in simple terms means 
acknowledging another person's point of view. In doing this 
the explainer is called upon to do more than cite the main 
points in the explanation with which the explainee has to 
come to grips. He must marshal the points in a manner that 
reveals their relationships, present them in a way that 
ensures that they are logically persuasive, take account 
of their pupil's predicament and shift the question as 
necessary. 
Martin (1970: 216) asks the question 'is it possible to 
teach someone to explain something to someone?' In arguing 
that it is possible to do so, she points out the value to 
this activity of utilising the conditions of explaining 
something to someone that she identifies. (See pp. 74-75). 
She warns, however, that she is not suggesting that it is 
necessary for an explainer to be aware of these conditions 
but simply that the conditions are there to be used 'in so 
far as they are found helpful.' She also stresses the point 
that 
explaining has the advantage over teaching of 
requiring the explainer to do the linguistic 
work. It is this work of answering or trying to 
answer the underlying and subsidiary question of 
an explaining episode in terms simple and clear 
enough for another to understand that would seem 
to provide the link that is said to exist between 
teaching a subject and coming to understand it. 
However, the teacher need not do this sort of 
linguistic work, whereas the explainer must. 
Ibid: 218 
Pupils are sometimes asked to explain things to their 
fellows, perhaps for reasons to do with shortage of teacher 
time rather than to give them practice in explaining or to 
increase their own knowledge and understanding and that of 
the other pupil concerned. In assessing the usefulness of 
these activities it has to be borne in mind that there is 
explaining and explaining and some may be no use in improving 
the explainer's own condition or the predicament of the 
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explainee. In short, it cannot be assumed that explaining 
episodes will do the job that it is hoped, and in some cases 
expected, they will. 
Bearing in mind the points raised in the above 
discussion the opening category to be investigated contains 
questions about the extent to which teachers and pupils see 
explaining as a central activity and whether what they 
identify as explaining qualifies as such when set against 
specific philosophical and pedagogical criteria. The 
specific hypotheses to be tested are: 
H1 That the occurrence of an activity in the rankings 
made by teachers from a list of logical acts of 
teaching on grounds of centrality and importance will 
be random. 
H2 That the occurrence of an activity in the rankings 
made by pupils from a list of logical acts of teaching 
on grounds of centrality and importance will be random. 
H3 	 That the activity teachers identify as explaining 
meets the philosophical and pedagogical criteria 
that is accepted as an account of explaining something 
to someone and which distinguish it from telling and 
other similar activities. 
1.2 Category 2 	 Types of Explanation and Meaning  
According to Green (1971: 147) explanation is 'what 
is called for by the question "why"' and, thus, on the 
surface it seems that this question should be among the most 
common in teaching and learning. Taylor (1970: 32) claims 
that it is explanatory to say what something is and thus 
answers to 'what' questions call for explanations. It has 
been argued (see pp. 33-34) that 'how' questions can be 
treated as a particular kind of what question if how is 
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translated as 'by what means', and thus also involves 
explanations. Sometimes it is possible to use the term 
explaining in the sense of interpreting as, for example, 
in explaining a text or one's behaviour. These aspects 
of the act of explaining are more open-ended and may come 
up against the condition requiring the underlying question 
of an explaining episode to have a 'correct' answer, However, 
it is the case that the former interpretation is constrained 
by the material in the text and, thus, only a restricted 
range of answers are likely to be acceptable, while the 
latter may involve, in addition to the giving of reasons, a 
cause and effect relation. 
Most teachers would accept that the offering of 
explanations is a common occurrence in day to day teaching 
whether or not they view the act of explaining as of major 
importance. They would also agree that not all the 
explanations that they handle are associated with the subject 
matter of the specific lesson. Explanations may be required 
in response to strategic, topical and personal questions. 
Of the questions that do arise from the subject matter 
it has been argued that the explanations so evoked to a 
considerable degree are determined by the characteristic 
nature of the subject area. In other words, the presence of 
a particular type of explanation and the frequency with 
which it appears reflects the notions and procedures that 
constitute the subject. 
There is no generally accepted way of classifying the 
forms of explanations but some suggestions have been offered 
and discussed in Chapter 3 (see pp. 33-45) by Taylor and 
Green. 
Taylor's (1970: 2-3) category of what explanations 
appear useful in relation to explanations in classroom 
contexts particularly with the category of 'by what means' 
which then incorporates answers to how questions. 
Green (1971: 147) in offering his typology of why-
explanations believes that some kind of classification is 
helpful to the teacher, arguing that a teacher would be 
guilty of an error if he tried to answer 'one kind of "why" 
with an explanation appropriate only to another kind of 
111 why ll . 1 
Distinctions associated with conceptual characteristic 
within explanations have been discussed (see pp.45-47) and it 
is possible that these reflect the demands of a stage of 
development within the specific subject. An awareness of 
conceptual levels on the part of the explainer can also 
lead to the structuring of material on the assumption that 
some concepts are more readily acquired than others, or 
that the understanding of complex concepts depends upon the 
knowing and understanding of a number of prerequisite 
concepts. It is possible that these constraints may affect 
the character of an explanation. 
It has been noted earlier that not all explanations 
arise from the subject matter of a lesson. Setting aside 
those that arise from personal and social matters there re-
main explanations that arise out of a pedagogical discourse 
of the lesson, for example, those concerned with classroom 
procedures and teaching strategies. Bellack's (1969 : 98) 
attempt to categorise the range of different kinds of 
meaning that could be communicated through the different 
functions to which pedagogical discourse is put in the 
classroom, is of use in understanding the range of meanings 
communicated. Mention has been made of this experiment in 
Chapter 4 (see p.134) and there has been brief discussion 
of the distinctive kinds of meanings that he reveals through 
his analysis and the dominance of specific categories with-
in the samples of classroom discourse that were used. No 
attempt was made by Bellack to compare different subjects, 
but this could be a fruitful exercise. It is also the case 
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that the study is concerned with secondary level teaching 
and the results for primary could afford a different 
pattern of dominance. 
In respect of both explanation and meaning types it 
may be the case that features occur in the teaching of 
science which are peculiar to this activity. A comparative 
analysis of the explanations and meanings obtained from 
science lessons with those from other subject's lessons 
could reveal these distinctions. For example, if Taylor's 
view of what constitutes a scientific explanation is sat-
isfactory, questions requiring answers of this type should 
arise in physics, chemistry, biology and mathematics as well 
as in those aspects of other kinds of subject which are 
scientific in nature and as, for example, diet within the 
context of cookery. 
Bearing these points in mind the second category to 
be investigated contains questions about the range and 
extensiveness of use of explanation types in different 
subject areas; the appropriacy of the selected type for the 
kind of questionsasked, and subject specific trends in 
relation to the nature and complexity of the concepts 
utilised within the explanations offered. 
There is also the question of the extent to which the 
meanings communicated in pedagogical discourse are dominated 
by those related to subject matter rather than strategies 
and procedures in the lesson. The specific hypotheses to 
be tested are: 
H4 	 That explanation types, both in relation to the 
kind of what and why questions they answer and 
their conceptual characteristics are randomly 
distributed throughout different subject areas and 
within the same subject at different developmental 
stages. 
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H5 That the meaning types communicated through the 
explanations that arise in pedagogical discourse 
are randomly distributed throughout different 
subject areas and within the same subject at 
different developmental stages. 
1.3 Category 3 The Gap between Intended Meaning and  
Received Meaning  
Understanding as well as explaining has been the subject 
of a variety of educational claims, some seeing it as the 
purpose of teaching and learning acquired through promotion 
of knowledge. One factor strongly influencing understanding 
is the ability of an explainer to convey his intended meaning. 
This raises a problem common to communications that abound 
in teaching and learning that has to do with a speaker's 
inability to communicate effectively to an audience unless 
he adheres to certain conventions and constraints. He must 
speak a language known to his audience, a notion that 
includes varieties of language within the same mother-tongue; 
he must comply with its phonological, syntactic and semantic 
rules, and talk in an audible voice. But many of the 
conventions he follows have to do with what he says as well 
as how he says it. He must talk about a topic at a level 
of conceptual development that matches that of the receiver, 
make his part of the dialogue coherent, and say something 
that has worth and relevance within the context. 
The four maxims that Grice (1967) maintains should 
be taken account of by the speaker in contributing to what 
Grice calls the co-operative principle in communication are 
of use to the activity of explaining something to someone 
and take the following form: 
Quantity: Make your contribution no more and no less 
informative than is required. 
Quality: 	 Say only that which you both believe and have 
adequate evidence for. 
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Relation: 	 Be relevant. 
Manner: 	 Make your contribution easy to understand; 
avoid ambiguity, obscurity and prolixity. 
Grice suggests that the speaker agrees to follow these 
maxims and the listener agrees to assume they have been 
followed. 
Where the speakers concerned are pupils it is possible 
to recognise a variety of ways in which the co-operative 
principle could fail to operate that would have consequences 
for subsequent comprehension and understanding. It is also 
clear that the breakdown could occur with the speaker or the 
listener. A teacher could fail to take account of one or 
other of the four maxims, or a pupil fail to perceive the 
relevance of the communication. Whatever the causes of break-
down, educationists have always had to grapple with the 
problem of how best to facilitate comprehension of a 
communication, and this is particularly true of communications 
that contain an explanation that is to be understood by a 
pupil. 
Other factors that influence the degree of understanding 
of an explanation that is achieved are to be found within 
the explainee. Where the explainee is a pupil the expect-
ation is that his state of knowledge and intellectual 
development is not as well advanced as that of the teacher 
who is undertaking to explain something to him, although 
to meet possible objections to this contention it may be 
wise to qualify it by confining the expectation to those 
situations in which the teacher offering the explanation 
has specialist knowledge of the area from which the explana-
tion arises. One of the internal factors that influence 
an explainee's understanding is memory. At the time when 
the explanation is being given, the pupil must be able to 
store information in the short-term memory as it is given, 
so that ideally, comprehension of what the information 
means occurs almost at the same time, or fairly rapidly 
after, the completion of the communication. However, in 
explaining, more than comprehension of the message is 
often required. Many explanations make exacting demands 
upon the reasoning processes of a pupil. Indeed, they 
challenge his general intelligence as well as his ability 
to make sense of verbal information. Examples of this 
are common in science and mathematics which tend to deal, 
commonly, with higher order concepts and rules. 
It is within this context that claims concerning the 
need for an explainer to take account of the explainee's 
predicament and to do the necessary linguistic work upon an 
explanation before presenting it, are revealed as being 
crucial to understanding. Edwards and Furlong (1977 : 108) 
pose some pertinent questions: 
How much of what teachers say is being understood, 
or is already understood, by their pupils? How 
much knowledge is already within the appropriate 
frame of reference, and how much new knowledge is 
being taken? In normal class teaching, finding 
the answers to these questions is a haphazard 
business. A few pupils answer questions and this 
can give the impression that everyone understands. 
It is not until the teacher looks at the pupil's 
written work that he discovers how much of his 
cherished exposition went over the heads of many 
of his class. 
Teachers attempt to get over this by asking questions 
around the class and noting looks and gestures with a view 
to assessing attention. This provides dubious evidence 
for pupils are adept at hiding the fact that they do not 
understand and teachers who do realise that their 
explanations are not picked up by all their pupils, vary 
greatly in their awareness of the nature of the gap that 
can exist between their intended meaning and that which 
is received by the pupil. 
160 
161 
Bearing these points in mind, the third category to 
be investigated contains questions concerning the reliability 
of teachers' perception of their own success as explainers 
and their awareness of the range of messages they communicate, 
both, as intended and unintended communications. The 
specific hypotheses are: 
H6 	 That teachers impressionistic assessments of their 
own success in explaining something to someone are an 
accurate source of information. 
H7 That the understanding achieved by individual pupils 
of an explanation given by their teacher to the class 
demonstrates considerable variation. 
1.4 Category 4 	 The Features that Contribute to or Detract 
from the Attainment of Understanding  
It may be one thing to reveal a gap between intended 
meaning and understanding in a situation where a pupil is 
being given an explanation by someone (usually a teacher) 
and quite another to identify the factors that hamper 
or render impossible, clear understanding of the something 
being explained. As was argued in the last chapter, the 
factors can arise from a number of different sources. On 
the explainer's side, the explanation can fail to be under-
stood for logical reasons such as the unintentional use of 
erroneous information or a confused interpretation of the 
facts. When it is possible to observe teaching going on in 
classrooms, examples of the kinds mentioned occur quite 
frequently, in particular, when teachers are handling a topic 
or subject area of which they have only very limited know-
ledge and experience. 
On the explainee's side it is possible to cite such 
factors as: degree of interest, attention span and certain 
cognitive abilities, as exerting influence upon his motivation 
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set and readiness to engage actively with the new material. 
These factors, which are highly important are always in 
evidence when teaching and learning are taking place. 
However, it is not these which are the concern of the 
investigations envisaged by the present writer. It has been 
argued that explaining is a certain use of language, whereas 
teaching need not be. It is the 'certain use of language' 
in explaining something to someone that provides the focus 
for the studies. Martin (1970 : 122) discussing explaining 
as a use of language, supports the view that for a teacher 
to have explained something to someone, he must do the 
linguistic work himself. She argues that not only should 
he state the relevant facts, but he must relate them to one 
another and to the underlying question. In other words, he 
must arrange or pattern them for the pupil. 
In explaining episodes, where the pattern of discourse 
is that of a dialogue, teachers' use and pupils' understanding 
of that use of language is of prime importance. The words 
used by teachers play a major part in ensuring the success 
or otherwise of their communications and, thus, their 
selections must be made with the vocabulary of the pupil 
in mind. If this is not done it is not too strong to say 
that pupils may be prevented from exhibiting and developing 
their knowledge because the language of the explanation 
they encounter blocks progress rather than facilitating it. 
While considering the function of words it is worth bearing 
in mind Taylor's point (see p.94 ) that knowing the meaning 
of words refers to skills exhibited over fairly long periods 
and to the warnings of a number of other writers in the 
area of language and thinking, that labels, i.e. words, 
are only useful when they refer to classes of things that 
are known to an individual. 
Bearing in mind the issues discussed above the final 
category with which the investigation is concerned contains 
questions about the nature of the features that cause 
confusion and appear to be a barrier to understanding. 
The specific hypotheses to be tested are: 
H8 That features associated with teachers choice of 
vocabulary influence the level of understanding 
gained by pupils from a message and thus from an 
explaining episode. 
H9 That factors arising from context and situation 
influence the level of understanding achieved by 
pupils in explaining episodes. 
H10 That factors associated with pupils' conceptual 
development and their ability to comprehend and 
employ learned capabilities and mental operations 
influence the level of understanding achieved by 
them in explaining episodes. 
2.0 PROBLEMS AND DESIGN STRATEGIES 
In planning the design and analysis of material from 
an investigation that is concerned with use of language, one 
of the major problems confronting the researcher is the 
enormous quantity of language activity that goes on at all 
times. Thus, any sample that is examined or analysed is 
but a fragment of the material available, which raises the 
question of whether or not the sample can be regarded as 
typical of the body of language from which it is extracted. 
Moreover, small though the sample may be in relation to the 
total, it affords the researcher a very large number of 
words to cope with analytically. Twenty thousand words 
may constitute only half a novel, but to scan this number 
of words (say) for the purpose of analysing the style of 
discourse is a formidable task. 
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The proposed investigation narrows down the language 
functions with which it is concerned to one, namely, explain.- 
2.64 
-ing. Notwithstanding, if teachers' judgements of their own 
activities are accurate a large quantity of explaining 
episodes occur every day, so the problem of obtaining 
samples that are typical is still considerable. Further-
more, attempts will be made to compare the explanations 
given in science subjects with those in non-science 
subjects which is likely to exacerbate the problems 
associated with deeming the sample of episodes from each 
subject area involved, to be 'typical' of the episodes 
in that area. 
In addition to the points raised, the investigation 
is concerned with revealing certain trends that may exist 
and also with examining particular aspects of the act of 
explaining in depth. To ensure an adequate degree of 
validity and objectivity the former objective requires a 
large number of explanations while in the latter case 
constraints imposed by time force the researcher to make 
selections within selections. 
Another difficulty, when examining a function that is 
in the nature of explaining, is to utilise empirical methods 
without reducing the underlying questions to those that have 
lost much of their interest and value for understanding the 
activity in question. More often than not a sensitive 
analytical description of a piece of discourse reveals 
features that are missed altogether when gross scrutiny of 
a large body of language to identify general features is 
undertaken. A solution to this dilemma demands the 
utilisation of both approaches to a degree that is feasible 
within the constraints of time and resources and with 
regard to those questions for which the respective 
approaches are appropriate. 
A number of problems to be overcome in designing the 
proposed investigation occur because the questions that 
form the bases of the hypotheses, arise from a common context 
but vary considerably in character: a situation for which 
the theoretical section prepares the ground in its 
discussion of the range of factors involved in explaining 
something to someone. The effect of this is to put 
pressure upon the researcher to employ a variety of 
investigatory methods for obtaining material and likewise 
a variety of analytical models for working upon the material. 
In the proposed investigation the major emphasis is 
upon explaining as an act going on between at least two 
individuals within the context of the classroom. It is 
assumed that an essential feature of the task confronting 
an explainer is the communication of intended meanings to 
an explainee such as to promote 	 explainee understanding. 
of the explanation. This assumption is made for all acts of 
explaining irrespective of the educational stage of the pupils 
involved and the subject within which they occur. The point 
is worthy of note for although explaining in science is to be 
given particular attention its features will be examined in 
relation to a range of school subjects, a small proportion 
involving primary school pupils. 
2.1 Investigatory Methods  
The investigation is designed in four parts that are 
concerned with the four categories of hypotheses that were 
described and justified earlier in the chapter and which are: 
(1) Identifying samples of teachers and pupils who value 
explaining and a sample of explaining episodes. 
(2) Analysis of explaining episodes to identify types 
of explanation and meaning. 
(3) The gap between intended meaning and received meaning. 
(4) Factors influencing effective explaining and 
understanding. 
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Because a variety of methods and analytical models will be 
used in the studies, it is not proposed to describe the 
methodology for each study before going on to discuss 
treatment of material and outcomes for each study. In each 
case, for reasons of clarity and ready comprehension, 
methodology, treatment of material and outcomes will be 
described in relation to a specific study within the 
category that it occurs and under the head of its associated 
hypothesis. Outcomes from specific studies will be examined 
in conjunction with others in a subsequent chapter that 
draws them together for the purpose of interpretation. 
The designs are cross-sectional and in the main 
analytical, a number of purely descriptive items being 
necessary on specific occasions. 
The range of methods includes use of rating sheets, 
taping and transcribing lessons, designing specific 
situations, i.e. experiments, and applying analytical models 
to samples of explaining episodes. 
The methods employed are given below, each alongside 
the hypothesis with which it is concerned: 
Hypothesis Method of Investigation 
H1 ) 
H2 ) 
Use of a rating sheet containing items from 
Green (1971) and Smith's (1969) Logical 
Acts of Teaching followed by collation and 
interpretation of information obtained. 
H3 	 The obtaining of tapes of lessons from 
different classroom contexts for trans-
cription and subsequent analysis using an 
appropriate model 
H4 	 The analysis of suitably large samples 
H5 	 of explaining episodes from different 
subject areas using appropriate models. 
H6 	 The setting up of experiments followed by 
H7 	 collation and interpretation of the 
H8 	 results. 
H9 	 The sensitive analysis of a suitably 
H10 	 small number of explaining episodes from 
the main sample, using appropriate models. 
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2.2 Analytical Models  
Like the investigatory methods, the models are widely 
differing in character and, indeed, in degree of sensitivity. 
While it has been possible to use certain models without any 
modification, it has been necessary to adapt others and to 
combine one with another in order to obtain the desired 
outcomes. There are also occasions when the categories em-
ployed in analysis is that of the present writer for reasons 
to do with the lack of any suitable alternative. 
The models employed are given below each alongside 
the hypothesis for which it is utilised: 
Hypothesis 
	 Model 
H1) Not required. 
H2)  
H3 	 Martin (1970) Hypothesis Six: 
Philosophical characteristics of 
explaining episodes. 
H4 	 Combination of Taylor (1970) and Green 
(1971): Typologies of explanations. 
Vygotsky (1962) Adapted by Richards(1)  
Conceptual categories. 
H5 	 Bellack (1969): 
Categories of communicated meanings. 
H6 	 Not required. 
H7 	 Richards: Categories of received 
meanings. 
H8 	 Not required. 
H9 	 Halliday (1975b): Situational factors 
as determinants of text. 
H10 	 Gagn (1977) adapted by Richards: 
A hierarchy of intellectual capabilities. 
(1) Richards is the present writer. 
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As can be seen from the outline, the models are 
numerous, each appropriate for identifying factors associated 
with a specific hypothesis. For this reason it is consider-
ed necessary to describe their characteristics and offer 
some justification for their selection. 
2.2.1 Martin (1970) Hypothesis Six 
Although it has been argued that philosophical accounts 
of explaining something to someone are incomplete because 
they exclude or give little consideration to a number of 
important characteristics that have to do with social and 
contextual factors, it is thought to be desirable to 
identify and subject to further analysis those explaining 
episodes that satisfy the requirements stipulated in these 
accounts. In so doing it may follow that certain episodes 
thought by the teacher concerned to be an act of explanation 
will not qualify as such. However, those that do qualify 
can be deemed to be explaining episodes with a reasonable 
degree of confidence. The model which sets out the essential 
characteristics of explaining something to someone has been 
discussed fully in chapter 3 and is set out there. (See 
pp•74'7S ) . 
2.2.2 Taylor (1970) and Green (1971)  
For the purpose of identifying the occurrence and degree 
of use of explanation types within subject areas Taylor's 
categories will be modified and used in conjunction with 
Green's typology of'why'questions. This is necessary 
because the hypothesis requires a typology that can dis-
criminate sensitively among different kinds of'why'questions 
(as does that of Green) while at the same time retaining 
the 'what' category that Taylor recognises. The latter's 
notion of a scientific explanation can also be utilised in 
order that the 'why' explanations that are scientific can 
be identified. 
The categories offered by both Green and Taylor are 
discussed in Chapter 3 (see pp. 33-44) and an outline of 
the combined typology will be given when the investigation 
for which the model is required is discussed in Chapter 6. 
2.2.3 Vygotsky (1962) Adapted by Richards  
The conceptual characteristics of the explanations 
within different subjects are also to be examined in relation 
to the hypothesis H4. For the purpose of revealing the 
concept type, Vygotsky's distinction of 'spontaneous' and 
'non-spontaneous' (or scientific) will be used. To these 
two will be added 'intermediate' and 'false' as it is likely 
that both these categories may occur in explanations, the 
former frequently and the latter from time to time. By 
'intermediate' is meant those concepts which are moving 
towards the non-spontaneous or scientific but which are not 
yet fully formed. 'False' is a category for placing 
erroneous concepts that have been acquired by the pupil. 
2.2.4 Bellack (1965)  
The categories that Bellack identifies are appropriate 
for revealing the meaning represented by the content of the 
messages that teachers communicate to their pupils. Four 
functionally distinct types of meaning are proposed which 
are: the subject matter, the cognitive processes involved 
in dealing with the subject matter, the routine procedures 
within the instructional process and didactic verbal 
processes. 
An assumption is made by the present writer that by 
'subject matter' is meant the 'notions that constitute the 
topic or topics with which the lesson is concerned and this 
will inform the judgements to be made when categorising 
the meanings. 
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Bellack's model is discussed in Chapter 4 and a 
further outline of his typology given there (see p. 135-36) 
2.2.5 Richards 1980 
In order to reveal the range of meanings received by 
pupils from the explaining episodes that take place in the 
experiment set up to investigate the possible gap between 
utterer's intended meaning and receiver's meaning, it is 
necessary to define categories that take account of the 
major variations. 
The method used to arrive at the definition involved 
setting up a situation in which a class of pupils were 
given an explanation of something, followed by oral and 
written questions which sought to establish the accuracy 
of their understanding of the message, as defined in terms 
of the utterer's intentions. The information so obtained 
revealed seven distinct categories, as follows: 
A. Complete Pupils have an understanding of the message 
that matches the utterer's intentions. 
B. Substantial Pupils understand the greater part of the 
message. 
C. Partial Pupils understand about half the message. 
D. Substantial with Misinterpretation Pupils understand 
a substantial part of the message but have misinter-
preted certain items. 
E. Erroneous Pupils have made sense of the message on the 
basis of erroneous interpretations of its meaning. 
F. Fragmentary Pupils have made contact with fragments 
of the utterer's intended meaning but are unable to 
make sense of the message. 
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G. 	 Absent Pupils have made no contact with utterer's 
meaning and cannot remember any part of the message. 
These categories are considered appropriate for the concerns 
associated with hypothesis H7 and will be used in analysis 
of pupil understanding of acts of explanation. It should be 
noted that it is not assumed that the list is exhaustive. 
2.2.6 Halliday (1975b)  
Utilising Halliday's (1975b: 24) notion of text which 
is discussed in Chapter 4 as a semantic unit an explaining 
episode qualifies as a text because functionally it involves 
linguistic meaning and as a physical event it is an instance 
of 'linguistic interaction in which people actually engage.' 
To reveal features associated with context and situation 
in explaining episodes Halliday's concepts of Field, Tenor 
and Mode will be used. 	 This appears to be a highly 
appropriate model for analysing the episodes in view of his 
argument that a particular situation type can be interpreted 
as a semiotic structure that can be represented as a complex 
of these three dimensions. 
The proposed model is as follows: 
(1) Field of Discourse - Concerned with the ideational  
function. 
(a) Habitual collocations. 
(b) Special vocabulary. 
(c) Habitual collocation of voice with active and 
passive. 
(2) Tenors of Discourse - Concerned with the inter-personal  
function. 
(a) Personal Tenor 
	 i. Informal-formal 
ii. Personal-impersonal 
(b) Functional Tenor 
(3) Mode of Discourse - Concerned with the textual  
function. 
(a) Spoken 	 i. spontaneous-non spontaneous 
ii. conversing-monologuing 
(b) Written to be spoken 
Indicators in the text of specific features of the model 
will be elaborated when it is being employed in relation to 
the concerns of hypothesis H9 and the full model included in 
the Appendices (see p.314). 
2.2.7 Gagne (1977) Adapted by Richards  
Of the five capabilities that Gagne (1977: 26-27) 
describes as categories of human performances established 
by learning, intellectual skills, cognitive strategies for 
problem solving, and verbal information are those likely to 
be involved in understanding explanations from different 
subject areas. 
In all three of these capabilities certain cognitive 
processes, such as attending discriminating encoding, storing, 
retrieving and transferring are taking place at one time and 
another. Individual differences with regard to the skill with 
which these processes are operated influence the success 
pupils achieve in understanding explanations. For example, 
if faulty encoding occurs in relation to the meaning of a 
label, an erroneous item may be stored which will have 
repercussions for the learner when that item is called upon 
in subsequent learning. 
On the other hand, lack of understanding can be attri-
butable to factors concerned with the conditions necessary 
for learning to take place as, for example, when a pupil is 
faced with new learning that depends upon prerequisite 
concepts which at that time he has not experienced. 
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Bearing in mind the points raised above Gagn4's 
model has been adapted by the present writer as follows: 
Operations  
(a) Attending 
(b) Discriminating 
(c) Encoding 
(d) Storing 
(e) Retrieving 
(f) Transferring 
Learned Capabilities  
(1) Intellectual Skills 
(2) Cognitive Strategies 
(3) Verbal Information 
The model will be used in relation to the concerns of 
Hypothesis H.10. The version showing all the features is 
included in the appendices (see p.315). 
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1.0 PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS TO OBTAIN SAMPLES AND TO TEST  
HYPOTHESES H1, H2 AND H3  
Within this preliminary section of the investigation 
the first two studies are concerned with identifying the 
status of explaining as an activity of teaching, i.e. with 
testing hypothesis H1 and H2. 
In addition to testing these hypotheses, the responses 
of teachers and pupils to the questionnaire will be used to 
obtain a sample of teachers who set high value on explaining  
as an activity of teaching and who teach classes of pupils  
whose ratings of explaining match their own. This group is 
asked to co-operate in the third study by allowing a lesson 
(or lessons) to be recorded, transcribed and analysed for 
the purpose of testing hypothesis H3 and providing a sample  
of explanations for use in other aspects of the investiga-
tion. 
1.1 Testing Hypothesis H1 and Obtaining Samples of Teachers  
who Value Explaining  
The hypothesis formulated to reveal the status of 
explaining in teaching and to provide a sample of teachers 
who set high value upon this activity is: 
H1 	 That the occurrence of an activity in the rankings  
made by teachers from a list of logical acts of  
teaching on grounds of centrality and importance,  
will be random 
1.1.1 The Initial Sample  
Making use of personal and professional knowledge 
of schools and individual teachers a group of 90 
teachers from 48 secondary schools and 30 primary 
schools each willing to allow lessons to be tape 
recorded were identified. 
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1.1.2 Stimulus Material 
This consists of a list containing 14 items defined 
by Green. (1971) and Smith (1969) as logical or 
intellectual acts of teaching as follows: 
Amassing evidence, describing, defining, 
classifying, designating, concluding, comparing 
and contrasting, explaining, demonstrating, in-
ferring, opining, reporting, stating, valuing, 
together with - 
instructions for selecting and rating the acts in 
respect of their relative centrality and importance 
in teaching. (see p.312 in the appendices). 
1.1.3 Procedures  
Each teacher was given a copy of the stimulus material 
by the researcher, or someone acting for the researcher, 
and requested to follow the instructions without 
reference to any other person and to complete the task 
in time for collection the following day. 
1.1.4 Results  
The results of the teachers rankings of explaining are 
given below in Table 1. 
TABLE 1  
Teachers' Rankings of the Centrality and Importance of  
Explaining as an Activity of Teaching  
Number of Teachers Ranking 
Rank Infant Age Junior Age 	 Secondary Age 	 Total  
Order (Possible 6) (Possible 24) 	 (Possible 60) (Possible 90) 
1 3 11 32 46 
2 1 3 14 18 
3 0 2 8 10 
4 1 3 2 6 
5 0 1 1 2 
6 1 2 3 6 
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Number of Teachers Ranking 
Rank Infant Age Junior Age Secondary Age Total 
Order 	 (Possible 6) (Possible 24) 	 (Possible 60) (Possible 
90) 
7 0 1 0 1 
8 0 1 0 1 
9 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 
Not 
Selected 0 0 0 0 
1.1.5 Discussion 
The results show that just over half the teachers 
in the group rate explaining as the most central and 
important logical activity in teaching. The proportion 
reflects the choices of secondary teachers, but infant 
and junior teachers' choices were only slightly below 
this proportion. Taking first, second and third 
choices together, each of which is a high status 
position, well over four-fifths of the group perceive 
explaining as a central and highly important 
activity of teaching. 
1.1.6 Conclusion 
Explaining is selected by teachers as the most 
central and important logical act of teaching and, 
thus, hypothesis H1 is rejected. 
1.2 Testing Hypothesis H2 and Identifying Pupils who Value  
Explaining  
The hypothesis formulated to reveal the status of 
explaining among learners and which pupils set high value 
upon explaining is: 
H2 That the occurrence of an activity in the rankings made 
by pupils from a list of logical acts of teaching on  
grounds of centrality and importance, will be random 
1.2.1 The Initial Sample  
Pupils in the classes of teachers who set high 
value on explaining in the previous study (Hl)were 
utilised as follows: 
From the classes of 2 infant teachers 20 pupils 
From the classes of 12 junior teachers 302 pupils 
From the classes of 45 secondary teachers 939 pupils 
Total: 1,261 pupils 
1.2.2 Stimulus Material  
This consists of a list containing 8 of Green (1971) and 
Smith's (1969) 14 items defined as logical or intel-
lectual acts of teaching, as follows: 
amassing evidence, defining, describing, demonstrating, 
explaining, opining and valuing. 
A simple statement about the nature of the activity and 
instructions for selecting and ranking the acts in 
respect of their relative centrality and importance 
for the learner. (see p. 313 of the appendices). 
Reasons for the modifications of the original list are: 
1. Pupils would find 14 items too many to manage. 
2. Pupils would not understand what was involved 
in some of the less obvious activities. 
3. The statements were intended to make clear to the 
pupil the nature of the activities included. 
1.2.3 Procedures  
Each pupil was given a copy of the stimulus material 
by the researcher or someone acting for the researcher 
and requested to follow the instructions without 
reference to any person other than the one conducting 
the study. 
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Help was given to pupils whose reading limitations 
inhibited completion of the task. 
The responses were collected when all pupils in 
the specific group had completed the task. 
1.2.4 Results  
The results of the pupils' rankings of explaining 
are given in Table 2: 
TABLE 2 Pupils' Rankings of the Centrality and Importance of  
Explaining as an Activity of Teaching  
Teacher Type 	 Number of Pupils Ranking in each Position 
1 2 3 4 5 Not Se-
lected 
Infant 1. (Poss 1.0) 5 2 3 0 0 0 
2. (Poss 11) 4 6 1 0 0 0 
Total Infant 
Selections- 21 9 8 4 0 0 0 
Junior 1. (Poss 	 25) 10 3 10 1 1 0 
2. (Poss 18) 8 4 4 0 1 1 
3. (Poss 	 22) 9 9 1 1 1 1 
4. (Poss 28) 12 7 7 2 0 0 
5. (Poss 19) 6 3 5 2 3 0 
6. (Poss 26) 7 5 10 3 0 1 
7. (Poss 	 24) 8 9 1 5 1 0 
8. (Poss 	 27) 5 13 6 1 2 0 
9. (Poss 	 28) 13 5 3 5 2 0 
10. (Poss 31) 18 3 8 1 1 0 
11. (Poss 	 29) 7 7 5 5 4 1 
12. (Poss 25) 9 6 6 0 4 0 
Total Junior 
selections-302 112 74 66 26 20 4 
Secondary 
(Poss 	 22) 7 5 5 3 2 0 1.  
2.  (Poss 	 23) 8 4 9 1 1 0 
3. (Poss 15) 4 7 0 3 1 0 
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Teacher Type 	 Number of Pupils Ranking in each Position 
1 2 3 4 5 Not Sele-
cted 
Secondary 
4. 	 (Poss 	 21) 9 2 2 4 3 1 
5. 	 (Poss 	 27) 14 6 0 5 2 0 
6. 	 (Poss 17) 6 6 3 0 2 0 
7. 	 (Poss 21) 7 7 5 1 0 1 
8. 	 (Poss 24) 7 8 5 2 2 0 
9 	 (Poss 26) 9 9 0 0 7 1 
10. 	 (Poss 19) 8 3 8 0 0 0 
11. 	 (Poss 23) 11 7 2 2 1 0 
12. 	 (Poss 	 22) 5 7 7 1 2 0 
13. 	 (Poss 25) 10 4 5 6 0 0 
14. 	 (Poss 22) 10 3 3 2 4 0 
15. 	 (Poss 	 23) 6 7 7 3 0 0 
16. 	 (Poss 	 15) 7 2 4 0 2 0 
17. 	 (Poss 	 21) 4 2 5 2 7 1 
18. 	 (Poss 	 22) 9 3 0 5 3 2 
19. 	 (Poss 24) 12 7 5 0 0 0 
20. 	 (Poss 26) 14 0 6 2 4 0 
21. 	 (Poss 	 15) 3 10 0 1 1 0 
22. 	 (Poss 	 19) 9 5 5 0 0 0 
23. 	 (Poss 	 19) 8 2 0 5 4 0 
24. 	 (Poss 30) 21 0 2 7 0 0 
25. 	 (Poss 	 22) 11 1 3 2 4 1 
26. 	 (Poss 	 18) 6 3 1 1 7 0 
27. 	 (Poss 	 20) 5 5 3 5 2 0 
28. 	 (Poss 	 24) 7 7 0 8 2 0 
29. 	 (Poss 	 12) 6 0 5 0 0 1 
30. 	 (Poss 21) 5 10 4 2 0 0 
31. 	 (Poss 	 17) 5 2 1 7 2 0 
32. 	 (Poss 	 19) 8 6 5 0 0 0 
33. 	 (Pass 	 24) 10 10 0 4 0 0 
34. 	 (Poss 	 25) 10 6 5 2 1 1 
35. 	 (Poss 	 16) 8 8 0 0 0 0 
36. 	 (Poss 	 21) 6 6 3 5 1 0 
37. 	 (Poss 	 20) 9 5 4 0 2 0 
38. 	 (Poss 20) 11 2 0 2 5 0 
39. 
	 (Poss 
	 27) 16 6 3 1 1 0 
Teacher Type Number of Pupils Ranking in each Position 
1 2 3 4 5 Not 
Selected 
Secondary 
40. (poss 14) 2 8 2 0 0 0 
41.  (poss 26) 13 0 7 4 2 0 
42.  (poss 14) 9 2 1 1 0 1 
43. (poss 24) 13 1 7 1 2 0 
44. (poss 21) 6 7 4 4 0 0 
45. (poss 19) 7 2 3 2 4 1 
381 203 149 106 83 11 
Total Secondary 
Selections 	 - 939 
Total of all 
selections 	 - 1,261 
1.2.5 Discussion 
The results show that over half the pupils in the group 
rank explaining as the most central and important logical 
activity in teaching. The proportion most closely 
reflects the secondary level pupils, but primary selec-
tions are only slightly below this. Taking first, second 
and third choices together, each being a high status 
position, just under four-fifths of the group perceive 
explaining as a central and highly important activity 
of teaching and learning. Moreover, only eleven pupils 
out of the sample of over one thousand did not rank it 
in one of the five positions. 
1.2.6 Conclusion 
Explaining is ranked by pupils as the most central and 
important activity of teaching and, thus, hypothesis 
H2 is rejected. 
1.3 	 Testing Hypothesis H3 and Obtaining Samples of  
Explaining Episodes  
The hypothesis formulated for the purpose of disting-
uishing explaining from telling and other similar activities 
and to provide a sample of explaining episodes for analysis 
in other aspects of the investigation is: 
H3 That the activity teacher's identify as explaining  
meets philosophical and pedagogical criteria that is  
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accepted as an account of explaining something to  
someone and which distinguishes it from telling and 
other similar activities. 
1.3.1 The Samples  
1. Teachers and Pupils 
Teachers from among those providing the sample for the 
first study H1, (by reason of their willingness to allow 
lessons to be recorded) subsequently revealed in this study 
as setting high value on explaining and who teach a class or 
classes containing a high proportion of pupils revealed in 
the second study H2 as also setting high value on explaining 
constitute the sample, together with the classes of pupils 
in question. 
2. Lessons 
Lessons were provided by teachers engaged with their 
own classes as follows: 
From the age range 6-7 years 2 teachers with 2 classes. 
From the age range 8-11 years 8 teachers with 8 
classes. 
From the age range 12-16 years 45 teachers with 70 
classes. 
The subjects represented in the sample of secondary 
school lessons are: 
Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, English, 
Foreign Languages, History and Geography. 
1.3.2 Procedure  
1. Recording of Lessons 
Arrangements were made for lessons to be recorded in 
accordance with the wishes of the teacher concerned which 
produced the following variations: 
i teachers made their own arrangements to record 
their lessons, 
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ii the recording equipment was set up by the present 
writer, 
iii the equipment was set up and the lesson observed 
by the present writer. 
In the last case pupil groups were recorded as and where the 
opportunity presented itself. 
The recordings were made and collected over a period of 
six months and transcriptions made of relevant sections of 
the lessons. 
2. Transcription of Recordings 
Those parts of the lesson that are in any way involved 
in the lead up to an explanation, or where the activity of 
explaining something to someone is going on, were transcribed. 
The actual proportion of a lesson involved varies from a short 
isolated episode to most of the verbal interaction in the 
lesson. 
3. Analysis of Transcriptions 
The explaining within the sections transcribed were 
subjected to analysis using as the model Martin's (1969) 
Hypothesis Six (see p. 74-75) 	 with the 
objective of revealing those episodes that meet the con-
ditions defined by philosophical accounts of_explaining 
something to someone. 
1.3.3 Methodological Limitations  
1. It is always possible that the presence of a tape 
recorder in a classroom during a lesson will influence the 
behaviour of teachers and pupils. To minimise the possible 
effects of this they were not informed at the outset which 
teaching activity was under scrutiny. 
2. In utilising analytical models, it is necessary to. 
make judgements against specific criteria. This introduces 
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a degree of subjectivity which, with certain exceptions, it 
is impossible to eliminate. 
1.3.4 Results  
The analysis of 161 explanations given by teachers to 
pupils is shown below. In the table the specific conditions 
are listed and beside each is shown the number of explanations 
that meet the requirements. Of the 110 explanations that 
satisfy all conditions the 106 to be used in testing hypothe-
sis H4 are in the appendices (see pp. 323-90). 
TABLE 3 Number of Teacher Explanations that meet the  
Requirements of Specific Conditions in Martin's  
Hypothesis Six  
Conditions 	 Explanations 
(Poss No. 161) 
(a) Soundness of question 	 160 
(b) Tutor rational and under- 
stands question 	 158 
(c) Tutor perceives tutee's 
rational predicament with 
regard to the underlying 
question 	 146 
(d) Tutor states right answer to 
underlying question 	 150 
(e) Tutor answers subsidiary 
question 	 121 
(f) Tutor allows tutee to exercise 
his reason and judgement 	 141 
(g) Tutor by end of episode has 
organised and stated the 
answers to questions in (c) 
and (e) 	 117 
Final total of those meeting 
all requirements 	 110 
1.3.5 Discussion 
Some two-thirds of the activity deemed by teachers to 
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be explanatory met all the conditions incorporated into 
Martin's Hypothesis Six. However, to obtain a more detailed 
picture of what this model reveals it is necessary to examine 
the figures for each condition in turn and to interpret the 
influence of one condition on the figures for another. 
It is reassuring to note that all but one explanation 
is concerned with an underlying question that is sound. The 
one explanation that fails to meet condition (a) being given 
by a teacher operating in an unfamiliar area of knowledge 
with a primary class. This explanation fails to satisfy 
conditions b, c, d, f and g for the reason that the teacher 
in question does not understand the underlying question 
herself (although unaware that this is the case) and is in 
no position to appreciate the tutees predicament or to offer 
right answers to the underlying question and any subsidiary 
questions. 
Condition (b) affords problems to the analyst for it 
cannot be judged with any degree of certainty. Furthermore, 
the judgement made has implications for condition (c) for 
the reason described above. In categorising 'doubtful' cases 
it was found helpful to scrutinise condition (d) and (e) as 
the quality of the answers to both the underlying question 
and a subsidiary question is a clear indication of the teach-
er's understanding of the underlying question(l)An answer may 
not be wrong, but if it fails to fully answer the underlying 
question it may cast doubt on the teacher's understanding of 
the underlying question. Having considered these points, 
on the occasions that doubt remained the benefit of it was 
usually given to the teacher, and always to those operating 
within their own specialism. 
(1) When necessary advice from a colleague qualified in 
the appropriate discipline was obtained by the present 
writer. 
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Of the explanations that fail to satisfy condition (c)  
four are considered to be totally inadequate. The remaining 
eleven were judged inadequate because they fail to identify 
the pupils predicament with a satisfactory degree of 
specificity. The effect of this is to make the ensuing 
explanations too general to do more than partially remove 
the basis of the tutees predicament. 
Condition (d) Out of the eleven losses five are wrong 
or unsatisfactory answers. Two of these are in error in 
respect of the subject matter involved and the other three 
unsatisfactory in that they only partially answer the under-
lying question. In the case of the remaining six explanations 
the teacher does not actually state the right answer at any 
time during the episode and, thus, not only fails to satisfy 
condition (d) but also condition (g). 
Condition (e) removes more explanations than any 
other, with the exception of condition (g), which to some 
degree it determines. Indeed, condition (e) also affects the 
total in (f) for one of the ways in which a tutee is afforded 
an opportunity to exercise his reason and judgement is by a 
shift in question. 
Although some teachers afford pupils an opportunity 
to exercise their reason and judgement thus fulfilling 
condition (f) through a shift in question, there are others 
who do this by allowing the pupil to state whether or not he 
accepts the explanation. This is done through questions 
like... O.K.?; clear?; or by leaving a gap in a sentence 
at the end of the explanation for the pupil to fill. 
Explanations failing to fulfil condition (g) are 
largely those that have already failed to fulfil condition  
(e). The further losses are provided by those teachers who 
fail to state the right answer to the underlying question -
condition (d) although they may state answers to a subsid-
iary question. It should be noted, however, that teachers 
whose explanations do not meet the requirement of category 
(g) do not necessarily refrain from asking subsidiary 
questions. Indeed, the style of the explaining episodes 
of these teachers is predominantly questioning in character. 
It is the omission of a statement of the right answer that 
is the cause of their failure to meet the conditions in 
question. 
Overall most explanations fulfil all or most of the 
conditions. Of those failing to do so, forty are accounted 
for by condition (e) that requires that a tutor answers 
one subsidiary question in order that the question-shifting 
requirement is satisfied. This requirement and the possible 
implications of failing to take account of it will be con-
sidered in the general discussion of results to be undertaken 
in Chapter 8. 
1.3.6 Conclusion  
In view of the high percentage of explanations that 
meet all the conditions of Martin's Hypothesis Six and the 
points raised in the discussion the hypothesis H3 cannot be 
rejected. In allowing it to stand it is necessary to bear 
in mind the reservation associated with condition (e). 
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2.0 ANALYSIS OF THE EXPLANATIONS GIVEN IN THE FIRST SAMPLE  
OF EXPLAINING EPISODES. TO TEST HYPOTHESES H4 AND H5  
2.1 Testing Hypothesis H4 - Types of Explanation  
The hypothesis formulated to reveal the nature and 
distribution of explanations given in certain primary 
and secondary school classroom contexts is: 
H4. That explanation types, both in relation to  
the kind of what and why questions they answer  
and their conceptual characteristics are distri-
buted randomly throughout different subject areas  
and within the same subject at different develop-
mental stages.  
2.1.1 The Sample  
A total of 106 explanations that satisfy the conditions 
of Martin's Hypothesis Six in the study associated with 
hypothesis H3 constitutes the sample. The distribution 
of primary and secondary contexts and of subjects and 
topics is: 18 explanations given by primary teachers 
within topics concerned with Mathematics, Humanities, 
Nature Study, Religious Education and Environmental Studies 
and 88 explanations given by secondary teachers within 
Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, History, 
Geography, English and Foreign Languages. 
2.1.2 Analytical Models  
(1) Combination of Taylor (1970) and Green (1971): 
Typologies of Explanations  
The categories used to analyse the sample of explana-
tions are as follows: 
What-explanations  
i. Linking the thing or event to scientific laws from 
which the event or behaviour of the thing could 
be deduced (Sci). 
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ii. Supplying information and satisfying curiosity.(inf.) 
iii. Explaining by what means or how something came 
about. (How). 
Why-explanations  
i. Deductive explanations - where what is to be 
explained is logically deduced from statements 
that explain the phenomenon in question. (Ded). 
ii. Probabilistic explanations - where the truth of 
the explana.ns does not guarantee the truth of the 
explanandum, but offers an account that is 
probable. (Pro). 
iii. Genetic explanations - that describe how a state 
of affairs developed or by what process it came 
about. (Gen). 
iv. Teleological and Functional explanations - that 
make reference to consciously held goals or 
purposes for which actions are taken and thus refer 
to the future. (Te/f). 
(2) 	 Vygotsky (1962) Adapted by Richards:Conceptual Categories  
i. Spontaneous concepts - those acquired by an 
individual through experience before he is able to 
define them in words. 
ii. Intermediate concepts - those which have started 
out as spontaneous concepts but have reached a 
stage at which they are developing into associated 
non-spontaneous or scientific concepts as a result 
of further experience and learning. 
iii. Non-spontaneous or scientific concepts - those 
which can be acquired only through specific tea-
ching because they start their development with 
a verbal for mation and their use in non-spontan-
eous
A 
 operations. 
lv. False concepts - those which an individual has 
acquired through experience or specific learn-
ing but which are erroneous. 
	2.1.3 	 Methodological Limitations  
In utilising analytical models it is necessary to 
make judgements against specific criteria. This introduces 
a degree of subjectivity which with certain exceptions it is 
impossible to eliminate. 
	
2.1.4 	 Results  
The philosophical nature and distribution of explana-
tions within five topics in primary teaching and eight 
school subjects in secondary teaching is given in Table 4 
and the conceptual nature and distribution of explanations 
in the same sample is given in Table 5. 
TABLE 4: The Nature and Distribution of Explanations within 
Primary and Secondary Teaching  
No. of Explanations 	 Explanations answering: 
in Lesson or Topic What-Questions 	 Why-Questions 
Sci. Inf. How Ded Pro Gen Te/f 
Primary: 
2 
6 
4 
5 
4 
5 
5 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
(3) Mathematics 
(4) Humanities 
(4) Nature Study 
(4) Environmental 
Studies 
(3) 	 Religious 
Education 
Secondary: 
(12) Mathematics 6 10 13 
(12) 	 Physics 15 1 2 10 2 
(12) Chemistry 14 2 3 9 2 
(12) 	 Biology 5 5 5 1 4 10 
(10) 	 English 10 4 5 2 2 
(10) 	 History 10 2 10 
(10) 	 Geography 2 19 3 1 2 3 3 
(.10) 	 Foreign 
Languages 14 8 1 
Totals 44 95 51 20 7 27 19 
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TABLE 5: Nature and Distribution of Concept Types in 
Primary and Secondary Explanations  
Non-spon- 
Subject 	 Spontaneous Intermediate taneous or 
Scientific 
Primary  
Mathematics 	 (3) 	 7 	 9 	 8 
Humanities 	 (4) 	 16 	 29 	 12 
Nature Study 	 (4) 	 22 	 25 	 4 
Environmental 
Studies 	 (4) 	 9 	 12 	 0 
Religious 
Education 	 (3) 	 4 	 12 	 10 
Secondary  
	
Mathematics (12) 27 	 37 	 33 
Physics 	 (12) 	 23 	 65 	 43 
Chemistry 	 (12) 	 25 	 60 	 61 
Biology 	 (12) 	 27 	 62 	 49 
English 	 (10) 	 53 	 43 	 12 
History 	 (10) 	 57 	 53 	 19 
Geography 	 (10) 	 54 	 50 	 11 
Foreign 
Language 	 (10) 	 31 	 23 	 24 
N.B. No. of explanations analysed is in brackets after 
the subject. 
2.1.5 Discussion  
Examination of Tables 4 and 5 suggest distinctions 
do exist among the subjects with regard to their utilisa-
tion of explanation and concept types. 
Table 4 showing the types of questions explanations 
are attempting to answer reveals that the distinctions that 
do exist are not limited to factors associated with being 
an art or a science subject. It is also clear that certain 
trends are common to all explanations irrespective of the 
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subject area. For example, in all subjects except Biology 
(where what and why types are equally represented) what-
questions predominate, as shown in the table below: 
TABLE 6: Distribution of What and Why-Questions Throughout 
All Explanations  
Explanations 	 What-Questions 	 Why-Questions 
Primary  
(3) Mathematics 	 11 	 0 
(4) Humanities 	 6 	 1 
(4) Nature Study 	 9 	 3 
(4) Environmental Studies 	 5 	 2 
(3) Religious Education 	 6 	 0 
Secondary  
(12) Mathematics 	 29 	 0 
(12) Physics 	 18 	 12 
(12) Chemistry 	 19 	 11 
(12) Biology 	 15 	 15 
(10) English 	 14 	 9 
(10) History 	 12 	 10 
(10) Geography 	 24 	 9 
(10) Foreign Languages 	 22 	 1 
TOTAL 	 190 	 73 
In the case of the secondary explanations, no distinct-
ions appear to exist between arts and science subjects in 
respect of their use of what-questions in general. In the 
sample the distribution is shown in Table 7 (over the page). 
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TABLE 7: Distribution of What-Questions Categories in  
Arts and Science Subjects - at Secondary Level  
Explanations 	 What-Questions 
All Types 
	 Sci. 	 Inf. 	 How 
(36) Science 81 40 18 23 
(30) Arts 72 2 53 17 
TOTAL 153 42 71 40 
It is difficult to identify arts and science in the 
primary level topics but it is clear that what-questions 
are much more common than why-questions. 
Eighteen primary explanations generate 37 what-
questions to 6 why-questions. 
Examination of individual what-question categories 
shows that overall, what-information occurs most frequently, 
71 of the total of 153 secondary what-questions being of 
this type. The primary pattern is similar, 24 of the total 
of 35 what-questions are of the what-information type. 
The distribution of what-information questions through-
out the explanations of specific secondary subjects shows 
considerable variation, Geography generating almost the 
same number as all the sciences added together. 
What-how questions are evenly distributed through the 
arts and sciences, as shown in Table 7. However, consider-
ed individually, Mathematics and Foreign Languages utilise 
this category significantly more than others for reasons 
which would appear to reflect the nature of the teaching 
of these subjects where there is a particular concern to 
explain by what means, or the method whereby, a problem 
may be solved or an activity carried out. The primary 
Mathematics explanations follow an identical pattern in 
this respect. 
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Explanations generating what-scientific questions 
show greater variation than any other what-question type. 
The range is from 0 in the cases of Foreign Languages, 
History and English to 15 in the case of Physics. As might 
be expected, there is a distinction between arts and science 
subjects for this category. The exception on the arts side 
is Geography, which has two such questions. This again is 
not unexpected when the nature of the subject is taken into 
account. It has for convenience been included on the arts 
side and indeed most of the explanations in the sample 
analysed are descriptive in the tradition of Geography as 
an art. However, the quantifying approach, which is now 
popular, is apparent in certain explanations that consitute 
the Geography sample and it is these that have generated 
scientific-what-questions. It is also worth noting that 
Biology, in addition to its characteristic scientific 
nature, has a descriptive aspect that is similar to that 
of Geography and that this may account for the relatively  
small number of scientific-what-questions its explanations 
generate when compared with Physics and Chemistry. 
At primary level, Nature Study has a similar pattern 
of what-questions to that of Biology and the topics which 
are predominantly arts orientated have no what-scientific 
questions. 
Distinctions between arts and science groups in respect 
of all why-questions do not occur as can be seen from the 
table below: 
TABLE 8: Distribution of Why-Question Categories in Arts  
and Science Subjects at Secondary Level  
Explanations 	 Why-Questions 
All Types Ded Pro Gen Te/f 
(36) Science 38 20 0 8 10 
(30) Arts 29 1 7 15 6 
TOTAL 67 21 7 23 16 
The distinctions that are revealed occur within 
individual categories or in relation to specific subjects. 
A large number of deductive-why-questions are answered 
in explanations on the science side, while on the arts side 
they are conspicuously absent. Closer examination of this 
category for individual science subjects reveals that 19 
of the 20 deductive questions generated, occur in Physics 
and Chemistry, none occur in Mathematics and only 1 in 
Biology. (.See Table 4). This distinctive pattern for 
Biology, by contrast with Physics and Chemistry, is main-
tained throughout the remaining why-question categories 
with the exception of the why-probabilistic category, while 
the Mathematics pattern is idiosyncratic relative to other 
arts and science subjects. 
The probabilistic-why-question is utilised rarely. 
The explanations from two subjects, English and Geography, 
generate questions, in both cases interpretation of material 
(text, questionnaire or survey) is the source. 
The genetic-why question is the most popular why-
category. It appears that questions concerning the events 
or factors that have given rise to something are the concern 
of all disciplines from time to time. Worthy of note is the 
large number of these questions occurring in and the absence 
of other why-categories from the sample of History explanat-
ions which appear to reflect both the subject matter and the 
mode of enquiry. This interpretation is supported by the 
figures for Biology and Geography, both subjects which are 
at times concerned with questions of development or evolution 
and with those for the genetic category in primary explanat-
ions where the sources were respectively the historical, 
biological and geographical strands of the topics represented. 
The teleological or functional why-question while not 
clearly associated with specific arts and science groupings 
is the category most utilised in explanations in Biology 
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(see Table 4). This would appear to be accounted for by 
the centrality of 'function' in the subject which gives 
rise to questions concerned with the purpose or function 
of an organ, system, or chemical function: a trend which 
is also repeated in primary Nature Study. The distribution 
of concept types varies in respect of primary and secondary 
contexts, arts/science groupings and individual subject 
characteristics. 
No clear developmental pattern is revealed in the 
explanations given at primary and secondary level that holds 
good for all subjects. Indeed, proportionately, a larger 
number of non-spontaneous and intermediate concepts occur 
in the explanations of the arts orientated primary topics 
than do in the explanations given in arts subjects at 
secondary level. This is not true of science subjects which 
show a clear developmental pattern towards increased use of 
both intermediate and non-spontaneous concepts at secondary 
level and a corresponding reduction in use of spontaneous 
concepts. Mathematics at primary level shows a pattern of 
conceptual usage that is identical with that of secondary 
level mathematics. This may have something to do with the 
characteristic nature of the subject and will be brought 
up later when this notion is examined. 
The relatively large number of intermediate and non-
spontaneous concepts present in three out of the five topic 
areas at primary level suggest a very high concept density. 
In fact, 11 explanations (4 Humanities, 4 Nature Study and 
3 Religious Education) utilised 92 concepts. At secondary 
level this trend is paralleled only by science subjects 
where 36 explanations (12 each in Physics, Chemistry and 
Biology) utilise 340 intermediate and non-spontaneous 
concepts. 
History is the arts subject that comes closest to 
demonstrating a trend similar to that of the sciences. 
Here, 10 explanations utilise 72 intermediate and non-
spontaneous concepts. 
In the main, arts subjects at secondary level utilise 
more spontaneous concepts than do science subjects. Science 
subjects, on the other hand, demonstrate a preoccupation 
with intermediate and non-spontaneous concepts. Physics 
and Biology have an almost identical conceptual category 
pattern, with Chemistry having the same as these two for 
spontaneous and intermediate concepts but going well ahead 
in the number of non-spontaneous concepts utilised. A 
glance at Table 5 shows Chemistry as the only subject to 
utilise more non-spontaneous concepts than any other kind. 
In the cases of Mathematics, Physics and Biology_, it is 
the intermediate category that is dominant. 
Examination of the nature of the concepts to be found 
within the explanations (see Table 5 on p. 191) reveals 
certain trends that are associated with specific concerns 
of subjects in respect of content and method of enquiry. 
In the main, most concepts that occur within the 
explanations from arts subjects are of the kind that start 
life at a spontaneous level and by a gradual process of 
increasingly precise definition reach the intermediate 
category as, for example, the concept of kingdom. A number 
of those in the non-spontaneous or scientific category are 
of this kind but there are also some concepts whose 
characteristics are culturally defined. Being abstract 
they do not arise spontaneously and it may be necessary to 
look to philosophical analysis rather than to a subject 
area for clarification of their meanings. An example of 
this sort that occurs in the explanations in the sample 
is 'democracy'. 
A large number of the concepts revealed in the arts 
subjects sample appear familiar in the sense that they are 
encountered in common usage (see pp.407-11 in appendices), 
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However, within the contexts of the explanations it is 
necessary for their meanings to be understood at an 
altogether more exact and well informed level than that 
which suffices in everyday use. 
A number of concepts, as in the case of democracy 
that has been quoted earlier, cannot be confined to a 
single definition. Their understanding, therefore, is 
dependent upon the learners awareness of the range of 
definitions or descriptions that are possible within the 
very broad boundaries of a concept of this kind. The 
appearance of several such concepts in Humanities and 
Religious Education at primary level, with little or no 
specific presentation, suggests that teachers may not be 
always fully aware that a young pupil's conception of 
what appear to be familiar terms, is unlikely to match 
their own. 
A last point worthy of note is that a great many of 
the arts concepts do not clearly belong to a specific 
discipline. Exceptions are concepts which have to do with 
the rules and grammatical terms associated with language 
work, which predominate in the explanations in Foreign 
Languages and to a much lesser extent in English. Progress-
ions with age can be seen in the explanations given in 
Foreign Languages towards more complex grammatical rules, 
which in turn influence fluent usage. A similar trend is 
revealed in the language teaching aspect of English. 
History and Geography explanations show no clear 
pattern of conceptual development and, indeed, some concepts 
occur at primary level that also occur in the upper part 
of the secondary school (see p.397 and pp.408-9 of the 
appendices). Where distinctions exist they appear to be 
associated with making the learner consider events or 
factors that may have had an influence upon some specific 
phenomenon, an objective that appears to become more 
dominant with gains in age and knowledge of the subject. 
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The characteristic nature of the science concepts 
is very different from that of the arts concepts on a number 
of points. They are more clearly defined and, in the main, 
are generated from the specific disciplines in which they 
occur. The greater proportion of those that occur in the 
intermediate and non-spontaneous categories are unfamiliar 
and unlikely to be encountered in common usage. 
It has been noted earlier that the concept density 
is very high for Physics, Chemistry and Biology. It is also 
the case that there is considerable variation in respect of 
the range of phenomena represented in the 36 explanations 
given. Bearing in mind that non-spontaneous or scientific 
concepts are normally of a higher order of complexity than 
intermediate or spontaneous ones it would appear that the 
science explanations are making demands with regard to 
previous attainment of prerequisite lower order concepts 
and the intellectual capacity of the learner that exceeds 
those made in arts explanations. 
Examination of the concepts occurring in Physics, 
Chemistry and Biology (see pp. 402-6 of the appendices) 
reveals a large number that are of a relatively high order. 
As the conceptual level rises there is increased use of 
precise definition and related concepts that have been 
formed at some earlier stage. 
There appears to be a trend from the primary through 
the secondary stage towards an increase in the number and 
complexity of the concepts utilised in the explanations. 
However, this is not as clear as might have been expected 
as some of the distinctions are related to ability rather 
than age. A similar trend is revealed in mathematics, 
though here ability is clearly the dominant influence upon 
the conceptual level of the explanations given. 
2.1.6 Conclusions 
The analyses have revealed certain trends which point 
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to the existence of distinctions between arts and science 
groups, primary and secondary stages and among explanations 
associated with specific subject areas. 
The trends are as follows: 
Arts subjects utilise: 
Large proportions of what-
information questions. 
Science subjects utilise: 
Small proportions of what-
information questions. 
Very low proportions of what- High proportions of what- 
scientific questions. 	 scientific questions. 
Very low proportions of why- High proportions of why- 
deductive questions. 	 deductive questions. 
High proportions of spon- 
	 Low proportions of 
taneous concepts. 	 spontaneous concepts. 
Low proportions of non- 	 High proportions of non- 
spontaneous or scientific 	 spontaneous or scientific 
concepts. 	 concepts. 
Primary explanations utilise: Secondary explanations utilise: 
Low proportion of non- 	 High proportion of non- 
spontaneous or scientific 	 spontaneous or scientific 
concepts in science 	 concepts in science 
orientated topics. 
High proportion of inter-
mediate concepts in arts 
orientated subjects. 
orientated subjects. 
High proportion of inter-
mediate concepts in arts 
orientated subjects. 
Subject distinctions: 
Mathematics utilise more what-how questions than any other 
subject, has no why-questions and has an almost equal 
distribution of spontaneous, intermediate and non- 
spontaneous concepts. 
Physics and Chemistry utilise high proportions of what-
scientific and why-deductive questions, also intermediate 
and non-spontaneous or scientific concepts. 
Biology utilises equal numbers of all what-question and 
why-genetic categories and a high proportion of why-
teleological/functional categories and intermediate and 
non-spontaneous or scientific concepts. 
History utilises a high proportion of genetic-why questions 
and a higher proportion of intermediate and non-spontaneous 
or scientific concepts than any other arts subject. 
Geography has the highest number of what-information 
questions of any subject and the most varied pattern for 
all explanation types. 
Foreign Languages has the highest propor tion of non-
spontaneous or scientific concepts of any arts subject. 
Taking account of the trends noted above, it is 
impossible to sustain the contention that question-types 
and concept types are randomly distributed throughout 
subject areas and at different levels in the same subject 
area and, thus, the hypothesis H4 is rejected. 
2.2 Testing Hypothesis H5 - Types of Communicated Meaning  
The hypothesis formulated to reveal the nature and 
distribution of meanings communicated in explanations given 
in certain primary and secondary school classroom context 
is: 
H5 That the meaning types communicated through the  
explanations that arise in pedagogical discourse are  
randomly distributed throughout different subject  
areas and within the same subject area at differ-
ent developmental stages.  
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2.2.1 The Sample  
A total of 106 explanations that satisfy the conditions 
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of Martin's Hypothesis Six in the study associated with 
hypothesis H3 constitutes the sample. The distribution 
of primary and secondary contexts and of subjects and 
topics is: 18 explanations given by primary teachers 
within topics concerned with Mathematics, Humanities, Nature 
Study, Religious Education and Environmental Studies and 
88 explanations given by secondary teachers within Math-
ematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, History, Geography, 
English and Foreign Languages. 
2.2.2 Analytical Model  
Bellack (1965) Categories of Communicated Meanings  
The categories used to analyse the explanations are 
as follows: 
Substantive with associated (Sub-Ass) - refers to the 
subject matter of the lesson in question. 
Substantive logical (Sub-Log) - refers to the cognitive 
processes involved in dealing with the subject matter 
of the lesson. 
Instructional with associated (Inst-Ass) - involves 
routine classroom procedures that are part of the 
instructional process. 
Instructional logical (Inst-Log) - refers to 
distinctively didactic verbal processes such as ex-
plaining procedures and giving directions. 
2.2.3 Methodological Limitations  
1. Bellack applied his model to full lessons given by 
teachers for the purpose of explaining certain 
concepts. In this study the model is applied 
only to the acts of explanation,which is likely 
to result in a more limited range of meanings 
being revealed. 
2. In utilising analytical models it is necessary 
to make judgements against specific criteria. 
This introduces a degree of subjectivity 
which with certain exceptions it is 
impossible to eliminate. 
2.2.4 Results  
The nature and distribution of communicated meanings 
within the sample of explanations given in primary and 
secondary classes is shown in Table 9. 
TABLE 9: The Nature and Distribution of Communicated  
Meanings within Primary and Secondary Teaching 
Primary 
Explanations 
No. Sub-Ass Sub-Log Inst-Ass Inst-Log Subject 
Mathematics (3) 3 2 1 3 
Humanities (4) 4 1 4 
Nature Study (4) 4 1 4 
Environmental 
Studies (4) 4 2 4 
Religious 
Education (3) 3 3 
Secondary 
Explanations 
Subject No. Sub-Ass Sub-Log Inst-Ass Inst-Log 
Mathematics (12) 12 10 1 12 
Physics (12) 11 1 3 12 
Chemistry (12) 11 4 2 12 
Biology (12) 12 2 2 12 
English (10) 10 5 1 10 
History (10) 10 1 3 10 
Geography (10) 10 5 5 10 
Foreign 
Languages (10) 10 4 3 10 
2.2.5 Discussion  
As could have been predicted for reasons to do with 
the first methodological limitation, all explanations 
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communicate meanings that belong to the instructional-
logical category because by definition (having satisfied 
Martin's Hypothesis Six) all are concerned with the 
didactic verbal process of explaining. This category, 
therefore, will not be taken into account when considering 
whether Hypothesis H4 can stand or be rejected on the basis 
of the evidence. 
Setting aside the instructional-logical category a 
number of specific variations are revealed among and within 
the others. Substantive with associated meanings,i.e. those 
that refer to the subject matter of the lesson are comm-
unicated in all the primary explanations. The exceptions 
occur in Physics and Chemistry respectively and in both 
cases a pupil initiates the explanation by questioning an 
incidental procedure (see p.351 and p.354 of the appendices). 
Substantive-logical meanings occur in all subjects but it 
is clear that reference to the cognitive processes involved 
in dealing with the subject matter is a major concern in 
Mathematics where 2 out of 3 primary explanations and 10 
out of 12 secondary explanations communicate meanings of 
this kind. 
Instructional with associated meanings appear to be 
randomly distributed throughout the subjects. The primary 
explanations show a range of 0-1 and the secondary ones a 
range of 1-5. Geography with 5 such meanings is 2 ahead 
of any other subject which may have something to do with 
the use of maps, pictures and slides, which have to be 
positioned, etc., thus calling forth meanings that have to 
do with routine classroom procedures. However, this kind 
of activity is common in all practical subjects and is 
also likely to occur in History which suggests that the 
distribution of communicated meanings of this type is 
likely to be a matter of chance. 
2.2.6 Conclusions  
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Substantive with associated meanings are clearly 
dominant throughout the explanations of all subject areas 
at primary and secondary level. 
Substantive with logical meanings have a major role 
in Mathematics at primary and secondary level. Instructional 
with associated meanings appear to have a random distribut-
ion. 
Taking account of the above points, it is impossible 
to sustain the contention that the nature and distribution 
of communicated meanings in explanations from primary and 
secondary subject areas in random and, thus, hypothesis 
H5 is rejected. 
Summary of the Findings of the First Set of Studies  
At this stage in the investigation certain points 
have been established from the evidence provided by the 
studies concerned with hypotheses H1 to H5 inclusive. 
The act of explanation is seen by teachers and pupils 
as a central and important activity of teaching and learning. 
However, not all the activity that teachers believe to be 
explaining something to someone qualifies as such when set 
against the philosophical conditions outlined in Martin's 
Hypothesis Six. Most explanations that fail to qualify 
do so because they do not meet the requirements of one or 
two conditions. The condition that requires a shift in 
question is the one most often not met. When this is the 
case it follows that the condition requiring a tutor to 
state the answers to the underlying question and a sub-
sidiary question, cannot be met either. 
Two-thirds of all the explanations that were set 
against Martin's Hypothesis Six satisfied all the condit-
ions. A further analysis shows them to be concerned with 
answering a variety of what and why questions and in doing 
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so utilise different kinds of concepts. These are not 
randomly distributed throughout the subject areas. Certain 
question types and concepts are dominant in arts subjects 
(notably large use of what-informaticn questions and 
spontaneous concepts) others in the sciences. 
Science subjects share a number of trends as, for 
example, large use of what-scientific questions, why ded-
uctive questions and non-spontaneous concepts. The pattern 
for Biology differs somewhat from Physics and Chemistry, 
the most notable feature being that why-teleogical and 
functional questions and why-genetic questions replace a 
large use of why-deductive questions. Patterns peculiar 
to other individual subjects also occur in which one 
question type occurs abundantly and another type is 
totally absent. 
Finally, the meanings communicated in all the explana-
tions are predominantly associated with the subject matter 
of the class. It is also the case that Mathematics com-
municates a large number of meanings that are concerned 
with the cognitive processes involved with dealing with 
the subject matter and that it also generates more what-
how questions than any other subject. 
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CHAPTER7 
1.0 	 THE GAP BETWEEN INTENDED MEANING AND 
RECEIVED MEANING 
1.1 Testing Hypotheses H6 - Teachers Assessments 
of their Success in Explaining Something to 
Someone. 
1.2 	 Testing Hypothesis H7 - Variation in Pupils' 
Understanding of Explanations Given by 
their Teachers. 
2.0 	 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN 
EXPLAINING EPISODE 
	
2.1 	 Testing Hypothesis H8 - 
Vocabulary Features in Explaining 
	
2.2 	 Testing Hypothesis H9 - 
Contextual Factors in Explaining Episodes 
	
2.3 	 Testing Hypothesis H10 - 
Conceptual Factors in Explaining Episodes 
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1.0 THE GAP BETWEEN INTENDED MEANING AND RECEIVED MEANING 
Within this section of the investigation the concern 
of the first study is to identify the degree of accuracy 
with which teachers assess their own success in explaining 
something to someone, such that understanding is achieved 
by the receiver, a question which is the concern of 
hypothesis H6. The second study seeks to reveal how much 
of what the giver of an explanation intends to communicate 
is actually received without distortion by the receiver, 
a question which is the concern of hypothesis H7. 
1.1 	 Testing Hypothesis H6 - Teachersl Assessments of Their  
Success in Explaining Something to Someone  
The hypothesis formulated to identify the degree of 
accuracy with which teachers assess their success as 
explainers is: 
H6 That teachers' impressionistic assessments of  
their own success in explaining something to  
someone are an accurate source of information 
1.1.1 The Sample  
From within the group of teachers co-operating in the 
previous studies a number prepared to predict their success 
in explaining something to a class of pupils and to take 
part in the experiment were identified. Of these two failed 
to complete the experiment so that the sample consists of 
10 primary and 26 secondary teachers, a total of 36 in all. 
1.1.2 Procedures  
Teachers co-operating in the study were asked to 
record their predictions of their own success in communicat-
ing intended meanings within an introductory explanation 
associated with a topic of their own choosing. The catego-
ries requested are the proportion of pupils who will (1) 
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acquire all or much of what is intended (2) some of what 
is intended and (3) little or nothing of what is intended. 
A set of guidelines was given to each teacher which 
they were asked to follow. These are set out below: 
1. Decide upon a topic that arises within your normal 
programme that could be introduced readily through an 
explaining episode. 
2. Identify not more than five concepts that pupils need 
to understand if they are to understand the topic in 
question and prepare an explanation around them such 
that they are explained during the episode. 
3. Prepare the follow-up checks as indicated below. 
Check I: An instruction given to pupils immediately 
after the episode is concluded to try in their own 
words either to tell another pupil (while being 
recorded), or to write down what the teacher has been 
explaining. If this proves impossible to write down 
anything (however small or fragmented) they can 
remember about the explanation. 
Check II: A work sheet for use in the lesson, the 
satisfactory completion of which is dependent upon 
understanding the explanation given by the teacher. 
Check III: A short set of questions and/or statements 
to which pupils must respond given towards the end of 
the lesson that seeks to reveal their understanding 
of the essential concepts within the explanation. 
4. Collate the outcomes, use a 10-point scale to assess 
the responses to each check and arrive at a score 
for each pupil. 
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5. 	 Send the results and associated material to the 
researcher before the date appointed for the feedback 
session. 
Teachers were asked to prepare and carry out the 
exercise within a period of six weeks. All but two managed 
to complete the work in this period and to attend the feed-
back session. 
The results from the exercise were set beside the 
predictions made at the outset and discussed at the feedback 
session. 
1.1.3 Methodological Limitations  
1. It is likely that individual differences among pupils 
in respect of their aptitude for a subject, previous 
learning and past experience influence all learning 
situation and by implication the explaining episode 
in question. An attempt has been made to reduce these 
influences by ensuring that the teachers are making 
their predictions in relation to classes they know 
well or very well. 
2. For reasons of convenience teachers will tend to take 
up the written option in Check I. This option may 
cause some pupils difficulties that have to do with 
use of formal language skills and not with their 
grasp of the explanation. 
1.1.4 Results  
In collating the results of the study it is intended 
to treat the sample as a group and not to be concerned with 
individual differences.(1)  The assumption underlying this 
decision is that if the sample is typical of teachers in 
(1) Individual predictions and actual scores are given on 
p. 416 of the appendices. 
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general Land there is no reason to believe that it is not), 
the points at which the 36 sample teachers' predictions 
cluster are also likely to be typical. 
Table 10 shows the numbers of teachers' predicting 
success at each interval of 10 between 0% and 100% for 
each category (Column A). The actual success is shown 
in the same manner (Column B). 
TABLE 10: Teachers' Predictedand Actual Success Within  
Categories of Understanding  
Category 	 1 
A 	 B 
Category 	 2 
A 	 B 
Category 	 3 
A 
100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
90+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
80+ 1 0 0 0 0 0 
70+ 12 3 0 0 0 0 
60+ 12 11 1 0 0 0 
50+ 6 16 3 3 0 0 
40+ 4 5 7 9 0 0 
30+ 1 1 9 16 0 0 
20+ 0 0 16 8 0 1 
10+ 0 0 0 0 9 17 
0+ 0 0 0 0 17 18 
No. in sample: 36 
1.1.5 Discussion 
Examination of Table 10 shows that all but 5 teachers 
expected 50% or more of their pupils to achieve the degree 
of understanding defined in category 1 as 'understanding 
all or much of what was intended'. Furthermore, 25 out of 
the sample of 36 teachers expected the proportion of pupils 
in this category to be between 60% and 80%. The actual 
scores for all but 4 teachers show the proportion of pupils 
in this category to be between 40% and 60%. 
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Differences between predicted and actual figures in 
categories 2 and 3 reflect this modification. In category 
2 the bulk of predictions lie between 20% and 30%; the 
actual scores between 30% and 40%. In category 3 the 
predictions of 27 out of the 36 teachers in the sample lie 
between 0% and 10%, while half the actual scores are at 10% 
or more. 
Bearing in mind that category 2 is defined as having 
some understanding and category 3 as having little or no 
understanding something approaching half the pupils in the 
classes involved did not acquire satisfactory understanding 
of the meanings communicated by teachers in the sample. 
This appears the more significant when it is remembered 
that the teachers selected their own topics for the 
exercise and that they were aware that the objective was 
to explain something to a class known to them as best they 
could. 
The results as they stand do no more than indicate 
the existence of a gap between what the teacher intends to 
communicate in the explanation and what the pupils actually 
receive. To understand more about the nature of the gap 
it will be necessary to analyse pupil responses using an 
appropriate model and this will be attempted in the next 
study. 
1.1.6 Conclusions  
Teachers tend to overestimate the proportions of their 
pupils who achieve good or satisfactory understanding of 
their explanations. There is a corresponding under-estimation 
of the proportions of pupils who achieve only some, little 
or no understanding. Bearing these points and the actual 
scores in mind, it cannot be said that teachers' predictions
are unreliable. On the other hand, they cannot be deemed 
an accurate assessment of the situation and, thus, the 
hypothesis H6 is rejected. 
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1.2 	 Testing Hypothesis H7: Variations in Pupils' Under- 
standing of Their Teacher's  
Explanations  
The study seeks to reveal more about the nature of 
the understanding that pupils acquire from an explaining 
episode, when they fail to receive the meanings intended 
by the giver of the explanation, in this case, the teacher. 
The hypothesis formulated to reveal the nature and distri-
bution of any variations that may exist is: 
H7 That the understanding achieved by individual  
pupils of an explanation given by their teacher  
to the class demonstrates considerable variation 
1.2.1 The Samples  
A group of 5 primary and 15 secondary teachers drawn 
because of their willingness to co-operate further from 
the sample of 36 teachers and their classes used in the 
study that tested hypothesis H6 comprise the sample. 
The material for analysis comprises the relevant 
pupil responses to the 'checks' used in the last study to 
identify three categories of understanding. 
1.2.2 Analytical Model  
The analysis of pupil responses to an explaining 
episode carried out by the present writer and described 
on p. 170 provides seven categories of understanding, 
which are: 
A. Complete 
B. Substantial 
C. Partial 
D. Substantial with some misinterpretation 
E. Erroneous 
F. Fragmentary 
G. Absent 
1.2.3 Procedures  
The sample of teachers were given directions on the 
use of the seven categories of the model, to analyse their 
pupils' responses to the checks used to assess understanding 
of the explaining episode undertaken in the experiment 
testing hypothesis H6. They were asked to analyse the 
material and cautioned not to assume that each category 
would necessarily be represented nor expect the list of 
different kinds of understanding to be exhaustive. 
A feed back session was arranged one month from the 
briefing which all teachers attended for the purpose of 
discussing results before handing them in for collation. 
The results were collated and implications discussed 
at a second feedback session, one month after the first. 
1.2.4 Methodological Limitations 
1. As teachers undertook the analysis of their own 
material it is possible that errors of judgement 
and inconsistencies of interpretation may occur. 
Feedback sessions help to reduce this as difficulties 
associated with problems of this sort can be talked 
out. 
2. In utilising analytical models it is necessary to 
make judgements against specific criteria. This 
introduces a degree of subjectivity which with 
certain exceptions it is impossible to eliminate. 
1.2.5 Results  
The table overleaf shows the number of pupils within 
each class whose understanding is in one or other of the 
seven categories. 
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TABLE 11: Variation in the Characteristics of Pupils'  
Understanding of their Teacher's Explanation 
Teacher 
No. and Type 
No. of Pupils 
in Class 
A 
No. 
B 
of Pupil Responses 
in each Category 
C 	 D 	 E 	 F G 
Primary 
Biology 1 25 4 4 8 0 2 5 2 
Humanities 2 17 4 5 3 1 0 3 1 
Mathematics 3 29 3 7 7 2 1 6 3 
Topic 4 15 4 6 2 1 0 2 0 
Topic 5 22 5 5 4 2 1 3 2 
Secondary 
Chemistry 6 19 3 4 5 3 0 2 2 
English 7 24 5 6 7 1 0 3 2 
Biology 8 32 3 5 10 2 3 5 4 
Mathematics 9 27 6 6 6 1 2 3 3 
Physics 10 23 5 3 9 1 0 3 2 
English 11 16 4 6 4 0 0 2 0 
Biology 12 28 2 8 6 3 2 4 3 
History 13 19 5 5 5 0 1 2 1 
Geography 14 31 6 7 7 2 2 3 2 
Chemistry 15 25 1 2 10 2 2 6 2 
Geography 16 23 6 6 8 0 0 1 2 
Mathematics 17 27 2 4 9 2 2 6 2 
Foreign 
Language 18 12 4 4 3 0 0 1 0 
Physics 19 29 3 6 9 2 1 5 3 
History 20 15 5 3 3 1 0 2 1 
Totals 80 102 125 26 19 67 37 
1.2.6 Discussion  
Examination of Table 11 revels that 9 teachers have 
all seven categories of understanding represented and a 
further 7 have all but one category represented. 
216 
Two teachers have two categories which are without 
representatives and the remaining two teachers have three 
categories that are likewise empty. Thus, on the basis 
of this evidence it appears that variation in relation to 
pupil understanding is a commonplace phenomenon. 
Category totals indicate that about one third of all 
pupils in the sample achieve complete or substantial 
understanding. The remainder either have further to go to 
acquire a satisfactory degree of understanding (partial 
and fragmentary categories C. and F.), or require re-
teaching in order that misconceptions may be rectified 
(substantial with misconception and erroneous categories 
D. and E.). Furthermore, just under 10% of all pupils 
have failed to understand the meanings their teachers 
intend to communicate to a degree that suggests they have 
no understanding of the explanation (absent category G). 
One other point worthy of note has to do with class 
size. While no abSolutely clear pattern is revealed it 
does appear that larger groups, i.e. 27 pupils or more tend 
to have all seven categories represented and in all cases 
less than half the pupils acquire an understanding of their 
teacher's explanation that is complete or substantial. On 
the other hand, smaller classes, i.e. 12-17 tend to have the 
opposite characteristics. They have between 1 and 3 of the 
seven categories not represented, over half the pupils 
have complete or substantial understanding and between 0 
and 1 pupil in each class acquires no understanding. 
These trends are not repeated in categories F, which 
denotes fragmentary understanding. The scores appear 
higher in the larger classes but the proportions in large 
and small classes is about the same. 
Errors associated with both category D (substantial 
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with misconception) and E (erroneous) tend to be absent 
with smaller groups and the greatest number of pupils 
falling into the latter category is found to occur in 
the largest class in the sample. While it is not possible 
to tell from the results why class size may exert an 
influence, the discussions with the teachers concerned at 
feedback sessions identified possible factors associated 
with: attention, opportunities for pupil-teacher dialogue 
and range of ability,as providing some reasons. These and 
other relevant implications will be examined in the general 
discussion of the outcomes of the investigation planned for 
the next chapter. A final point concerns understanding in 
relation to specific subject areas. For explanations given 
by secondary teachers in the sample those concerned with 
Science tend to have all seven categories represented and 
smaller proportions of pupils within the complete and 
substantial categories A and B. There is a correspondingly 
large proportion of pupils in all the other categories that 
for one reason or another fall short of being satisfactory. 
1.2.7 Conclusions  
In relation to the seven categories of understanding 
defined in the model there is considerable variation among 
individual pupils with regard to their understanding of 
explanations given to their class by the teacher and, thus, 
the hypothesis H7 cannot be rejected. 
In allowing the hypothesis H7 to stand, points worthy 
of note are, first, that large classes show more variation 
than small ones and have less success in achieving complete 
or substantial understanding for their pupils and, secondly, 
that at secondary level explanations in Mathematics and 
Science produce more variation in pupil understanding and 
have less success than arts subjects in achieving complete 
or substantial understanding. 
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2.0 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ACTS OF EXPLANATION 
The studies of this section are concerned with the 
identification and description of factors that contribute to 
or detract from effective explaining. In all cases it is 
the teacher's explanations that are being scrutinised, but 
the whole explaining episode is perceived as a dialogue 
involving explainer, explainee, and a context within which 
the dialogue takes place. The assumption is, therefore, 
that factors from each and all of these component parts 
exert an influence upon the success or otherwise of the act 
of explanation, 
The first study, associated with hypothesis H8 takes 
the form of an experiment and is intended to shed light 
upon the effect of vocabulary choice upon understanding in 
Chemistry and Biology. The two studies associated respectively 
with hypotheses H9 and H10 involve the analysis of a small 
number of explanations in a range of subject areas but with 
a bias towards sciences to reveal their contextual (H9) 
and conceptual (H10) features. 
2.1 Testing Hypothesis H8 - Vocabulary Factors in Explaining  
Explanations are constructed out of words and, thus, if 
explainee understanding is the goal for the explaining episode 
the explainer must select words that are able to carry the 
message clearly and accurately. This involves taking account 
of more than the demands upon language of the message itself, 
it involves making a judgement about the extent of the 
explainee's language experience within the context in question. 
Failure to do this increases the risk that the explanation 
will not be understood, although it may be couched in clear 
'correct' language. 
Teachers, when giving explanations, utilise large 
numbers of words and, particularly at secondary level, 
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introduce both technical and non-technical terms that are 
not in everyday use. Science teaching is an appropriate 
example employing as it does a high proportion of such 
terms and, thus, these subjects will be the major focus 
of the investigation. 
It can be argued that technical terms serve a useful 
purpose in facilitating accurate communication between 
individuals familiar with their definitions, but this cannot 
occur when the meaning of a term is unknown to one of the 
participants. 
When acting as explainers, teachers are often more 
aware of the difficulties explainees have in understanding 
technical terms than they are of the problem of non-technical 
but unfamiliar vocabulary. One of the purposes of the study 
is to demonstrate that pupils can have their understanding 
blocked by being confronted with words that are non-technical 
but unfamiliar. The subjects used for this purpose are 
Chemistry and Biology. 
Another purpose of the study is to reveal the extent 
to which technical words and what Gardner (1972) calls non-
technical words not readily accessible to pupils, are present 
in the sample of explanations obtained for use with the 
previous studies. 
The hypothesis formulated to examine the effect of 
vocabulary choice upon understanding is: 
H8 That features associated with teachers' choiceof 
vocabulary influence the level of understanding  
gained by pupils from a message, and thus from 
an explaining episode. 
2.1.1 The Samples  
Teachers 
Teachers who had provided secondary science explanations 
for previous studies and who were prepared to co-operate 
further, constitute the sample, a total of 6 teachers. 
Explaining Episodes 
The explanations obtained for study H3 and comprising 
explanations in the secondary age range for Mathematics, 
Physics, Chemistry, Biology, History and Geography, a total 
of 68, and the explanations obtained for study H7, a total 
of 6, constitute the sample. 
2.1.2 Stimulus Material  
1. Cassels and Johnstone's (1978) modified examination 
papers in '0' Grade Chemistry. These comprise paired test 
sheets of the same examination questions. On each test 
alternate questions have been modified such that questions 
modified on Test A are left unmodified on Test B and vice-
versa. Modifications take the form of replacement of an 
unfamiliar word or phrase with a more familiar one using 
positives to replace negatives and reducing length to 
diminish linguistic 'noise' (see pp. 316-18 of appendices). 
2. A pair of test papers prepared as described above, 
in C.S.E. Biology. (See pp.319-21 of appendices). 
2.1.3 Analytical Model  
Gardner's (1972) list of words not readily accessible 
to pupils, obtained from a study of the vocabulary skills 
of pupils in the early part of secondary schools will be 
used to analyse the sample of explaining episodes (see 
pp.432-35 of appendices). 
2.1.4 Procedures  
1. 	 Giving the Tests 
The sample of 6 science teachers were given copies 
of either the Chemistry '0' Grade papers or the C.S.E. Bio-
logy papers in accordance with their particular specialism 
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and asked to give the tests under normal mock examination 
conditions to two similar groups of pupils in the final 
year of the appropriate subject. 
2. Scoring and Collating the Results 
Teachers were asked to score the tests, giving 1 for 
each item correct as indicated on the marking scheme and 
return them to the researcher for collation within one 
month of receiving the papers. 
Collation of the results involved comparison of 
modified and unmodified questions across similar groups and 
across the total number of pupils answering in each subject. 
Final results are shown as the percentage correct for 
modified and unmodified questions. 
3. Analysing Explaining Episodes 
Explanations from study H3 were analysed by the 
researcher for non-technical words not readily accessible 
to pupils, using Gardner's Word List. Explanations from 
study H7, together with pupil responses to checks on these 
explanations were similarly analysed by the researcher and 
attempts made to corroborate examples of unfamiliar words 
affecting understanding, using pupil responses as a source 
of information. 
2.1.5 Results  
The questions that influenced pupil attainment by 
more than 10% are shown overleaf in Table 12 for both 
Chemistry and Biology tests. 
The number of occurrences in subject explanations of 
words on Gardner's (1972) list of words not readily 
accessible to pupils is given in Table 13. 
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TABLE 12: Pupil Attainment on Original and Modified Questions  
in Chemistry and Biology Tests  
Question Chemistry Correct Gain Question Biology Correct Gain 
No. 	 Original Modified 	 % 	 No. 	 Original Modified % 
1 30 46 16 1 57 68 11 
2 36 52 16 2 51 62 11 
4 78 92 14 4 65 80 15 
6 55 69 14 5 48 59 11 
7 52 64 12 9 31 47 16 
8 64 75 11 10 45 56 11 
10 66 78 12 
TABLE 13: Occurrences of Non-Technical Words not Readily 
Accessible to Pupils in Subject Explanations  
Mat Phy Che Bio His Geo 
Number of Explanations 13 13 13 13 11 11 
Number of Occurrences 
of Words 10 19 23 23 1 10 
2.1.6 Discussion 
The difference in pupil performance for original and 
modified questions does not arise from any disparities 
between the groups, as within any group the same pupils 
tended to do better on modified questions in proportions 
that reflect the total group percentages. 
Not all modifications gave some gain. For example, 
'anode' paired with positive electrode in Chemistry, question 
5, and retaining or removing 'reside' in Biology, question 7, 
made very little difference. The removal of negative forms 
improved scores in Chemistry more than in Biology. However, 
there were differences relating to the length and complexity 
of the particular questions which coupled with the presence 
or absence of the negative form could have been influential. 
The Biology question in which the negative form is changed 
is short and simple, whereas in Chemistry the question in 
which the negative form is changed is lengthy and complex. 
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Shortening a question to reduce linguistic 'noise', 
as in Chemistry, question 10, and Biology, question 5, 
appears to be one of the most effective ways of improving 
performance. However, changing just one word can at times 
make a marked difference as is evidenced by the improved 
attainment in Chemistry, question 4, and Biology, question 
9. 
The largest gains in attainment are obtained when 
questions are conceptually demanding, as in Chemistry, 
questions 1 and 2, where the scores are 30% and 46% and 
34% and 52% respectively and in Biology, question 9, where 
the scores are 31% and 47%. 
In the analysis of explanations relating to Gardner's 
list of words not readily accessible to pupils, the number 
of occurrences of words is moderately high in the science 
subjects. The implications of this in relation to possible 
vocabulary problems has to be appreciated with reference to 
the large number of unfamiliar technical terms present in the 
episodes plus a number of words equally likely to be not 
readily accessible that are not included on Gardner's word 
list. 
There are fewer occurrences of words from the list in 
Mathematics than may have been expected and this possibly 
reflects contextual factors which will be revealed by 
analysis in the next study. 
The distribution of occurrences in Geography is note-
worthy. Six out of ten words occur in the explanation given 
in the H7 sample. Examination of all the Geography explana-
tions reveals the nature of this explanation as being 
considerably more scientific than any other. The distri-
bution of occurrences in Physics, Chemistry and Biology 
is reasonably uniform throughout all the explanations, 
there being rather more occurrences with older age groups. 
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History is unique in generally not utilising words 
from the list. This appears to reflect its narrative 
style which does not save it from heavy use of complex 
technical terms but does not lend itself to the employment 
of words of the type in question. 
2.1.7 Conclusions  
Pupils can be prevented from exhibiting scientific 
knowledge because the language of the question blocks the 
process. The heavy use of unfamiliar vocabulary in science 
subjects puts strains upon the language facility of most 
pupils and can act to distort meanings that teachers wish to 
communicate in their explanations. Bearing in mind the 
points raised above, the hypothesis H8 is allowed to stand. 
2.2 Contextual Factors in Explaining Episodes  
It is possible to argue, as does Wittgenstein (1967), 
that utterances have meaning only in the stream of life and 
to claim that those who do not actively promote this view 
would agree that context is of fundamental and central 
importance to the successful communication of one's meaning 
to another. Assumptions of this kind underlie the view 
offered in relation to hypothesis H9 which claims that to be 
effective, explaining something to someone must go on within 
a context that can be shared by both explainer and explainee. 
Moreover, it seems likely that logical organisation of 
conceptual material within an explanation will fail to have 
the desired impact when contextual awareness is clearly 
lacking. 
The hypothesis formulated to reveal contextual factors 
likely to influence success in explaining is: 
H9 That factors arising from context and situation  
influence the level of understanding achieved by 
pupils in explaining episodes  
2.2.1 The Sample  
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Explaining episodes and 'checks' used to ascertain 
pupil understanding obtained for the study associated with 
hypothesis H7, constitute the sample. Reference is also 
made to the sample of explanations that satisfy Martin's 
Hypothesis 6, obtained for the study of Hypothesis H3. 
2.2.2 The Analytical Model  
The contextual model which is outlined in Chapter 5 
(pp.17I -72) and given in full in the appendices (p.314) 
is that associated with Halliday (1975b). Each of the three 
major categories it supplies, i.e. field, tenor and mode 
will be applied in turn to all the explanations to enable 
contrasts and comparisons to be made among the subjects 
represented. 
2.2.3 Procedures  
In analysing the explanations and outcomes from the 
sample associated with hypothesis H7, and where appropriate 
referring to certain explanations from the sample that 
satisfy Martin's Hypothesis six, the procedure given below 
has been employed: 
1. For each explanation analysed, a description of the 
manner in which the episode has arisen and slots 
into the lesson is given. 
2. The explanations are analysed for the three functions 
in the order: 
field of discourse, tenor of discourse, mode 
of discourse. 
3. Each separate occurrence of an item or feature is 
counted, but where the number exceeds 10 it is 
referred to as 'numerous'. 
4. The approximate length of each explaining episode 
is given by indicating the number of lines of text 
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utilised. 
5. 	 Each explanation is scanned twice in relation to 
each feature. Phenomena that do not appear to be 
accounted for by the categories are listed under 
'points worthy of note'. 
2.2.4 Methodological Limitations  
In utilising analytical models it is necessary to make 
judgements against specific criteria. This introduces a 
degree of subjectivity which with certain exceptions it is 
impossible to eliminate. 
2.2.5 Results  
2.2.5.1 The Manner in which the Explanation arises in and 
slots into the Lesson  
Mathematics: The explanation which lasts for approximately 72 
lines of around 10 words each arises at the start 
of the lesson, the teacher using an anecdote from 
her own life to pose the question 'How can I say, 
they must have been selling at a loss?' The 
episode is sprawling in character, being a 
mixture of supplying information and of getting 
pupils to co-operate in working out examples. 
It is brought to a close by pupils being asked 
to complete the working out of a simple operation. 
Most of the rest of the lesson is taken up with 
pupils working out other examples and the 
teacher going round checking their understanding. 
A short conceptual test is given in the last 
ten minutes. 
Physics: 	 Pupils have been working for approximately twenty 
minutes on pieces of apparatus, following instruc-
tions given at the start of the lesson by the 
teacher and having written down what they had to 
do as 'method'. The teacher calls them back to 
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their places and uses the outcomes from the 
practical exercise to answer a question about the 
nature of frictional force. There is much 
reference to the apparatus and pupil observations 
and the episode extends to 40 lines of 10 words. 
Pupils are asked to complete their results tables 
and to write a conclusion for the experiment before 
putting the apparatus away. The teacher gives a 
final resume of the work in the last five minutes 
of the lesson. 
Chemistry: 	 Arising as a new topic within a complex area of 
work ('liquids'), the explanation arises at the 
start of the lesson and extends to 34 lines of 
10 words. The teacher 'warns' the class that the 
work is new and important for later work in 
Chemistry. Checks are made on previous knowledge 
and use is made of this to answer the question 
'What is an acid?' The episode is terminated 
with short recall questions and the pupils form 
groups to attempt to set up apparatus that could 
be used to produce hydrogen, using the information 
supplied in the lesson. 
Biology: 
	 Pupils have been checking experiments that were 
set up in the previous lesson. This involves 
simple tests for iodine and glucose respectively. 
The teacher calls pupils to their places and spends 
the first five minutes asking revision questions 
that lead up to the question with which the 
episode is concerned, i.e. 'Why is starch 
changed to glucose?' Further recall is promoted 
by requests to pupils to bring to mind the 
experiment, and the tests with which the lesson 
began. The teacher attempts in the next stage 
of the lesson to get the pupils to infer from 
the evidence of the tests the crucial difference 
between the molecular structure of starch and 
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glucose and the implications this has for 
the process of digestion and absorption. The 
episode which extends to 51 lines of approximately 
10 words, ends with a brief reiteration of the 
key points and pupils are asked to complete results, 
write their own conclusions and clear away their 
apparatus. 
History: 	 The explanation arises about one third of the way 
through a lesson. Pupils have been completing 
notes and are called by the teacher to attend so 
that they may acquire information seen as helpful 
in relation to a visit arranged for the following 
day. The teacher is concerned with making clear 
some of the events that lead up to the battle of 
Worcester and the form of the explanation is 
correspondingly ordered - a large number of 
points being made briefly and at a level that 
avoids going into depth. The episode extends 
to 51 lines of approximately 10 words and is 
completed with the promise that further 
discussion will take place after the visit. 
Pupils are asked to make their own lists of the 
events as they happened, which lead up to the 
battle of Worcester. 
Geography: 	 The explanation is introduced at the start of 
the lesson and leads up to answering the question 
'What is our largest source of energy that is 
not fossil fuel?' The explanation goes on for 
40 lines of approximately 10 words and attempts 
to make clear both how much energy comes from 
the sun and what happens to it. The episode 
closed with a reference to plant energy and then 
pupils are asked to try to draw their own 
pictorial representation of energy radiating 
from the sun and what this causes on earth. A 
short set of slides about solar energy is set 
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up while pupils are working on their 'pictures' 
and these are run for the class until the end 
of the lesson. 
2.2.5.2 Field of Discourse  
Ideational Function  
Although the manner in which each explaining episode 
arises within the context of the lesson and runs its course 
may differ, essentially the ideational function is the same 
for all. All explanations are concerned with phenomena 
arising within a subject discipline and are of the kind with 
which the subject would expect to deal, thus affording no 
surprises for learners or for the teachers themselves. The 
manner in which the ideational function is realised does 
differ both for reasons that have to do with individual 
teachers and the distinctive nature of the underlying ques-
tion which the explanation seeks to answer. The range with 
regard to the latter are shown below: 
TABLE 13.: Showing Underlying and Subsidiary Question Types  
in Subject Explanations  
Subsidiary  
Subject Explanation 	 Underlying Question Questions  
Mathematics 	 What-How 	 Numerous what- 
Information 
Physics 	 What-Scientific 1 What-Scientific 
1 Why-Deductive 
1 What-Information 
Chemistry 	 What-Scientific 1 What-Scientific 
1 Why-Deductive 
2 What-Information 
Biology 	 Why-Functional 
	 1 What-Scientific 
2 Why-Functional 
4 What-Information 
History 	 Why-Genetic 	 1 What-How 
2 What-Information 
1 Why-Genetic 
Geography 	 What-Information 1 Why-Deductive 
2 What-How 
2 What-Information 
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The features Halliday identifies as indicating the 
ideational function or field of discourse are given below 
for each subject in turn. 
TABLE 14: Ideational Function in Subject Explanations  
Habitual Collocations Special Vocabulary Habitual Colloca- 
tions of Voice 
Mathematics: 
In 40 out of 72 lines 
habitual collocations 
occur. 
Specific words occur 
between 1 and 3 times. 
Physics: 
In 26 of the 40 lines 
habitual collocations 
occur. 
Specific words occur 
between 1 and 5 times. 
Chemistry: 
Present are 5 tech- The active voice 
nical and 8 special is employed on 
non-technical words,all but 1 occas- 
Approximately half ion. Non-finite 
the words are fam- verbs number 13. 
iliar but have a 
highly specific 
meaning within the 
context. 
The degree of un- 
familiarity of the 
remainder is high 
to moderately high. 
Present are 8 tech- The active voice 
nical and 20 special is employed on 8 
non-technical words. occasions. The 
The degree of un- 	 passive voice on 
familiarity is 	 4 occasions. 
high for both types Non-finite verbs 
of words. 	 number 12. 
The active voice 
is employed on 
all but 1 occas-
ion. Non-finite 
verbs number 3. 
In 28 out of 34 lines Present are 11 te-
habitual collocations chnical words and 
occur. 	 15 special non- 
Specific words occur technical words. 
between 1 and 6 	 The degree of un- 
times. 	 familiarity is 
moderately high. 
Biology: 
In 35 out of 51 lines 
habitual collocations 
occur. 
Specific words occur 
between 1 and 6 
times. 
Present are 10 	 The active voice 
technical words 	 is employed on 
and 17 special non- all but 1 occa- 
technical words. 	 sion. Non-finite 
About half the 	 verbs number 3. 
words are moderat-
ely familiar but 
have a highly 
specific meaning 
within the context. 
The degree of un-
familiarity of the re- 
mainder is also 
moderately high. 
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Habitual Collocations  Special Vocabulary Habitual Collo- 
cations of  
Voice  
History: 
In 22 lines out of 51 
habitual collocations 
occur. 
Specific words occur 
between 1 and 6 
times. 
Geography: 
In 24 out of 40 lines 
habitual collocations 
occur. 
Specific words occur 
between 1 and 5 ti-
mes. 
Present are 9 te-
chnical words and 
10 special non-
technical words. 
Most words are 
familiar but have 
a highly specific 
meaning within the 
context. 
A moderately high 
degree of un-
familiarity 
occurs twice. 
The active 
voice is empl-
oyed on all but 
2 occasions. 
Non-finite 
verbs number 
21. 
Present are 5 tech- The active 
nical words from the voice is empl-
subject in question, oyed on all but 
8 technical words 	 2 occasions. 
from other disci- 	 Non-finite 
plines (notably 	 verbs number 
physical science) 	 8. 
and 14 special non-
technical words. 
Approximately one-
third are familiar 
but have a highly 
specific meaning 
within the context; 
one-third are moder-
ately unfamiliar and 
the remaining are un-
familiar 
N.B. Lists of technical and special non-technical words 
are in the appendices. (See pp.436-37). 
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2.2.5.3 Tenors of Discourse  
TABLE 15: Inter-Personal Function 
a) Personal Tenor  
Features  
- in Subject Explanations 
Subjects  
Mat Phy Che Bio His Geo 
Informal  
Contractions 
Phrasal Verbs 
Idioms and 'slang' 
Formal 
22 
7 
1 
7 
23 
5 
2 
2 
6 
1 
5 
0 
1 
7 
0 
7 
6 
4 
8 
1 
3 
11 
4 
6 
1 
8 
2 
1 
7 
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Unspecified origins 
Unspecified Destinations 
Source and address 
irrelevant to message 3 14 8 11 29 3 
Personal 
1st and 2nd person reference 37 12 5 15 9 11 
1st and 2nd person pronouns 13 1 4 3 1 3 
3rd person reference to named 
individuals 0 8 6 7 4 4 
Impersonal 
3rd person evading reference to 
author and addressee 1 12 10 6 24 7 
Passive voice 1 4 1 1 2 2 
Non-finite verbs 13 12 3 3 21 8 
b) 	 Functional Tenor  
The situational factor involved in this tenor of 
discourse are related to what the user is trying to do with 
language in a way that is different from the ideational 
function in the field of discourse. In each episode in the 
sample the user is involved in teaching and, furthermore, 
in the activity of explaining. However, this does not lead 
to identical patterns of significant situational and ling-
uistic variation as can be seen from examination of the 
analytical outcomes concerned with this category that are 
given as follows for each subject: 
TABLE 16  : Functional Tenor in Subject Explanations  
Mathematics: 
T 	 Offering exemplar from everyday life. 
T 	 Questioning (subsidiary to underlying question). 
P1 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
T 	 Explaining - how, exposing. 
T 	 Questioning, (subsidiary to underlying question). 
P2 	 Questioning, seeking clarification. 
T 	 Responding, offering apology and clarifying. 
P2 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
T 	 Explaining-how, exposing. 
T 	 Questioning for feedback. 
P3 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and Explaining-how. 
T 	 Questioning for feedback. 
P4 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
T 	 Explaining-how, exposing. 
T 	 Propositioning. 
T 	 Questioning. 
P5 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and rewarding. 
P5 Responding. 
T 	 Confirming and rewarding. 
T 	 Showing how. 
P6 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Responding and giving instructions. 
Physics: 
T 	 Controlling. 
T 	 Questioning for feedback. 
T 	 Questioning - (underlying questions). 
P1 	 Responding - correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
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T 	 Questioning (underlying question). 
P2 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Questioning - seeking opinion. 
P3 	 Responding incorrectly. 
T 	 Responding to pupil response and confirming earlier 
correct response. 
T 	 Explaining - (What-scientific) and exposing. 
T 	 Questioning (subsidiary to underlying question). 
P4 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Questioning (subsidiary to underlying question). 
P4 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Questioning (subsidiary to underlying question). 
P5 	 Responding, admitting ignorance. 
T 	 Admonishing and giving reason. 
Chemistry: 
T 	 Introducing. 
T 	 Reviewing previous knowledge. 
T 	 Questioning. Checking on previous knowledge. 
P1 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
T 	 Questioning checking on previous knowledge. 
P2 	 Responding in part correctly. 
T 	 Confirming part, questioning further by qualifying. 
P2 	 Responding and accepting qualification. 
T 	 Questioning, seeking greater specificity. 
P3 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
T 	 Questioning subsidiary to underlying question. 
P4 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
T 	 Explaining underlying question (what-scientific) and 
exposing. 
T 	 Questioning for recall. 
P5 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
T 	 Questioning for recall. 
P6 Responding. 
T 	 Confirming and modifying. 
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Biology: 
T 	 Controlling. 
T 	 Reviewing previous learning. 
T 	 Questioning for recall. 
P1 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
T 	 Questioning for recall. 
P2 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
T 	 Questioning for recall. 
P3 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
T 	 Questioning for recall, subsidiary to underlying question. 
P4 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
T 	 Recapitulating with regard to practical work. 
T 	 Giving directions. 
T 	 Questioning. Nature of underlying question. 
P5 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and asking for response to underlying question. 
T 	 Pointing out evidence. 
T 	 Questioning. Subsidiary to underlying question. 
P6 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Questioning. Subsidiary to underlying question. 
Ps Responding correctly. 
T 	 Controlling. 
T 	 Questioning. Subsidiary to underlying question. 
P7 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming. 
T 	 Questioning. Subsidiary to underlying question. 
P7 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming. 
T. 	 Questioning. Subsidiary to underlying question. 
P5 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Questioning. Underlying question. 
T 	 Motivating pupils to respond. 
T 	 Explaining underlying question (why-functional) and 
exposing. 
T 	 Questioning. Subsidiary to underlying question. 
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P 	 Responding. 
T 	 Confirming. 
T 	 Giving directions. 
History: 
T 	 Introducing and preparing for future event. 
T 	 Questioning. Subsidiary to underlying question. 
P1 Responding in part correctly. 
T 	 Modifying pupil response. 
T 	 Questioning. Repeat of previous subsidiary question. 
P2 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and explaining (What-genetic) - employing 
expository function for 21 lines. 
T 	 Questioning. Subsidiary to underlying question. 
P3 	 Responds correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and Explaining - Employing expository 
function for 6 lines. 
T 	 Questioning. Underlying question. 
P4 	 Responding correctly. Offering further information. 
T 	 Confirming expected response. 
T 	 Explaining - employing expository function for 5 lines. 
P5 	 Questioning, seeking discussion of future events. 
T 	 Responding, promising discussion after visit. 
Geography: 
T 	 Introducing. 
T 	 Questioning, checking on previous knowledge. 
P1 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
T 	 Questioning, checking on previous knowledge. 
P2 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming. 
T 	 Questioning. Underlying question (What-information). 
T 	 Explaining and exposing. 
P3 Questioning - Seeking information. 
T 	 Responding - Explaining and exposing. Underlying question. 
P4 	 Questioning. Seeking information. 
T 	 Responding. Explaining and exposing underlying question. 
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T 	 Questioning. Seeking to know what further information 
is needed. 
P5 Questioning. Seeking confirmation. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
T 	 Questioning. Subsidiary to underlying question. 
P6 	 Responding correctly. 
T 	 Confirming and enlarging. 
2.2.5.4 Mode of Discourse  
Textual Function  
(a) Spoken. 
All episodes consist in spoken text and all involve a 
teacher and pupils. Distinctions exist among the subjects 
represented with regard to the proportion of the dialogue 
that is uttered by the teacher, whether the activity is 
spontaneous or non-spontaneous, and if it is conversing or 
monologuing. Details of these features are given below. 
Although the language used in the episodes is not 
considered to be 'written to be spoken' - category (b), it 
is possible that teachers have made notes or, indeed, written 
out sections of their explanations in record books or as 
lesson notes. Thus, the likelihood that the written mode 
has influenced the style of discourse cannot be discounted 
and will be discussed in the next section. 
TABLE 17: 	 Analysis of Mode of Discourse - (a) Spoken in 
Geo 
Subject Explanations 
Mat 
Subjects 
Phy 	 Che Bio His 
Feature 
No. of words in episode 702 339 270 429 462 384 
No. of words in teacher's 
contribution 682 289 244 373 431 348 
No. of words in pupils' 
contribution 20 50 26 56 31 36 
No. of pupil initiated sequences 1 0 0 0 2 3 
No. of spontaneous sequences 1 0 2 3 3 4 
No. of lines of text used for 
conversing 47 20 23 45 17 21 
No. of lines of text used for 
monologuing 25 20 11 6 34 19 
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2.2.6 Discussion  
The material set out in the results includes features 
that are shared by all episodes as well as a number of 
distinctions peculiar to subjects because they reflect 
their characteristic modes of knowing or processes and methods. 
It is also the case that teacher style, possibly reflecting 
personality and individual perception of role, also influence 
language behaviour and, thus, certain categories, notably 
tenors and mode of discourse. 
The manner in which the explanation arises and is 
slotted into the lesson follows one of two patterns. All 
but two teachers utilise the start of the lesson for introduc-
ing the episode. Feedback from teachers suggests that one 
of the reasons for this is that pupil attention is greater at 
this point and another stresses the dependence of the rest 
of the work planned upon the pupil's grasp of certain key 
ideas. 
Physics and Biology set up a practical session as a 
means of providing information that is fundamental to their 
explanations and which they utilise during the episode. In 
Chemistry on the other hand, the explanation is offered 
before pupils start work on an experiment. This is common 
practice in Chemistry and may reflect the teacher's aware-
ness of the problem pupils face in inferring with any degree 
of confidence what is actually taking place during a reaction 
without having some information about its nature. Looking 
back over the explanations obtained for Hypothesis H3 (here-
after referred to as the H3 sample) the episode is typical 
of Chemistry explanations. 
Two features that occur frequently as part of the 
structure of the episode are a period of questioning by 
the teacher that seeks to reveal relevant previous knowledge 
and towards the end of the episode a period of questioning 
that summarises the points that have been made while obtain-
ing some feedback about pupil understanding. 
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The episodes are concerned with answering different 
types of underlying questions, but each one is highly 
typical of the kind of explanation that the discipline 
seeks to offer. The pattern of the subsidiary question 
types is also interesting. Chemistry and Physics have the 
same types, which reflect their scientific nature. Biology 
continues to demonstrate its concern with why-functional 
questions and Geography has a why-deductive question which 
reflects the scientific element in this explanation. 
In realising the ideational function, variations in 
the manner in which each subject employs the features tend 
to be matters of degree rather than difference. The incidence 
of habitual collocations and special vocabulary is high for 
all subjects but particularly so for the sciences. With the 
exception of the Mathematics episode which has relatively 
fewer technical and special non-technical words than other 
subjects, the major distinction among subjects relates to 
the degree of unfamiliarity of the vocabulary. In Physics 
it is very high and moderately high for Chemistry and Biology. 
Explanations from these subject areas in the H3 sample show 
similar degrees of unfamiliarity in their vocabularies. 
Geography adds to its own five technical and fourteen 
special non-technical words, eight more which are unfamiliar 
from other subject areas, notably Physics and Mathematics, 
and, thus, adds to its vocabulary burden; a situation that 
may well occur whenever Geography inculcates a large element 
Of scientific phenomena into its field of interest. 
History shares with Mathematics the distinction of 
having a vocabulary that consists of more familiar words. 
However, these words tend to have a highly specific meaning 
within the context. This is a problem common to all subject 
episodes and to the explanations in the H3 sample. Where 
the word in question is a defined concept as is often the 
case in History, the problem is exacerbated because of the 
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difficulty of agreeing positive and negative instances. 
Habitual collocations which occur in all episodes are 
in the main highly subject specific. There are, however, 
groups of words like information, apparently, causes, category, 
indicate, produces, which appear in many episodes and may, 
in fact, be associated with offering certain kinds of 
explanation. 
The inter-personal function and the situation function 
revealed through analysis of the tenors of discourse are 
common to all the subject explanations, but this does not 
mean that they are realised in each episode in exactly the 
same way. 
Inter-personal relations contain a degree of formality 
and impersonality sufficient to indicate that the participants 
are neither intimates nor of equal status. The use of 'Sir', 
'Miss' and 'please' before answering or asking a question 
denote a degree of ceremony. This may occur in lessons where 
the teacher used Christian names, or surnames (usually 
only for boys), or neither, and thus reflects as much the 
pupils' perception of their role and status in relation to 
the teacher as any desire on the teacher's part to promote 
ceremonial in order to highlight differences in status. 
Only Mathematics adopts a more generally personal style, 
reflecting its conversational mode but this does not eliminate 
all formal structures as is evidenced by the presence of 
twenty-three unspecified destinations. The remaining subjects 
adopt a moderately personal style and a moderate to high 
degree of formality, the latter tending to occur during the 
period when the underlying question is being explained. What 
use of passive there is tends also to be associated with 
this period, while non-finite verbs are more generally used 
throughout the episodes. The functional tenor clearly 
confirms the teacher as controller of the language acts in 
the episodes. In the main this is done by questioning 
followed by the confirming of and enlarging upon pupil 
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responses. Pupils are expected to respond in a predictable 
manner that gives evidence of their understanding of what is 
being explained. 
On the few occasions that pupils initiate a sequence 
a question is asked that seeks clarification of something 
the teacher has done or requests further information. There 
is one occasion in History when a pupil attempts to offer 
information but this is not taken up. 
The subject patterns associated with what the teacher 
is doing with language at any given time have much in common 
and a number of variations. 
The pattern of; questioning, followed by the confirming 
of a pupil's response, followed by some enlargement of what 
has been said to include points not made by the pupil is 
common. However, Mathematics tends to ask more questions to 
obtain immediate feedback in relation to one step in the total 
operation of explaining - how. 
Physics, Chemistry, Biology and, in the particular 
episode used in the analysis, Geography tend to use subsidiary 
questions that have some bearing on the underlying question, 
thus clarifying the degree of understanding the pupil has 
of the underlying question as well as the subsidiary question 
that is being put. This is also typical of the science 
explanations in the H3 sample and reflects their conceptual 
complexity. 
Teacher's responses to pupil initiated questions 
demonstrate a concern both with answering the immediate 
question and then enlarging on it, often so as to relate 
it to the underlying question. 
Most teachers employ an expository mode when giving their 
explanation of the underlying question. This was also 
employed in relation to subsidiary questions requiring 
further elaboration to link them with the underlying question. 
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All episodes employ the same mode of discourse which 
is for reasons outlined before the analysis considered to 
be spoken but with possible influence from the written-to-
be-spoken category upon some of the features. 
Undoubtedly, teachers utilise most of the talking time 
in an episode. The highest proportion of talk contributed 
by pupils is around 15%. What may be somewhat unexpected 
is that this percentage occurs in Physics where conversing 
and monologuing are equally represented. Mathematics, on 
the other hand, has the lowest proportion of pupil talk, 
around 2%, although using the conversing mode almost twice 
as often as the monologuing mode and with the highest 
proportion of personal and informal features of any subject 
in the sample. Other points worthy of note are that 
Chemistry and Biology employ conversing for the greater part 
of their episodes, while the History episode is largely 
monologuing. 
Spontaneous teacher produced sequences tend to occur 
when a pupil responds unpredictably, or fails to respond 
at all. He may ask a question, offer information or say he 
doesn't understand all activities that call for some ad hoc 
response from the teacher. Otherwise, most of what the 
teachers say in the episodes has been thought out before or 
prepared earlier, possibly by being written down, and cannot 
be regarded as spontaneous. Indeed, if non-spontaneous 
is taken to cover anything that has been thought about and 
organised in advance then most statements central to the 
underlying question would not qualify as spontaneous. Indeed, 
the more the teacher has 'rehearsed' the explaining in order 
that the main points can be presented in some logical 
sequence helpful to the learner, the less spontaneous the 
spoken words of the explanation will be. 
2.2.7 Conclusions  
Teacher initiated explanations arise and are slotted 
into lessons in a limited number of ways, two common ones 
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being to introduce an explanation at the start of a lesson 
or to follow practical work that provides relevant 
information for the explanation. 
The type of underlying question with which the 
explanation is concerned influences: the range of the 
subsidiary questions generated, most features in the field 
of discourse, the degree of formality in the personal tenor 
and, to a lesser degree, spontaneity and the monologuing 
features in the mode of discourse. 
The ideational function is realised in all subjects 
through habitual collocations and technical and special non-
technical words. Many of these are unfamiliar, the special 
non-technical words appearing to be as difficult for pupils 
to understand as the technical vocabulary. 
The inter-personal function is characterised by frequent 
use of personal features and the presende of colloquial 
features. The level of formality is moderately high and for 
the sciences this is consistent with the level in the H3 
sample. 
Teachers in controlling the functional tenor of discourse 
use questioning, confirming, enlarging and exposition. 
Teacher and pupil contributions are not of equal proportion, 
pupils rarely contribute more than ten percent of what 
is spoken in an episode. The teacher fulfils the role of 
initiator of spoken sequences, pupils the role of receiver 
and responder. 
Employment of a high proportion of conversing as a 
feature of the mode of discourse does not necessarily produce 
a corresponding increase in the size of the pupils' 
contribution. A relationship does exist between conversing 
and large use of personal features, and between monologuing 
and large use of formal features. 
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2.3 Testing Hypothesis H10 - Conceptual Factors in  
Explaining Episodes  
Within this section of the investigation the concern is 
with intra-organism functions in that it seeks to understand 
the intellectual cognitive and verbal demands made upon 
pupils thinking by the learning involved in understanding 
a specific explanation and to evaluate their appropriacyfor 
the pupils in question. In doing so the age and conceptual 
development of the pupils is taken into account and the 
assumption made that to be effective explanations must be 
pitched at a conceptual level to be decided by the stage of 
development and state of knowledge of the pupils and not 
by the teacher's specialist knowledge and understanding of the 
subject field. 
The specific hypothesis formulated to examine how fact- 
ors of this kind influence pupil understanding of explana-
tions is: 
H10 That factors associated with pupilst conceptual  
development and their ability to employ learned  
capabilities and mental operations influence the  
level of understanding achieved by them in  
explaining episodes. 
2.3.1 The Sample  
Explanations, together with the checks used to reveal 
pupils' understanding, obtained for the study testing hypoth-
esis H7, constitute the sample of material to be analysed. 
Reference is also made, as considered necessary, to 
the explanations that satisfy Martin's Hypothesis six, ob-
tained for the study testing hypothesis H3. These explana-
tions will be referred to in the study as the H3 sample. 
2.3.2 Analytical Model  
The adaptation of Gagng's model of learning, outlined 
on p.173 and given in full in the appendices (see p.315). 
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provides the categories for the analysis. 
2.3.3 Procedures  
1. For each subject in turn, the explanations are divided 
into sections and each section scanned in order to 
reveal the occurrence of intellectual, cognitive and 
verbal features. 
2. The features obtained from the initial scanning are 
grouped into the categories identified by Gagng as 
'learned capabilities', i.e. intellectual skills, 
cognitive strategies, and verbal information. 
3. The sections are scanned to reveal the mental operations 
required of pupils during the explaining episodes, i.e. 
attending, discriminating, encoding, storing, retrieving 
and transferring. 
4. A number of pupil responses to the checks used by 
teachers to assess their understanding are scanned in 
relation to the features of the learning capabilities 
and the mental operations, with a view to identifying 
specific problems influencing understanding. 
2.3.4 Results  
The outcomes from the conceptual analysis of explaining 
episodes are given in Table 19 and the outcomes from the an-
alysis of wrong responses given by pupils are given in full 
immediately 
TABLE 19: 
Subject 
after the check with which they are associated. 
Conceptual Analysis of the Learning Demands of 
Subject Explanations 
Learned 
Capability Operation Features 
Mathematics 
Discriminations 
Concrete concepts 
Defined concepts 
Intellectual 
skills 
Attending 
Discrimin-
ating 
Section 1 
Subject 	 Features Learned Capability Operation 
 
216 
Identifying a prob- Cognitive 
	 Retrieving 
lem type 	 strategies Transferring 
Identifying approp- 
riate rules 
Facts 
Connected discourse Verbal 
information 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Physics 
2 
3 
4 
1 
Concrete concepts 
Defined concepts 
Rules 
Identifying appropr- 
riate rules 
Applying appropri- 
ate rules 
Facts 
Connected discourse 
Intellectual 
skills 
Cognitive 
strategies 
Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Encoding 
Storing 
Concrete concepts 
Defined concepts 
Rules 
Identifying approp- 
riate rules 
Applying appropri- 
ate rules 
Facts 
Connected discourse 
Intellectual 
skills 
Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Discriminating 
Retrievin 
Transferring 
Encoding 
Storing 
Concrete concepts 
Defined concepts 
Rules 
Applying appropri-
ate rules 
Facts 
Connected discourse 
Intellectual 
skills 
Cognitive 
strategy 
Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Discriminating 
Retrieving 
Transferring 
Defined concepts 
Rules 
Higher order rules 
Identifying problem 
Identifying appro- 
riate rule 
Facts 
Connected discourse 
Intellectual 
skills 
Cognitive 
strategies 
Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Discriminating 
Retrieving 
Transferring 
Section 
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Subject 	 Features Learned Capability Operation 
Section 2 Discriminations 
Defined concepts 
Rules 
Higher order rules 
Bodies of knowledge 
Intellectual 
skills 
Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Discriminating 
Encoding 
Storing 
Section 3 Concrete concepts 
Defined concepts 
Rules 
Applying approp-
riate rule to 
problem 
Facts 
Connected discourse 
Bodies of knowledge 
Intellectual 
skills 
Verbal 
information 
Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Retrieving 
Discriminating 
Transferring 
Encoding 
Storing 
Chemistry  
Section 1 	 Defined concepts 	 Intellectual Attending 
Rules 	 skills 	 Encoding 
Storing 
Bodies of knowledge Verbal 
information 
Section 2 Defined concept 
Rules 
Identifying a 
problem type 
Identifying approp- 
riate rules 
Facts 
Connected discourse 
Intellectual 
skills 
Cognitive 
strategies 
Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Discriminating 
Retrieving 
Transferring 
Section 3 Defined concepts 
Rules 
Higher order rules 
Bodies of knowledge 
Intellectual 
skills 
Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Discriminating 
Retrieving 
Transferring 
Encoding 
Storing 
Biology  
Section 1 Concrete concepts 
Defined concepts 
Rules 
Facts 
Connected discourse 
Intellectual 
skills 
Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Discriminating 
Retrieving 
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Subject 
	
Features Learned Capability Operation 
Section 2 Concrete concepts 	 Intellectual 
Defined concepts 	 skills 
Rules 
Identifying a problem 
type 	 Cognitive 
Identifying approp- strategies 
riate rules 
Applying approp- 
riate rules 
Facts 	 Verbal 
Connected discourse information 
Attending 
Discriminating 
Retrieving 
Transferring 
Section 3 Defined concepts 	 Intellectual 
Rules 	 skills 
Higher-order rules 
Identifying a 
problem type 	 Cognitive 
Applying approp- 	 strategies 
riate rules 
Attending 
Discriminating 
Encoding 
Storing 
Retrieving 
Transferring 
Bodies of knowledge Verbal 
information 
History  
Section 1 Concrete concepts 
Defined concepts 
Identifying a 
problem type 
Connected discourse 
Intellectual 
skills 
Cognitive 
strategies 
Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Discriminating 
Encoding 
Storing 
Retrieving 
Transferring 
Section 2 Concrete concepts 
Defined concepts 
Bodies of knowledge 
Intellectual 
skills 
Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Encoding 
Storing 
Section 3 Concrete concepts 
Defined concepts 
Bodies of knowledge 
Intellectual 
skills 
Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Discriminating 
Retrieving 
Transferring 
Encoding 
Storing 
Concrete concepts 	 Intellectual 
Defined concepts 	 skills 
Rules 
Higher order rules 
Bodies of knowledge Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Discriminating 
Encoding 
Storing 
Retrieving 
Transferring 
Section 2 
Subject Features Learned Capability Operation 
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Geography  
Section 1 Concrete concepts 
Defined concepts 
Identifying a 
problem type 
Facts 
Connected discourse 
Intellectual 
skills 
Cognitive 
strategy 
Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Discriminating 
Retrieving 
Transferring 
Section 3 Concrete concepts 
Defined concepts 	 Intellectual 
Rules 	 skills 
Identifying a 
problem type 
	
Cognitive 
Applying an 	 strategies 
appropriate rule 
Bodies of knowledge Verbal 
information 
Attending 
Discriminating 
Encoding 
Storing 
Retrieving 
Transferring 
The outcomes from the analysis of pupil responses to teacher 
checks after explaining episodes follow. They are not the 
responses of one pupil, they have been selected from a range 
of unsatisfactory responses given by pupils in each subject 
sample: 
Conceptual Analysis of Unsatisfactory Pupil Responses to Each 
Question of Checks, for the Subjects Represented  
Mathematics 
CHECK III. Mathematics Explanation  
1. What is another way of writing 8 out of 100? 100 - 8  
2. What is an improper fraction? One with a number and a 
fraction. 
3. Which is usually larger, the cost price or the selling 
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price? Cost price. 
4. What do we call money a shopkeeper makes on the goods 
he sells in his shop? Cash. 
5. If a shopkeeper wants to make 20 percent on each item 
that he paid £1 for to the manufacturer, what must 
he sell each one for? 
What is his selling price as a percentage? 25% 
6. In deciding what percentage to set the selling price, 
what is always considered to be 100%? the price. 
7. What do we call a fraction which consists of a whole 
number and a part of that number? improper  
8. Put down the sum as you would if you were finding 75% 
of £15. (Do not work it out). 75 x 100 
15 
9. What do you know about the selling price of an article 
when a shopkeeper sells at a loss? It's cheaper. 
1. Inability to discriminate. Pupil has not yet grasped 
the defined concept of 'percentage' and is confusing 
the notion of 'out of with minus or from, which has 
led to faulty encoding. 
2. Faulty discrimination between two distinctive fraction 
types. 
7. In 2, association of mixed with number and fraction is not 
being made while the pupil confusing 'improper'(fractions) 
has failed to build into the encoding process an identify-
ing clue that would avoid confusion with 'mixed'. 
3. Faulty discrimination. Failure to discriminate between 
cost price and selling price suggests that the pupil has 
failed to form defined concepts central to the explanation. 
4. Failure to attend to the significant clue provided by 
the word 'makes' which indicates the nature of the word 
to be retrieved. 
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5. The inability of a pupil to answer anything to this 
question suggests a level of understanding that is 
at best fragmentary. This has affected encoding to 
a degree that has made storage and retrieval impossible. 
Part 2 of question 5 appears to be a guess, the per-
centage chosen can be attributed possibly to the large 
use of 25% in the explanation given by the teacher. The 
choice is made by the teacher to keep numbers simple to 
work out on the spot, but the repetition of similar 
numbers may have caused discrimination problems for pupils. 
8. This shows a discriminatory confusion about percentages 
similar to that in question 1. The pupil has also failed 
to understand, encode and store the rule and, thus, 
cannot retrieve it and apply it to the problem. 
9. Failure to take account of the specific technical nature 
of the words 'loss' and 'selling price' within the con-
text. The answer is acceptable in an everyday sense but 
mathematically the pupil demonstrates no awareness of the 
link between the words and their further relationship 
to the unstated 'cost price', although from the explana-
tion they would be encoded as an habitual collocation. 
Physics  
CHECK III. Physics Explanation  
1. In Physics, friction is considered to be a... problem. 
2. What do polished surfaces look like under a microscope? 
shiny. 
3. When one solid rests on another what has to happen in 
order that the upper one can be supported? It has to  
take the pressure. 
What is there at the places of contact? 	 points. 
What must happen before one surface can move over 
another? You have to push it. 
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4. When you start something moving on the apparatus used 
in the experiment when is the reading on the spring 
balance greatest? When it's moving fast. 
What does this tell us about friction at that point? 
It's very strong. 
5. Does friction remain constant? Yes. 
6. Is it possible to get rid of friction completely? 
7. If the difference between the peaks and troughs of a 
surface are measured - what sort of scale is used? 
A microscope. 
1. The response though not incorrect gives prominence to a 
peripheral attribute and fails to offer the significant 
criterial attributes with which the explanation is con-
cerned. This may be to do with either the attending or 
discriminating operation. 
2. Failure to encode and store significant information 
that is fundamental to understanding the explanation. 
3. In parts 1 and 2 lack of specificity generates doubt as 
to whether or not the pupil has understood the nature of 
the defined concept 'friction' well enough to encode the 
information accurately. In part 3 there is failure to 
discriminate between the method of investigating and the 
implications of the evidence. 
4. An example of a misconception which is the very opposite 
of the relationship that the experiment demonstrates. 
This is confirmed in the second part of the question, 
answered by the same pupil. 
5. As all the experimental evidence points to variation in 
frictional force, failure to respond correctly suggests 
lack of understanding of the defined concept 'constant'. 
6. Inability to offer an answer suggests an inability to 
transfer what has been encoded and retrieved to a 
specific problem. This could mean that encoding has 
beenfaulty or that the pupil has difficulty with the 
mental operation of synthesis. 
7. Pupil has failed to encode and retrieve the concept 
'atomic microscope'. 
Chemistry 
CHECK III. Chemistry Explanation  
1. Some liquids are acids, as what other categories can 
the remaining liquids be classified? 	 Poisons. 
2. Why is it important to know in which category a liquid 
belongs? It could be dangerous. 
3. State a test for an acid. A bit of pink paper turns  
red colour. 
4. What substances do acids corrode? Metals. 
What is happening during the fizzing that takes place 
when the process of corrosion is going on? It burns  
them away. 
What is left when the fizzing stops? Nothing. 
5 Complete the definition - An acid is a substance which 
generates 	 gas.  
6. What do liquids that are of the opposite sort to acids 
generate? 
7. If you dropped some acid on your skin, what would be 
the best thing to do to prevent a burn? Put a burn  
dressing on. 
1. Failure to discriminate between significant classes of 
criterial attributes and peripheral information which 
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causes faulty encoding. 
2. Failure to encode significant criterial attribute in 
relation to underlying question of the explanation. 
3. Faulty discrimination of an essential distinction 
between similar phenomena, or failure to build into 
encoding procedure some clue to facilitate recognition 
of the appropriate information. 
4. Either there is a failure to form satisfactorily 
the defined concept of 'corrosion' or failure in 
attending to the last part of the message where the 
process of corrosion is mentioned. The second part of 
the question is answered by the same pupil and tends to 
support the former proposition as there is a clear 
lack of understanding of the process which is funda-
mental to the underlying question. 
5. Insufficient specificity points to shaky conception 
formation in relation to the defined concept of 'acid'. 
6. Inability to offer a response may be due to inability to 
retrieve the concept of alkali or the pupil may retrieve 
this concept successfully but have failed to encode 
successfully the significant criterial attribute of an 
alkali. 
7. Inability to synthesise using available scientific in- 
formation suggests that concepts of acidity, alkalinity 
and neutrality still not sufficiently well formed to be 
encoded with an appropriate degree of prominence. 
Biology 
CHECK III. Biology Explanation  
1. How do teeth help the process of digestion? By chewing. 
2. What is produced in the mouth when we chew? Spit. 
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Give two ways in which it helps us in the digestion 
of food. 
i. Makes food soft. 
ii.  
3. What happens to starch in the mouth? It's chewed up. 
4. Which of the solutions in the parchment diffusion 
shells entered the water in the beaker? Fehlings. 
What did you use to test for it? Blue colour. 
How did you know it was present? Went black. 
5. Why can one solution go through the parchment shells 
and not the other? -- 
Where in the process of digestion is it necessary for 
this process to happen? In the mouth. 
1. Lack of specificity contributes to the superficiality 
of the answer which fails to get to grips with the 
consequences for digestion of the action of the teeth. 
2. The term saliva has not been encoded but the pupil has 
made some contact with the location and function of the 
concept at a more familiar everyday level which does 
not extend to accurate encoding of the bio-chemical 
processes involved. 
3. Failure to form the defined concepts of the bio-chemical 
processes with which the question is concerned. Under-
standing and subsequent encoding of this phenomenon 
is fundamental to the success of the explanation as it 
is the underlying question of the episode. The res-
ponse in question at best reflects only fragmentary 
understanding. 
4. Failure to discriminate between the indicators and 
the phenomena being indicated adversely influences 
accurate encoding of the implications of a practical 
demonstration. 
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The second and third part of the question as answered 
by the same pupil confirms that the use of two different 
indicators each paired with a specific solution for 
comparative purposes has caused confusions which have 
not been resolved during the encoding operation. 
5. In offering no response to the question either the pupil 
has failed to infer and thus to encode, the implications 
afforded by the experimental evidence, or, in encoding, 
has failed to build in a satisfactory discriminatory clue 
to aid recall when retrieving the results of the two tests. 
The former seems most likely as in the latter case the 
pupil is likely to make a guess at the response. 
In the second part there is a failure to discriminate be-
tween the process described in the question and the first 
stage of digestion. As this is the same pupil answering 
who failed to offer a response to the first part of the 
question, this appears to confirm the interpretation 
that the pupil has not encoded successfully the evidence 
of the practical experiments. 
History 
CHECK III. History Explanation  
1. How is our country governed today? Our country is the  
Queen's. 
2. How is our government chosen? By the Prime Minister. 
3. Can you give any reasons why King Charles was so unpop-
ular. He was unpopular when he had his head cut off. 
4. What is a civil war and why is it worse than other 
wars? A lot of people get killed. 
5. What was another name for the Cavaliers? Horsemen. 
6. Why were they called this? They fought on horseback. 
7. Who were the Roundheads? Men with short hair. 
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8. Who was their leader? King Charles. 
9. What happened to Charles the First? He got big-headed  
and was killed. 
10. What happened later that led to the battle of Worcester? 
He came back with an army. 
1. Failure to attend to teacher's description of the position 
of the Queen and to encode the defined concepts 'ruler' 
and 'nominal head'. 
2. Problems of discrimination exist in this question. The 
pupil has chosen to take the defined concept 'government' 
in the sense associated with the notion of a Prime Minister 
forming a government. The teacher intends the question to 
be one about the electoral system. The confusion might 
have been avoided if the teacher had used the term 
'Parliament'. 
3. The defined concept 'unpopular' has not been fully acquired 
and it is not possible from the response to ascertain with 
any degree of certainty what the pupil thinks the term 
means. 
4. Failure to discriminate and encode the major criterial 
attribute associated with the concept 'civil war'. 
5. The question is answered correctly, but this is the only 
& pupil to make this response; all other pupils responding 
6. as the teacher intended with 'Royalist', and in the second 
part 'because they followed the king who is Royal'. 
Examination of the episode shows that the pupil making this 
answer (Mitchell) answered a question during the explana-
tion about cavalry and this has clearly influenced his 
selecting and encoding. 
7. Prominent in the pupil's mind is some previous explanation 
of the origin of the term 'Roundhead'. This appears to 
have blocked the associated defined concept 'Parliamentarian' 
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given in the teacher's explanation and, thus, it has 
not been encoded. 
8. Failure to discriminate correctly the pairing of each 
group of followers with the appropriate leader causes 
encoding of wrong information. 
9. Failure to discriminate a word sound converts be-headed, 
probably somewhat unfamiliar into bigheaded, a change 
which influences the sense of the rest of the statement 
and, thus, the encoding. 
10. Failure to discriminate between Charles 1st and his son. 
Some pupils may not appreciate that Charles 1st was 
beheaded before the battle. Both errors would cause 
misconceptions which could be encoded and stored. 
Geography  
CHECK III Geography Explanation  
1. Give 2 examples of fossil fuels. Coal Wood. 
2. What is the largest alternative source of energy to 
fossil fuels? Gas. 
3. About how much energy is released from the sun each 
year? Enough to fill a supertanker. 
4. What happens to the energy that does not reach the 
earth? It stays around in the clouds. 
5. Put down two things that are created by solar energy. 
The sun. 
6. What happens when our atmosphere absorbs solar 
energy? It would get hot. 
What does this cause? An explosion. 
7. How are clouds formed? From water. 
1. Pupil has not fully acquired the concept 'fossil' nor 
formed a scientific concept of the nature of coal. 
2. Inability to discriminate among phenomena in relation 
to a specific class possibly because the concept of 
that class has not been fully formed, or because con-
cepts of particular members of the class have not been 
acquired. 
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3. Attention has been diverted to the analogy given in the 
explanation resulting in a failure to encode the salient 
information. 
4. A misconception possibly caused by failure to attend to 
and encode salient information. 
5. It is possible that the defined concept 'created' is 
unfamiliar in this context and thus blocks the retrieving 
process. Another possibility is that the defined concept 
of 'solar energy' is not fully acquired and encoding is 
limited to a tenuous notion that solar energy is something 
to do with the sun. 
6. The first part of the question appears acceptable, but the 
same pupil's response to the second part casts doubt upon 
the level of understanding of the phenomenon that has 
been achieved. 
7. The lack of specificity suggests that the association 
between clouds and water has been perceived but a concept 
of the process involved has not been acquired and stored. 
2.3.5 Discussion  
Within all subject episodes the full range of mental opera-
tions identified in the model are utilised. In the main, 
attending and discriminating occur throughout, retrieving 
and transferring tend to be associated with periods of 
questioning, while encoding and storing are prominent in the 
expository mode of monologuing periods. 
The three learning capabilities identified by Gagne 
are in evidence in all episodes but there are small 
distinctions associated with the degree of use. 
Mathematics utilises cognitive strategies considerably 
more than most subjects. This is to be expected in view of 
what has been revealed about its characteristic concerns 
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and approach. 
Taking each capability in turn and dealing first with 
intellectual skills, demands upon this capability show a 
degree of variation among the subjects represented. 
Mathematics is concerned with rules, but not high order 
rules and utilises a large number of concrete concepts. 
Physics makes large use of high-order rules, Chemistry 
and Biology considerable use, Geography some use and 
History little or no use. These characteristics hold true 
for the subject explanations in the H3 sample. All subjects 
utilise many defined concepts, those of History being more 
loosely defined and open to interpretation than is true for 
Mathematics and the Sciences and to a considerable degree 
in Geography. 
Cognitive strategies are most in evidence in Mathematics, 
which utilises all aspects of this capability and, indeed, 
is preoccupied with identifying a problem, identifying an 
appropriate rule and applying the rule. These activities 
appear in other subjects, notably Physics and Chemistry 
but frequently go no further than the identification of a 
problem, in an overt sense. It is likely that pupils are 
expected to infer from the evidence the appropriate rule and 
to do their own applying of the rule. 
Verbal information is common in the subjects,(all but 
Mathematics which makes much use of connected discourse) 
being concerned with bodies of knowledge. 
Gagne's model is characteristically hierarchical within 
each of the learned capabilities. In all episodes analysed 
the preoccupation is with the upper levels of the hierarchies, 
i.e. with defined concepts, high order rules and bodies 
of knowledge. This is particularly true of Physics, followed 
by Chemistry, Biology and Geography. Scrutiny of the H3 
sample confirms this pattern with the exception of Geography 
which can be very variable relative to topic within its 
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loosely defined field. 
History has peculiar problems related to the nature of 
its sizeable body of knowledge and the complexity and 
variability of its defined concepts. 
The analysis of unsatisfactory pupil responses confirms 
the contention that with episodes operating at a conceptual 
level, that is at the top of Gagng's hierarchies there will 
be frequent occasions when pupils are unable to cope with 
the material confronting them. The strain this puts upon 
the discriminating function which, in turn, is dependent 
upon attending is great, moreover, failure of this operation 
has repercussions for all the other mental operations that 
depend upon it. 
Effective encoding is only possible with at the very 
least partial understanding, while storing for easy retrieval 
because of the need to build in clues demands a satisfactory 
level of understanding. 
Many concepts occurring in the episodes do not appear to 
have been formed let alone fully acquired by pupils. 
Numerous technical terms will take years to become really 
established, but the results show that words like create 
and unpopular are less familiar to pupils than teachers 
realise. 
There is also some lack of appreciation of the centrality 
of certain processes and concepts relative to others. If 
pupils fail to perceive the significance of criterial 
attributes relative to peripheral aspects of the concept 
the effect may be to encode and store in such a way as to 
give prominence to the peripheral rather than to the 
fundamental and central. The longer term effect of this 
is that the pupil fails to retrieve the latter but may well 
be able to retrieve the former which in most related 
situations will be much less useful to him. 
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Most of the concepts utlilised in the episodes, and 
notably in those containing scientific material, could not 
be readily understood and, thus, formed without the backing 
of prerequisites. For example, the concept of 'friction' 
depends upon the formation of the concept 'force' which, 
in turn, is highly complex and abstract in character. 
The Biology episode was not understandable without 
some knowledge of the concepts of diffusion, absorption, 
molecular structure, chemical reaction, indicators, etc. 
Yet these concepts were not being presented and explained 
in the episode. 
Not all the conceptual factors influencing under-
standing within an episode reflect difficulties associated 
with the mental operations and learning capabilities of the 
recipients of the explanation. There are occasions when the 
utterer fails to put across the message adequately. 
Conceptual confusion is generated by failure to mark 
clearly the relative importance of one piece of information 
compared with another, indiscriminate use of unfamiliar 
terms without presentation or expansion, use of 'noisy' 
exemplars that divert attention from the underlying question 
or use of exemplars that are too similar thus making it 
difficult for pupils to discriminate one from another. It 
is also true that teachers' commitment to the bodies of 
knowledge that constitute their subjects appears at times 
to have a greater influence upon their speech acts than 
does their commitment to the rational predicaments of their 
pupils. 
Conclusion  
Explaining within subject teaching makes heavy demands 
upon the mental operations of pupils, notably upon attending 
and discriminating throughout episodes and upon encoding 
when the teacher is monologuing in order to expose bodies 
of knowledge. 
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The level of intellectual skills demanded is moderately 
high for all subjects and where scientific material is 
involved the level becomes higher. 
With the exception of Mathematics cognitive strategies 
are not utilised in the episodes as much as the other 
learning capabilities. Verbal information, again with the 
exception of Mathematics which employs much connected 
discourse, consists in bodies of knowledge each subject 
with its special vocabulary and habitual collocations which 
tend to be unfamiliar when set against everyday speech. 
Teachers contribute to the overall conceptual demand 
upon pupils through a number of different practices that 
detract from the clarity of the explanation given and appear 
to be 'overcome' by the perceived demands of the subject 
to the detriment of their awareness of pupil needs. 
Bearing in mind the points raised above rejection of 
the hypothesis H10 is not contemplated and, thus, is 
allowed to stand. 
CHAPTER8 
1.0 
	 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS  
1.1 The Status of Explaining and the Nature of 
Explanations 
1.2 Communicating Meaning in Explaining Something 
to Someone 
1.3 Effective Explaining 
2.0 
	 CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
2.1 The Act of Explanation in Teaching and Learning 
2.2 The Act of Explanation in Teaching & Learning Science 
2.3 Areas of Further Research 
264 
1.0 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS IN THE CONTEXT OF PROFESSIONAL  
PRACTICE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
The classes in the studies constitute a wide range of 
pupils from primary, middle and secondary stages of school 
life and the lessons in which the explanations have arisen 
cover eight subject areas. Although the act of explanation 
is examined in each subject, particular reference has been 
made to teaching and learning science and the practice will 
be followed in this final chapter. 
The investigation has concentrated upon those aspects 
of the act of explanation that are highly relevant to 
an understanding of its place and function in classroom 
teaching and learning. As a result, a number of distinctive 
studies have been necessary, each contributing one or other 
aspect. 
The early studies have taken up the question of whether 
or not in current practice explaining is much used and valued 
and perhaps more important if teachers are explaining when 
they believe themselves to be doing so. 
Setting up an investigation to examine the above aspects 
was less complex than attempting to reveal and describe how 
successful acts of explanation are in facilitating pupil 
understanding. However, the latter aspect is of such 
importance in the context of teaching and learning that no 
investigation into the act of explanation in classroom 
contexts could afford to ignore it. This is particularly 
so in the case of science subjects which have as their 
'stock in trade' explanations which can be simple or complex, 
conceptually demanding or highly demanding, limited or 
extended in character and concerned with a very wide range 
of phenomena. 
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If any justification is needed for going beyond a 
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description of the act of explanation and attempting to 
identify factors that can contribute or detract from 
its success in achieving its objective, it is pedagogy 
that is able to supply it. It can be summed up shortly 
as the need felt by all 'good' teachers to become more 
effective at replacing the rational predicaments pupils 
find themselves in in relation to some underlying question, 
with understanding; the ultimate key to learning. 
The ensuing discussion brings together findings from 
the ten studies that constitute the investigation into a 
coherent statement about the act of explanation in a class-
room context and examines their implications for teaching and 
learning. It will also refer to issues raised in the theore-
tical sections and examine them afresh in the light of the 
evidence provided by the investigation. 
1.1 The Status of Explaining and the Nature of Explanations  
In the first chaper of the thesis, making specific 
reference to Green (1971), Komisar (1969) and Smith (1969) 
it is argued that explaining is one of a number of logical 
acts of teaching, sharing many of the characteristics of 
teaching in general but distinct from it in certain ways 
that reflect its peculiar philosophical nature. 
Closer examination of it utilising the views of philosophers 
such as Martin (1970), Scheffler (1969) and Hempel (1965) 
shows it to be an activity similar to telling and describing 
but having certain characteristics that they do not, notably, 
the rational predicament of the explainee and an underlying 
question which the explanation seeks to answer. 
An issue arising from these theoretical considerations 
concerns the importance of explaining as an activity of 
teaching. The logical and strategic activities of 
teaching that Green, Smith and Komisar recognise are not 
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of equal status, some being more peripheral than others. 
However, changes over recent years have tended to act against 
the achievement of consensus regarding what is or is not 
important in teaching and learning. Thus, the first two 
studies were set up to reveal the current position of ex-
plaining within teaching with regard to two perspectives 
which are: the value of the activity to teachers and pupil, 
and its centrality in the classroom. 
Evidence from these studies firmly establishes explaining  
as a valuable and central activity of teaching and learning  
in the eyes of both teachers and pupils at primary and  
secondary stages of school life. Indeed, the strength 
of the positive response to it is somewhat unexpected when 
considered in conjunction with an increasing number of 
activities going on in school which include some that would 
have difficulty qualifying as either logical or strategic 
acts of the kind identified by Green (1971). 
Nor is the enthusiasm for explaining confined to any 
particular group of teachers or pupils. Similar numbers of 
high ratings are found among infant, junior and secondary 
teachers, the last group from the typical range of subject 
disciplines to be found in secondary schools. The same is 
true in the case of the pupils and, in addition, there is no 
difference between able and less able groups in their 
perception of the value and centrality of explaining. 
Over half the teachers of science rated the activity as 
the most important and no one in this group rated it lower 
than third. 
Establishing the value that teachers and pupils set upon 
explaining is one thing, to ascertain the nature, quality 
and effectiveness of an act of explanation is another. In 
defining the nature of explaining a philosophical conception 
of explaining based on conditions offered by Bromberger 
(1965) but modified by Martin (1970) to produce her Hypothesis 
six is employed. It is used for the question appertain-
ing to whether or not what teachers consider to be acts 
of explanation meet acceptable criteria for deciding 
that they are. Moreover, as the teachers and pupils 
providing the explaining episodes set high value on 
explaining, the study is able to furnish information 
about their conception of what is involved in the act in 
which they are well practised. 
Some two-thirds of the explanations meet philosophical  
criteria for deeming an activity to be explaining. However, 
this should not encourage complacency particularly as 
one in three so-called explaining episodes do not qualify 
as such; which constitutes a sizeable minority. 
The reasons for their failure to qualify are import-
ant for understanding what is involved in the activity. 
Few teachers (11 out of 161) fail to state the right 
answer to the underlying question which suggests that 
teachers do appreciate the need for responding appropriate-
ly to what or why questions with something more than would 
be adequate for telling or describing. By and large their 
failure is a failure to meet the rational constraint upon  
teaching and thus explaining and to take account of the  
pupil's rationality. This involves the condition that 
requires an explainer to shift the question, which in 
turn is realised through the asking of one or more sub-
sidiary questions. 
The number of failures caused by this condition suggest 
that many teachers do not appreciate the necessity for or  
the potential gains from, question shifting. It does much 
to make the pupil a partner in the episode instead of being 
just a receiver and supplies the teacher with valuable 
feedback on how his meanings are getting through to the 
pupil and what the pupil makes of them. Question shifting 
also goes some way to meeting claims from those like 
Scheffler (1960) that the teacher must at some time submit 
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himself to the independent judgement of the pupil or he 
won't be teaching. It should also be effective for in-
creasing reciprocity as subsidiary questions give pupils 
opportunities for influencing the course, form and sub-
sequent interaction of the explaining episode. 
In science the need to put subsidiary questions is 
very strong. These explanations tend to require the per-
ception of relationships while being packed with often 
difficult and relatively unfamiliar concepts that must be 
understood if the pupil is to see the relationship. Sub-
sidiary questions can help to bring out the required re-
lationship and give examples of positive and negative 
instances of the essential concepts associated with it. 
In this way, the concepts become securely formed in the 
pupil's mind and are more readily available for use in 
subsequent learning that requires them. 
Examination of pupil responses to checks used in re-
vealing the gap between intended meaning and received 
meaning (the study associated with hypothesis 7) provides 
evidence that subsidiary questions are instrumental in  
promoting understanding. 
	
They serve to reinforce certain 
of Cicourells (1974) interpretative procedures notably the 
retrospective sense of occurrence(1)that something will be 
said subsequently that clarifies what at the time is an 
ambiguous utterance. 
A point worthy of note is that the acts of explaining 
which provide the sample of philosophically acceptable 
explanations took place in a variety of subject contexts 
and with different age groups but neither subject area 
nor age appear to have had any influence upon the success 
of an explanation in satisfying all the conditions. This 
suggests that what is offered as explaining reflects 
(1) This procedure is outlined on page 110. 
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individual perceptions that teachers have of what con-
stitutes a good explanation. Moreover, it raised the 
question of whether effective explaining must needs start 
with the explainer having a clear understanding of the 
nature of the activity particularly those aspects that 
distinguish it from telling and describing. Certainly 
it is not a simple activity and there could be many 
advantages in learning how to explain. 
Support for the idea is provided from work undertaken 
by the present writer at the outset of the investigation 
using pupils as explainers. Of the small sample obtained 
only two meet the conditions of Martin's Hypothesis six 
and both were near the top of the secondary school. 
Other than these the explaining episodes that got closest 
to satisfying the conditions were generated by pairs 
of pupils neither of whom had achieved understanding of 
a particular phenomenon but who achieved understanding 
by talking together and pooling their knowledge. 
Although this aspect of the work is not followed up 
within the present thesis, which concentrates upon the 
teacher as explainer, it is potentially a rich area for 
further research. 
Of particular use to subject based teaching are the 
issues generated by the typologies of explanations 
furnished by Green (1971) and Taylor (1970). 
In the first instance, interest centred on the range 
of question types utilised by teachers in their explana-
tions followed by a concern to reveal possible relation-
ships between a subject area and a specific question type. 
It was then thought to be likely that if a relationship 
exists between a subject and its question types, it 
would exert an influence upon the concepts utilised and 
the meanings communicated. Specifically, concept distinc-
tions of the kind associated with Vygotsky's (1962) 
theories of the development of language and thought were 
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thought to be of interest while in the case of communicated 
meanings Bellack's (1969) categories seemed appropriate. 
The three typologies applied in turn to the explana-
tions obtained for the study associated with hypothesis 
H3 did reveal a number of general trends and relationships 
within the studies associated with hypothesis H4 and H5 
respectively. 
One general trend common to all explanations is the 
answering of greater numbers of what-questions than why-
questions. Bearing in mind Green's (1971) notion of 
explaining as answering a certain kind of why-question, 
this may seem unexpected. However, the analysis of 
questions carried out by Barnes (1961) and Richards (1978) 
confirm that teachers share a preoccupation with putting  
across bodies of knowledge and this appears to generate a 
concern for knowing what is so, rather than why something 
is so. This same concern is probably largely responsible 
for the clear dominance of substantive with associative  
meanings; i.e. those meanings that refer to the subject 
matter of the lesson in question, throughout the sample. 
When question types, concept types and communicated  
meanings are taken together relationships between particular  
characteristics and subject areas show up clearly. For 
while all explanations share common features such as the 
philosophical characteristics that identify them as such 
and an ultimate goal, understanding, the influence of the  
origin of the something being explained is considerable.  
In the first instance, subject origins of explana-
tions influence the kind of underlying questions that 
teachers have to take on in their role of explainers. In 
some the influence is very strong as has been brought out 
in the discussion of the results of the study in question. 
Examples in relation to why-questions are the dominance 
of deductive questions in the sciences, of functional 
questions in Biology and of genetic questions in History. 
As would be expected the underlying question has a direct 
influence upon the conceptual character of the explanation, 
a clear example being the association of high order rules 
and principles with deductive questions and to a lesser 
degree with functional questions. Moreover, all these 
characteristics are realised through the language use 
so this, too, reflects the methods processes and concepts 
of the subject of origin. 
Subjects distinctions tend to be somewhat blurred  
at primary level although in the upper part of the junior 
stage they begin to emerge, notably distinctions between 
arts and science orientated topics. At secondary level  
the distinctions are much sharper notably between arts  
and sciences so that it is possible to say that the nature 
of the explanations in one subject can bear little or no 
resemblance to those of another. Science explanations 
show a relationship between question type, concept type 
and language selections as, for example, when dealing with 
a causal relationship in a deductive why-question that 
involves a high order rule couched in technical terms to 
avoid ambiguity. These question types are unlikely to 
occur in the expressive arts. 
How aware teachers are of these distinctions is a 
matter for speculation. What cannot be assumed is that 
they know of their existence or even that they know and 
understand the distinctive character of their own subject's 
explanations. 
This raises the question of whether or not teachers' 
explanations would be improved by knowledge of their 
characteristic nature. By and large greater knowledge and 
understanding contribute to human competence so it would 
appear to be advantageous. It is also possible that 
communicating this information to pupils at a stage at 
which they are capable of understanding it could help them 
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to utilise appropriate strategies and modes of thinking 
when faced with specific kinds of explanations. 
1.2 Communicating Meaning in Explaining Something 
to Someone 
So far discussion has centred upon the nature and 
influence of the something being explained during the act 
of explanation which is perceived by teachers and pupils 
alike to be a central and important activity of teaching. 
Unfortunately, satisfying all the conditions that philoso-
phers consider must be met before an activity can be called 
explaining and being aware of its characteristic nature, 
does not guarantee understanding for the explainee. It is 
this problem that the two studies associated with hypothe-
ses H6 and H7 have as their concern, i.e. the probable gap 
existing between what a teacher intends to communicate and 
what in fact a pupil receives. 
This section of the investigation is seen as particu-
larly important because it demonstrates unequivoca ly that  
despite warnings about the problems of accurate communica-
tion from linguists such as Rommetveit (1979) and Saugstad  
(1977) naive assumptions about the extent to which intended  
meanings reach their destinations and are understood are  
much in evidence.  
This is not to say that teachers are unaware that 
some parts of the messages they wish to communicate do not 
reach their destinations, their predictions in the study 
associated with hypothesis H6 show that, in general, they 
are aware that they can expect only a certain proportion 
of the pupils with whom they are communicating to under-
stand the message satisfactorily. There are, moreover, 
distinctions among teachers with regard to their confidence 
in their own ability to communicate meanings, as is indicat-
ed by the range that is demonstrated in the predictions 
which includes moderately low proportions and very high 
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ones. 
What most teachers in the group fail to appreciate 
(and there is no reason to think that the group is 
untypical) is the size of the gap that exists in certain  
cases and the relatively modest number of pupils who  
achieve satisfactory understanding. If the results 
obtained from this experiment is a true reflection of 
what happens during acts of explanation in teaching and 
learning, and if anything teachers in the experimental 
sample may unconsciously have put in more time and effort 
than is normally the case, some realistic reassessment 
of the expected outcomes is necessary. 
It is not difficult to see how teachers form wrong 
impressions about pupil understanding, bearing in mind 
the common practices of asking if everyone has understood 
or checking the responses of one or two pupils to questions 
about the meanings communicated in the episode. By and 
large pupils who lack understanding try to hide the fact 
and, thus, are party to the deception. 
Perhaps the most important implication that these 
issues generate is that teachers should start from a dif-
ferent base line in assessing what they have communicated. 
Ordinary everyday explanations are not very readily comm-
unicated and those that abound in school learning are all 
the more difficult because they deal with unfamiliar 
phenomena and utilise high order concepts. Possibly, it 
would help pupils to admit their lack of understanding 
if the characteristic teacher response at the end of an 
explaining episode were to be a show of surprise that 
anyone should have understood it at the first attempt. 
Certainly this kind of approach would be likely to gen-
erate a larger number of subsidiary questions than one 
which appears anxious to confirm that all but a few have 
achieved understanding but further questions will be put 
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if necessary. Moreover, the quality of interaction 
between teacher and pupils would probably improve. 
Mathematics and Science are subject areas that would 
benefit most from a teaching approach to explaining of 
this kind not least because characteristically they tend 
to be sequential and where subsequent learning is heavily 
dependent upon previous learning a small gap in under-
standing that is not remedied can become a chasm in a 
small space of time. Indeed, the high degree of unfam-
iliarity and complexity typical of much of the phenomena 
of science are such that understanding of them proceeds 
in a very gradual fashion, thus ensuring that whenever an  
act of explanation is in progress only some of the pupils  
will be following most of what is being said, the remainder 
will be coming in as and where they can between partial 
understanding and no understanding at all. 
The size of the problem identified in the practical 
investigation reinforces the view expressed in the theore-
tical sections of the thesis that philosophical accounts 
fail to cover adequately certain dimensions that influence 
the act of explanation. All the explanations employed in 
identifying the gap between intended meaning and received 
meaning are able to satisfy Martin's Hypothesis six but 
satisfactory understanding was not attained by a relatively 
high proportion of pupils. Perhaps it is because many 
philosophers do not make achievement of understanding a 
necessary condition of explaining that they are satisfied 
with accounts that pay scant attention to contextual and 
interactional features as integral to the act of comm-
unicating meaning. Within this thesis they are seen as 
essential to the understanding of the nature of explain-
ing something to someone as a phenomenon and as a likely 
source of information about factors that may be blocking 
understanding. 
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1.3 Effective Explaining  
Although this section is discussed under the head 
of effective explaining this is done by considering the 
information obtained from sociolinguistic and psychol-
inguistic analysis, about features of explaining that 
are not brought out by purely philosophical accounts. 
One reason for this approach stems from the stance 
that these are the features which exert a crucial 
influence upon what actually takes place when an explainer 
is communicating meanings to an explainee within an 
explaining episode. Moreover, this activity subsequently 
affects the eventual outcome in terms of the understanding 
achieved by the explainee. Another reason for proceeding 
on these lines is that gaining some awareness of what is 
taking place in a typical episode looks to be a sensible 
first step in a consideration of what contributes to or 
detracts from effective explaining. 
As the notions and processes of subjects are comm-
unicated through language an obvious starting place 
appeared to be their vocabularies. The word selections 
of explainees within an explanation may have potentiality 
for furnishing the explainee with a clear statement of 
what he needs to know, i.e. it is adequate in the sense 
that it meets the demands of what Halliday's (1975b) 
refers to as the field of discourse concerned with the 
ideational function of the communication. However, as 
was argued with reference to Rommetveit (1979) in the 
theoretical sections of the thesis, linguistic competence 
cannot be conceived of as devoid of variation and 
ambiguities. It has to do with human discourse under 
continually varying conditions. 
In setting up the studies associated with hypothesis 
H8 note was taken of points brought out in the discussion 
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of the influence upon communication of what is explained 
by Cicourel (1973) and Stubbs (1976). In particular, 
their concerns regarding occasions when an explainer's 
word selections include a high proportion of those words 
that rarely occur in the normal vocabulary of the ex-
plainees, or the context is an unfamiliar one with its 
own special habitual collocations, informed the design 
of the experiments. 
The position was taken that, in the main, concern for 
possible vocabulary problems is directed at the technical 
word and bearing in mind the large number revealed by 
the conceptual analysis of explanations associated with 
hypothesis H4 there appears to be a great need for this to 
be so. However, as Stubbs pointed out the technical term 
serves a useful purpose but there are many words used by 
teachers in their explanations that are not of this sort 
which are equally difficult and unfamiliar and which 
could be readily replaced with a simpler and more familiar 
word. It is these words which are the focus of the ex-
periments carried out with pupils learning Chemistry and 
Biology. The words are non-technical and not readily 
accessible to pupils, but frequently teachers fail to 
recognise them as giving pupils problems of meaning. 
Moreover, they are in common use in the subjects involved 
in the experiment and, with variations related to range 
and frequency, in use with most other subjects taught in 
secondary schools. An assumption made when setting up 
the experiment that appeared reasonable is that problems 
of word meaning contribute to problems of understanding 
although as Cassels (1978), whose work provides the 
blue-print for this148  study, reminds us, many teachers do 
not entertain the notion that greater understanding can 
at times be achieved by changing one word. 
Whatever may be the typical view of teachers concern-
ing the effect words of the kind described have upon pupil 
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understanding, the evidence of the study confirms the  
view that non-technical words that are not readily  
accessible to the pupil can and do block pupil under-
standing. 
In certain modified questions, simplifying one word 
improved pupil performance by fifteen percent. This is 
not an enormous increase but taking the total of pupils 
who sit the examination in question each year, it is a 
large number and for the individuals concerned it can make 
the difference between success and failure. 
It is doubtful that those who set examination papers 
are aware of the depressing effect upon scores of negative 
forms unless they take a sadistic pleasure in asking 
questions in a form that they know gives pupils more 
problems of understanding than the alternative form which 
is positive. 
The ease with which modified questions were produced 
by replacing the original words or phrases with others, 
simpler or more direct, is something of which teachers 
should be convinced. In particular, the possible gains 
within an activity like explaining which concentrates 
every effort upon getting the meanings through to the 
.explainee, cannot be too clearly stressed. Indeed, 
teachers should be pressed to do more than be aware of 
the knowledge, they should be expected to act upon their 
knowledge. 
More specifically science orientated subjects which 
meet the problem described rather more than do most other 
subjects, often in conjunction with a very heavy load 
of technical words, could tackle this problem which is 
made that much more difficult when pupils are expected 
to remember a wide range of unfamiliar phenomena over a 
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long period of time as, for example, five years of 
course material in Nuffield Science. 
A point worthy of note is that all the evidence  
comes from pupil responses to multiple choice questions  
and undoubtedly challenges the belief that tests of this  
kind provide for pupils who are not among the highly able, 
easier options with regard to the language functions they  
have to understand and perform. It is true that they are 
not called upon to express anything in their own words 
or, indeed, to utilise the written form at all except to 
place a tick in a box or circle a letter. However, the 
first stage in being able to respond to any question is 
understanding what that question is asking. If pupils 
cannot get beyond this stage the so-called advantage of 
not having to express themselves in writing loses its 
point. 
One of the problems of question papers of this kind 
is that the language is under strong pressure to make 
without ambiguity, yet concisely, (for with four options 
to include, the questions can become lengthy thus increas-
ing the number of sheets necessary to carry the test) 
a statement that will inform pupils which option is cor-
rect and which are not. This technique is necessary for 
some of the options are similar to one another and only 
attention to specific information in the initial statement 
will ensure that the correct solution is identified. 
In responding to these pressures, when the initial 
statement is kept short the concepts are very tightly 
packed, a short sentence will carry a lot of information. 
Pupils who do not unravel these before making a response 
often miss crucial information, while if several unfamiliar 
words appear in close proximity to one another they fail 
to make any sense of the sentence. 
Where initial statements are longer negative forms, 
and, or, chunks of additional explanatory information 
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tend to have been introduced. Although the latter iS 
intended to be helpful it can obscure the point to which 
pupils are supposed to be responding, while the former 
practice causes confusion although it is not clear why. 
Perhaps like the additional information it increases 
the burden placed upon the mental operations of dis-
criminating and encoding. 
The implications for teaching and the act of ex-
planation in particular of the issues that have been dis-
cussed are self-evident. Moreover, that the words that  
have been the focus of attention are not the technical  
vocabulary of the subject brings the points home with  
greater force and reveals yet more sharply the burden of  
vocabulary with which pupils learning Science are expected 
to cope. 
It is true that, traditionally, Sciences are perceived 
as having a large technical vocabulary and it is tempting 
for teachers of other subjects to think that they do not 
have problems of this kind. However, this is to deceive 
themselves, for every subject has a technical vocabulary 
and it is likely to be brought out most fully when teachers 
are engaged in explaining a phenomenon with which the 
subject is concerned. Furthermore, although there may 
be a greater number of everyday or familiar words than is 
the case in the Sciences, within the subject discipline 
these words take on an altogether more precise and special-
ised meaning and, thus, are equally likely to cause pro-
blems of understanding for pupils. 
In the case of the words with which the study is 
concerned, no teacher can assume that the implications do 
not apply for him. All the words are non-technical and 
in common use throughout the subjects taught in secondary 
schools which carries the implication that they do occur 
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in subject explanations. There would seem to be advanta-
ges to be gained, for teachers in terms of their effective-
ness as explainers and for pupils in terms of better 
understanding, from acting upon the evidence that the 
study provides in any way that is possible. 
Arguments made with reference to the work of writers 
from the fields of sociolinguistics, philosophy and 
psycholinguistics, notably that of Rommetveit (1979) 
Cicourel (1973) and Halliday (1978 and 1975b) provided 
the stimulus for the contextual analysis undertaken in 
the study associated with hypothesis H9. 
Although Halliday furnishes the model for the con-
textual analysis, the interpretative procedures that 
Cicourel considers of such importance in the communication 
of meaning are taken into account in seeking to uncover 
the social and contextual influences operating in explain-
ing episodes. These were seen as highly relevant to the 
study not least because although crucial in understanding 
a communication they are learned only over a relatively 
long period of time. It was considered therefore that 
they have potentiality for contributing to understanding, 
but if they are not operating effectively the opposite 
effect could be produced. 
For example, an adverse effect could readily occur 
in an explaining episode over lack of reciprocity of 
perspective, which is the taking for granted that ex-
plainer and explainee have the same interpretation of what 
is going on in the situation. Another is the et cetera 
assumption which it was thought could greatly influence 
ultimate understanding being concerned with the filling 
in by explainer and explainee of what is necessary to 
promote the meaningfulness of an utterance. 
The retrospective sense of occurrence which was 
mentioned earlier in this chapter in relation to the 
function of subsidiary questionsin explanations is yet 
another example, this time, concerned with the assumption 
speakers and hearers have when engaged in interaction, 
that ambiguous utterances will be clarified at some later 
time. These phenomena are of the kind Rommetveit had in 
mind when referring to dynamic residuals in human comm-
unication which he considers to be the same as Wittgen-
stein's (1962) bottom level of interpretation, thus it 
seemed reasonable to hope tliat much of value both to an 
understanding of the dynamic nature of an act of explana-
tion and to the interpretation of the features in relation 
to their effect upon understanding, would be uncovered 
by the analysis. 
The hope proved to be anything other than a vain one 
for material obtained from the analysis is wide ranging 
and relatively sensitive. Moreover, it does shed light 
on the concerns that were identified in the theoretical 
sections. 
In conducting explaining episodes teachers as  
explainers tend to utilise a somewhat narrow range of  
procedures, regardless of subject, the exception being 
when very young children of primary age are involved. 
Explanations are slotted into lessons usually in the 
manner dictated by the teacher although there are occas-
ions when an episode is initiated by a question or demand 
from a pupil. 
The habitual practice of using questions to revise  
material already taught may have the effect of bringing 
to the front of the pupil's mind a relevant conceptual 
frame thus meeting some of the conditions of learning 
that are contained in Gagne's model of learning that is 
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used in relation to hypothesis H10. It can also establish 
for the pupils the ideational context and thus facilitate 
interpretative procedures starting with reciprocity of 
perspective and the et cetera function in the explanation 
proper. 
A problem associated with the effectiveness of this 
practice is the relatively small number of pupils who are 
given the opportunity to respond directly to a question, 
in contrast with the numerous others who may or may not 
be attending to the dialogue and going through the motions 
of organising their thinking in order to be able to respond 
if necessary. 
The same problem exists for the practice of asking 
questions towards the end of episodes to obtain feedback 
on understanding this time in relation to the retrospective 
sense of occurrence and it would appear to be some ad-
vantage to all concerned if the numbers of subsidiary 
questions with their potentiality for providing further 
information and removing existing ambiguities, were increas-
ed. 
Explanations reflect the concerns of the disciplines  
from which they arise and, thus, there are subject distinct-
ions associated with phenomena. It is in realising the  
ideational function of the field of discourse that they draw 
upon technical and special non-technical vocabularies and  
subject-specific habitual collocations. The degree of  
difficulty and unfamiliarity reaches its peak in the  
sciences while groups of words of the kind identified in  
the study associated with hypothesis H8 occur in the epi-
sodes of all subjects and appear to be associated with the  
'explaining language' of teachers. There are, therefore, 
examples of the phenomenon Cicourel has in mind when he 
speaks of teachers who seem unable to employ ordinary 
everyday words in their language use even when they are 
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readily available. 
Inter-personal relations are an interesting mix of  
personal and formal features, the former level being 
slightly more towards the personal pole than the impersonal, 
while a moderately high degree of formality is demonstrated 
for the latter. It does not necessarily follow that the 
more personal tenor is associated with a.lower level of 
formality although this could have been expected in view 
of the tendency for impersonal, formal and complex features 
to cluster together as do personal, colloquial and simple 
features. Perhaps this happens only when tenors of dis-
course remain relatively constant, which is not the case 
in teaching which dodges around between the polarities. 
Ceremonial features are in evidence though not on 
a grand scale. However, they support the interpretation 
of the inter-personal tenor evident in all episodes as 
being between participants of unequal status in which the  
message itself is the focus of attention and not the  
source (i.e. the explainer) or the destination (i.e. the 
explainee). This suggests that the field of discourse 
or the ideational function has the dominant influence 
upon the act and not the personal tenor of discourse. 
This point also can be made in relation to the 
functional tenor which confirms the teacher as the control-
ler and initiator within the context, in the sense that  
field, i.e. the subject discipline, exerts a very strong  
influence upon his perception of what must be said and  
how it is to be communicated. 
The influencesof the teachers' perceptionsi constructs 
and frames of reference are plain to be seen in the 
episodes, as are their expectations that generally pupils 
will not initiate but remain acquiescent responding in 
predictable ways when called to do so. 
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Whether this pattern suits the needs of pupils, 
particularly with regard to the furthering of their under-
standing, is a matter for speculation. Everything points 
to an imbalance in respect of pupil representation com-
pared with teacher representation. Any shift will have 
to be initiated by teachers for they are in the control-
ling position. Indeed, pupils with their lower status 
in the hierarchical structure of the school, their more 
limited experience and knowledge of the subject and their 
lack of understanding of the something to be explained 
start from a position that is so much weaker than that of 
the teacher that without dedicated and informed attempts 
by the teacher to create contexts in which their pupils' 
perceptions, constructs and frames of reference can 
operate effectively, for many pupils, satisfactory under-
standing will be an unrealistic goal, for numerous 
explaining episodes. 
Although in the study teachers' discourse is class-
ified as the spoken mode concerned with monologuing and 
conversing the influence of the written to be spoken mode  
is considerable. It removes a great deal of spontaneity 
from the talk and at times teachers sound as if they are 
reading from a text. Clearly, they utilise texts when 
planning lessons and although there are many reasons for 
declaring this to be good practice it does throw up 
this problem if care is not taken to translate the content 
into language that can be shared by pupils. On the other 
hand, this could be an example of what Barnes (1969) and 
Stubbs (1976) describe as the specialist teachers' in-
ability to separate their own use of language from the 
written everyday language without loss of meaning. 
There is no doubt that conceptual difficulties  
increase when teachers fail to modify subject language  
in a way that allows pupils to utilise their own  
language competences.  
A familiar problem is the facility pupils have for 
parroting the teacher's language without having formed 
the concepts represented by the words. Where as is 
commonly the case in the sciences the concept density 
is often very high, an act of explanation could readily 
confront pupils with more concepts that are not formed 
or only partially formed than with concepts that they 
have acquired and used in past learning. Moreover, in 
these areas (and again science is a good example) where 
the concepts in common use are of an high order of dif-
ficulty and complexity, any attempt to explain them or 
use them to explain other equally or more complex concepts 
without defining what they really mean, where possible 
by relating them to real experience, can expect to fail 
miserably. 
Before the mental operations of pupils can get to 
grips with the business of encoding and storing for future 
retrieval inputs from teachers, they must be in possession 
of a certain minimal amount of information so as to be 
able to make some sense of the meanings coming their way. 
If they do not have even this minimum, they are not in a 
position to encode. 
Conceptual confusions generated by teachers' failures  
to say clearly what they mean occur with a frequency 
sufficient to dispel any assumptions that all misunderstand-
ings arise from pupils' errors or lack of expertise, but 
these confusions will only come to light when pupils are 
encouraged to take a more active part in the dialogue. 
Taken altogether, the evidence from the study 
associated with hypothesis H10 exposes the heavy demands 
that are made upon the mental operations and intellectual 
and verbal capabilities of pupils and adds weight to the 
contention that if teachers are to be effective explainers 
they must accept responsibility for the inter-personal 
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function in acts of explanation with a commitment that 
exceeds that which at present they reserve for the ideatio-
nal functions. 
2.0 CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND. FUTURE RESEARCH 
2.1 The act of Explanation in Teaching and Learning  
Group 1 Conclusions  
In spite of changes in professional methods and approaches 
teacher and pupil set very high value upon the contribut-
ion that the act of explanation makes in teaching and 
learning. Teachers view it as the most central and im-
portant activity of all but sometimes fail to appreciate 
its characteristic nature, notably the need to take account 
of the pupil's rationality while, at the same time, facilit-
ating interpretative procedures such as the retrospective 
sense of occurrence, by putting and responding to subsidiary 
questions, which the investigation has shown to be a most 
powerful influence in facilitating understanding of an 
explanation in all subjects and at all stages of formal 
education. 
The putting of subsidiary questions also gives pupils more 
opportunity to become involved in the dialogue of the 
explaining episode. 
Recommendations: 
Teachers should be made aware of the importance of 
and advantages to be gained from putting and receiving 
from pupils subsidiary questions that are related to the 
underlying question of an act of explanation. They should 
be encouraged to increase their own use of such questions 
and to give pupils more opportunities to exercise their 
rationality through the questions they put to the teacher. 
Group 2 Conclusions  
The specific nature of explanations reflects the 
peculiar concerns of the subject from which they arise 
which, in turn, influences the kind of concepts utilised, 
and the meanings communicated to pupils. The character-
istics of one subject's explanation can be very different 
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from those of another, the most pronounced distinctions 
being between expressive arts subjects and empirical 
sciences. Pupils seeking to understand subject explana-
tions must needs become aware (:albeit unconsciously) of 
the distinctions in order to respond appropriately. 
Recommendations: 
Teachers should be persuaded that they stand to improve 
their own performance as explainers and their pupils' 
performance as explainees by having some understanding 
of the characteristics of the explanations that arise in 
their subjects and making their pupils aware of what 
these are. 
Group 3 Conclusions  
Teachers are aware that they do not always succeed 
in communicating the meanings they intend in acts of 
explanation, but do not appreciate the degree and scope 
of pupil failure to achieve satisfactory understanding. 
Indeed, in many cases, their expectations are totally 
unrealistic and demonstrate lack of awareness of the 
differences that exist between their own frames of 
reference and those of their pupils. 
Recommendations: 
Teachers need to be convinced that understanding of 
explanations of the kind that abound in formal education 
is a long term process that is highly dependent upon 
factors that have to do with individual development and 
experience. 	 There appear to be considerable advantages 
to be gained, with implications for effective explaining, 
from starting with the more realistic assumption that 
most pupils will not attain understanding by the end of 
the first explaining episode and proceeding on this basis. 
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Group 4 Conclusions  
Between them, influences from language use, contextual 
features and conceptual factors are largely responsible 
for the success or failure of an explanation to facilitate 
understanding. 
4.1 Teacher's use of language and the opportunities they 
give pupils to verbalise their own interpretations of 
explanations are shown in the investigation to be of major 
importance in the quest for understanding. 
Non-technical words that are not readily accessible 
to pupils can and do block pupil understanding in much the 
same way that technical words do. The burden of both 
types of vocabulary is a heavy one, particularly in subjects 
that have a scientific orientation. Choice of vocabulary 
by the teacher, therefore, exerts a strong influence upon 
the success of an explanation. 
Recommendations: 
Teachers need to be convinced that there are advantages 
to be gained, with implications for effective explaining, 
from defining and re-defining technical words over long 
periods and of replacing those non-technical words that 
do not need to be used with more familiar everyday words. 
4.2 Contextual features are among the most influential 
and varied in the ways in which they contribute or detract 
from effective explaining. 
The ideational function tends to dominate in most 
acts of explanation at secondary level and notably 
in subjects that have a scientific orientation and this 
can lead to the demands of the subject being taken more 
account of than the demands of explainees. 
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The inter-personal functions do not always proceed 
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with the grain of pupil conceptions and competences and 
when this happens understanding is severely impeded, or 
can break down altogether. The utilisation of pupil 
competences is the key to successful explaining for it 
exerts a compelling influence upon language use and 
conceptual features. 
Recommendations: 
There are important advantages, with implications for 
effective explaining from giving pupils a greater share 
in the dialogue and of promoting the inter-personal 
tenor of discourse as the first priority. This would give 
pupils increased opportunities for responding within their 
frames of reference rather than trying to accommodate that 
of the teacher. 
4.3 Conceptual difficulties are exacerbated by features 
related to language use and by the demands made upon 
newly formed, or partially formed concepts. The presence 
of large numbers of defined and abstract concepts which 
depend for their inception upon verbal formulations also 
greatly adds to the problem. 
The burden upon mental operations and learned capabilities 
is heavy and can cause breakdowns in the discriminating 
and encoding function which makes understanding impossible, 
both at the time and in subsequent learning where the 
concepts are crucial. 
Recommendations; 
There are advantages to be had with implications for 
effective explaining from providing pupils with ample 
exemplars of the concepts that occur in explanations. 
Where the concept density is high, every attempt should 
be made to reduce the effects to proportions manageable 
by the pupil, possibly through the use of strategies 
like advance organisers which bring the necessary concepts 
into the 'front' of the mind and by promoting the inter-
personal tenor of discourse as a first priority. 
2.2 The Act of Explanation in Teaching and Learning Science  
Although the act of explanation in science has to contend 
with problems that are essentially similar to those of 
other subject areas, it is clear from the general conclus- 
ions and recommendations that characteristics and trends 
in science explanations are very clearly marked and 
largely consistent. 
One reason for this is that the natural focus of 
science is upon explanation. Its methods are concerned 
with finding, testing and demonstrating causal relation-
ships and its bodies of knowledge are what have been 
referred to in an early chapter as explanations of the 
success(1)kind. A large part of the work of science 
teachers is to explain (in the task(2)sense) these 
scientific explanations to pupils learning their subject; 
a situation which helps us to understand why 'subject' 
pressure is so strongly felt in teaching the sciences. 
Group 1 Conclusions  
Teachers of science and their pupils set particularly 
high value upon explaining and utilise it frequently in 
the teaching and learning that goes on in science lessons. 
They tend to be as aware of the characteristic nature of 
explaining as teachers of other subjects and are more 
inclined to ask at least one subsidiary question. 
The number of subsidiary questions asked is altogether 
too few, for when set beside the explanations of other 
(1) and (2) Distinctions made by Ryle (1949) 
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subjects, science explanations are consistently concept-
ually difficult and highly demanding of cognitive and 
linguistic skills. 
Reconuaendat ions: 
Teachers of science even more than other subject teachers 
need to be made aware of the invaluable functions that 
subsidiary questions can perform in facilitating under-
standing and promoting concept formation. 
Group 2 Conclusions  
The characteristic nature of science explanations 
is that they are concerned with what and why questions 
that require deductive, functional or genetic explana-
tions that demand a wide variety of specialised and re-
latively high order concepts which are realised ling-
uistically through the use of technical terms. 
Recommendations: 
It is important for science teachers to understand the 
unique demands of science subjects so that they can 
appreciate the problems pupils have in understanding the 
explanations given. They should also initiate pupils 
into the methods and concerns of science so that they 
can learn to respond appropriately. 
Group 3 Conclusions  
The gap between what teachers hope to communicate in 
their explanations and what, in fact, they succeed in 
communicating is widest in the explanations given in 
science teaching. As there is no reason to believe that 
the teachers giving the explanations are less effective 
as explainers it is assumed that the specific nature of 
the explanation is an important factor. 
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Recommendations: 
Teachers of science must be persuaded that pupils find 
many science explanations difficult to understand and 
that the process of understanding will necessarily be 
a lengthy one. They can help the process by defining 
and re-defining concepts and through the use of advance 
organisers. 
Group 4 Conclusions  
Teachers use of language both in relation to style 
of discourse and vocabulary place a considerable burden 
upon pupils' understanding of science explanations. 
There is over much formality that has no useful 
function and the ideational function is dominant at 
times to the detriment of the inter-personal function. 
Conceptual difficulties are more common and of an 
higher order than is the case in other subject areas. 
Recommendations: 
Teachers of science need to take somewhat less account of 
the pressures from the subject they teach and more account 
of the constraints that reflect the cognitive development 
and frames of reference of the pupils who are the ex-
plainees in explaining episodes. There is also a strong 
need to give pupils a larger part in the dialogue that 
should be going on in the act of explanation. 
2.3 Areas for Further Research 
Taken altogether the studies expose a formidable 
range of features that may and do influence the nature and 
effectiveness of an act of explanation. However, there 
is always more to uncover and certain promising areas for 
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further research suggest themselves as follows: 
1. Pupils as explainers in a number of different 
situations. 
2. Identifying what constitutes the minimum of 
information that a pupil can possess in relation 
to a specific communication to achieve at least 
partial understanding. 
3. The extent to which any one or all of the possible 
advantages suggested in the general conclusions 
of the thesis do enable explainers to communicate 
their meanings more effectively in the act of 
explanation. 
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METHODOLOGICAL MATERIAL  
A1.1.1 TEACHERS RATINGS OF THE CENTRALITY AND IMPORTANCE OF  
CERTAIN LOGICAL ACTS OF TEACHING (BASED ON GREEN  
1971 AND SMITH 1969) - TESTING HYPOTHESIS H1  
The activities listed below occur in teaching.. Examine 
each in turn and select ten that you consider to be most 
central and important in teaching. Record your choice 
by crossing out the four you reject. 
Rank the ten activities selected in order of importance by 
putting 1 beside the activity you rate most highly and so 
on down to 10 which will be the activity you rate least  
highly. 
Amassing evidence 	 Comparing and contrasting 
Defining 	 Explaining 
Describing 	 Inferring 
Designating 	 Opining 
Demonstrating 	 Reporting 
Concluding 	 Stating 
Classifying 	 Valuing 
Please tick as appropriate: 
Infant age teacher 
Junior age teacher 
Secondary age teacher 
Subject(s) taught: 
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A1.1.2 
	
PUPILS RATINGS OF THE CENTRALITY AND IMPORTANCE OF  
CERTAIN LOGICAL ACTS OF TEACHING (BASED ON  
GREEN 1971 AND SMITH 1969) - TESTING HYPOTHESIS H2  
Below is a list of things that teachers do when they 
are teaching you. 
Look at each one and cross out 3 that you do not  
think are very important. 
Look at the 5 things left and number them in what you 
think is the order of their importance. Put 1. beside 
the most important, 2. beside the next and so on until 
by the least important you put a 5. 
(1)  
(2)  
Defining 
Describing 
Demonstrating 
Explaining 
Classifying 
Opining 
Amassing evidence 
Valuing 
- saying what something is as the 
dictionary does 
- saying what something is like 
- showing how something is done 
- getting you to understand something 
- putting things into groups 
- giving opinions 
- getting together facts 
- saying if something is good or bad 
Put how old you are here 
A1.2.1 Halliday's (1975a) Model for Contextual Analysis of Subject  
Explanations - Hypothesis H9  
(1) 	 Field of Discourse - Ideational function realised through: 
(a) Question type 	 i. Underlying question 
ii. Subsidiary question 
(b) Linguistic 	 i. Habitual collocations 
features 	 ii. Special vocabulary 
iii. Habitual collocation of voice with 
active and passive 
(2) 	 Tenors of Discourse - Inter-personal function: 
(a) Personal Tenor 
i. Informal Features 
	 - Formal Features 
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Contractions 
Phrasal verbs 
Idioms and slang 
ii. Personal Features 
1st and 2nd person 
reference 
1st and 2nd person 
pronouns 
3rd person reference 
to named indi-
viduals 
Unspecified origins 
Unspecified destinations 
Source and address irrelevant 
to message 
- Impersonal Features 
3rd person evading reference 
to author and addressee 
Passive voice 
Non-finite verbs 
(b) Functional Tenor. 
(3) 	 Mode of Discourse - Textual function 
(a) Spoken i. Distribution of teacher and pupil verbal 
contributions 
ii, Spontaneous - non-spontaneous features 
iii. Conversing 
iv. Monologuing 
(b) Written to be spoken. 
A1.2.2 Model of Conceptual Analysis of the Learning Demands of  
Subject Explanations (Hypothesis H10)  
Operations  
(a) Attending 	 - Control skills in attending to and 
selectively perceiving 
(b) Discriminating - Identifying similarities and distinctions. 
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(c) Encoding 
(d) Storing 
(e) Retrieving 
- Using strategies that make sense of new material 
so that it can be absorbed into existing 
structures. 
- Using methods such as class attributes to 
store new information with related existing 
phenomena 
- Using cues and systems to find and bring back 
information 
(f) Transferring 	 - Bring previously learned information to bear 
upon new phenomena 
Learned Capabilities  
(1) Intellectual Skills  
(a) Associations and chains 
(b) Discriminations 
(c) Concrete concepts 
(d) Defined concepts 
(e) Rules 
(f) High-order rules 
(2) 	 o nitive strate les for roblem solvin 
(a) Identifying a problem type 
(b) Identifying appropriate rules 
(c) Applying rules 
(3) Verbal Information  
(a) Labels 
(b) Facts 
(c) Connected discourse 
(d) Bodies of knowledge 
A1.3 Modified Test Sheet - Hypothesis 8  
A1.3.1 Chemistry Test A  
1. Which statement is true about the ions 8L1+ and 8Be 2+ ? 3 	 4  
A. They contain the same number of neutrons 
B. Their atoms contain the same number of protons 
C. They will combine with the same number of F- ions. 
D. They contain the same number of electrons 
2. Which one of the following requires a liquid other than 
water to dissolve it? 
A. Salt 
B. Sugar 
C. Sodium nitrate 
D. Sulphur 
3. Elements in the same column of the Periodic Table have the 
same number of 
A. Protons 
B. Electron shells 
C. Neutrons 
D. Outer electrons 
4. Which one of the following is a choking gas? 
A. Carbon ditaide 
B. Nitrogen 
C. Sulphur dioxide 
D. Methane 
5. When a concentrated aqueous solution of sodium bromide is 
electrolysed the product at the positive electrode is 
A. Bromine 
B. Hydrogen 
C. Oxygen 
D. Sodium 
6. Which one of the following sulphides is easiest to break down 
to its elements? 
A. Lead sulphide 
B. Sodium sulphide 
C. Calcium sulphide 
D. Zinc sulphide 
7. A fused compound conducts electricity but when solid does not 
conduct, this suggests the bonding in the compound is 
A. Covalent 
B. Polar covalent 
C. Metallic 
D. Ionic 
316 
8. To tell the difference between nitrogen and helium you could 
use: 
A. a burning taper 
B. a large balloon 
C. a glowing splint 
D. bromine water 
9. Which element would form the same number of bonds as nitrogen? 
A. Hydrogen 
B. Beryllium 
C. Boron 
D. Oxygen 
	
10. 	 The atomic weight of chlorine is 35.5. Why is it not a whole 
number? 
A. Ions are present 
B. Impurities are present 
C. Unequal numbering protons are present 
D. Isotopes are present 
A1.3.1 Chemistry Test B  
	
1. 	 8L1 and 4
8Be 2+ have the same number of: 3  
A. Neutrons 
B. Protons 
C. Charges 
D. Electrons 
2. Which one of the following requires a non-aqueous solvent to 
dissolve it? 
A. Salt 
B. Sugar 
C. Sodium nitrate 
D. Sulphur 
3. Elements in the same group of the Periodic Table have the 
same number of 
A. Protons 
B. Electron shells 
C. Neutrons 
D. Outer electrons 
4. Which one of the following is a pungent gas? 
A. Carbon dioxide 
B. Nitrogen 
C. Sulphur dioxide 
D. Methane 
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5. When a concentrated aqueous solution of sodium bromide is 
electrolysed, the product at the anode is 
A. Bromine 
B. Hydrogen 
C. Oxygen 
D. Sodium 
6. Which is the least stable sulphide among the following? 
A. Lead sulphide 
B. Sodium sulphide 
C. Calcium sulphide 
D. Zinc sulphide 
7. A melted compound conducts electicity but when solid does not 
conduct, this suggests the bonding in the compound is 
A. Covalent 
B. Polar covalent 
C. Metallic 
D. Ionic 
8. To distinguish between nitrogen and helium you could use: 
A. a burning taper 
B. a large balloon 
C. a glowing splint 
D. bromine water 
9. The valency of nitrogen is the same as that of 
A. Hydrogen 
B. Beryllium 
C. Boron 
D. Oxygen 
10. The atomic weight of chlorine is usually quoted as 35.5. 
It is not a whole number despite the fact that protons and 
neutrons have very closely integral atomic weights because 
A. Ions are present 
B. Impurities are present 
C. Unequal numbers of protons and neutrons are present 
D. Isotopes are present 
A1.3 Modified Test Sheets - Hypothesis H8  
A1.3.2 Biology - Test A  
1. Which one of the following parts of the human gut is mainly 
concerned with the absorption of our digested foods? 
A. Stomach 
B. Ileum 
C. Colon 
D. Rectum 
2. Which type of weather will cause the rate of water loss in 
a leafy shoot to speed up most? 
A. Cold and windy 
B. Warm and wet 
C. Hot and still 
D. Hot and windy 
3. Which of the substances listed below is not one of which 
mammalian blood is composed? 
A. Plasma 
B. Urea 
C. Platelets 
D. Red Corpuscles 
4. Where in the body is starch first changed into sugar? 
A. Stomach 
B. Mouth 
C. Duodenum 
D. Colon 
5. Which blood vessel carries de-oxygenated bllod to the heart? 
A. Pulmonary veins 
B. Hepatic portal vein 
C. Aorta 
D. Inferior vena cava 
6. At which of the following is a ball and socket joint located? 
A. Knee 
B. Shoulder 
C. Elbow 
D. Ankle 
7. Auxins responsible for a plant's response to light are in 
A. The root 
B. The flower 
C. The shoot 
D. The leaf 
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Biology Test A (continued) 
8. Which of the following is not an invertebrate? 
A. Crab 
B. Worm 
C. Snake 
D. Snail 
9. The tissue that passes water up a plant is known as: 
A. Xylem 
B. Cortex 
C. Phloem 
D. Pith 
10. The function of the intercostal muscles is to aid: 
A. Focussing 
B. Movement in the neck 
C. Breathing 
D. Blinking 
A1.3.2 Biology - Test B  
1. Which one of the following parts of the human gut absorbs most 
of our digested foods? 
A. Stomach 
B. Ileum 
C. Colon 
D. Rectum 
2, Which climatic condition of the environment will cause the rate 
of water loss in a leafy shoot to speed up most? 
A. Cold and windy 
B. Warm and wet 
C. Hot and still 
D. Hot and windy 
3. Which of the substances listed below is not one of which 
mammalian blood is made? 
A. Plasma 
B. Urea 
C. Platelets 
D. Red Corpuscles 
4. Where in the body is starch first converted into sugar? 
A. Stomach 
B. Mouth 
C. Duodenum 
D. Colon 
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Biology - Test B (continued) 
5. Which of the following blood vessels is concerned with the 
transportation of deoxygenated blood to the heart? 
A. Pulmonary vein 
B. Hepatic portal vein 
C. Aorta 
D. Inferior vena cava 
6. Which of the following has ball and socket joint? 
A. Knee 
B. Shoulder 
C. Elbow 
D. Ankle 
Auxins responsible for a plant's response to light reside in: 
A. The root 
B. The flower 
C. The shoot 
D. The leaf 
8. Which of the following is an invertebrate? 
A. Crab 
B. Worm 
C. Snake 
D. Snail 
9, The tissue responsible for conducting water up a plant is known as: 
A. Xylem 
B. Cortex 
C. Phloem 
D. Pith 
10. 	 The job of the intercostal muscles is to aid: 
A. Focussing 
B. Movement in the neck 
C. Breathing 
D. Blinking 
APPENDIX A2  
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EXPLANATIONS AND THEIR OUTCOMES  
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A2.1 	 EXPLANATIONS THAT SATISFY MARTIN'S HYPOTHESIS SIX  
	
A2.1.1 	 Primary Explanations  
Subject: MATHEMATICS  
	
1. 	 Age: 	 10-11 years 
	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
T 	 What way do we usually group shapes? 
	 Oh come on 	  
think about it.... Well, let's show you some 
	
 What's 
this" 	 Jane? 
P1 A triangle. 
T 	 Right 	  now this Andy? 
P2 	 er 	  Square .... 
T 	 No... Look at it again... 
P2 I mean a rectangle. 
T 	 Right.... and this? 
	
 Yes Kevin? 
P3 A hexagon. 
T 	 Right... now any ideas? 	  Oh you are slow today. How 
many sides has this one Anne? 
P4 Three. 
T 	 And this Sarah? 
P5 Four. 
T 	 Right.... So the number of sides is one of the things we look 
at .... All three sided figures are called triangles although 
their shapes may look different. There are lots of four- 
sided figures. Can you tell me the names of some 
	  Yes. 
P6 Square. 
T 	 Yes.... and another 
P2 Parallelogram. 
T 	 Good 	  any more? 	  Well there is the rhombus rectangle 
of course and the trapezium 	
 Can anyone draw the last? 
	  Yes John. (Pupil draws on board). 
T 	 Good 	 These are different because they are not regular 
like the others. 
	
2. 	 Age: 	 9-10 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
P 	 How do you find the vertex? 
T 	 Does anyone know what the vertex is? 	  Well it's the top 
of the triangle 	  here 
	  (uses diagram) 
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T 	 If I want the height of a triangle I have to draw a line 
from the base at right-angles to it... up to the vertex... 
Sandra would you point to the vertex on this triangle? 
(Pupil does so). 
T 	 Good... Now Samantha.... How about this one? 
P 	 There... 
T 	 Good. 
3. 	 Age: 9-10 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
P1 Miss Seedsman. I can't do this one 	  
T 	 Which number is it Linda? 
P1 	 Er.... three. 
T 	 Ten books cost £4.50. How much for seven books? 
What do you need to know if you are going to do this by 
dividing and multiplying.... What must you know before you 
can find how much seven cost? 
P2 	 Miss 	  I know.... 
T 	 Never mind.... Nigel.... you get on 	  Now Linda.... Look, 
is it easier to find how much one book costs? 
P1 Er 	  yes. 
T 	 Right.... find out what one cost by dividing £4.50 by ten... 
like this (writes on pupil's book).... You can do that can't 
you? 
P1 	 Yes Miss. 
T 	 Now.... when you know what one costs 	  how will you find 
the cost of seven? 
P1 One times seven 	  
T 	 Yes.... the cost of one, times seven will give you the 
answer. 
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Subject: HUMANITIES 
	
1. 	 Age: 10-11 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
T 	 First of all, who can say how our country is ruled or 
governed today? 
P By the Queen. 
T 	 By the Queen? 
P By the Government. 
T 	 That's right. We have a Parliament of just over 600 men 
and women. These men and women are elected. We vote for 
them. Anyone over the age of 18 can vote at a special 
time. 
P A general election. 
T 	 Right. - At a General Election when men or women are chosen 
or elected to represent us in Parliament, there are three 
major parties - which are? 
P Mrs Thatcher, Mr Steele and Mr..er...er...Mr 
P Callaghan. 
T 	 Well, those are the three leaders of the parties. What 
are the names of the parties? 
P Conservative, Labour and Liberal. 
T 	 That's right. Then the party with the most votes form a 
Government. The men and women who form the Government make 
big decisions as to what we should do, they make the laws of 
the land, the laws of the country. They run the country in 
the same way that perhaps Kevin's father runs a factory or 
I run the school, but on a much bigger scale. 
Now, the Queen has to agree to any change in law, or any 
decision that the Government makes. She is still, in a 
way, the leader of the country, but there is no way in 
which she can really refuse to sign a new act. She has no 
real power. She is what we call 'nominally' in charge, 
the leader in name only. 
	
2. 	 Age: 9-10 years 
	
Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group 
T 	 Now in 1642, a terrible thing happened. The king then was 
Charles 1st. The first King Charles. He had a parliament, 
he had a government who were supposed to give him advice and 
help him rule the country. But he told them what do do. He 
ignored their advice. He voted himself extra money when he 
ran into debt. He got angry when Parliament criticised him, 
that is when Parliament told him he was ruling badly. He 
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believed that he had been chosen to rule by God. God 
had made him king and so he could do anything he wanted 
and people dared not object. This made the people angry. 
He then married a young French princess who was a Roman 
Catholic, although he was a Protestant. 
(Break for interruption) 
His wife, Henrietta, encouraged Charles in his demands for 
obedience from the nation, from the people in the country, 
and the people hated her. She had a bad influence on him. 
He wanted to please her as well. King and Parliament had 
many arguments, and in 1642 the quarrel between them got so 
bad, a terrible war broke out. A Civil War. Can anyone tell 
me what a Civil War means? 
P When people fight each other. 
T 	 Yes, but in any war people fight each other. Does anyone 
know what is so special about Civil War? 
P The Americans had one. North against South. 
T 	 That's right, but what was so special about that? 
P They were all on one side, er... they were all in one country. 
T 	 Good - but go on. All the fighters were in one country so.... 
P They were fighting their own. 
T 	 Fighting against their own what? 
P Countrymen. Their own people. 
T 	 Right. Civil War is far worse because you are fighting 
your own countrymen. 
So, we had on one side King Charles with his followers. He 
believed he had right on his side because God had made him 
king. He believed he could rule the country exactly as he 
wanted to because God had made him king. He wanted to govern 
the country without the help of Parliament. On the other 
side was Parliament, the men who represented the people of 
the country. Although it was their duty to give advice when 
asked, they did not believe the king had the right to rule 
as he pleased. They thought it was their duty to tell him 
when he made a bad or wrong or unfair decision. They 
wanted to rule the country without so much power from the 
king. The quarrel got worse and both sides prepared 
for war. 
3. 	 Age: 8-9 years 
	
Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
T 	 Well, you all seem to enjoy eating.... and what a lot of 
different 'favourite' foods you have. Not all children 
can enjoy eating lots of different things. Can you think 
why this is so? 
P1 If you are ill you can't. 
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T 	 Good 	
 but I was thinking of children who live in 
countries where there is not enough to eat or where the 
harvest fails because of lack of rain... or.... even where 
the weather and soil are good but the people don't know how 
to be good farmers. Can you see that all these things could 
stop lots of different foods that most of you can choose 
to have any day 
	
 Just ask yourself if your favourite 
food would be one of them 
	
 Derek, what would you say? 
P2 They wouldn't have sausages would they, Miss Warner? 
T 	 I doubt if they would have any, and certainly not ones like 
we eat.... They wouldn't have any foods that had to go 
through a special process before they go into the shops.... 
like baked beans in tins 	  
4. 	 Age: 7-8 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
T 	 Reading: 
A long time ago Red Indians of North America would make the 
boys of the tribe go through a period of training before 
they could be acknowledged as braves. 
A time came when a boy who had passed some of the easier 
tests was taken deep into the forest until he reached a 
region he did not know and there he was left by himself all 
through the night. 
T 	 That would be very frightening, don't you think? 
P 	 I wouldn't like to do it. 
T 	 I don't think I would either... What do you think they were 
trying to prove? 
P2 	 ...If he was... er 
	 scared.... 
T 	 That's part of it, but I think they knew he would be scared. 
....The important thing was... that he stayed there.... 
though he was scared.... he showed courage and reliability.... 
I expect too they would expect him to try to make himself 
as comfortable and safe as possible... How would you do that, 
Gary? 
P3 	 I would.... er.... I would light a fire to scare wild 
animals away. 
T 	 Good.... and it would help to keep you warm. 
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Subject: NATURE STUDY  
1. 	 Age: 7-8 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
T 	 "The Very Hungry Caterpillar" by Eric Carle. (L970) 
Hamish Hamilton. London. 
T 	 "In the light of the moon a little egg lay on a leaf. One 
Sunday morning the warm sun cane up and - pop! - out of 
the egg came a tiny and very hungry caterpillar. He 
started to look for some food. On Monday he ate through 
one apple. But he was still hungry. On Tuesday he ate 
through two pears, he was still hungry. On Wednesday 
he ate through three plums, but he was still hungry. On 
Thursday he ate through four strawberries, but he was 
still hungry. On Friday he ate through five oranges, but 
he was still hungry. On Saturday he ate through one piece 
of chocolate cake, one ice-cream cone, one pickle, one 
slice of Swiss cheese, one slice of salami, one lollipop, 
one piece of cherry pie, one sausage, one cupcake, and one 
slice of watermelon. That night he had a stomach ache: 
The next day was Sunday again. The caterpillar ate through 
one nice green leaf, and after that he felt much better. 
Now he wasn't hungry any more - and he wasn't a little 
caterpillar any more. He was a big, fat caterpillar. He 
built a small house, called a cocoon, around himself. He 
stayed inside for more than two weeks. Then he nibbled 
a hole in the cocoon, pushed his way out and 	  he was 
a beautiful butterfly!" 
T 	 What part of this story is true of the butterfly in this 
picture 	  (shows picture of cabbage white)? 
P 	 It does turn into a butterfly 	  a caterpillar does. 
T 	 Right, but caterpillars don't usually eat lollipops and 
things, do they? 	 What do they eat? 
Ps No 	  they don't 	 (noise) 
T 	 Sh 	  Now let's see how the caterpillar turns into this 
butterfly (indicates cabbage white). 
T 	 The mother butterfly lays as many as 300 eggs at a time 
and the eggs are usually glued onto a leaf or a twig. 
The eggs are not much bigger than the head of a tiny pin 
but they are covered with beautiful patterns. The eggs 
of the Large White BlItterfly look like little yellow 
skittles with ridges down the sides. 
After about ten days - when the eggs have been laid for 
about ten days - they are ready to hatch, and tiny pale 
green caterpillars bite their way out of each egg. When 
a baby caterpillar hatches out of its egg, it nearly always 
starts off life by eating its own eggshell. After that it 
is still hungry; just like the caterpillar in our story, so 
it looks around for the next meal: Fortunately, for the 
caterpillar, it doesn't have to look very far because mother 
butterfly takes great care to lay her eggs on the cater- 
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pillar's favourite foodplant. The Large White Butterfly 
lays her eggs mostly on cabbage plants. A caterpillar 
hardly ever stops eating; it eats and eats all day long, 
and it grows so fast that it keeps bursting out of its 
skin. Now this happens as many as five times. The cater-
pillar eats and eats and eats - its skin grows tight -
the skin splits, and out pops the caterpillar wearing a new 
skin, and during the next few weeks another change will take 
place inside the pupa. The remains of the old caterpillar 
will be rebuilt into the body of a butterfly, ready to climb 
out into the light and fly away. 
2. Age: 	 7-8 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
T 	 The caterpillars of the Large White Butterfly, by the way 
are very good at hiding. They are green to match the cabbage 
leaves on which they feed. What can you remember about some-
one else, about whom we've been talking recently, who was 
very good at hiding? - because he dressed in green to match 
his surroundings.... 
P Robin Hood. 
T 	 Robin Hood. Can you tell us a bit more about Robin Hood, 
Arthur? How did he fool the Sheriff? 
P He was hiding from the Sheriff's men in the forest.... so he 
was dressed in green.... so that he would match the trees. 
P2 	 And he was green to match the grass. 
T 	 Yes, because he'd got to be camouflaged, like that crafty 
crocodile 	  who was pretending to be a rock.... all slimy 
and green, like the rocks in the river.... he tricked the 
monkey 	  but he didn't catch him. 
Well, the crafty crocodile; Robin Hood; and the Cabbage White 
caterpillars are all masters of disguise. 
3. 	 Age: 9-11 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
T 	 Right. If you look at that picture on the back of the door, 
what is that? (pause) Yes, Carolyn? 
P A leopard. 
T 	 It is a leopard. Well done - I think - what else might 
it be? 
P Cheetah. 
T 	 Cheetah, but it is a leopard. We know that because it says 
so on the back. (Pause for laughter). Now if we look at 
it, in many ways, that big cat is ideally suited for the 
kind of life that it has to lead. If you look at it care-
fully, you can see the power in its back legs. It appears to 
be ready to.... to what, would you say; I mean it doesn't 
seem to me to be ready to go to sleep. Gordon? 
P Pounce. 
T 	 Yes, it appears to be ready to pounce (inaudible on tape) 
.... coiled like a spring. Its eyes are fixed on its 
prey, fixed on - fixed on Gordon Brown, just about 
(laughter). Why do you think it needs such powerful legs? 
	  (noise on tape) 
P Mr Powell, it's going to pounce on the photographer. 
T 	 Yes, it's a very good photograph. Now then, we've mentioned 
this before. Most animals, indeed all animals, I suppose, 
are suited to the way that they have to live, remarkably well, 
and if you look above the door to the poster of animals of 
Africa - um, all those animals there look entirely different 
and they are entirely different, even though they all live in 
almost the same part of the world. They are different 
(hesitation) because they all have to lead a different kind of 
life, they eat different things, Garth. They live in different 
bits of Africa in the sense that some live in the water, 
and some in the trees and some live on the deserts and so on. 
So they are different for those reasons. 
4. Age: 	 9-11 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
T 	 What's that called? 
P An elephant. 
T 	 An elephant - that's right - what's perhaps the most striking 
thing, do you think, when you first look at the picture? 
Yes, Kim. 
P Their ears. 
T 	 The ears - well, we'll start with the ears - I want to try and 
solve the question of: why should an elephant (which is an 
incredible creature in many ways), why should this elephant 
have such very big ears? You know when we ask people to 
decide the difference between the two elephants, which I 
think most of you know, the African and the Indian, Kim, 
or the Asiatic, people always go for the ears. Well, the 
African has got which one 	  which is the one with the 
big ears? 
P African. 
T 	 African, yes. The Indian doesn't have such big ears - now 
why should the African have such big ears? Anybody like to 
make a guess? 	 (pause) 	  (a loud hiccup). I'm wondering 
what an elephant with hiccups must be like. (laughter) It 
couldn't be worse than you, Sally Rogers. Yes, Joanna? 
P To fan itself, to keep itself cool. 
T 	 Yes. You're quite right. The African elephant, big animal, 
doesn't use its ears for hearing, it does hear with its 
ear-flaps (indistinct on tape) 	  it does listen with them, 
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um, we don't have such big flaps because we don't need to 
fan ourselves with our ears, to keep cool. (laughter) but 
an elephant does - so - that is it uses its ears as a great 
cooling device to cool itself down. It can stand and use 
them as two kinds of great fans and a.... (hesitation) a 
stream of cool air is shot over its back. Go and have a 
drink of water, Sally, will you. Now then, why should the 
African elephant have such big ears and the Indian or 
Asiatic elephant not so big? Yes, Paul? 
P 	 The Indian elephant's country isn't so hot, so they don't 
need so much cooling. 
T 	 Yes 	  India is pretty hot, in fact, let's get this right. 
Indian elephants come from Asia 	  (indistinct on tape, 
but the teacher used the globe to show the parts of Asia 
where Asiatic elephants might be found) 	  
The fact is that there are jungles there and in jungles you 
can find shade, in the African bush you can't always and so 
elephants have got this kind of built-in fan to keep them-
selves cool, so that explains partly, the big ears. 
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Subject: RELIGIOUS EDUCATION  
	
1. 	 Age: 	 8-9 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
T 	 Do you remember I told you about Jesus' Goodbye Party. 
Ps 	 Yeah. 
T 	 Then about His dying on the very first Good Friday. 
Ps 	 Mmm. 
T 	 And then, what happens on Easter Day? 
P1 	 He came alive. 
T 	 He came alive again; that's right. God raised Him from the 
dead. And Jesus was really alive and He went into the room 
where His frightened disciples were and He comforted them. 
Another time He had breakfast with some of His disciples on 
the beach. 
P2 	 Oh yeah. 
T 	 And one time He appeared to over 500 of His disciples. 
Well, 40 days after Easter Day, that's nearly, that's about 6 
weeks, Jesus came to His disciples again and He walked with 
them up a hill called Mount Olivet and He talked to them there. 
And He told them this: He said "I want you to go everywhere 
and tell people about Me." And then He promised them something 
very wonderful. He said "I'll always be with you." 
	
2. 	 Age: 	 8-9 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group 
P1 	 We can't be in two places. 
T 	 No, we can't be, can tire? We're here now and because you're 
here in my room now, you're not in your classroom. So, how 
can Jesus be in heaven and on earth at the same time? 
Perhaps Jesus is in His body in heaven now, and when we go 
to heaven we'll see Him with our eyes 	  
P2 	 And our body will be ... 
P1 	 Cor... ( 	  I can't wait to get up there. 
(P2 
	  down here. 
P2 	 Our body will be left in our grave but we will go up to heaven. 
T 	 What 	 9  
P3 	 No. 
T 	 What bit of us will go to heaven? 
P1 	 Spirit. 
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T 	 Yes. 
P1 	 The body will be left and buried. 
T 	 Jesus' Spirit is on earth everywhere. He's with us in this 
room and He's with your Mums and Dads at work or at home. 
He's with your friends in your classroom. We can't see Jesus' 
Spirit, but Jesus is always near us. 
P2 	 Will we see Jesus' Spirit up in heaven. 
T 	 Will we see Jesus' Spirit? What do you think, Andrea? 
P3 	 His body - er - his body 	
 er -- 
Cos His Spirit will be in the earth. 
T 	 His Spirit will be in the earth, His body is in heaven. 
Sometimes we can feel He's near us and we feel peaceful, 
or if we're doing something we shouldn't because He's 
with us it makes us feel bad. 
3. 	 Age: 	 9-11 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
T 	 Imagine yourself a member of the early church under Roman 
persecution. You would have to meet in secret and if you 
were found out you would be charged with being a Christian 
and if you admitted you were, you would be executed.... 
People who were prepared to die for their faith were called 
what 	  Annette? 
P1 	 Saints. 
T 	 They may have later been called saints but there is a special 
name.... No? 	  Well, it's 'martyr'... you say it like 
m-ar-ter.... Do you think there are martyrs today? 
Yes? 
P2 	 No, Miss Hemsley.... You can be what you like 	  
T 	 Can you 'be what you like' in all countries in the world? 
Ps 	 (confused) No.... no, Miss... In Russia you - no 	  
T 	 Sh... Diane.... what do you think? 
P3 	 There are some countries where you can't be a Christian. 
T 	 Yes. There are some where you may have to suffer and even 
die for what you believe.... so I think there are martyrs... 
even today.... not all of them Christian, of course. 
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Subject: ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES  
1. Age: 8-9 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
T 	 Do you understand what 'arms' are? 
P1 	 A knight wears arms. 
P2 	 A coat of arms. 
P3 	 And we've got arms. 
T 	 Yes, follow up what you first said, David. 
P1 	 Knights wear arms to protect their body. 
P4 	 A king has arms. 
T 	 You're on the right line, but you're thinking of armour. 
What else does a knight have? 
	 Soldiers nowadays have 
arms. Policeman sometimes. The word can be used for a 
large number of things that people have to protect themselves. 
Can you think of some? 
P3 	 Guns? 
P1 	 Oh yes, guns and weapons. 
Ps 	 Oh yes. 
2. Age: 	 7-8 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
T 	 A factory is a building where they make things. Where who 
makes things? If you asked the men coming out of a car 
factory - can you make a car? Each one would answer 'no'. 
No-one working in a car factory says he can make a car. 
Now why not? 
P1 	 Because they all do different bits. 
P2 	 Oh yes. 
T 	 That's right. Today in car factories, and many other 
factories, each worker has his own special job. He doesn't 
know how to do all the things that must be done to build a 
car. But he's good at his own job. It would take a long 
time to teach a man everything he'd have to know to build a 
car. But when a man has just one special thing to do, he 
can learn his job quickly and well. Then lots of men working 
together can make a car. Each worker in this car factory is 
part of an assembly line. This is a line of workers 
putting the parts of something together. Now, suppose you 
people were working in a toy factory, what part would you 
want to work on? 
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P3 	 We'd be able to play with some toys. 
P4 	 So we would. 
	
3. 	 Age: 	 9-10 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
T 	 Right. So, we get a piece of wool. I'm going to ask one 
or two of you to feel it. I want you to tell everybody else 
what you think. Darran. 
P1 	 Soft. 
T 	 Soft. Paul, what do you find? 
P2 	 Greasy. 
T 	 It feels greasy - things are happening to his fingers. It 
feels greasy. It is greasy, because in that we have a substance 
called lanolin. Incidentally, we use lanolin, girls, in quite a 
lot of make-up when we get bigger, so it is a very important 
thing. Why do you think sheep's wool has got grease in it? 
Why should it have the grease in it? 
P 	 To keep all the rain out. 
T 	 Yes, to help the water drip off like the shiny side of a 
leaf 	  it won't mix. 
	
4. 	 Age: 	 9-10 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group  
T 	 When I've got a long thread I then put it into skeins. 
Ps 	 Ugh! Eh! A skein?... What's a skein? 
T 	 A long skein of wool which is how I used to buy wool when I 
was your age. In skeins and when we've got it into a skein 
like this - (makes a skein) like that we can then dye it. 
Change its colour. It's all the different colours that we need. 
Dye. D Y E (children join in the E). Do make sure you can try 
and remember to spell it the right way because otherwise you'll 
be telling me the wool dies like you do when you stop breathing. 
(laughter) 
Right, so 'dye' while we are changing the colour of wool has to 
be 'ye'. 
P 	 Has to be 'ye' 	  How do we dye it? 
T 	 Well, let's dye the wool and see. We put it into vats with 
special substances in, colours. Nowadays we can go to a shop 
and we can buy a dye, a tin of dye and a tin of fixer and do it. 
If you had lived in those Welsh mountains or on the Scottish 
Islands you'd have gone and collected your plants to dye 
your wool. 
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A2.1.2 Secondary Explanations  
Subject: MATHEMATICS  
1. Age: 
	 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
P1 Please, sir - I don't know how to answer number 6. 
T Pythagoras .... we've just done that .... very basically. You 
need to narrow it to two things, that's all. You've got a right-
angled triangle. O.K.? 
P1 Yes. 
T Yes, right. The square of the hypoteneuse is equal to the sum of 
the squares of the other two sides. That means if we draw a square 
on that, draw a square there and there, add the area of that square 
to the area of that square, the two will combine to equal the area 
of that square.... right. Which is the longest side of a right- 
angled triangle 
	  Well, which is the hypoteneuse? Yes? 
P2 Ehm, the diagonal. 
T The diagonal? 
Ps The longest one (much mumbling from pupils). 
T The longest one... and the longest one is always what? If any-
body says hypoteneuse... 
P3 The one opposite the right angle. 
T The one opposite the right angle. Right. There's two sorts of 
questions you can be asked on this. First of 	 you might 
be told the area of the squares. You may be told in your exam. 
that the area of that square is 101.... 171 square centimetres, 
and that one 73 sq.cms. What is the area of that square.... and 
half the population of the second year will start squaring these. 
You're given the areas of the squares. How would you find the area 
of that square? Paul. 
P4 Add those two together. 
T Add those two together. What is the information you're given before 
you start squaring things? The only situation in which you start 
squaring things.... 
P4 The length of the sides. 
2. Age: 	 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T Right.... If you're given the length of the sides, for example, if 
you're told that that's 12 ans. and that's 5 cms. then you've got 
to square them. Why? (Pupil's name) 
P1 To find the area of the square. 
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T 	 To find the area of the squares on those particular sides. 
Only two different sorts of questions you can be asked. 
Given the areas of the squares or given the lengths of the 
sides. That's all. Be careful in this case to do what 
with your square? 
	
Ian. 
P2 	 Add it together. 
T 	 You add it together. If you're given the hypoteneuse, you've 
got to be careful you know which you're taking away, from 
which and what and why. John? 
P3 	 You're taking the shortest side away from the other to get 
the other side. 
T 	 You're taking away the square of the shortest side, the square. 
Age: 	 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
P1 	 What happens if 	  the answer is wrong? 
T 	 It won't balance. 
You'll get a ridiculous statement 	  and this is a 
ridiculous statement. 
46 = 60. 46 = 0 - that is another ridiculous statement. 
For you to have the right answer 	  this has got to come to 
what this side says it is 	  nothing. Now then... I haven't 
got as far as the answer here 	  I can't substitute anything 
yet because I haven't got a solution. 
Right, Kelly 	  read that out for me. 
P2 	 x + 3, x + 2 = O. 
T 	 Louder. 
P2 	 x + 3, x + 2 = O. 
T 	 Fine. Now, can you explain exactly what that means? Anybody 
explain that.... what that means? 
P3 	 An unknown number + 3 (multiplied ? by) an unknown number and 
2 = O. 
T 	 An unknown number + 3, good; an unknown number + 2 ... what 
happens between the two numbers? 
P3 	 Should balance. 
T 	 No. 
p4 	 Joined. 
T 	 How are they joined? 	  Are they joined by adding, taking 
away? 
P. 	 Multiplying. 
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T 	 Ah, by, now that's the important thing, isn't it? By 
multiplying. They're joined by multiplying. If I add 3 
to an unknown number, Kelly, and add 2 to the same unknown 
number.... the unknown number is of a certain value. 
That value means that when I multiply the two answers 
together I get nothing. Now what do I get when I 
multiply 7 by 1? 
P6 	 7. 
4. 	 Age: 	 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: 	 '0' Level Group  
T 	 Right then, I said we were going to start off with, em, with 
number patterns, right? First of all, Pascall's triangle; em, 
without looking at those things on the board, how do you make 
up Pascall... Pascall's triangle? Yes? 
P1 	 Ehm, by having the, say eight, hex, hexagon numbers and we have, 
ehm, a row coming down (?) and then a row roming down the other 
and you end up with one one, and then one two one, then one three 
five three one or something like that. 
T 	 He's talking about these figures at the bottom. First of all 
one (calend?) and two (calends), four, eight, sixteen and, 
er, (calends) come together and they all get (split up?). 
You can do that but in an examination where you're going to be 
asked to write down part of Pascall's triangle you're not going 
to start drawing cars and lorries. Yes? 
P2 	 Two numbers above the eh.... the number you want and then you 
get the answer. 
T 	 Is that after the number one and you do what to it? 
P1 	 You double it. 
P2 	 You double it. 
T 	 No, you don't double it. Paul? 
P2 	 You add nothing to it. 
T 	 You're gonna get nothing, aren't you? 
P3 	 You add the number that's before it. 
T 	 What do you mean before it? Yes? 
P3 	 You add the number... er .... to the right of and and er... 
the left. 
T 	 No, not to the right nor to the left. There's quite 
specific instructions. 
P4 	 You have, er, a one and a nought and then underneath that you 
put one and then underneath that you put nought. 
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T 	 (working on B.B  ) 	 That's the next answer that's 
wrong. Now what's the next? Susan... 
P5 	 One, two, one. 
T 	 One, two, one. How did you get that? (B.B.) 
P5 	 Well, you add the one and use.... well, it's nothing into that 
makes one and then the two ones, it makes two and then you've 
one over. 
T 	 So, for any one space you take the number to the top right and 
the top left and add them. O.K.? Well, how did we get a one 
there? Gillian! 
P6 	 We added a one, two and I think (?) 
T 	 Right, we add this one which is top left to the nothing which 
isn't there, is that right? So all of the numbers down here 
we're going to get one, because you're going to be adding the 
one to the top right of it and the nothing which isn't there 
to the top left of it. Right, so the next line would be what? 
P7 	 One, three, three, one. 
T 	 One, three, three, one. Next line, John. (B.B.) 
P8 	 One, four, six, nought, one. (B.B.) 
T 	 Next line, John Prestwick. 
P9 	 Eh, one, five, ten, nine, five, nought. 
T 	 Good. One more line. Yes? 
P10 	 One, six, fifteen, twenty, fifteen, six, one. 
T 	 I've missed the middle one. 
P11 Twenty. 
T 	 Right, we'll stop there. That's how we compile Pascall's 
triangle 	  
5. Age: 	 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T 	 Next subject 	  fractions. Just interested in one thing and 
that is terminating and recurring decimals. If we're given 
a fraction there is one basic technique used for turning a 
fraction into a decimal.... Which is, to divide the bottom 
number into the top number.... U.K.? There's two different 
fractions as far as we're concerned, terminating and recurring. 
First, terminating fractions - this means that you can divide 
the fraction and it stops. 
Right.... and now recurring decimals. 
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T 	 You get a sequence of numbers repeated. Right, we'll try this 
one 4/7. Sevens sevens into 4.... a decimal point instead of 
noughts. (B.B.) Decimal point in the answer (pupil's name)... 
rapid calculation... 
T 	 Uh, uh.... 
P1 	 6 	 7 
T 	 Uh, uh 	  
P1 	 1 
T 	 1 	  (?) that's thirty. 
P2 	 4 
	  
28 remainder 2. 
P3 	 2. 
T 	 Remainder 6. 
PS 	 8 	
 7 	  6 
T 	 8, 7, 6 	 8, eight sevens are 56 	  that leaves a 
remainder of 4. 
Sssh 	  5 fives are 35, that's a remainder of 5. 
P4 	 7 (with other mumbled numbers) 
T 	 7, remainder of 1. 
PS 	 One. 
T 	 Right then, we've now got 5, 7, 1, 4, 2, 8, 5, 7, 1. We've 
found the recurring sequence eh? The first number is 5 and the 
last number is 8 before we come up against the next 5. Now 
there's a mistake made.... here. Where to put the dots. Some 
people put them above there. That's when you did that test 
in class and stacks of people did it wrong. Some people put it 
above the 5 and the 5 to show that that was the next.... the 
first 5 in the next sequence. Well, what that means is that 
this fr.... this decimal's going to be .5714285571428 so.... 
you put a dot above the first and the last of the recurring 
sequence so that your dot goes there and the dot goes above 
there 	  right? If we had a recurring sequence like this... 
(B.B.) there's various ways of being able to do it. It's a 
three figure recurring sequence .... 0,1,7,9.... four, sorry, 
0,1,7,9. There's no need if you don't want to put the dot 
above the 0 and the 9. If you want to you can put them above 
the 7 	  
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6. Age: 	 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: Top C.S.E. Group  
T 	 What is that as a percentage? 	 Yes? 
P1 	 Er - one hundred....er.... 
T 	 I'll start right from the beginning again. 
I've just sold something for six pounds. I've written it as 
six hundred pence, which is going to equal it. Every time we 
will have an amount of money and a percentage which are 
equivalent to each other. That selling price of six hundred 
pounds included a twenty-five percent profit. 
Now.... the cost price as money we don't know, but what was it 
as a percentage? You quite correctly said it was a hundred 
percentage. We know this as an amount of money, but what is 
it as a percent? One hundred and twenty-five equals a hundred 
and twenty-five percent. I now want to know what the cost 
price is. Anybody any inspiration how we can find the cost 
price? 
P2 	 Is it five hundred? 
T 	 Don't try to guess what it is.... Pupil 2 - work it out... 
like you did before. 
T 	 Right, how are we going to work it out? Now, we've got a 
statement. A hundred and twenty-five percent equals six 
hundred pence. 
P3 	 (inaudible suggestion) 
T 	 Now, I'm afraid that won't work. 
It's a good idea but it's one of those things that won't work. 
If I said to you, "a hundred and twenty-five pens cost six 
hundred pence, what is the cost of a hundred pens?" how do 
we work it out? A hundred and twenty-five cost six hundred 
pence, how much would a hundred pens cost? How would you do 
your sum? 
P1 	 Find out what one cost. 
T 	 Right. You would find out what one pen cost. So can we find 
out the value of one percent? Yes; exactly the same way. 
What is the value of one percent? Yes? 
P4 	 Six hundred divided by one hundred and twenty-five. 
T 	 Right, it would be six hundred divided by a hundred and twenty- 
five. If that's the cost of a hundred, or the value of a 
hundred and twenty-five percent, that six hundred divided by 
a hundred and twenty-five would be the value of one percent. 
How can I then find the value of a hundred pens, or a hundred 
and fifty 	 9 
P5 	 (inaudible) 
T 	 Times it by? 
P5 	 A hundred 
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T 	 A hundred, right. So a hundred percent equals six hundred, 
over a hundred and twenty-five, times a hundred over one. Now 
what can we do? 
P6 Cancel. 
T 	 Cancel: Fives into that goes twenty-five, fives into that goes 
twenty. Anything more we can cancel by? 
P6 Yes. 
T 	 Twenty-five will go into six hundred, twenty-five goes into that 
once; twenty-fives into six hundred goes how many times? 
P7 Twenty-four 	  
T 	 Twenty-four; that's four for each hundred, so that will be twenty- 
four. What are we left with now? Nothing at the bottom, so we 
can multiply straight across. Twenty-four times twenty is? Four 
hundred and eight, or four pounds eight. 
Now, Mark, because of the twenty-five and because he was thinking 
of a quarter, said you can think of a quarter and take it off. 
But I'm afraid it doesn't work there because it's a quarter of 
a hundred and twenty-five percent, isn'it? Not even that, it's 
twenty-five: well, I'm not quite certain what it is. Now, we 
are including that into your final amount in a percentage. 
7. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
P1 How do you find the answer to number 3? 
T 	 Ah... using Napier's rods 	  Look at these (indicates rods).... 
Now to find 36 x 5 using the rods. 
Take rod 3 and rod 6 with the index rod and look at row 5... 
P1 Yes. 
T 	 This tells us what? 
P1 	 It shows 1, 8, 0. 
T 	 Right. 1, 8, 0.... Can you see how it is obtained? 
P1 Yes 
T 	 Right.... Use the rods to work out 36 x 2, 36 x 4 and 36 x 8. 
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8. 	 Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
T 	 Even numbers are ones that we can divide by two. Odd numbers.  
ones that we can't divide by two. 
PS Yes. 
T 	 Don't you think we ought to be a bit more careful about what 
we are saying? I can divide 3 by two. 
PS Eh!! 
PS Six. 
T 	 Divide. 
P1 But you get a remainder. 
T 	 No, I don't get a remainder! 
PS You do. 
P2 You get minus one! 
T 	 Julie, what is it if I divide three by two? 
P1 A fraction. 
T 	 Yes, what fraction do you get? 
P1 
if you divide 3 by 2, you are splitting it up into 2 bits, 
and you'll get li, so we need to be very careful about what we 
are saying, when say - we divide something by 2 we have got to 
divide it exactly by 2. Yes, Dawn. 
P3 We say numbers that are divided by 2, but they only carry the 
whole numbers after. 
T 	 Yes, we must have whole numbers in the answer, mustn't we? 
P3 Yes. 
9 	 Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
T 	 Why do you think that house has a number 1A? Why on earth 
didn't they number it 1,3,5? See is anybody can tell us. 
P1 	 'Cause they had one extra house on the end and they didn't 
know what number to give it. 
T 	 If they built it on the end, they'd just give it the next 
number. 
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P2 They built another house on the estate later. 
T 	 Samantha - Do you know what happened; were all the houses 
built at the same time? 
P3 Don't know. 
T 	 Well, what probably happened is that that house was built after 
the others, I may be wrong, because I'm guessing now. If that 
was so, if the houses had been built and numbered 1,3,5 - which 
is what we'd expect, and then suppose they had a bit of spare 
ground on which another house was built, then they've got 
to fit another number in between 1 and 3 and we find them 
doing things like fitting in 1A. Right, see if you (to 
Samantha) can find if that is what happened; I may be wrong. 
10. 	 Age: 11-12 years 
	 Ability Range: 	 C.S.E. Group  
T 	 If I add 2 even numbers together, give me an even number. 
P1 20. 
T 	 Another one. 
P2 2. 
T 	 Right, let's add them together. 
PS 22, an even number. 
T 	 I get an even number, now that happens every single time I add 
two even numbers together.... Does everyone agree? 
PS Yes. 
T 	 You are quite sure? 
PS Yes. 
T 	 Why are you sure? 
P3 No, I'm not sure. 
P4 If you add 2 even numbers together you are bound to get an even. 
T 	 All right, how many girls are sitting down that row. 
PS Ten. 
T 	 And how many in that row? 
PS Ten. 
T 	 And the third row. 
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PS 	 Six. 
T 	 Two even rows, add them together, what do we get? 
P2 20. 
T 	 Right, two even rows, add them together. 
PS 16. 
T 	 Right, let's add the three together. 
PS 26. 
T 	 An even number. How about if we had 2 odd numbers and added 
them together? 5 and 3 make? 
PS Eight, even. 
T 	 11 and 9. 
P3 20. 
T 	 15 and 7. 
PS 22. 
T 	 23 and 19.... come on quick. 
PS 42. 
T 	 Stop there; what are we getting? 
P4 Even numbers. 
T 	 Even numbers, yes. Why? If we add 2 odd numbers we are getting 
an even number. Yes, Kimberley? 
P5 Well, if you had an odd row. 
T 	 Let's make it odd, come out of the way, Samantha, up you get, 
right, go out and stand by her, Debra, please. Do you agree 
that we have got 2 blocks where we have odd numbers? 
P5 Yes. 
P6 Nine and nine. 
T 	 Kimberley - if we put her to sit by her we would get an even 
number. 
P7 No. 
T 	 Yes, come on, we can combine those two together to get a pair, 
because we've got an odd one there - I'm not saying you're odd! 
and we've got an odd there, and we put them together. Is that 
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what happens, then? We've got an odd one from that pile and an 
odd one from this pile, that fit together to make a pair, to 
make an even number. 
O.K. sit down. So that if we are putting even numbers together or 
odd numbers together what we are really doing is making up pairs 
of numbers, aren't we? And when I use the word 'pair' do you 
think of it in twos? 
P1 A fruit. 
T No! When I say a pair of numbers (sigh!) you don't think of a 
fruit, do you? 
P2 No - you think of two together. 
11. Age: 14 years 	 Ability range: C.S.E. Group  
T I'm going to divide that rectangle into thirds, any suggestion 
as to how I can do it? Yes, Linda? 
P1 Lines across. 
T Lines going across, yes, on each one of the lines do you mean? 
P1 Yes. 
T 	 Yes, that's it, right. 
P2 Do we do the third? 
T Yes, we'll do one third there, I'm going to do sixths on the 
second one, how do you think I could do sixths - Deborah? 
P3 Put a line in the middle of each of those spaces. 
T Or? 
P3 Down. 
T Go down, how many lines do I need to put down? 
Ps Two, three, one. 
T One, good, because I've already got it into three, haven't I, 
so that if I put one line down I've divided it up into two bits 
and one of those would be a sixth, good. Now I'll do twelfths. 
P4 Oh, that's easy. 
T 	 It's easy, is it, Michelle. Right, come on then. 
P4 All you have to do is have a square for each twelfth. 
T Yes, so how many lines will I have going across in any rectangle? 
P4 Five. 
T Lines going across. 
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PS Two. 
T 	 Then how many down? 
P5 Three. 
12. 	 Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: Below Average C.S.E. Group  
T 	 Right, can we look at this problem for a minute; this is some- 
thing that I haven't sort of mentioned so far - er - what? 
P1 Can you do one going from the squares? 
T 	 Wait a minute, we can do all sorts of things but I want us to 
look at this aspect first. Don't draw this on yours. What's 
wrong with what I've done on the board? Theresa? 
P2 They are not equal parts. 
T 	 Good. Right, you've got the right word there, equal, all the 
way along you see on those that we have drawn out so far, every 
time we've drawn a diagram we had to make sure that they were 
equal parts. We can't say one third unless we have divided 
it up into three equal parts. That is wrong what I have just 
done because we cannot just divide it up into any four parts and 
say that one of them is a quarter, each part must be equal. 
This fraction one over four means one whole one divided by, that 
line going across means divided, four equal parts, right, so 
that's what we have got to be careful about. Now, let's go back 
to this once again, we have fairly easily. Yes, Tracy? 
P3 In division sums you sometimes have a line across. 
T 	 That's right, and it is regarded as division, isn't it? Yes, so 
think of that in the fractions. Yes, Michelle? 
P4 Why did you put a line with the one-fourth because it wasn't 
divided properly? 
T 	 Exactly, That's what I'm saying, that is what is wrong. When 
we talk about a quarter it means that one whole is divided 
into four parts exactly, each part is equal. 
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Subject: 	 PHYSICS  
	
1. 	 Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: Average C.S.E. Group  
T 	 Today we are going to try to understand more about air. First 
of all, what is air? 
P1 	 It's a gas. 
T 	 Well, in fact it is a mixture of several gases, some of which 
are very important for living things. Do you know what some 
of the gases are? 
P 	 Oxygen 	  
T 	 Yes. 
	
2. 	 Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T 	 Water vapour is one of the gases in the air. When water 
evaporates it changes into a gas called water vapour. You 
cannot see it or, indeed, any others because they are 
colourless and so invisible. 
P2 	 What does evap.... evaporate mean? 
T 	 Well, you must have noticed that puddles don't stay wet. They 
dry up. The reason they dry up is that in the right conditions 
the water turns into water vapour - in other words, it becomes 
a gas and goes into the air. Have you noticed in what kind of 
conditions things dry most quickly? 
P2 	 When it's hot and windy. 
T 	 Right. That's because the water turns into water-vapour more 
quickly when it's like that - both heat and wind increase the 
rate of evaporation. 
	
3. 	 Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T 	 It has probably been noticed by most of you that a sounding 
body changes its apparent pitch when it passes the observer 
with considerable velocity. For example, a car horn or a 
locomotive 'whistle' appears to become lower in pitch as it 
passes the observer. This is what we call the Doppler 
effect 	  But why does it happen 	  pay attention! 
As the vehicle approaches the observer each compression or 
rarefaction leaving the sounding body is a little nearer 
to the compression in front than would be the case if the 
body were at rest. Thus, the frequency with which the 
compressions arrive at the observer will be greater than it 
would be if the sounding body is at rest. As the vehicle 
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moves away from the observer the frequency appears to be 
correspondingly lower. 
Does anyone not follow that? 
Right. If the sounding body is approaching the observer, 
what would we expect the pitch to be, relatively speaking? 
P1 	 Raised. 
T 	 Right. The pitch is apparently raised and when the body 
recedes from the observer the pitch appears to be lowered. 
4 	 Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group 
('0' Level & C.S.E.)  
T 	 Yes, Morris? 
P1 	 Why pass electrical currents through liquids, sir? 
T 
	 Well, Faraday had discovered that if electric currents 
were passed through electrolytes 	 what are electrolytes... 
anyone... Baker? 
P2 	 Liquid conductors of electricity. 
T 	 Well done. Yes...when electricity was passed through liquid 
conductors of electricity or electrolytes, chemical changes 
took place and he further showed that those chemical changes 
were related to the amount of current that had flown.... 
In other words, that the electricity was measurable. Electric 
current was measurable 
	
 What does this seem to indicate 
about the atoms? 
P1 	 They go from one place to another. 
5 	 Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: Average C.S.E. Group  
P1 	 Why does it need so much heat to melt a substance like a 
piece of metal? 
T 	 Heating causes the 'springs' between atoms to be over-stretched 
to an extent that causes the regular structure to collapse. At 
the point at which the collapse takes place the solid melts. 
To stretch the 'springs' in this way requires a supply of 
energy - What provides the energy, Sharon? 
P2 	 The heat source, sir? 
T 	 Right. So it is not surprising that melting requires a good 
supply of heat. O.K., Harrison? 
P1 	 Yes, sir. 
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6. 	 Age: 	 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T 	 When a bar magnet is dipped in iron filings why do most of the 
filings cling near the ends? 
P1 It must be more powerful there. 
T 	 What must be? 
P1 The magnetism. 
T 	 Why do you think that is? Anyone? 	  Well, these areas 
are known as the poles, one South seeking and one North seeking. 
They are of equal strength, are concentrated near the ends of 
the magnet and have the power to attract iron and steel. 
7 	 Age: 	 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
T 	 Jeremy, bring your South pole towards my South pole (of bar 
magnets). 
P1 It won't pick it up. 
T 	 Almost there. We say it won't attract. In fact, if you look, 
it is doing more than that. It appears to be 	  
P Pushing the other one away. 
T 	 Good. Now, why do you think that is? 	  Well, look at this 
(turns one bar magnet round so that N & S poles are facing). 
P2 It picks that up. 
T 	 Right. Why does it do that, do you think? 	  Well, it's 
because the poles are what we call unlike. In other words, a 
North and South pole attract one another. Two south poles 
repel each other. Both poles can pick up pieces of iron and 
steel that are not magnetised. 
P What about two North poles? 
T 	 The same as two South poles - so what will happen? 
P(several) They will repel each other. 
T 	 Good. 
8. 	 Age: 	 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: Average C.S.E. Group  
T 	 Some boys and girls wear glasses because they can't see properly 
without them. Does anyone know why they cannot see properly? 
P It's not clear what they see. 
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T 	 True, but why is it not clear? 	 Most of you can see clearly. 
	
 Well, the lens in the eye cannot focus correctly on the 
retina. This part here (indicates model) because the distance 
between the lens and the retina is too great or too small. 
All right? 
	
9. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: Average C.S.E. Group  
P1 Why are some lenses in glasses thicker than others? 
T 	 Anyone answer that for Paul? 
P2 More powerful? 
T 	 More power if they are thick or thin? 	 No one know? 
When the lens is thick it bends the rays more, see 	  (puts 
different thicknesses in ray box) 	  they converge more 
quickly.... Look there 	  Everyone see that? Thicker lenses 
bend the rays more, so we say what, Pat? 
P2 More powerful. 
T 	 O.K. 
	
10. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability Group 
('0' Level & C.S.E.)  
T 	 Most of you appeared to know that metals are good conductors 
of heat but very few explained why this is so 	  So let's get 
it right. Metals possess a regular crystalline structure 	  
O.K.? 	  They also contain large numbers of free or very 
loosely held electrons 	  Still with me? 	 Rothwell?... 
If they are loosely held what can they do easily? 
P1 Move about. 
T 	 Good. They can move easily through the regular structure.... 
It's a bit like musical chairs. For when an electron is moved 
from the end of something like a metal rod a positive charge is 
left there which attracts an electron leaving a positive charge 
further along and so on 	  This is an over simplification, but 
it should give you the idea 	  
	
11. Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: Below Average C.S.E. Group  
P 	 Why is there a third wire in the plug? 
T 	 The third wire is a safety precaution. Can anyone suggest why 
it's necessary? 
	
No-one? 
P 	 Does it stop us getting a shock? 
T 	 Yes, that's its job. It's there in case a fault like a short 
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circuit occurs in the appliance. The third connection goes to 
a ring of wire that is connected to.... to the earth 
	
 see 
the dotted line on the diagram of the connection. 
	  
Look at it everyone. 
12. Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group 
T 	 Some of you are making mistakes in the calculation 
	
 You must 
be sure that.... that you take the correct distance moved 
	
 If 
a man lifts a barrel of weight 200 N from the ground to a truck 
in high, the work is 200X1 = 200 joules 
	
 But if he rolls it 
up a 3m long plank.... what distance do you take? 
P1 200 x 3. 
T 	 No.... Now, that's the mistake many of you are making. 
	  
Although the barrel moves through 3m, the man does not exert a 
force as great as 200 N.... which is why he uses the plank, 
isn't it, Jones? 
P1 	 Yes, sir. 
T 	 He's using the plank to save himself effort 
	
 right? 
P(several) Yes.... 
T 	 How can you calculate the force he does apply? Remember you 
must do this for all cases like this (draws example on board). 
In (a) force 200 N and distance in, work done is 200 joules... 
because force is, Maynard? 
P2 Applied upwards. 
T 	 Right... now in (b) what must you calculate before you finish 
off in the same way, Barbara? 
P3 The - the force. 
T 	 Yes, the value of F. 
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Subject: CHEMISTRY  
1. 	 Age: 13-14 years 
	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability (C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T 	 Look at your write-up of last lesson's experiment. Your con- 
clusions were in a few cases rather wide of the mark and in most 
rather limited and thin 	
 In other words, you only noticed 
some of the things that er - your results were giving you 
information about. 
Now then 	
 many of you realised that the change that had come 
about for some of the nails was due to the process of rusting. 
But 	
 not all the nails had rusted so it should have been 
possible for you to realise why we can say that rust is a 
compound of iron, oxygen, water and carbon dioxide. You should 
also have been able to say why the nails have not rusted in 
certain of the test tubes. Let's have a look at the results 
again and see what they are telling us. 
1. Iron does not rust in dry air because if the tube has 
been properly prepared there is no water and water is 
necessary in the process of rusting. 
2. Iron will not rust under water if all the oxygen gas 
is dissolved because oxygen is necessary in the process 
of rusting. 
3. Why did the nail in the salt water rust more quickly than 
the others? 	 Because salt speeds up the process.... 
Is it essential for the process, Marie? 
P1 No.... because the nail rusts in tap water which is not salty 
	  and in rain water. 
T 	 Good 	  It only speeds up the reaction. 
2. 	 Age: 13-14 years  Ability Range: Mixed Ability (C.S.E. & 
'0' Level 
   
T 	 What kind of a reaction is rusting, David? 
P2 Chemical. 
T 	 Yes, a chemical action; that is why interfering with the reaction 
prevents rusting. How can the action be interfered with, 
Yvonne? Come on, the evidence is before your eyes.... Look at it. 
P3 Grease. 
T 	 Yes, grease or paint helps to prevent rusting by interfering 
with the chemical reaction. 
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3. Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: Average C.S.E. Group  
P1 Sir. How does the balance work? 
T Look at the scales 	  Now some have got the beam on the top 
and some of them have got the beam on the bottom. We're con- 
cerned with the little divisions 	  It starts at nought, one, 
two, and so on 	  You can all see that these divisions are 
divided into ten small sections. Each is 1/10th of a gram. 
Now if 1.6 is wanted, how many little divisions must the rider 
be moved? 
P2 Six. 
T Right. 	  Six little divisions along the bar with the rider. 
	
 The thing that goes along the bar is called the rider and 
if the rider is a large square one it's the shaved off edge from 
which you take your reading 	  the left hand edge. The other 
riders have a little pointer which points to the figure. 
	
4. Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: Below Average C.S.E. Group  
T Start by dissolving your calcium nitrate in 25 cc's of distilled 
water. Why distilled water? 	  Why not tap water? 
Well, it's got some other materials in it whereas distilled water 
has not, so if we want a pure solution, that is, one without any 
other substance in it, we must use distilled water. What sort 
of things could be in tap water'? 	 Anyone? 
P1 Chalk, 
T Possibly. 
P2 Chlorine. 
T Yes, things that have been put in the water to make it drinkable 
but which will contaminate our pure solution. 
	
5. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability (C.S.E. & 
'0' Level) 
T Suppose matter is made of particles, then what's a solid look 
like? If matter's made of particules, what's a solid'? 
Should we say, ehm 	  a block of ice. Now, in a block of ice, 
the particles can't move around. It's rather like you sitting 
in the classroom here. You're stuck there. You can't move 
around.... well, I hope not but, in a lesson, you're sitting 
there all in regular order and that's just what happens to 
particles in a block of ice. They're stuck there. They can't 
move around. However, when the ice turns to water,the particles 
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can move around and, in fact, they do. They're just gently 
moving around banging into one another, so that's a liquid. 
Imagine a picture of a liquid. It's you moving around doing 
a practical, if you like. Not banging into one another too 
often, I hope, but doing a practical just gently moving around 
the room. Now what about a gas? Eh.... it's difficult to 
imagine a picture of a gas. Ehm, suppose the school catches fire. 
You probably all dash out into the middle of the school field and 
there you'd be scattered over the school field. Now, that's the 
picture of a gas. In a gas the particles are no longer close 
together. They've spread out over a wide area. They'll still 
bang into one another. They're much further apart 
	
 so in a 
solid, the particles close together, not moving; a liquid, 
they're still close together but they're moving around banging 
into one and other. In a gas they're much further apart but they're 
still banging into one and other, all right. Now what happens when 
water.... well, let's consider this block of ice again. Take a 
block of ice. There the particles are.... all lined up.... just 
like you in (assembly in the hall?), if you like. Standing still, 
there they are all stuck there... Now, when ice melts, it's rather 
like 	
 breaking it. You're moving around gently in the hall, no 
running. You can go from group to group and talk to one another. 
That's a liquid. Now, as you heat a liquid up 
	  these particles 
start moving around, faster and faster. It's rather like.... a 
wet break and there's nobody in control in the hall. Somebody's 
gone out. To start off with you're all nice and orderly but 
gradually it gets rowdier and rowdier and you move around faster 
and faster. That's just what happens when water gets heated up. 
The particles move around faster and faster banging into one another 
more and more.... until 	
 in the end 	  Well, if you were in 
the hall one or two people would probably get banged so hard they'd 
disappear out the doors 	  In a beaker of water.... that's 
boiling, the particles move around so fast.... in the end, the 
particle near the surface is hit by another particle and is 
knocked right out of the water and that's just what happens when 
water boils 
	
 Can you picture that happening? 	 It's 
quite a simple picture really...... you can probably picture more . 
easily somebody flying out of the doors in the hall.... ehm 	  
so you can see that.... it's quite easy when you start thinking 
about matter being particular to explain how things happen.... 
water boiling.... ehm, it 	 it can also be shown, it's been 
shown, I'm going to try and get a film to show you later on this 
year to show that particles are moving around.... What do you 
think would happen if, eh 
	
 I mean you can't see a lot of water 
particles moving around, can you? No.... so you wouldn't, looking 
at that you wouldn't be able to say that the water particles 
were moving around but, if you were to put some very, very small 
particles in that water. (Blackboard) 	  
and take a drop of that water with the very small particles 
in and put it under a microscope, hold the microscope and look at 
the little particles..., well, what do you think you'd see? 
You took these very tiny particles which you dissolved or placed 
in the water. They're suspended in the water... rather like, ehm... 
I can't think what I mean.... let's say soot particles but not 
really. Those tiny particles that you put in the water, now you're 
looking at the water with a microscope... magnifying up. Do 
you think you would see anything happening? 	 If so, what 
do you think you would see? 	 Nobody 	  nobody courageous 
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enough to say what they think they would see? All right, let's 
consider it (?). In the water, made of particles, the particles 
are moving around banging into one another. If you put very 
small particles of something else into there.... which you could 
see with a microscope.... what do you think you'd see on the 
microscope when, say, a water particle banged into one of these 
particles'? 	 Yes? 
P 	 You mean it would shatter. 
T 	 No, it wouldn't shatter, no. It, it, it's on the right lines. 
It wouldn't shatter, no.... I mean do you think if you looked 
with a microscope 	  you'd just see lots of still particles? 
Or do you think you would see them moving? 
Ps 	 Moving (very tentatively). 
T 	 Come on, somebody. Do you think you'd see them moving or would 
they be still? 
Ps 	 Moving. 
T 	 Hands up: How many people think they'd be moving? Well, all right... 
most people think they'd be moving. Yes, they would be moving.... 
and they'd be moving around.... in a certain 	  as each particle 	  
if you could look at this one particle....as it got bumped it 
would move and (slow up?) rather like you bumping into somebody 
in the hall.... and then it would be bumped by another particle 
and it would move about like that, then another one. There would 
be a sort of random motion, like that... and, in fact, if you 
do do this experiment, if I get this film, you'll see it happening 
under a microscope. You'll see that these particles do move around 
in a very 	  They're sort of shaking like this as they move. 
So there's pretty good evidence then that matter is made of 
particles. 
6. 	 Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
P1 	 Why are sugars called carbohydrates? 
T 	 It's a term that applies to all sugars and other compounds like 
starch that can be readily converted into sugars by hydrolysis.... 
The name comes from the fact that they contain only carbon, 
together with hydrogen and oxygen in the correct proportion to 
form water. However, they are in no way comparable to those 
compounds that we call hydrates, so don't let that part of the 
term confuse you 	  Can you think of any other chemicals where... 
er.... where something like this term is used 	  
Yes, David? 
P2 	 The hyd in hydroxide 	  
T 	 Good. 
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7. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T Before the development of sulphide dyes, why was it necessary with 
most dye stuffs to use a different process when dying cotton than 
with silk or wool? 
P1 Because they take up the dye easier. 
T Nearly 	
 anything else anyone can add? 	
 Well, wool 
and silk are protein fibres and are not only more readily dyed 
when just heated with a solution of the dye stuffs.... they are 
dyed permanently. 	
 Cotton and linen, which are cellulose 
fibres will not retain the dye permanently even after boiling 
in a solution of the dye stuff. 
	
8. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
P2 What keeps the dye in then? 
T The cotton is first impregnated with a solution of a metallic 
salt which is hydrolysed by the action of steam. Why do you 
think this is done? 	 Clare? 
P3 I'm not sure. 
T After being hydrolised the material is impregnated with the 
hydroxide of the metal. It is then dyed and the dye attaches 
itself to the metallic compound in an insoluble form and is 
retained in the cotton. 
	
9. Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T 	 Powdered antimony bursts into flame when dropped into chlorine 
	  forming what? 	  Anyone? 
P1 A chloride? 
T Good. Yes, a chloride 	  Anyone know why we don't refer to 
this burning as true combustion? 	  Well - true burning 
is generally defined as direct combination with oxygen.... 
The reaction we have is chemically a form of oxidation because 
the term oxidation is used when referring to any reactions in 
which electrons are lost whether oxygen is involved or not.... 
Antimony loses electrons in its reaction with chlorine so 
although not true combustion it is 	  ? 
P2 Oxidation. 
T Right 
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10. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T Everybody settled/ 	 We are starting new work today which will 
last through to half term.... the topic is Nitrogen 
	  Let's 
have a quick look at it. Anyone know anything about it 
	
 What 
is it? 
P1 It's a gas in the air. 
T 	 Good.... it's one of the gases in the air.... Anyone know 
anything else about it 
	
 What makes it rather an odd element? 
P1 It doesn't seem to er.... do much. It's passive. 
T Now, that's part of what makes it odd.... As Andrew says, it's 
passive.... or inert as it's often defined.... but this is only 
true when it is uncombined. If I said nitroglycerine, what would 
come to mind/ 
P (several) Explosives 
	  
T Right... That's what makes nitrogen odd. Its compounds are often 
powerful explosives, which when you think how unreactive it is as 
an element.... well, it's unexpected, isn't it? 
11. Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
P1 Miss King, is it bicarbonate that causes hardness in the water? 
T Yes.... Do you remember why and what kind of hardness? 
P1 Er 	  is it permanent? 
T No. It's temporary hardness which is lost when water is boiled 
	  
The reason it is lost is that any bicarbonate.... er.... decomposes 
to give insoluble carbonates when it is boiled....Does that happen 
with permanent hardness? 
P1 No, Miss King.... it gets worse if you boil it. 
T Right. 
12. Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
P1 What's happening to the gas? 
T Did you watch the demonstration with bromine? 
P1 Yes, sir. 
T Well, in exactly the same way you can explain what happens with the 
carbon dioxide. This goes into the upper gas jar for the same 
reason. 
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Although it's heavier than air.... sounds very unlikely, doesn't 
it, so why does it go ups 	 Well, it's because of the way the 
particles are moving around, banging into one and another, colliding, 
they slowly get pushed up there.... What did you notice with the 
bromine? 
Did anyone take a note of what happened'? 	 Well, to start off 
with, I had a fairly uniform brown colour in the lower gas jar, 
immediately I was taking the cover slide away 
	
 but slowly 
this brown colour went into the upper gas jet. Now, it didn't go 
straight up and give you a uniform brown throughout the whole of 
the two gas jars. It moved very slowly up.... the reason it was 
moving slowly up was because it was taking time for these 
particles to bang into one another and move up here 	  Is that 
clear? 
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Subject: BIOLOGY  
	
1. 	 Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T Today we are going to take a closer look at eggs. Does anyone 
know what the shell of an egg consists of? 
P (Several) No. 
T Well, it's mostly chalk or calcium carbonate with a little 
calcium phosphate. Looking at the opened egg can you see what 
is next to the shell? 
P1 A sort of skin 	  
T The shell membrane.... good. Well, this divides the broad end of 
the egg into two layers to form an air chamber which allows the 
embryo to breath air in a fertilised egg.... You realise that 
there is no other way the egg can get air? 	 What stops air 
getting in? 
P2 The shell 	  
	
2. 	 Age: 13-14 years 
	
Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T The yolk is roughly spherical and is surrounded by a thin elastic 
membrane. Underneath the yolk membrane is the living embryo. 
Attached to the yolk are two fibrous hoists. Does anyone know 
what they are for? 	 No? 	 Well, they are balancers. 
They keep the yolk in position with the embryo uppermost. Why 
is this important? 
P2 The bird inside could be hurt when an egg is moved. 
T Right. The egg.gets moved around in the nest and this device 
makes sure that the embryo stays in place. 
	
3. 	 Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
T Right! (noise) Listen, Mary! Your blood goes to all your 
organs, brain, liver, kidneys. 
Ps Miss, Why does your blood go through your kidneys? 
T Sh! Listen! Your blood goes through your kidneys and your 
kidneys take out the salt and a thing, a bit, a thing called 
urea, which is, which is waste bits in the blood, waste products, 
all the waste, the things that your body doesn't want, and lots 
and lots of water. It's mainly water and it takes that out, 
an', in fact, it takes out over a hundred litres (pause) a 
day. (children gasp). But, of course, you only get rid of 
one litre. 
P 	 I'm 'ungry now. (Laughter). 
T Do you? All right, sh: Otherwise you'd just get bigger 'n 
bigger 'n full of water, wouldn't you, if you didn' get rid of 
it? 
4. 	 Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T Can anyone tell me why many living things need air? 
P1 To live. 
T Yes, but why do you need it to live? 
P2 To breathe. 
T Good. But why do living things have to breathe? 	 No one? 
Well, living things need oxygen from the air. Breathing it 
in is only part of the process. It has to be taken to each cell 
in the body so that by a special process called respiration it 
can get the energy it needs to function. Have you learnt about 
chemical actions in chemistry some of you? 
P (several) 	 Yes 	  Yes, Miss Powell. 
T Well, respiration is a chemical action and oxygen is an essential 
part of the reaction which finished up releasing energy. 
	
5. 	 Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
P1 There are sharp things on it. Why does it have those? 
T 	 Yes, that's right.... spines. These are for removing pollen from 
nine rows of combs on the inside of the .... er 
	  hind leg. 
These combs clean the middle leg 	
 The pollen falls into a 
hollow and... ehm.... by flexing the leg it is compressed and 
passed into the pollen basket. Can you see them? 
	 It's 
rather like combing your hair, isn't it? 
P1 Oh... yes. 
	
6. 	 Age: 13-14 years 
	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T Yes - Anne? 
P2 Miss.... Don't the bees have trouble feeding themselves and all 
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larv.... em.... eggs. 
T They don't feel them 	 The drones are turned out to die 
over the winter.... (noise of pupil comment). Don't be silly... 
	  only the workers, queen and young larvae... er... 
go through the winter. Ehm.... Nurse workers feed the larvae 
on regurgitated honey and pollen.... (noise from class)... and 
honey.... I mean pollen.... one kind for the (future) workers 
and males, and 'royal jelly' for the future queens. Ehm.... 
the food is changed according to the age of the larvae.... 
Now, er, are there any other questions before Mr Herbert comes? 
How do you think we know how they go through the winter? 
P Do they watch real bees through glass? 
T 	 Yes, ehm. They probably do... er....working on a comb.... between 
glass.... er. Mr Herbert is bringing a hive.... to show you how it 
works. 
7. 	 Age: 13-14 years  Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
   
T Right... from your stomach, goes out of your stomach, where does 
it go to then? What's the next part from your stomach? (Laughter 
and calling out). Quiet, listen.... where does it go to next in 
the body? (P goes right down there'.) Goes to this part here. 
But what's.... what's there, that's all coiled up? 
Ps (Various attempts at answers). The catty 	 bellybutton. 
Cattyfactor. (laughter). 
T The capillaries? Yes, there are capillaries there.... No? 	 You 
go on to your intestines, surely you know what your intestines 
are. You know that they're there, don't you? 
P I don't. 
T Did you know they measure up to about twenty-five feet long, your 
intestines? 
P No, miss. 
T Well then.... in fact.... all this puts something through your 
mouth right to your anus (laughter). That's thirty feet long, 
that whole tube! 
P Miss! Miss, how do you know that it's thirty feet long when some 
of us are small and some of us are big? 
T It's still thirty feet long. 
P It comes out.... 
T It's much smaller when you're a baby 'n it grows as you grow 
older. It's still approximately thirty feet long... Why do you 
need it? 
Ps (Start to discuss).— down to the bottom, don't it? 
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(The tape-recorder is switched off for a moment). 
T Sh... Right. So, when food goes into your intestines, it's really 
in... it's in pulp, 'n it's.... it's just like water then. An'.... 
all round your intestines are all these blood capillaries that 
you mentioned, Sharon. 
P Does your mouth get... (end of sentence lost in noise). 
T Well, through the skin of the intestines goes all the food, all 
the important, you know, all the.... all your vitamins, and all 
your proteins.... and... erm.... the salts, the minerals, you've 
heard of carbohydrates, the fats. 
	
8. 	 Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T Well, you all seem to know that living things are made of cells. 
Can anyone say why we have cells - what sort of things cells can 
do 	  What is their function? 
P1 You can't see them, so you don't know what they do. 
T Ah, but by looking at cells through the microscope you can find 
out all sorts of things about them. You cannot see them or move 
them yourself but each cell does certain things for itself. They 
can reproduce themselves, take in food nutrient, go through 
chemical processes, get rid of their own waste. Now, why should 
they be able to do all those things? 
P2 They must help to keep us alive. 
T Right. Each cell has a special job to do in your body. Some 
form linings, produce antibodies or become muscles. So, you see, 
they are busy all the time. 
	
9. 	 Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T Before we go on to look at leaf structure and transpiration, can 
we check the way in which the guard cells work. First of all, 
why does the plant need them? 	 What are they controlling? 
P1 The opening. 
T Yes - the stoma. Right, they control the stoma which controls 
water loss. Now, what actually makes them work? 
P2 They swell. 
T Why do they swell? 	 Does anyone know why they swell? 
What about the chloroplasts in the guard cells? 
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P3 Contain chlorophyll. 
T Go on.... deathly silence' 	 Exposure to light stimulates 
the chloroplasts in the guard cells to make sugars by 
photosynthesis, right? The increased sugar concentration in 
these cells causes water to enter from the cells around by 
	
9 
P4 Osmosis. 
T Good. Now the increase in the water content makes the guard cells 
swell and as the inner walls round the stoma are thicker than the 
outer walls, as the cell bulges they have to curve 
	  (Draws on 
blackboard) 	
 This enlarges the stoma. What would you expect 
to happen at night? 
P They won't make sugar because it's dark and they can't 
photosynthesise. 
T Right, so what will you expect the guard cells to be like? 
P They won't bulge so the opening will be narrow. 
T Good. Guard cells flaccid, stoma narrow.... So why does the 
plant need stoma? 
P To control the loss of water from the cell. 
10. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T You can see that blood performs some very important services 
for the body so let's have a look at its make-up. What is the 
liquid part called? 
P1 Plasma. 
T Right. Plasma. This contains valuable proteins and is 
colourless. 
P2 If it's colourless, why does blood look red? 
T The red colour comes from the red blood cells which contain 
haemoglobin. These cells are produced in the marrow of the 
bones in the body. There are so many of them suspended in 
the plasma that it makes it look red. Do you understand, Anne? 
P2 They must be very small because they don't look as though they 
are lots of little separate things. 
T They are, but you will be able to see them later in the lesson 
when we look at a slide of a blood smear under the microscope. 
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11. Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T (Completing diagram of a transect on board). 
There we are; that's the lot, now let's see if we can interpret 
the symbols and decide what it is telling us. Kevin. If you 
had not been to the place yourself, could you get some idea of 
it from the diagram? 
P1 Well, you could, er.... well, you would know the land was rising 
because scale shows it at the side. 
T 	 Right. Anything else? .... Deidre? 
P2 It's not all the same. 
T Good. Can you say any more? 	 Look at the diagram. 
P2 Well, there's some places with a lot of plants and other bits 
with hardly any. 
T Ah now, can we suggest any reasons why this is the case 	  
Come on, anyone suggest why this is so9 	 No?... 
Well, one of the things that is influencing the variety and 
density of the plant is the height. Look how many different 
plants grow down here (indicates). These bits here are almost 
bare.... What were they like, Sally? 
P3 Rock. 
T Right. Now plans need soil and in these parts where the rock 
is poking through only tough low growing, root spreading -
gripping kinds can manage to survive. What's it like on top of 
hills, Garry? 
P4 Windy.... and colder. 
T Good. Both conditions that only hardy plants can survive. So 
now you see why, as Deidre said, 'it's not all the same.' 
	
12. Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T Right. Can I have your attention now, please? (Pause) That 
diagram that you're 	 looking at. You can see several things 
about it. Don't worry too much about the complicated words. 
The timescale down the side is important but the main things 
are these animal groups (pause) that you've drawn. And, as 
I explained last time 	 the amphibia, the birds.... sorry, 
the amphibia, the reptiles and the fishes have all expanded 
terrifically in the number of species that they've had, and 
then they've retracted again. Some will have found to be less 
successful than others and so some of the species will have died 
out. Now, where did we say the birds and the mammals stood 
regarding that? What's the difference in the shape of the birds' 
and the mammals'... em graph, if you like to call it that, 
as opposed to the other three that I've already spoken about? 
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P1 (Colin?): They're still growing. 
T They're still growing, or at least they haven't contracted 
again so you s- what does that mean in terms of number of 
species? 
P1 More.... er 	  more to come, sir. 
T There may be more to come, you've certainly got lots of them 
and they're still experimenting. Good. Now, going back down 
into history, as it were, going say when the fishes were quite 
young, three hundred and twenty-five million years ago, there 
were certain types of fishes in existence then. Two hundred and 
eight million years ago, coming up a little bit more recently, 
there were about the same number, but they may not necessarily 
have been all the same types. How.... is it possible that we can 
draw a chart like that? 
P2 The fossils. 
T The fossils in the earth, right. How do we know how long ago 
they lived, these fossils? 
P1 By carbon dating. 
T 	 By... good. Yes, by carbon... yes carbon dating it's called. 
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Subject: 	 ENGLISH  
1. Age: 11-12 years 
	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
P1 That - what makes a cluster into a message? 
T We have already seen that Headings are often word-clusters which 
when added to can produce messages. The addition may be a word 
or a group of words but it does not merge with the Heading to 
form a cluster.... By and large most messages comprise at least 
two items to which we give the grammatical names of 
	
9  
	  subject and 
	
9 
P2 Predicate. 
T 	 Yes.... so-called because, together, they make a prediction.... 
Messages unlike other sequences of words always - what, Janet? 
P1 .... They - always predicate 
	  
2. Age: 13-l1 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group 
P1 Why is the passive form used at all? 
T What normally tells us who has done an action in the sentence 
	  
P The subject. 
T Good.... the subject 
	
 However, we don't always know who has 
done the action and sometimes the most important thing in the... 
	  er 	
 message is not the subject but the action itself.... 
Now, the passive form lets you say both these things in a sentence 
	
 The terrorist murdered his victim.... can be said in the 
passive.... if we don't know who the murderer is.... as the victim 
was murdered. (Underlines on board) 
They made the exam results known on Tuesday 
	  Vera? 
P2 The exam results were... um.... made known.... on Tuesday. 
T Fine.... Does everyone follow what I have been saying? 
Good. 
3. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
T 	 I want to start off by discussing... the er.... the miracle 
play and to show in what ways it is a special kind.... of 
festival play. Does anyone know what is special about a 
miracle play? 
P1 It's about something that.... that happens in the Bible. 
T It is, but then so were all the festival plays. No, what marked 
out the miracle plays from other religious festival plays was 
their.... er their association with an annual religious procession 
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held in the towns 	
 The feast of Corpus Christi was a very 
popular one.... The play was always organised by the townsfolk 
themselves so miracle plays were essentially community plays. 
Each guild was responsible for one scene, usually one that... 
was.... er... something to do with its craft. 
Anyone give me an example? 
P2 Taylors could make costumes 	  
T Right...and bakers and vintners might do the Last Supper scene... 
	
4. Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T Why do you think it was possible for Abigail and the other children 
to persuade members of the community that witchcraft was rife 
among them? 	 Were there any events that had prepared the ground? 
P1 Some of the people seemed to want to believe it. 
T How do you mean, Rosemary? 
P1 Well, Mary Putnam... who... who lost all her babies could blame 
it on... on... witchcraft. 
T Good...and she is not the only one who wanted to believe in some-
thing... some evil force. Reverend Hale sees himself as Miller 
tells us, as 'a young doctor on his first call' and in his zeal 
to identify and wipe out what he sees as an evil force he too is 
guilty of seeing only what he wants to see' 	  Any other 
reasons? 
	
5. Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T Starting off. Two points to make. Two terms I'm going to be 
using before you start. One of them is 'imagist' i-m-a-g-i-s-t 
(spelling) and when I talk on imagist technique... I'm talking 
about a technique of poetry 	  Anyone know anything about this 
technique? 	 anyone know what it is? 
Ps (several) No.... No, Miss Threadgold. 
T It's where you get a creation of a mental picture from the words, 
like a word picture. And this picture will be put alongside 
another, probably without comment, so you get juxtaposition of 
images without connecting comments so that the reader has to fill 
in the implications.... Understand? .... What's an image, Jenny? 
P1 A mental image. 
T O.K. 
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6. Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
P1 What does it mean when it says the 'curled up knees of Jesus 
choking in the air.' 
T Anyone any ideas? 
P2 Um... curled up could be just a description of a baby.... you 
know how a baby lies in his cot. 
T But 'choking' is a disturbing word. It suggests death and must, 
I think, be looking forward in time to the crucifixion eventually -
um - suffocates the victim. He has to push up with his legs to 
get enough air and as he grows weaker he cannot do this and 
suffocates. That's why the thieves on either side of Jeses asked 
the soldiers to do what.... Paul? 
P3 Break their legs. 
T 	 Good. You see, they would not be able to push up then and would 
suffocate more quickly.... putting an end to their suffering. 
7 	 Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T O.K.... settle down and have ready the questionnaires you used... 
Now, let's go through each question in turn, starting where we 
left off yesterday.... um.... it's number.... 5.... I think. 	 'Has 
television interfered with family life.... What came across from 
the interviews9 	 Janet. 
P1 The lady I was interviewing thought it had spoilt family life... 
T Did she give her reasons? 
P1 No... she just thought it had. 
T Any person disagree9 	 Not all at once.... Kevin? 
P2 Mine said she thought it brought them together 	  
T The family? 
P2 Yes, Miss. 
T Why do you think we are likely to get quite different views on 
this one? 
P3 There's no right answer. 
T Good. Yes.... this is a matter for opinion 	 but why such opposed 
opinions.... I wonder.... Anyone? 	  Well, I think it must be to 
do with the kind of life going on in the home. If before telly.... 
er the husband.... say.... went to the pub and the kids went out 
on the street, the wife could think it was better if after they 
had the telly, everyone stayed in and watched together. On the 
other hand, if they had been spending time following interests 
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or perhaps all joining in a special hobby.... what might happen 
after the telly arrived'? 	 Debbie? 
P4 They might drop their hobbies and just watch. 
T Right. 
8. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
P1 Sir, there's about twice as much 'violent' news in my paper than 
there is in Clem's and sometimes although.... er it's the same 
thing.... it's.... it doesn't seem to be the same 	  They don't 
always agree about the facts. 
T What did you expect, Jane? 
P1 	 I don't know....I suppose I didn't think they'd be much 
different. 
T There are several reasons why they are different 	  
P2 One could have made a mistake 	  
T 	 That's right.... or both could be wrong.... It doesn't do to 
believe all you read not only bceause reporters make mistakes 
but - um 	  each reporter has his own views and this may 
give him a bias 	  Another reason is that people have to be 
er.... tempted to buy newspapers so they try to make them.... 
the way they.... er 	  think their readers like them.... Jane's 
paper has a lot more detail about 'violent' happenings than 
Clem's. If this happens most days it is likely that the paper 
is aiming to attract people who want to read this kind of news... 
Yes, Don? 
P3 My dad says the Telegraph has the best sports cover and that's 
one of the reasons he takes it. 
T That's just the kind of reason that sells papers... though of 
course your dad may go for the political views.... most papers 
tend to be for one or other political party. 
P4 What about The Times, Miss? 
T Well, that does try to be neutral.... although this is a very 
difficult thing to be... I.... I think The Times does try to 
let you know when it is offering an opinion and... and when 
it's reporting fact. What else could a paper do to avoid... 
well, to avoid the things that Jane was mentioning.... How could 
they be more accurate? 
P3 They could check all the items. 
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T Good. Careful checking would help, but of course it takes time 
and costs the paper more to check. 
P2 They might be late getting the... um... the article in the paper. 
T Right.... papers do like to get things out fast, otherwise it 
isn't news any more. 
9. Age: 15-16 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T I want a word about your essays before we go on with our reading. 
On the whole they were quite a good set but no-one.... no-one took 
up the point that one of her readers made about 'Emma' being 
'too natural to be interesting' 	  You all concentrated on 
'Emma's' character and forgot the character of the author. 
Now what do you know about Jane Austen's views of contemporary 
writings that would help 	  Anyone? 	 Did she know 
anything about it 	  
P1 She read a lot herself. 
T 	 Right... so she was in a position to criticise... well? 
P2 She was critical of it... she didn't think much of a lot of it. 
T Yes... but why didn't she like it? 	 Surely you recall how 
she disliked pretension. This led her to have a distaste for the 
absurd artificiality of contemporary literature.... she was 
particularly galled by the unnatural and sterile conventions of 
the time.... which is why she would probably be pleased with a 
supposed criticism.... made er made on the grounds of her work 
being too natural.... Which of her early novels mocks 
novelistic habits? 
	 Pam? 
P3 Northanger Abbey. 
T 	 Good.... a light hearted romance... but she is not laughing in 
her criticism... she is using it to attack what she despises. 
10. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
P1 Why did he decide not to kill them after all? 
T Can anyone suggest a reason? 	 Yes 	  
P2 He may have liked them and... er felt sorry for them. 
T Well, stronger than that, I think.... If you remember he had 
killed a lot of others in cold blood and not only let them go 
free.... he 	  
P3 Killed himself with the poisonous ice.... 
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T Right. So he must have been feeling pretty bad, don't you 
think.... My view is that, like Sarah said, he found these 
people very different from the others who had come to the island 
but he might still have killed them if something hadn't happened 
to him, which the author just hints at 	  Anyone notice? 
Doesn't the author suggest that he has fallen in love with 
Miss Belcher? 	 Read that section again 	  (several minutes 
while reading goes on). 
T Now then.... anyone agree with me.... hands up... Oh, lots of 
you. I think it's possible that this, plus the fact that Miss 
Belcher won't return his affection is what makes him do what he 
does. Do you think that's possible? 
p4 I think it is because he could have seen how bad and lonely he 
really is 	  (murmurs of agreement from pupils). 
T Good... that's just what might have caused him to take the 
poison 	  
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Subject: 	 HISTORY  
	
1. 	 Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T When Britain was part of the Roman Empire, the Celts of the 
North-west did not learn Roman ways and so were never to be 
trusted to keep the peace. Also, across the frontier of 
Hadrian's Wall in the North lived the Picts, fierce barbarians 
who were always ready to attack, while across in Ireland lived 
the Scots who were eager to settle in Wales.... Yes - Windsor? 
P1 I thought the Scots came from Scotland. 
T You are not alone and not wrong as you will see when we trace 
the movements of each race. However, at this period they were 
living in Ireland and being kept at bay by the strength of the 
Roman-British fortifications. Does anyone know why in the end 
the barbarians were able to make successful attacks in many parts 
of Britain and to plunder the rich villas and farms? 
Well, the trouble was that barbarian tribes on the continent 
began to attack Gaul and even Italy - the home of 	 ? Betty? 
P2 The Romans. 
T Right.... When this happened Roman troops were called back from 
Britain to fight on the continent. This left the forts under-
manned and warrior bands were able to attack and overcome some 
of them. 
	
2. 	 Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
T In the time of the early farmers every family had to grow or hunt 
its food... what happened to change this? 	 Why did some of them 
stop doing this? 
P1 Er... people began to sell things. 
T Yes, they began to trade. But what discovery really set up 
trading as an occupation? 
It was the discovery of how to make bronze. Not only did this 
provide tools which could be traded for other goods but craftsmen 
began to shape ornaments, weapons.... plates.... out of bronze. 
The smith kept his methods secret 	  do you see why? 
P2 So the others in the tribe would look up to him. 
T 	 Good... He was a man of some importance. 
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3. Age: 11-12 years 
	
Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S .E. & '0' Level) 
T Is there anything you can see in the picture that's going on... 
what's happening? 	 Yes? 
P They're taking down the buildings. 
T They're taking down the ruins of the buildings. You can see these 
men here. They're moving a large stone. These men here have got 
a rope round it and they're pulling. This man here's got a, ehm, 
piece of wood to act as a lever and these men here are lifting 
some pieces of carefully made stone and they're carrying them away. 
So these are Anglo-Saxons inside the ruins of a Roman town. Now, 
can anybody tell me what on earth the Anglo-Saxons would be doing 
inside the ruins of a Roman town? Yes? 
P Taking the stones. 
T But why should they take the stones? 
Well you see, the Anglo Saxons weren't as we've said particularly 
civilised and so as somebody said they didn't know very much 
about architecture. They didn't know how to make buildings and 
so here when they came to a Roman town, here were stone buildings 
that still stood and here were some stones which still remained 
and so they took these, moved them away and they built their own 
places. In many cases, where the Anglo-Saxons first settled, there 
was just an ordinary Roman town that had been deserted 	  Rather 
like the one in this picture. 
L. Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T About half a million years ago a new arrival appeared on earth. 
He walked on his hind legs and was covered in hair. He is 
sometimes called an 'ape man'.... Yes, Sanderson? 
P1 Why didn't they call him an ape? Why a man? 
T That's a good question. Well, in addition to having arms and fingers 
with nails the most important difference is the size of his brain. 
This is larger than any other mammal and he used it to survive. 
He learnt to chip stones and with these to sharpen points on 
spears 	  He hunted animals using the spears and made a shelter 
for himself from branches, or, in winter, used a cave. In other 
words, his development was more like that of a man which is another 
reason why he is called 'ape man'. 	  O.K.? 
P Yes. 
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5. Age: 13-14 years 
	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level Group) 
T First of all, I want to talk about Cromwell's recall from Ireland 
- where you will remember he dealt with the conquered Irish 
people with great savagery 
	
 He took only six months to 
accomplish this being recalled in May 1650 to face a new danger 
	
 this time.... from Scotland. Now why do you think the 
Scots should pose a threat? 
	 What brought about this revolt? 
P1 They wanted revenge for the King's death 
	
 while Cromwell was 
out of the way. 
T It's a good idea, but what they really wanted was the establishment 
of Presbyterianism.... something they expected after the execution 
of the king. They forced the late king's son.... also called 
Charles.... to sign a covenant agreeing to accept this religion 
and offered him their support in winning back the throne. Did 
it work? 	 Janet? 
P2 No, Miss. He was defeated at Worcester and had to escape to France. 
T Right... leaving the burden of leadership to Cromwell. 
	
6. Age: 13-14 years 
	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T The homework wasn't particularly well done and some of you could 
not have read the chapter properly. What you seemed to forget 
is that, by and large, Elizabeth did not greatly care about people's 
religion. The important thing for her was their loyalty. If you 
remember she does not seem to want to execute her cousin. Do you 
remember? 	 Karen? 
P1 She wouldn't act when the first plots were discovered. 
T Right... Things were getting worse, the Pope was training young 
Englishmen as Jesuit priests in colleges abroad and sending them 
over to win converts to Catholicism and Catholics in England were 
having a hard time.... Why was this 	
 Was this because of their 
religion, Andrew? 
P2 Er... yes, I think so. 
T No. It was not, in fact! They were being accused of treachery.... 
It couldn't go on, and eventually letters between Mary and a 
conspirator named Babington (writes on board)... brought things to 
a head. The letters proved that a plot to invade England and 
remove Elizabeth was planned and Elizabeth decided she must 
remove Mary. 
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7 	 Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
T 	 Can anyone remember what factors encouraged the growth of a town? 
P1 A castle. 
T 	 Good. Any others? 	 It was often more than one thing and 
some were more important than others... Any more that you can 
think of? 	 Well, there were others like castles that brought 
people to the town.... not for protection this time, but as 
pilgrims.... Yes, Dennis? 
P2 A monastery. 
T 	 Yes. Monasteries and churches - but you still haven't given the 
chief factor 	  No? 	
 Why did some villages grow 
into thriving towns? 
Well 	  
It was the possession of a market. In some places they had been 
there for a long time but, in others, the lord obtained a charter 
from the king and established one.... Having one brought traders 
and encouraged craftsmen to settle.... The lord allowed them to 
pay rent instead of labouring in his service, which left them 
free to do what, Beverley? 
P3 	 To make things.... 
T 	 Good.... They could work at their craft and were also free to 
trade and all this encouraged more and more people to the place 
	
 turning a fair number of villages into towns by 1377.... 
Have a look at the map on page 23 of your books. 
8. Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T 
	
After the defeat of the central powers, why did the 'victors' 
find it very difficult to agree the new map of Europe? 
P1 Most countries tried to get as much as they could from the 
agreement. 
T 
	
What sort of actions and situations caused most trouble 	  
P2 Secret treaties? 
T 
	
Right.... Pledges had been made during the war in secret and the 
pressure was now on to honour them.... But these were not the only 
complications confronting the peace-makers. 	  The main 
problem was the amount of territory that had changed hands 
throughout the war... and it.... it was very difficult to dislodge 
claimants... Can you give me an example of a country that behaved 
in this way? 
P3 Australia tried to keep control of German New Guinea. 
T 	 That's right.... they tried to insist that 'what we have we hold.' 
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9. Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
P1 This question says - why was Henry II sometimes called the 
'lawyer king'? 
P2 I think he read a lot. 
P1 He must have brought in some law or something.... Do you know 
why, Tony? 
P3 No.... shall I ask Miss Bird? 
P1 She's coming round 	  (noise 	  
P2 Miss 
	
 we 	  we don't know the answer to number 4. Is it 
'cos he read a lot? 
T Well, he did read a great deal and was intelligent and educated 
but it was what he did to reform the law that.... that makes the 
words er.... right in his case. Haven't any of you read about his 
changes in the .... um... . the courts? That did he do about trials? 
P3 Didn't the barons used to.... to 	  they ran the courts -- and 
they weren't always fair. 
T He certainly mastered the barons.... in .... law but he did 
more than that he really set up a proper legal system. When 
he came to the throne.... there were at least five.... five 
different systems of jurisdiction but by sending out his... 
his representatives he brought criminal offences of all kinds 
under the crown.... By choosing carefully.... and trying them 
out.... he formed a group of men trained to administer justice in 
the courts.... we call them.... Tony? 
P3 Judges. 
T 	 Good. Now, that's only a start.... Read pages 193-199 in this 
book and you will see how much he did to set up the rule of 
law in this country. 
10. Age: 14-15 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
T Yes, Linda? 
P1 Why did they call the new colony Virginia 	  when the queen 
was called Elizabeth? 
T Well 	  some places did have the name Elizabeth in them... But in 
this case you see they were remembering that the queen was... was 
not married.... not being married she would be a virgin.... she 
was often called the virgin queen. Do you see, now, where the name 
came from? 
P1 Oh yes 	  Does Virginia mean virgin? 
T 	 I'm sure it must, though.... I haven't looked it up in a dictionary 
of Christian names. 
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Subject: GEOGRAPHY  
1. Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: Below Average C.S.E. Group  
T What do you think will be the advantages for the Lake District 
of being marked out as a National Park? 	 Jenny? 
P1 They'll keep it looking nice. 
T Yes, indeed, but it goes much further than that 	  
anything else? 	 well, in keeping its natural beauty they 
must, as Jenny says, look after it properly 	  but, in fact, they 
have to take measures to improve its beauty 	  they can remove 
dead trees, unsightly buildings, and so on. They must also 
improve its recreational facilities 	  What might they do.... on 
	  on this side, Norman? 
P2 Provide camp sites, places where you can buy food.... or stay. 
T Good.... anything else? 	  Anne? 
P3 Places to sail or swim. 
T Right... not to mention proper areas to park cars. 
	
2. 	 Age: 13-14 years 
	
Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
P1 Sir. Why are there farms under water at Haweswater? 
T Well, the Corporation of Manchester in the process of converting 
the natural lake into an artificial reservoir made some very 
drastic changes which involved submerging everything below a 
certain level in the valley. The new village.... much higher 
up, is which one.... Geoff? 
P2 Burnbanks. 
T Right. This was created by - by Manchester Corporation to replace 
the old farmhouses that had been 'drowned' 	  What other 
examples have you heard of? 
P2 	  inaudible. 
T Good 	  
	
3. 	 Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T Now, the homework you did last night was about steel making and 
I set you that homework because I said we were going to start 
on a part of the British Isles where the making of steel was 
one of the most important of its industries. Purvis, right, 
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just attend to me. And what part of the British Isles did I say? 
P1 Wales. 
T 	 What part of Wales, Cook, please? 
P1 South West. 
T 	 Eh - South. South Wales - and you were drawing a map of Wales 
for me. Now - South Wales is one of our greatest 
	  
Hall.... steel producing regions and as the film went on I 
think I stopped it and I told you that was one of the products 
of South Wales 	
 Scorer.... Now the next person I have to 
speak to, not attending, I'm a very good shot with chalk. 
Right, what did I show you on the film that I said this is what 
they do make in South Wales from the steel? Do you remember? 
It was something which was coming off at terrific speed off that 
rolling 	 flaking off like a snake. 
P2 Eh, wire. 
T 	 Not wire. 
P3 Tape. 
T 	 Not tape. 
P3 	 Er.... plate. 
T 	 Er... plate, yeah, steel strip or steel plate, correct, mm. 
Now what we've got to do is, we know the answer now, you see. 
I've rather put the cart before the horse this time. I've told 
you what South Wales produces, so instead of what we'd normally 
do, starting from South Wales and finding out what it's got and 
then what it uses these things for we can do it the other way 
round. We know what it produces... well, let's find out the 
working. Well, South Wales is an iron producing region, an 
iron and steel area, so there are certain things at once that 
we know that South Wales will have. It's got to have otherwise 
it couldn't be an iron and steel producing region. Right, what 
must it have? 	 What must there be in South Wales? Eh? 
Chewing gum? 	 Come on, what must there be for them to 
produce iron and steel? Why has it been able to develop a 
steel industry? What do you need to make iron and steel? 
P4 Limestone. 
T 	 Limestone.... yes 	  I wouldn't call that the most important 
one but there is limestone (interruption - teacher says 
"Thank you very much indeed") 	  yes, there is limestone but 
what's the most important thing(?) (pupil's name) 
P5 	 Iron ore. 
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T 	 Iron ore.... yes, iron ore and 
	  
P5 	 Coal.... coke. 
T 	 Coal and coke is made from 	 9  
Ps(Chorus) Coal. 
T 	 Coal. Right, so let's say coal ( 	 7) 
 and (cough interrupts) 
there's got to be air to produce the hot blast of, I think we 
can say 
	  
P6 Gas. 
T 	 Well, the gas comes from the coke but I was thinking about the 
air. I don't think we need worry too much about that, need we, 
Brown, because there's air 
	  
P6 All over. 
T 	 All over, yeah, there's air everywhere. That's a one that 
everybody can have. All right now, let's just go and look at 
this list and let's find out whether South Wales does, in fact, 
have this, these things. Well now, you drew a map of Wales for 
me, didn't you? 
	 and what did you put down in the south of 
Wales by shading? 
P7 Coal area. 
P8 Coalfield. 
T 	 Robson -- a coalfield, yeah. There is a very large coalfield in 
South Wales and it's called, strangely enough, you'd never guess 
what it's called - it's called the South Wales coalfield. The 
South Wales coalfield. It's a very big coalfield and we shall 
find out that it has just the right kind of coal which is needed 
because not all the coal is suitable for making coke. Right, 
there's the South Wales coalfield. Now, in the northern part of 
that coalfield there used to be discovered iron ore and this was 
mined along with the coal. Sometimes the two were mined together. 
Well, that was very useful, wasn't it? They could mine the 
coal and they were mining the iron ore as well (interruption 
by Mrs R) so in South Wales then we have the South Wales coalfield 
and we have the iron ore. Now this limestone 
	  well, coal 
is a mineral, you know, and it's only found with certain other 
kinds of rocks. I don't know if you know this but if you 
go into our Pennines or Cheviots here or if you walk along our 
coastline you can see these coal seams coming up, can't you? 
Right, and one of the rocks that the coal is found with is lime-
stone. It's usually found below the coal. Now, if we look in our 
books, the British Isles books, this one, have a look on page... 
68. You should have your books out, shouldn't you, Cook - eh? 
I know you were helping Mrs Richards. Page 68 	  hurry up! 
Oh dear.... all right, now it says a section across the South 
Wales coalfield from North to South. Well, this is as though 
you made a cut clean through the rocks, a section. Those of 
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you who do metal work or woodwork.... you may be used to using 
sections. And it's as though they had set off one of these 
atomic bombs and made a great big earthquake and caused the 
wo... earth to split open so that you could look down and see 
what sort of rocks you've got. Well now, if you look at South 
Wales here, what have you got? Well, we've got upper coal, it 
says, then we've got sandstone, then we've got lower coal. So 
we've got two lots of coal.... that's very useful, isn't it? 
Upper coal and lower coal. Then we've got what it calls, well 
	
 underneath, it says, old red sandstone but if you look 
you can see in the dotted area millstone grit and carboniferous 
limestone. Right.... carboniferous limestone. Can you see it 
printed down there on the left? So there we've got the coal 
and not very far below it we've got the limestone. And you 
notice that the limestone comes to the surface, doesn't it? 
If you follow that bed, the limestone is the faint red, right, 
	
 the pink. It comes along and it comes to the gr...surface 
in the South and up in the North by what are called the Brecon 
Beacons, right. So South Wales then has iron ore, coal, lime-
stone. So it has the three most important things you need for 
making iron. 
4. Age: 11-12 years 
	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T 	 Look at the map in front of you 
	
 Now... what do you notice 
about the distribution of crops and farm animals in England and 
Wales and Scotland? 
P1 	 It seems to be... er.... some things are grouped together. 
T 	 Like what? 
P1 Like wheat and barley.... 
T 	 Yes... any reason for that? 
P2 Rotation of crops. 
T 	 Well.... yes.... that would happen but as a result of what... 
you have to look at the distribution over the whole country to 
get the answer 
	
 can no one see a pattern? 
	
 Well, you are dozy today....Let's take sheep. The 
position of a lot of the sheep are on places like 
	
 The 
Pennines. The Welsh mountains, the Chilterns.... all 	  
P3 Hills or mountains. 
T 	 Right. Now we cannot jump to the conclusion that sheep like  
hills because we know they are also happy eating grass on 
lowland, so we can only assume that they are there because.... 
why, Michael? 
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P4 Nothing else will live there. 
T 	 Right. Cattle are not able to get enough grass on places like 
the Pennines and the soil is not rich enough to grow crops. 
5. Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
P1 Why are the lines different distances apart? 
T 	 They are called contour lines. If you look you will see they 
have heights marked.... Now if you imagine a hill - if there 
is a big space between that line and the next height it means 
the slope of the hill is rising slowly. If they are very close 
together it means... it's very steep. What are those there 
showing? (indicates on atlas). 
P1 A fairly steep slope. 
T 	 Good. You've got it 
	  
6. 	 Age: i4-16 years 	 Ability Range: E.S.N. Group  
T 	 A lot of you have seen this book (P. I ain't).— er... it's got 
a lot of babies in it from all over the world. You'll see that 
some of them look very different from you. Look at this Eskimo 
lady and her baby.... what do you think about her? 	 Put your 
hand up 	  Julie? 
P She's darker. 
T 	 She's darker skinned, yes (several voices) sh.... I must say put 
your hands up otherwise two people talk at once and we don't 
get the benefit of what you're saying. Yes, Cheryl? 
P Her baby looks like his... like what his Mum is... or her Mum. 
T 	 Doesn't he? He looks very like his Mum. 	 What about the clothes 
they're wearing? Cheryl? 
P from sheep an' things like that. 
T 	 What's the word for it? 
P Wool. 
T 	 Yes. er... 
P Or.. er 
T Fur 
P Or fur. 
T 	 Yes, and why do you think they're wearing fur things? 
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P To keep 'em nice and warm. 
T 	 Yes.... so what do you think the weather must be like there? 
P Freezing cold. 
T 	 Freezing cold weather, so they wear.... 
P Not like this. 
T 	 Not like this, that's right. Eskimos, they look very cosy in 
their nice warm clothes. 
P Miss Knowles, can we have a look at that, please? 
T 	 Sh.... Yes, certainly. What about this little boy? 
P Indian. 
T 	 What do you think? 	 Yes, but hands up. Andrew, what do you 
think? 
P Indian. 
T 	 Why do you say Indian? 
	 He's not, doesn't look anything like 
an Indian 	
 You said it 'cos Kevin said it, didn't you? 
Now tell me something that you think about it. 
7. 	 Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T 	 Milford Haven used to be a small town in which sailing and some 
fishing went on.... Now, the tankers from all over the world 
bring oil to the refineries there. Why do you think they chose 
it? 	 Schofield? 
P1 It would give the people work. 
T 	 Well, that is true, but I don't think it is the most important one... 
P2 	 It's a port. 
T 	 Right, but there are lots of ports they could have chosen 
	  
What's its position for getting the oil from the refinery to 
the petrol pumps? 
	 Dyson? 
P3 Bad, sir - there are no main roads until you get near Port Talbot. 
T 	 Good... so why choose it? 
	 Well, the reason is that it has 
one of the largest... and more important, deepest natural harbours 
in Europe, which means the tankers can ccme right up to the 
refineries instead of what 	
 Sarah? 
P4 Having to have long pipes to pipe it ashore. 
T 	 Good. 
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8. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group 
T 	 Right.... This morning we are going to look at our traffic 
survey and try to see if we can use the information to answer 
certain questions.... Have you all got your sheets ready? 
	 (noise) 	  
Right... First let's see if we can identify the really congested 
spots 	  the places where traffic gets held up for a long time 
or is always very slow... Gary? 
P1 	 Near the bridge 	  
P2 (calling out) Both sides of the bridge. 
T 	 Yes.... both sides.... any others? 
P3 	 First part of the High Street. 
T 	 O.K. .... anywhere else? 
P4 	 Past the hospital going up Castle Street. 
T 	 Are you sure... I have never been held up there, myself... 
How long were you observing this point and did the traffic 
really have to stop for long? 
P4 	 It was stuck for ages... 'Bennie' was with me. 
P5 	 It was, sir... 
T 	 O.K. I believe you. Now what time was this?... 
P5 	 Between 4.00 p.m. and 4.45 p.m. 
T 	 Which day? 
P5 	 Thursday. 
T 	 That is odd because Thursday is early closing and usually quiet. 
.... What could have caused its 	 Wait a minute. I think I 
know why - It was probably a race meeting and that would explain 
it. Check that out, Graham 	  
p4 	 I think there was one... though we couldn't see the entrance, 
it's round the corner from where we were watching. 
	
9. Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
T 	 I noticed when marking your work that you were not clear about 
the reasons for making the Local Authorities in African countries 
collect the local tax which goes to the County Council. What 
happens to the major tax?... Yes? 
P1 Goes to Central Government. 
T 	 Right. So why is there any advantage in having a local tax for 
the County Council to use? 
P2 The Central Government might not know what - what the people want. 
T 	 Well, they will have some idea of the problems, but the people 
on the County Councils come from every part of their country 
and can let them know of local difficulties and possible 
improvements much better and quicker.... What's more the Councils 
have money from the local tax to try to do the things that... 
that need to be done. 
10. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T 	 Now in the film you saw something of the different methods of 
fishing and you know... well, what did you learn about the 
importance the industry is to a number of countries like... 
Yes? 
P1 In Iceland it's - it's most important. 
T 	 Right... and this country, of course. Can you think why the 
Governments of many countries involved in fishing exert certain 
controls? 	 Anyone? 	 Yes? 
P2 You mean like saying where their fishing limits are? 
T 	 Well, that's the kind of thing - It stops other countries from 
fishing in what is considered to be a country's waters without 
permission 	  I was thinking of a restriction on nets which 
makes sure that little fish can get through and only fish of a 
certain size get caught 	  Can you see why this is done?... Joan? 
P3 So little ones can get bigger. 
T 	 Yes.... and have a chance to multiply. 
385 
386 
Subject: FOREIGN LANGUAGES  
1. Age: 
	 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T 	 Can you give us a plural form, Pam? 
P1 	 Habitamus 	
 They live. 
T 	 No, that becomes habitant.... If you take any of those verbs, 
habitat, ridet, ambulat, whatever they may be, and put an 'n' 
in, it makes them into they do something instead of he or she, 
but there's one of them where it doesn't work. 
P2 	 Est. 
T 	 Est 	  because est becomes? 
P2 	 Sunt. 
T 	 Sunt.... nothing like it. Est becomes sunt. Now, I wonder if 
you can tell me, eh, how you describe a word in a language which 
doesn't obey the rules.... it particularly applies to verbs. 
You call it a certain kind of verb and this is a good example 
of one. 
P3 	 Irregular. 
T 	 Right. This is an irregular verb and if you have a word which is 
irregular.... disobeys the rules and so eh.... you don't try to 
make any others fit in, in a word like that. Est is different 
from the rest. For all the others, if they end in a 't' in the 
singular, for he or she does something, you simply put in an 'n' 
and that makes it they do something 	  
2. Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T 	 O.K. and the last one.... aller 	
 Je vais.... How does 
it go? 
Ps 	 Je vais, to vas, il.... it va, nous allons, vous allez, ils vont, 
elles vont. 
T 	 Now what you have to remember is that.... er.... these four verbs, 
in fact the only four in Fr.... in the French language which in 
their final form, in the ils plural form, or elles, if you like, 
have o.n.t. S.o.n.t., f.o.n.t. and v.o.n.t. (blackboard). 
Look, each one. Ont, sont, vont, font. In addition, a lot of you 
are confusing this verb, especially in this form. Eh, sorry, I 
(confused) myself then, vous avez and this one, vous allez and, 
of course, the nous forms, allons and, eh, avons. Now, be careful 
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and keep those separate in your minds, would you 	  
Now then, I shall leave the rest of that to you as far as the 
present tense goes, ehm, except to bring again to your attention 
the need for knowing thoroughly avoir for the perfect, the 
passe compose, O.K. 
3. Age: 11-12 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T 	 Several of you made the same mistake in your translation of No. 3 
yesterday. Look at it now.... How do we say.... I like 
flowers. Those who got it wrong put... J'aime fleurs. Now in 
French the definite article 'the' is used whether or not there 
is a 'the' in the English, if the meaning is general. So what 
should No. 3 be, Dan? 
P1 	 J'aime les fleurs. 
T 	 Good. Now all of you do Nos. 10 and 15 for practice. 
4. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
Why is there a de before pain? 
There is a special rule about the use of de - Listen everyone 
so that you know on what occasions to use de or d'.... on what 
two occasions instead of the usual du or de la. These are, 
first after a negation to mean any 	  He is not taking bread 
ne prend de pain. He hasn't any money - Terry? 
n'a pas d'argent. 
Now, the other occasion is after an expression of 
- How many boys. Combien de garcon - a lot of 
Beaucoup de garions. 	 O.K. .... Brenda, does 
it clear? 
P1 	 Yes. 
5. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T 	 I want to start off this morning by explaining the agreement of 
past participles. What tense uses past participles, Dawn? 
P1 	 Compound past. 
T 	 Right.... Now there are two rules for the agreement of the 
past participle. One concerns those verbs that follow 'etre and 
the other avoir. Let's make those following etre first 	  
Can someone give -me a verb that takes 'etre, and I'll show you 
how it works 	  
P1 
T 
P2 
T Good. - 
quantity. 
boys. 	  
that make 
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P2 	 Aller. 
T 	 Right, aller - Now the rule is that the past participle agrees 
with the subject in gender and number. So - Il est all (writes 
on board) but Elle est allee. Can someone write up "The men 
have arrived".... John? 
P3 	 (writes on board) 
T 	 Good. Les messieurs sont arrives. What would we add if it were 
the women who had arrived. Neil - 
P4 	 Another e (writes arrivges). 
T 	 Good. 
6. Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: 	 Mixed Ability 
(C.S.E. & '0' Level)  
T 	 Let's see how to make agreements when using avoir.... 
Now the past participle after avoir and the past participle of 
a reflexive verb agrees in gender and in number with the preceding 
direct object. This is the one that often gives the problems. 
Hands up those who are not too sure about what a preceding 
direct object is9  
Hm.... most of you. 	  The direct object can often be located 
by asking yourself either what or whom. For example, sent what? 
or sent whom? If the answer precedes the past participle then 
the past participle agrees with the answer. For example 
	  
J'ai mange la pomme 	  Ate what, Philip? 
P1 	 The apple. 
T 	 Does it precede the past participle? 
P1 	 No. 
T 	 So - no agreement necessary. But if I write I ate it.... 
Je l'ai mang4e 	  Ate what, Annette? 
P2 	 'It'. 
T 	 Where does 'it' come? 
P2 	 Before the past participle. 
T 	 Good. So there is an agreement necessary.... Make the agreement 
for these examples when necessary (writes on board) 	  
7. Age: 	 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T 	 What is Karola asking for.... Fur heute abend. 
P1 	 Something for the evening. 
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T 	 She is asking for a room for this evening, meaning for tonight 
(fur haute nacht). Note two things, she will be asked to do... 
sign the register - tragen sie sick bitte ein - and what sort 
of room she would like if it's available.... 
What sort of room were you thinking of - was fur ein zimmer 
sole das sein? Right - now you know how to ask for a room. 
	
8. Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
T 	 What would you expect the people in this part of the Loire 
to drink? 	 Yes? 
P1 Wine. 
T 	 Well, yes it would be wine but wine is not all the same, is it? 
Can you say what kind of wine by looking at the chart? 
Anyone? 	 Well, vineyards in that area are in the 
Muscadet region. So the wine will be dry and white 	  
Has anyone tried Muscadet? .... No .... well, you will take my 
word for it, I hope, and perhaps we will have some next lesson. 
Ps 	 (excited agreement). 
	
9. Age: 13-14 years 	 Ability Range: C.S.E. Group  
T 	 Que fait Denise avec la boule de neige? 
P1 	 Elle souffle. 
T 	 Qui--mais que fait Denise avec la boule de neige apres elle 
souffle? 
	  No one... I think you must have failed to understand 
that part of the story. 	  Look at the sentence c'est 
n'est plus une boule de neige 	  C'est une belle pomme rouge.... 
Comprenez? 
P2 	 An apple. 
T 	 Right. It's no longer a snowball, she has turned it into an 
apple. 
	
10. Age: 15-16 years 	 Ability Range: '0' Level Group  
T 	 I noticed going over your work that you had very little trouble 
using the l'interrogatif-affirmatif 'simple' method but that you 
were less clear about other methods using est - ce-que and 
n'est-ce-pas. Can anyone explain how we deal with pronoun 
subjects and noun subjects? 	  No one? 
	
Debbie? 
390 
P1 	 No, sir... 
T 	 Well, it's as well I brought it up.... A rule that helps is 
est-ce-que goes before je with a pronoun subject.... Est ce-
que je donne? All other pronoun subjects are placed after the 
verb or auxiliary 	  Did you give? 	 Powell? 
P2 	 Donnez-vous.... 
T 	 Now for noun subjects you repeat the subject in the form of a 
pronoun after the verb or auxiliary. Is the boy singing.... 
Mark... What do we say? 
P3 	 Don't know, sir. 
T 	 Oh come on. Turn it round to - The boy is he singing. 
Ps 	 Le garion.... is is chanter to sing - 
T 	 Yes... carry on. 
P3 	 Le gargon chante-t-il. 
T 	 Good... Let's try a past... Yvonne... Did my sisters come? 
P4 	 Vene... 
T 	 Hold on.. turn it round in English first.... 
P4 	 Oh - er - Mes soeurs... er ven.... (teacher interrupts) 
T 	 Passe compose, Yvonne... No... can anyone help her? 
What should it be - Pete? 
P5 	 Sont - elles venues? 
T 	 Good. So the whole thing is, Yvonne? 
P4 	 Mes soeurs 	 er 	 sont-elles venues? 
T 	 Right.... I think we had better try some more with everyone 
working on their own. 
A2.2 Nature and Distribution of Question Types Within Explanations 
Subject: MATHEMATICS (Primary)  
	
Explanation 	 What-Questions 	 Why-Questions 
	
No. 	 Sci. Inf. How 	 Ded Pro Gen Te/f 
1 4 2 
2 1 1 
3 1 2 
Subject: HUMANITIES (Primary)  
Explanation 
No. 
What-Questions 
Sci. Inf. 	 How 
Why-Questions 
Ded 	 Pro 	 Gen 	 Te/f 
1 1 1 
2 1 
3 1 1 
4 
Subject: NATURE STUDY (Primary)  
Explanation 
No. 
What-Questions 
Sci. Inf. 	 How 
Why-Questions 
Ded 	 Pro 	 Gen Te/f 
1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 
3 1 1 1 
4 1 1 1 
Subject: 	 ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES (Primary)  
Explanation 	 What-Questions 	 Why-Questions 
No. 	 Sci. Inf. How 	 Ded Pro Gen Te/f 
1 	 1 
2 	 1 	 1 
3 	 1 	 1 
4 	 1 	 1 
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Subject: 
	
R'T, IGIOUS EDUCATION ( Primary )  
Explanation 	 What-Questions 	 Why-Questions 
No. 	 Sci. Inf. How 	 Ded Pro Gen Te/f 
2 
	
2 	 1 
3 	 2 
Subject: 
Explanation 
No. 
MATHEMATICS (Secondary) 
Why-Questions 
Ded 	 Pro 	 Gen 	 Te/f 
What-Questions 
Sci. Inf. 
	 How 
1 1 1 2 
2 1 1 
3 2 1 1 
4 2 1 
5 1 2 
6 1 1 
7 2 
8 1 
9 1 1 
10 1 1 1 
11 1 
12 1 2 
Subject: 	 PHYSICS (Secondary)  
Explanation. 	 What-Questions 
	 Why-Questions 
No. 	 Sci. Inf. How 
	 Ded Pro Gen Te/f 
1 
2 
1 
3 
3 1 1 
4 2 1 
5 1 
6 1 1 
7 1 1 
8 
9 
10 1 1 
11 1 
12 1 1 1 
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Subject: 	 CHEMISTRY (Secondary)  
Explanation 
No. 
What-Questions 
Sci. Inf. 	 How 
Why-Questions 
Ded 	 Pro 	 Gen 	 Te/f 
1 3 
2 1 1 1 
3 1 
It 1 1 
5 3 2 1 1 
7 1 
8 1 
9 2 1 
10 3 
11 1 1 
12 2 1 
Subject: 
Explanation 
No. 
BIOLOGY (Secondary) 
How 
Why-Questions 
Ded 	 Pro 	 Gen Te/f 
What-Questions 
Sci. 	 Inf. 
1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 
3 1 
It 1 1 
5 1 
6 2 
7 1 1 1 
8 1 2 
9 1 1 1 2 
10 1 1 
11 2 1 
12 1 1 
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Subject: 	 ENGLISH (Secondary)  
Explanation 	 What-Questions 	 Why-Questions 
No. 	 Sci. Inf. How 	 Ded Pro Gen Te/f 
	
1 	 1 	 1 
	
2 	 1 
	
3 	 1 	 1 
	
4 	 1 
	
5 	 1 
	
6 	 2 	 1 
	
7 	 1 	 1 
	
8 	 2 	 1 	 1 
	
9 	 1 	 1 1 1 
	
10 	 1 
Subject: 	 HISTORY (Secondary)  
Explanation 	 What-Questions 	 Why-Questions 
No. 	 Sci. Inf. How 	 Ded Pro Gen. Te/f 
1 1 
2 1 1 2 
3 2 1 
4 1 
5 1 1 
6 1 1 
7 1 1 1 
8 1 1 
9 2 1 
10 1 1 
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Subject: 
Explanation 
No. 
GEOGRAPHY 	 (Secondary) 
Why-Questions 
Ded 	 Pro 	 Gen 	 Te/f 
What-Questions 
Sci. Inf. 	 How 
1 1 	 1 
2 1 1 
3 5 	 2 1 
4 1 2 1 
5 1 1 
6 2 1 
7 1 1 
8 1 1 
9 1 1 
10 1 1 
Subject: FOREIGN LANGUAGES (Secondary) 
Explanation What-Questions Why-Questions 
No. Sci. Inf. 	 How Ded 	 Pro 	 Gen 	 Te/f 
1 1 2 
2 1 1 
3 1 1 
4 1 
5 2 1 
6 2 1 
7 1 1 
8 2 
9 1 
10 2 1 
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A2.3 
	
Nature and Distribution of Concept Types 
A2.3.1 Primary Explanations: 
Subject 	 No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
MATHEMATICS 1 side 
	 group 	 triangle 
number 	 regular 	 square 
name 
	 four-sided 	 rectangle 
look 	 shapes 	 hexagon 
figures 	 parallelogram 
trapezium 
2 line 	 base 	 vertex 
top 	 triangle 
3 	 cost 	 divide 
multiply 
times 
HUMANITIES 1 year 
	 Queen 	 Parliament 
country 
	 power 
	 party (political) 
battle 	 nominal 
	 Conservative 
cathedral 	 rule 	 Liberal 
leader 	 govern 	 Labour 
vote 	 General Election 
represent 
major 
run (rule) 
law 
elect 
decision 
2 	 debt 	 king 	 Charles 1st 
quarrel 	 advice 	 Parliament 
obedient 	 rule 	 Government 
argument 	 unfair 	 Roman Catholic 
war 	 vote 	 Protestant 
criticise 	 Civil War 
demands 
countrymen 
believe 
3 favourite fails 
harvest 	 (harvest) 
soil 	 lack 
4 	 courage 	 Red Indian 
train 	 N. America 
reliable 	 tribe 
period 
braves 
prove 
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Subject No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
NATURE STUDY 1 glued hatch pupa 
eggshell 
nibble 
hungry 
built 
body 
caterpillar 
butterfly 
egg 
skin 
change 
cocoon 
2 crafty 
slimy 
trick 
pretend 
match 
surroundings 
master of 
disguise 
caterpillar 
camouflage 
3 pounce 
fix 
animal 
different 
desert 
leopard 
big cat 
cheetah 
prey 
sense 
suited (adapted) 
African 
power 
4 striking 
ear 
fan 
country 
jungle 
shade 
creature 
elephant 
solve 
earflaps 
hearing 
coding device 
African 
Asiatic 
ENVIRONMENTAL 1 armour coat of arms 
STUDIES weapon 
protect 
arms 
knight 
2 factory 
building 
machine 
assembly line 
3 wool 
greasy 
sheep 
substance 
lanolin 
incidentally 
4 collect skein 
vat 
substance 
dye 
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Subject 	 No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
RELIGIOUS 	 1 	 comfort 	 raised 	 Good Friday 
EDUCATION 	 promise 	 disciple 	 Jesus 
alive 	 appeared 	 God 
2 peaceful earth 	 heaven 
body 
spirit 
3 	 member 	 early church 
charged 	 Roman 
executed 	 occupation 
suffer 	 faith 
admit 	 saint 
Christian 	 martyr 
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A2.3.2 Secondary Explanations: 
Subject 	 No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
2 	 side 
short 
3 	 join 
numbers 
length 
add 
equal 
length 
add 
ridiculous 
statement 
balance 
multiply 
add 
unknown 
double 
figure 
nought 
space 
compile 
divide 
basic 
technique 
sequence 
right-angle 
hypotenuse 
square 
diagonal 
square 
hypotenuse 
area 
centimetres 
substitute 
solution 
value 
Pascalls- 
triangle 
triangle 
hexagon 
calend 
fraction 
terminating 
fraction 
recurring 
fraction 
decimal 
MATHEMATICS 	 1 	 side 
4 	 number 
nothing 
row 
right 
left 
underneath 
5 
6 	 pounds 	 selling price fraction 
sold 	 cost price 	 percentage 
amount 	 cancel 
	
7 	 row 	 multiply 	 Napiers rods 
Index rod 
	
8 	 whole 	 even 	 fraction 
number 	 divide 
remainder 
odd 
minus 
	
9 	 built 	 numbering 
spare 	 fit 
guessing 
	
10 	 number 	 odd 
together 	 pair 
even 
combine 
Subject 	 No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-Spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
MATHEMATICS 11 line 
	 rectangle 
(continued) 	 middle 	 thirds 
across 	 sixths 
square 
twelfth 
12 whole 	 divide 
parts 	 quarter 	 traction 
four 	 equal 
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Subject 	 No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-Spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
PHYSICS 
	 1 	 air 	 oxygen 
mixture 
gas 
2 puddle 
hot 
windy 
dry up 
quickly 
3 	 car 
horn 
whistle 
4 	 discovered 
one place -
to another 
5 	 springs 
good 
6 dipped 
7 	 pick up 
8 	 glasses 
see 
clear 
9 	 glasses 
thicker 
bends  
water 
colourless 
invisible 
increase 
condition 
living things 
gas 
heat 
relatively 
apparent 
observer 
lower 
vehicle at rest 
recedes 
related 
measurable 
indicate 
passed through 
liquid 
Faraday 
flown 
heating 
collapse 
supply 
melting 
solid 
iron 
filings 
powerful 
magnet 
attract 
steel 
concentrated 
attract 
unlike 
like 
repel 
eye 
distance 
correctly 
powerful 
water vapour 
evaporate 
rate 
pitch 
sounding body 
velocity 
locomotive 
compression 
frequency 
rarefaction 
Doppler effect 
electric currents 
electrolytes 
chemical 
atoms 
liquid 
conductors 
atoms 
energy 
magnetism 
south seeking 
equal 
South Pole 
lens 
retina 
focus 
lenses 
rays 
converge 
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Subject 	 No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
11 
12 plank 
metals 
heat 
regular 
structure 
possess 
loosely held 
free 
over simplifi- 
cation 
metal rod 
plug 
safety 
precaution 
shock 
fault 
connection 
ring of wire 
calculation 
distance 
weight 
moves through 
effort 
conductors 
crystalline 
free electrons 
positive charge 
electron 
earth 
appliance 
work 
joule 
force 
value 
applied upwards 
apply (a force) 
PHYSICS 	 10 move 
(continued) 	 musical 
chairs 
CHE1ESTRY 1 	 nails 
2 paint 
grease 
3 	 scales 
4 tap 
drinkable 
test tube 
rusting 
process 
essential 
reaction 
interfered 
prevent 
rusting 
evidence 
bears 
division 
nought 
sections 
bar 
rider 
reading 
figure 
balance 
water 
chalk 
substance 
pure 
contaminate 
salt 
oxygen 
carbon-dioxide 
chemical 
dissolved 
gas 
chemical 
action 
dissolving 
calcium nitrate 
cubic centimetres 
distilled 
chlorine 
solution 
1+04 
Subject 	 No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
CHEMISTRY 
(continued) 
5 moving 	 solid 	 matter 
stuck 	 heat 	 surface 
banging 	 liquid 	 microscope 
faster 	 boiling 	 suspended 
shaking 	 evidence 	 magnifying 
apart 	 water 	 random motion 
shatter 	 particles 
6 apples 	 sugar 
	
carbohydrates 
term 	 starch 
proportion 	 compounds 
comparable 	 hydrolysis 
carbon 
hydrogen 
oxygen 
hydrates 
7 	 cotton 	 process 	 sulphide dyes 
silk 	 readily 	 dye stuffs 
wool 	 heated 	 protein fibres 
permanently 	 solution 
boiling 	 cellulose fibres 
8 keeps 	 dye 	 solution 
steam 	 metallic salt 
attaches 	 hydrolised 
retained 	 hydroxide 
impregnated 	 metallic compound 
action of 	 insoluble form 
9 	 bursts into 	 powdered antimony 
flame 	 chlorine 
chloride 
combustion 
oxygen 
chemical reaction 
oxidation 
electrons 
10 odd 
11 
air 	 nitrogen 
gas 	 element 
explosive 	 passive 
powerful 	 inert 
uncombined 
compounds 
unreactive 
hardness 	 bicarbonates 
water 	 decomposes 
permanent 	 soluble 
temporary 	 carbonates 
boiled 
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Subject No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
CHEMISTRY 12 upper 
(continued) 	 heavy 
collide 
brown 
bangs 
collide 
gas 
gas jar 
air 
particles 
cover slide 
bromine 
carbon-dioxide 
uniform 
(distribution) 
BIOLOGY 	 1 egg shell 
2 nest 
elastic 
egg 
skin 
chalk 
layers 
divides 
egg 
yolk 
balancers 
in position 
uppermost 
device 
calcium carbonate 
calcium phosphate 
shell membrane 
embryo 
air chamber 
fertilised 
embryo 
membrane 
fibrous hoists 
3 
	 brain 	 organs 
salt 	 urea 
liver 	 litres 
kidney 
blood 
waste products 
water 
4 
5 remove 
6 winter 
food 
7 mouth 
food 
living things 
air 
break 
releasing 
essential 
process 
spine 
comb 
flexing 
drone 
worker 
queen 
royal jelly 
live 
stomach 
intestine 
feet 
fats 
skin 
oxygen 
function 
respiration 
energy 
chemical action 
pollen 
pollen 
mineral salts 
capilliaries 
vitamins 
protein 
carbohydrates 
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Subject 	 No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
BIOLOGY 	 8 	 waste 	 living things cells 
(continued) 	 food 	 linings 	 function 
muscle 	 microscope 
reproduce 
nutrient 
chemical process 
anti-bodies 
	
9 	 leaf 	 structure 	 transpiration 
narrow 	 plant 	 guard cells 
curve 	 control 
	 chlroplasts 
swell 	 opening 	 photosynthesis 
inner 	 walls 	 stoma flaccid 
outer 	 sugar 
water loss 
	
10 	 body 	 blood 	 plasma 
performs 	 protein 
services 	 haemoglobin 
liquid 	 bone marrow 
colourless 
	 blood smear 
	
11 	 low 	 valuable 
	
density 
rising 	 symbol 
rock 	 diagram 
windy 	 plants 
cold 	 height 
hard 	 variety 
bare 	 survive 
	
12 	 million 	 fish 	 amphibia 
chart 	 bird 	 reptile 
attention 	 type 	 species 
expanded 	 mammals 
retracted 	 carbon-dating 
fossils 
ENGLISH 1 	 heading 	 cluster 
messages 	 subject 
word group 	 predication 
items 	 grammatical 
sequences 	 terms 
2 	 action 	 sentence 	 passive form 
3 	 play 	 miracle 
town 	 scene 
clothes 	 feast 
baker 
	 (of Corpus Christi) 
tailor 	 Last Supper 
vitner 
festival 
annual 
4 	 children 
	
community 
babies 
	 witchcraft 
evil 	 believe 
zeal 	 force 
identity 
4o7 
Subject No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
ENGLISH 5 picture technique imagist 
(continued) creation 
mental 
juxtaposition 
poetry 
6 knees 
curled 
choking 
baby 
cot 
death 
soldiers 
break 
push 
suffocate 
victim 
air 
Crucifixion 
suffering 
7 television 
family 
hobby 
disagree 
questionnaire 
interview 
interfered 
view 
opinion 
8 news 
paper 
facts 
cover 
buys 
sells 
sports 
mistake 
reporter 
violent 
attract 
neutral 
accurate 
check 
article 
political party 
9 writing author sterile 
read character convention 
mock natural novelistic 
despise 
absurd 
interesting 
view 
contemporary 
pretension 
artificiality 
habits 
10 kill 
like 
sorry for 
poison 
love 
island 
lonely 
affection 
cold blood 
author 
4o8 
Subject 	 No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
HISTORY 1 fight 	 Britain 
live 	 Celts 
home 	 Picts 
peace 	 frontier 
strength 	 Ireland 
period 
tribes 
warrior 
settle 
fortifications 
2 family trading 
plates 	 craftsmen 
grow 	 bronze 
hunt 	 tribe 
weapon 	 occupation 
goods 
ornaments 
secret 
method 
discover 
Roman Empire 
barbarian 
3 	 houses 	 deserted 	 Anglo Saxons 
picture 	 Romans 
rope 
town 
stone 
ruin 
building 
4 	 cave 	 hind legs 	 mammal 
animal 	 ape man 
hair 	 survival 
arms 
	
development 
fingers 
nails 
spear 
shelter 
million 
5 people Ireland 	 establishment 
danger 
	
revolt 	 convenant 
savagery 	 revenge 	 religion 
king 	 Presbyterian 
execution 
throne 
Worcester 
France 
burden or 
leadership 
6 people loyalty 	 Catholicism 
cousin 	 execute 	 religion 
discover 	 plot 	 Pope 
England 	 Jesuit 
treachery 	 conspirator 
convert 
1+09 
Subject No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
HISTORY 7 town factor pilgrim 
(continued) castle 
people 
church 
village 
market 
encourage 
monastery 
possession 
trader 
rent 
craftsmen 
growth 
8 map map central powers 
war 
secret 
country 
victor 
peace 
defeat 
territory 
claimant 
control 
agreement 
treaty 
9 educate king reform 
lawyer law 
judge 
representations 
trials 
courts 
baron 
jurisdiction 
legal system 
rule of law 
10 new 
name 
married 
virgin 
dictionary 
colony 
queen 
Virginia 
Christian 
GEOGRAPHY 1 park 
trees 
car 
swim 
sail 
National Park 
recreational 
facilities 
unsightly 
buildings 
advantageous 
Lake District 
2 farm 
houses 
lake 
village 
natural 
level 
Haweswater Corporation of 
Manchester 
artificial 
reservoir 
3 iron coalfield rolling mill 
river coke 
industry 
map 
products 
regions 
steel 
limestone 
seams 
earthquake 
iron ore 
blast furnace 
section 
4io 
Subject 	 No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
GEOGRAPHY 	 4 
(continued) 
farm 
animal 
wheat 
barley 
country 
sheep 
cattle 
grass 
hills 
distribution rotation of crops 
crop 
Pennines 
soil 
fertile (rich) 
Chilterns 
5 	 lines 
hill 
close 
steep 
6 baby 
lady 
dark 
skin 
clothes 
cold 
warm 
fur 
wool 
weather 
hair 
7 town 
sailing 
fishing 
walk 
petrol pump 
roads 
pipe 
8 traffic 
places 
hospital 
race meeting 
9 money 
heights 
space 
slope 
Eskimo 
Indian 
improvements 
African coun-
try 
contours 
Local Authorities 
County Council 
Central Government 
local tax 
Milford Haven 
oil refineries 
port 
main road 
natural harbour 
ashore 
tanker 
deepest 
traffic survey 
information 
identify 
congested 
observing 
10 	 fishing 
country 
bigger 
fish 
nets 
industry 
Iceland 
governments 
controls 
fishing limits 
restrict 
multiply 
4ii 
Subject 	 No. Spontaneous Intermediate Non-spontaneous 
or 
Scientific 
FOREIGN 
LANGUAGE 
1 word 
confuse 
example 
kind 
tell 
work 
fit 
obey 
disobey 
language 
rule 
plural 
singular 
irregular 
present tense 
perfect 
passe compose 
verb 
	
2 	 go careful 
confuse 
separate 
3 general 
4 after 
5 works 
6 make 
come 
7 room 
asking 
sign 
register 
8 drink 
wine 
vineyards 
white 
9 words 
make 
snowball 
apple 
sniff 
	
10 	 simple 
method  
final form 
French 
language 
translation 
meaning 
special rule 
occasion 
expression of 
quantity 
agreement 
takes (etne) 
number 
agreement 
example 
necessary 
Loire 
chart 
muscadel 
dry 
French 
rule 
noun form 
verb 
definite article 
negation 
subject 
past participle 
tense 
gender 
past participle 
reflexive verb 
gender 
preceding direct 
object 
l'interrogatif 
affirmatif 
noun subjects 
pronoun subjects 
auxiliary verb 
passe compose 
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A2.4 
A2.4.1 
Meanings Communicated Within Explanations 
Inst.Ass 
Inst-
Log 
Primary Explanations 
Sub.Ass 	 Sub-Log Subject Question 
Mathematics 1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 
3 1 1 1 
Humanities 1 1 1 1 
2 2 1 
3 1 1 
)4 1 1 
Nature Study 1 1 1 
2 1 1 
3 1 1 
)4 1 1 1 
Environmental 1 1 1 1 
Studies 2 1 1 
3 1 1 
4 1 1 1 
Religious 1 1 1 
Education 2 1 1 
3 1 1 
A2.4.2 Secondary Explanations 
Inst - 
Subject Question Sub.Ass Sub-Log Inst.Ass Log 
Mathematics 1 1 1 
2 1 1 
3 1 1 
)4 1 1 
5 1 1 
6 1 1 
7 1 1 1 
8 1 1 1 
9 1 1 
10 1 1 1 
11 1 1 1 
12 1 1 1 
)413 
Inst- 
Subject 	 Question Sub.Ass Sub-Log Inst.Ass Log  
Physics 	 1 	 1 	 1 
	
2 	 1 	 1 
	
3 	 1 	 1 
	
4 	 1 	 1 
	
5 	 1 	 1 
	
6 	 1 	 1 
	
7 	 1 	 1 	 1 
	
8 	 1 	 1 
	
9 	 1 	 1 	 1 
	
10 	 1 	 1 
	
11 	 1 	 1 
	
12 	 1 	 1 	 1 
Chemistry 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 
	
2 	 1 	 1 	 1 
	
3 	 1 
	
4 	 1 	 1 
	
5 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 
	
6 	 1 	 1 	 1 
	
7 	 1 	 1 
	
8 	 1 	 1 
	
9 	 1 	 1 
	
10 	 1 	 1 
	
11 	 1 	 1 
	
12 	 1 	 1 	 1 
Biology 	 1 	 1 	 1 
	
2 	 1 	 1 
	
3 	 1 	 1 	 1 
	
4 	 1 	 1 
	
5 	 1 	 1 
	
6 	 1 	 1 	 1 
	
7 	 1 	 1 	 1 
	
8 	 1 	 1 
	
9 	 1 	 1 
	
10 	 1 	 1 
	
11 	 1 	 1 	 1 
	
12 	 1 	 1 
414 
Subject Question Sub-Ass Sub-Log Inst-Ass Inst-Log 
English 1 1 1 
2 1 1 
3 1 1 
4 1 1 
5 1 1 1 
6 1 1 
7 1 1 1 
8 1 1 1 
9 1 1 1 
10 1 1 1 1 
History 1 1 1 
2 1 1 
3 1 1 
4 1 1 
5 1 1 
6 1 1 1 
7 1 1 1 
8 1 1 1 
9 1 1 1 
10 1 1 
Geography 1 1 1 
2 1 1 
3 1 1 
4 1 1 1 1 
5 1 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 1 
7 1 
8 1 1 1 1 
9 1 1 
10 1 1 
Foreign Languages 	 1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 
3 1 1 
4 1 1 
5 1 1 
6 1 1 1 1 
7 1 1 
8 1 1 1 
9 1 1 1 
10 1 1 1 
APPENDIX A3  
TEACHERS' EFFECTIVENESS IN EXPLAINING  
SOMETHING TO SOMEONE  
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A3.1 Predictions and Actual Proportions of Pupils in Each  
Category given as Percentages of the Whole Class  
(Hypothesis H6)  
Teacher 
No. 
Cat.l 
A 	 B 
Cat.2 
A 	 B 
Cat.3 
A 	 B 
Teacher 
No, 
Cat.l 
A 	 B 
Cat.2 
A 	 B 
Cat.3 
A 	 B 
1 70 72 20 26 5 2 19 45 41 50 54 5 5 
2 56 60 34 30 10 lo 20 30 60 65 35 5 5 
3 6o 58 25 30 15 12 21 50 42 45 50 5 8 
It 65 59 30 31 5 10 22 66 63 24 32 10 5 
5 72 6o 24 3o It lo 23 55 60 4o 4o 5 0 
6 66 32 30 53 It 15 24 60 5o 35 4o 5 10 
7 48 55 40 4o 12 5 25 80 69 20 21 0 10 
8 6o 52 4o 43 0 5 26 6o 5o 3o 4o lo lo 
9 66 69 36 26 It 5 27 7o 6o 25 3o 5 5 
10 55 60 40 33 5 7 28 48 55 50 33 2 12 
11 75 69 20 29 5 2 29 75 65 20 3o 5 5 
12 65 57 25 28 lo 15 3o 55 55 4o 35 5 lo 
13 70 52 30 4o 0 8 31 7o 58 25 32 5 10 
14 70 5o 20 42 10 8 32 68 70 3o 25 2 5 
15 65 45 20 39 5 16 33 70 56 25 29 5 15 
16 66 5o 30 4o It lo 34 45 48 5o 42 5 10 
17 7o 62 25 37 5 2 35 7o 71 20 17 10 2 
18 50 58 40 32 10 10 36 70 48 25 32 5 20 
Categories: 
Cat. 1 	 - Pupils understand all or most of the explanation 
Cat. 2 	 - Pupils understand some of the explanation 
Cat. 3 
	
- Pupils understand little or nothing of the explanation 
Column A - Predicted percentage 
Column B - Actual percentage 
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A3.2 	 EXPLANATIONS AND CHECKS USED IN ASSESSING PUPIL  
UNDERSTANDING (H7)  
A3.2.1 Mathematics Explanations  
Age: 	 12 years 
	 Ability Range: 	 C.S.E. Group  
T On Saturday I was in a bookshop in the town and I bought 
a book from a pile marked reduced for 25p 	  Now they 
must have been selling at a loss 
	  How can I say 
they must have been selling at a loss 	
 Yes? 
P1 It's much too cheap. 
T The price was down too far. Do you think anybody could 
produce a book, indeed a paperback book, but bigger than 
an exercise book, for 25 pence? No, the cost of the paper 
would be more than that. So they have sold at a loss. 
Now we have to work out whether they dropped the selling 
prices or the cost prices. So one thing we've got to 
know is the cost price itself, and then we've got to 
work out the percentage in profit or loss. Now, firstly, 
we have an item costing £1, which is going to be sold at 
25% profit. Now, there are two ways of working it out, 
but I want you to get used to the second way that I'm 
going to show you. 
There is our cost price. Our selling price is going to 
be that, plus, this is the 25%. I could work out 25%, 
and remember what 25% means; it means 25 over 100 of my 
£1. I'm not going to write my £1 as £1: I'm going to 
write is as a 100 pence, because obviously it's going to 
be difficult to work with 1.0. Two 100s cancel out and 
I'm left with 25p. What is my selling price going to be? 
P2 	 .... Is that a 5,'? 
T No... That's supposed to be a nought. Sorry, that's my 
bad figures. Right. 
P2 .... £1.25. 
T That's £1.25. Now you can work that out very easily because 
I've chosen very simple numbers. Now, let's see if there's 
another way. Our cost price was £1, which represents all 
the cost, and therefore must be 100%. If that's what it 
costs you it has to be a 100%. Our selling price is that 
100% plus our profit, which is - well, what did I just say 
the profit was going to be, as a percentage? 
P3 Er.... 25%. 
T 	 25%. So as a percentage, my selling price is 125%. So 
I've got to work out 125%; that's 125 over a hundred, if 
43_8 
we multiply a hundred pence. Again, the hundreds cancel 
out: 100 into 100 goes once, a 100 into a 100 goes once, 
and so we are left with 125 pence, which is £1.25. 
Now I say this is a better way to do it because I think 
it will make you understand a great deal better. Another 
thing is you will only need the one sum.... 
Now, an item costs £5. First of all, if it costs £5, 
what is it as a percentage? 100%. I sell it at a loss of 
15%. What is my selling price as a percent? Right? 
P4 85%. 
T Right. 85% As an amount of money my selling price will be 
85% of £5. When you think if you're going to need to 
spread it out so you got (rid) of that 5.... ( working on 
board). 
So my selling price is going to be 85% of the 500 pence. 
Two noughts will cancel, so we're left with the cost which 
is: 5 times 5, that's 25, 5 times 8 is 40. So 42 pence. 
So that becomes £4.25. Now think of your cost price always 
as a hundred percent. Now, the selling price is going to be 
that original, plus the profit, minus the loss. So you're 
going to think of your cost price first of all as an amount 
of money, and as a percentage; your selling price as a 
percentage, and then you will work out an amount of money. 
No, supposing I said to you, "I have just sold an article 
for £6." So the selling price is £6 or 600 pence. That 
represents a 25% profit. You've got to work out how much 
the thing costs. Now we don't know the cost price, but we do 
know what as a percentage? Right, yes? 
P5 It's 100%. 
T A hundred percent, good boy. We do know the selling price. 
P5 It's 125%. 
T 	 Good.... So the C.P. = 600 
	 100 	 O.K. 
125 x 1 
You know what to do next 
	  
P6 Cancel. 
T Right, work it out yourselves. 
CHECK II Mathematics Explanation  
A worksheet containing 5 questions involving finding cost price, 
selling price, profit and loss. 
CHECK III Mathematics Explanation  
1. What is another way of writing 8 out of 100? 
2. What is an improper fraction? 
	  
3. Which is usually larger, the cost price or the selling price? 
4. What do we call money a shopkeeper makes on the goods he sells 
in his shop? 	  
5 	 If a shopkeeper wants to make 20 per cent on each item that he 
paid £1 for to the manufacturer, what must he sell each one 
for? 
6. 	 In deciding what percentage to set the selling price, what is 
always considered to be 100%. 
	  
7. What do we call a fraction which consists of a whole number and 
a part of that number? 
8. Put down the sum as you would if you were finding 75% of £15. 
(Do not work it out). 
9. What do you know about the selling price of an article when a 
shopkeeper sells at a loss? 
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A3.2.2 Physics Explanation Age 13 years 	 '0' Level Group  
(Pupils have been working in groups of 5 and 6 on apparatus) 
T 	 Quiet please.... everyone... settle down on your stools.... 
you too, Parker... Now... is there any group that did not get 
a chance to try out all the different conditions on the 
apparatus? 	 Including checking if the frictional force 
remains constant? 	 The last question... Right.... good 
er...we'll work through the results together but before 
we do... what can you tell me about the nature of friction 
.... Jane? 
P1 It makes it more... difficult to move things.... I mean... it 
still does when things are moving. 
T Yes... that's why we view it as a force that has to be overcome 
	  What do you think causes it 	  Only Turner with 
any ideas? 	  O.K. Turner - 
P3 Is it because things are rough? 
T What do the rest of you think.... Claire? 
P3 Sir... the... the rollers weren't rough. 
T Apparently not rough is more like it, Claire... Turner is right 
when he says things are rough... Even the flattest and most 
highly polished surface is not really flat... An atomic scale 
would show that there are peaks and troughs differing in height 
by... er... around one hundred atoms or more... If we could see 
surfaces under a microscope, this is what they would look like 
(draws on board) 	  When one solid rests on another, the peaks 
flatten until the upper solid can be supported. At the places 
er.... of contact there are strong attractive forces between 
molecules... and before one surface can be moved these tiny.... 
er... er 'joints' have to be broken.... O.K 	 ? Once 
motion starts the flattened peaks appear to skim over one 
another... but this does not prevent there... being... no force 
to overcome... it's just that this force is not as much as the 
frictional force just before movement.... What did you find 
was the reading on the spring balance when you were doing 
operation 3? 	 Check if you can't remember.... yes, Andrews? 
P4 The reading isn't the same at the... er... beginning as it is 
when it is moving. 
T Is it greater at the beginning or later on? 
P4 More, sir. 
T Why will it be greater, Green? 
P5 Don't know, sir. 
T You will if you listen 	  it's greater because more force is 
needed at the beginning. 
CHECK II Physics Explanation  
Write a conclusion to the experiment that uses all the information in 
your results. 
CHECK III Physics Explanation  
1. In Physics, friction is considered to be a 
	  
2. What do polished surfaces look like under a microscope? 
3. When one solid rests on another what has to happen in order that 
the upper one can be supported? 
	  
What is there at the places of contact? 
What must happen before one surface can move over another? 
4. When you start something moving on the apparatus used in the 
experiment when is the reading on the spring balance greatest? 
What does this tell us about friction at that point? 
5. Does friction remain constant? 	  
6. Is it possible to get rid of friction completely? 
7. If the difference between the peaks and troughs of a surface 
are measured - what sort of scale is used? 
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A3.2.3 Chemistry Explanation 
	 Age 12 years 
	 '0' Level and C.S.E. Group  
T We are starting new work today on acids and alkalis 
	  
Er.... As you know we've been considering the properties 
of liquids.... and... er.... one of the things we know 
about liquids is that they're acid or alkali or neutral. 
.... It's important to know which category because.... 
anyone? 	
 Well, their.... many of their chemical 
properties and... er ... uses... depend on this.... Right... 
let's start with acids 
	
 Anyone know anything about an 
acid.... Yes, Thomas? 
P1 Turns litmus red, sir. 
T 	 Yes... that is a test for an acid... anyone else think 
they know something about an acid... King? 
P2 They burn and... er... wear things away. 
T Right, but isn't that also true of a strong alkali 
	  
like sodium hydroxide? 
P2 ... Er... yes. 
T Can anyone be more specific.... Atkins? 
P3 They wear away metals. 
T Good... they corrode metals and the fizzing that takes 
place when a metal dissolves in acid is caused by the 
evolution of a gas.... Anyone know which gas.... Annette? 
P4 Is it hydrogen? 
T 	 It is.... and this gives us our definition of an acid.... 
.... It is a ,ubstance which generates hydrogen ions (writes 
on board). H .... An alkali on the other hand generates 
hydroxyl ions (writes on board).... OH .... To understand 
just what these definitions mean is our work for the next 
weeks... Now, let's re-cap the information we have about 
acids.... Gillian, one thing you know about acids... 
P5 They dissolve metals, sir. 
T Right... they dissolve metals to form salts.... Another 
one.... Wilkinson. 
P6 They contain hydrogen 	  
T 	 Good.... they generate hydrogen. 
CHEMISTRY EXPLANATION CHECK II  
1. Using the apparatus provided describe how you could set up an 
experiment to produce hydrogen. 
2. Form the list of substances given overleaf, select the ones 
you could use for the experiment by ticking them. 
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Hydrochloric acid 	 Copper 
Sodium hydroxide 	 Marble Chips 
Calcium hydroxide 	 Zinc 
Sulphuric acid 	 Sodium chloride 
CHECK III Chemistry Explanation  
1. Some liquids are acids, as what other categories are the remaining 
liquids classified? 	  
2. Why is it important to know in which category a liquid belongs? 
3. State a test for an acid 
4. What substances do acids corrode? 
What is happening during the fizzing that takes place when the 
process of corrosion is going on? 	  
What is left when the fizzing stops? 
5. Complete the definition - An acid is a substance which generates 
6. What do liquids that are of the opposite sort to acids generate? 
7 	 If you dropped some acid on your skin, what would be the best 
thing to do to prevent a burn? 	  
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A3.2.4 Biology Explanation 	 Age 14 years 
	 C.S.E. Group  
T O.K. Stop looking at your tests and let's recap on what we've 
done so far. (The tests are referred to later in the explana- 
tion 	  
Last week we studied the work of the teeth and... if you remember 
er... we came to the conclusion that teeth start off what 
we call the process of digestion.... Why is that, Brenda? 
P1 They break down food into bits. 
T 	 Good.... it's easier for food to be digested later on if it is 
broken down.... Does anything else happen in the mouth? 
P2 Miss.. it's made soft by sp... er.. saliva. 
T Yes, Don, it is saliva that moistens it.... Why do you think it 
needs to be soft? 
P3 It would hurt yer throat. 
T Right... and I think you would find it very hard to swallow... 
Saliva is a useful product - it has another purpose in the 
mouth.... Does anyone know what? We mentioned it last week... 
Anne? 
P4 It changes starch.... into sugar. 
T Good.... Into a simple sugar called glucose actually 	  
Remember the experiment you set up.... half of you have starch 
solution in your parchment diffusion shell.... the rest have 
a solution of glucose.... Have you all tested the water in the 
beaker? 	 go quickly and do it.... (to those pupils involved 
in testing) Iodine if you've got starch, fehlings if its glucose. 
Right... now what question are we hoping to answer from your 
results.... Clive? 
P5 Why is starch in your food... er... changed during digestion? 
T 	 Good.... Has anyone got a bright idea? 
Well, look at the evidence in front of you.... Any change in 
your iodine, Carol? 
P6 No, miss. 
T 	 Has anyone got a change in the iodine... no.... O.K. 
What about the glucose? 	 Anyone? 
Ps (speaking together).... Yes, it's turned... etc. 
T 	 O.K.... sh.... quiet... now 
	
 what does the colour change 
indicate.... Derek? 
P7 There's glucose in the water 	  
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T Right.... it must have come... through where? 
	  
P7 Through the er.... parchment. 
T Right. It has come through the parchment.... How about the 
starch? 
Ps (Together) No.... no, miss. 
T Now does this give you a clue to the answer of our question? 
	
 Come on.... you're asleep today.... anyone? 
	  
Well, later on in the process of digestion the products have 
to be absorbed through the wall of the small intestine 
	  
If starch were left in original state it couldn't pass through 
the walls of the small intestine.... but as glucose it can... 
	
 What does this tell you about the relative size of 
the molecules in starch and glucose 
	
 Andy? 
P8 Glucose.... is... er .... has smaller ones. 
T Right. Glucose has smaller molecules. Now make sure you put 
in your own group's result and those of the other group. 
CHECK II Biology Explanation  
Without talking to anyone else, write your own conclusion to 
this experiment. 
What in the digestive system is represented by the parchment 
diffusion shell? 
CHECK III Biology Explanation  
1. How do teeth help the process of digestion? 
2. What is produced in the mouth when we chew? 
Give two ways in which it helps us in the digestion of food. 
ii 
3. What happens to starch in the mouth? 
4. Which of the solutions in the parchment diffusion shells entered 
the water in the beaker? 
	  
What did you use to test for it? 
	  
How did you know it was present? 
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5 	 Why can one solution go through the parchment shells and not 
the other? 
Where in the process of digestion is it necessary for this process 
to happen? 	  
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A3.2.5 	 History Explanation Age 12 years 	 '0' Level & C.S.E. Group  
T Next lesson.... and for the whole of the morning we are going 
into Worcester.... to look round at some of the historic 
places 	
 like King Charles's House.... We shall be finding 
out about the battle of Worcester 
	  so today I want to tell 
you.... er.... a little bit about... er... what led up to the 
battle.... First... who can say how the country is ruled 
today.... Jane? 
P1 By the Queen. 
T 	 Well.... the Queen is the... er.... nominal head, but the ruling 
is really done by 	
 Stephen? 
P2 The Government. 
T Right. We have a parliament to run the country 	  
Now the Queen has to agree to any change in law or any decision 
that the Government makes. She is still, in a way, the leader 
of the country, but there is no way that she can really sign 
a new act. She has no actual power 	  But it wasn't always 
like this; for many hundreds of years the King or Queen of 
this country had a lot more power... He really did rule... 
He could call together the men in parliament... or dismiss them. 
He had a lot more to do with the making and passing of laws. 
Now just prior to 1640 Charles 1, then King of England, began 
to ignore the advice of his parliament and to exert his right 
to rule without them by claiming for himself the 'divine 
right of kings'. He voted himself extra money when he ran 
into debt and threatened to disband parliament whenever they 
opposed him 	  Things were made worse by his marriage to 
a Roman Catholic French princess.... although he was a Protestant. 
His wife Henrietta encouraged him to stand against Parliament... 
so quarrels grew worse.... Eventually men began to take sides 
and a terrible Civil War broke out in the country 	  At first 
Charles and his army were successful for they had good 
cavalry 
	  What's cavalry.... Mitchell? 
P4 Ehm.... they're men who fight on horses.... 
T 	 Good... The King's army became known as Royalists.... his 
cavalry as cavaliers 	  After a time the king began to 
lose more battles and eventually he surrendered 	  Then 
something most unusual happened. He was tried and beheaded. 
The only king of this country ever to be executed by Parliament... 
Anyone know what happened next? 
P5 Cromwell ruled.... Miss, I saw the film of Cromwell. 
T Did you? 	 Well, as you say, Cromwell ruled for some years 
with the help of the army.... Then another Charles, the son 
of the Charles who had been beheaded, raised an army and the 
two sides met.... The battle took place at Worcester where 
Charles was defeated.... Any questions... Yes, Phillip? 
P6 Did Charles.... I mean the son of Charles, come back again? 
T Yes, he did and we will be talking about that after the visit 
next lesson.... 
CHECK II History Explanation  
Starting from the King's quarrel with Parliament: 
Make a list in the order that things happened, of the events that led 
up to the battle of Worcester. 
CHECK III History Explanation  
1. How is our country governed today? 
2. How is our government chosen? 
3. Can you give some reasons why King Charles was so unpopular? 
4. What is a civil war and why is it worse than other wars? 
5 	 What was another name for the Cavaliers? 	  
6. Why were they called this? 
7. Who were the Roundheads? 	  
8. Who was their leader? 	  
9. What happened to Charles the First? 
10. What happened later that led to the battle of Worcester? 
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A3.2.6 	 Geography Explanation 
	 Age 15 years 	 C.S.E. Group  
T In the lesson today we will try to see what alternative 
forms of energy are available to replace fossil fuels.... 
First of all... what's the problem with fossil fuels? 
P1 .... They are running out... 
T Right. We are using them up at a very fast rate and they're 
not replaceable 
	
 Can anyone suggest other sources of 
energy that are not oil, gas or coal 
	
9 Yes.... 
P2 Sir... wind... it drives sailing boats and windmills. 
T Good.... any others? 
	 Well, what about the sun? 	  
You may be surprised to know that the sun is our largest 
alternative source of energy 	  We receive the equivalent 
of 100 million, million tonnes of oil from the sun each year... 
if you think of a supertanker carrying 200,000 tonnes of oil 
then it would need... er.... so many tankers that they could 
girdle the earth.... and more 
	  Yes, Peter? 
P3 Where does it all go, sir? 
T It radiates from the sun at a rate of around 225,000,000 million 
tonnes per year 	
 The earth doesn't get it all 	  You see, 
some of it is not directed at the earth.... and a quarter 
of the sun's energy is reflected back into space by the upper 
atmosphere.... What does come through.... er.... creates winds 
and ocean currents and produces clouds rain and waves... 
Jenny? 
P4 .... Is the energy used in any other way? 
T 	 Yes, it is.... it's used to harness the wind.... You see, 
indirectly the sun causes winds.... when our atmosphere 
absorbs solar energy it changes the air temperature and this 
causes winds.... Water power too is indirectly energy from the 
sun, because rainfall comes from clouds and clouds are formed 
by the evaporation of water and evaporation of water is caused 
by the sun's heat 	  Anyone want to ask anything? 
Yes, Donald? 
P5 Isn't there energy in plants 	 9  
T 	 Good. There is... and it comes from the sun.... but it's only 
a small amount of what the sun gives off 	  We release it... 
when Sybil? 
P6 When we eat food... like cereals. 
T 	 Yes... and other foods, too.... and when we burn wood. 
CHECK II Geography Explanation  
Work Sheet:- 
Draw a diagram that shows pictorially what happens to the energy 
radiating from the sun. Start with the sun and use arrows 
	  
to symbolise radiation and boxes to put the names of what the 
radiation causes 
CHECK III Geography Explanation  
1. Give 2 examples of fossil fuels 
2. What is the largest alternative source of energy to fossil 
fuels? 
3. About how much energy is released from the sun? 
4. What happens to the energy that does not reach the earth? 
5. Put down 2 things that are created by solar energy. 
6. What happens when our atmosphere absorbs solar energy? 
What does this cause? 
7. How are clouds formed? 	  
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FACTORS INFLUENCING PUPIL UNDERSTANDING  
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A4.1 	 Unfamiliar Word List (Gardner - Hypothesis H8 
Form Word 
1 
School Form Word 
1 
School 
2 3 2 3 
ability 71 79 88 90 capture 89 92 96 93 
abnormal 85 87 93 95 caution 86 92 92 95 
absence 74 78 80 85 cave 81 89 95 94 
abundant 72 82 93 94 characteristic 73 79 88 91 
accumulate 61 70 87 92 chew 88 90 96 95 
accurate 75 79 88 92 chip 82 88 89 93 
*action 46 57 64 76 clamp 80 90 95 96 
adjacent 73 83 95 96 climate 80 89 89 93 
adjust 64 75 77 73 coarse 76 84 92 92 
adopt 88 82 93 92 coil 89 91 97 96 
advantage 85 89 95 92 *coincide 60 77 90 93 
affect 87 93 88 91 collapse 88 94 95 96 
agent 72 80 87 93 column 63 63 73 79 
agriculture 75 82 93 96 combination 86 91 94 97 
airtight 82 87 96 94 commence 86 91 96 95 
*algebra 48 58 71 81 compare 89 91 94 98 
alternate 64 82 91 92 *complex 52 64 77 82 
analysis 68 78 81 92 *component 49 63 76 87 
ancestor 84 87 91 92 *composition 49 61 81 91 
angle 80 85 93 95 compress 83 88 93 95 
annual 70 78 90 90 **concept 32 45 61 74 
aperture 67 73 83 87 **conception 31 44 63 74 
apply 83 88 93 94 conclusion 76 86 88 91 
appropriate 70 79 91 83 conical 62 72 79 83 
approximate 81 79 86 89 consecutive 68 78 81 88 
*arid 53 72 86 92 consist 88 93 97 91 
ascend 83 88 92 92 consistent 68 79 87 92 
ash 84 90 93 94 constant 71 79 92 96 
assignment 80 87 95 94 *constituent 44 51 63 81 
associate 70 78 78 84 construct 86 93 95 95 
assume 76 85 91 87 *consume 47 62 76 85 
attract 87 90 95 96 contact 87 92 97 96 
*audible 45 60 69 75 container 80 84 88 92 
automatic 78 85 88 92 contents 87 92 95 96 
*average 35 54 6o 61 *continent 54 64 71 79 
avoid 89 93 90 94 continual 89 91 96 94 
are 88 92 93 94 **contract 39 59 70 80 
basic 87 93 96 97 *contrast 51 53 60 68 
bind 86 95 97 98 *contribute 58 72 86 89 
bounce 79 87 87 89 convenient 83 91 97 97 
boundary 76 84 91 91 convention 61 72 82 85 
breed 82 86 93 95 *converge 58 74 81 87 
breeze 89 93 94 94 **converse 38 39 38 41 
brittle 75 86 92 94 convert 72 84 88 91 
bud 89 91 94 94 co-ordination 81 89 92 94 
bulb 84 92 95 91 cord 87 93 94 93 
bump 88 86 92 93 core 85 93 92 90 
calculate 68 83 92 96 **correspond 35 44 58 61 
camouflage 85 88 95 95 creation 88 93 95 98 
canal 83 93 97 95 *crest 50 66 72 74 
cancel 83 91 88 95 criticise 66 72 79 83 
capable 76 84 92 85 *crude 42 62 71 87 
capacity 82 88 96 97 crust 87 92 95 97 
*see last page 
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cultivate 76 84 92 92 extreme 79 88 92 93 
cure 82 85 88 90 **factor 35 62 67 76 
decay 72 79 83 90 film 64 72 75 84 
decimal 89 93 93 95 fin 82 79 81 75 
decrease 80 82 96 97 fog 66 79 75 81 
define 74 78 90 97 formation 88 93 96 96 
deflect 64 75 8o 83 function 88 94 96 95 
degree 66 78 84 85 *fundamental 53 66 73 75 
dependent 85 92 95 99 generate 67 81 86 87 
depth 82 90 90 95 globe 88 91 91 95 
derive 74 73 84 91 **grain 31 35 39 48 
descend 69 85 92 93 grind 79 85 89 90 
**descendant 32 47 52 62 hatch 82 86 84 87 
description 84 93 95 92 horizon 85 91 92 95 
detect 61 71 79 83 hygiene 88 92 97 98 
device 67 81 87 88 identical 85 87 84 84 
*devise 53 65 69 84 identify 82 90 93 95 
diagnose 69 79 90 95 *illuminate 49 71 84 89 
diagonal 69 75 85 86 *illustrate 56 59 70 76 
dial 88 91 92 93 imagination 78 82 88 91 
*diameter 48 67 81 86 *immerse 52 62 8o 85 
dimension 77 86 93 95 impact 66 77 85 87 
disc 83 85 92 88 *incident 42 54 54 62 
discuss 84 92 95 97 *incline 47 47 61 63 
**disintegrate 18 22 27 38 index 78 84 81 89 
disperse 62 74 85 90 indicate 85 91 94 96 
displace 67 72 73 82 industry 87 93 97 96 
distinct 71 85 90 93 inflate 77 83 85 83 
distribute 79 85 91 96 influence 63 73 79 90 
disturb 89 89 87 88 inhabit 84 84 91 95 
*diversity 49 58 66 78 inhale 88 94 96 96 
*dominant 51 67 81 88 **initial 35 45 47 64 
doubt 82 91 94 95 inquiry 86 92 93 97 
drain 87 90 93 94 insert 88 90 95 93 
drought 85 88 95 93 instantaneous 77 84 92 96 
duplicate 89 93 98 96 instrument 88 88 94 94 
edible 77 85 91 93 intake 71 82 85 92 
*effect 45 46 62 70 intelligence 89 89 91 94 
*efficient 48 56 68 72 interfere 84 87 90 94 
elastic 74 86 86 86 internal 79 86 93 94 
*emit 46 58 65 79 *interpret 56 67 77 83 
enable 62 76 83 8.3 intersect 89 94 98 95 
equipment 89 93 95 96 interval 88 96 96 97 
equivalent 88 92 93 97 invent 89 88 95 91 
erect 75 85 91 93 *invert 45 54 68 79 
essential 63 71 82 86 involuntary 67 8o 89 92 
estimate 76 76 82 89 irritate 69 77 89 86 
evacuate 78 85 94 93 isolate 63 77 90 97 
exact 70 85 88 85 junction 74 78 87 92 
exception 79 87 93 96 **latitude 35 45 47 52 
excess 70 79 90 94 **law 39 51 72 78 
excite 69 77 8o 89 layer 77 83 95 95 
exclude 68 79 91 95 leaf 86 88 87 91 
exert 64 68 88 87 leak 87 86 94 95 
expand 89 91 93 96 level 79 84 91 87 
expel 77 82 87 93 liberate 54 71 86 90 
experience 88 93 92 97 limit 69 81 86 91 
explode 86 88 93 94 *linear 52 59 77 8o 
expose 70 76 89 90 logic 61 69 70 78 
*external 53 68 82 90 **lubricate 37 45 7o 84 
extra 87 88 93 91 *magnitude 5o 74 85 8o 
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majority 86 88 96 95 pump 69 81 88 84 
manufacture 74 82 91 91 purify 81 92 92 93 
margin 87 92 94 96 **random 12 18 36 35 
mate 84 90 92 95 **rate 25 39 47 58 
mature 74 82 92 92 *recoil 52 63 71 75 
maximum 63 74 84 90 reference 67 77 85 93 
measure 87 86 88 89 refine 76 84 88 90 
medium 87 90 90 94 reflect 62 62 79 80 
method 82 87 95 95 regular 69 76 76 85 
mild 75 85 90 89 *regulate 50 61 75 82 
*minimum 52 67 82 81 reject 89 93 96 97 
mobile 87 90 96 97 relationship 79 89 92 94 
modify 57 61 76 87 *relative 41 58 63 74 
moisture 89 89 94 94 relevant 66 75 84 88 
molten 64 75 86 92 reliable 88 91 94 95 
multiple 70 72 85 90 *repel 58 71 83 88 
multiply 86 88 94 97 replace 88 94 94 95 
naked 65 68 75 80 *represent 59 74 83 86 
*negative 39 61 73 77 research 86 94 96 96 
neglect 78 86 95 92 *residue 57 65 79 81 
*negligible 52 68 62 73 *resist 55 72 79 90 
*neutral 53 67 78 82 resource 64 76 86 86 
observation 74 77 92 88 respond 72 80 87 90 
obvious 67 73 83 84 retard 62 80 87 90 
occasional 89 93 98 92 **revise 33 40 50 58 
occur 84 83 90 93 rigid 6o 68 82 85 
*omit 42 59 74 81 rim 81 86 94 92 
operate 88 92 95 90 rotate 83 91 95 93 
opinion 83 87 93 92 *row 53 49 55 57 
oppose 68 71 84 82 rule 78 84 83 88 
origin 64 78 87 87 scale 76 85 95 94 
*outline 56 70 80 80 scratch 88 88 95 93 
overcome 85 92 95 90 screen 87 89 90 92 
overhead 88 91 90 88 seaweed 88 92 93 94 
*partial 39 51 59 68 section 61 65 76 86 
particle 82 84 94 86 *sense 47 53 65 68 
penetrate 76 84 91 94 sensitive 
(to light) 64 68 83 82 
per 88 86 88 91 sensitive 
(instrument) 75 79 86 88 
*percentage 41 51 49 55 *sequence 57 63 63 80 
permanent 76 84 89 90 sign 79 87 90 92 
*perpendicular 47 67 84 81 significant 83 86 93 94 
*phenomenon 56 59 73 81 simplify 78 86 91 91 
pierce 87 90 95 91 *simultaneous 54 66 71 77 
pivot 82 87 91 92 sink 86 91 91 88 
*plot 51 81 90 95 smear 74 80 89 93 
positive(test)64 72 78 81 source 79 89 94 94 
*positive 
(number) 42 86 92 92 spark 88 91 95 94 
practise 87 91 98 93 spiral 76 82 89 89 
predict 71 85 93 94 splint 87 90 92 92 
preparation 74 78 85 82 **spontaneous 15 26 39 45 
presence 74 84 92 92 stable 85 93 95 94 
previous 64 72 84 89 stagnant 63 69 79 87 
primary 63 71 76 83 stain 64 81 86 90 
primitive 67 65 86 86 *standard 41 50 72 76 
*probability 52 58 68 76 stationary 85 93 95 95 
procedure 81 88 94 94 steady 87 93 91 94 
process 66 76 84 91 *stimulate 43 48 57 71 
profile 67 81 88 90 structure 88 92 97 96 
proof 77 87 87 90 submerge 70 76 82 85 
propagate 67 69 70 71 substance 87 96 94 94 
propel 
	 . 
EA 
90 90 93 substitute 64 76 87 88 proportion r 74 81 successive 79 88 93 96 
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suckle 63 69 81 78 School forms 1,2,3 and 4 equate 
summary 85 89 95 98 approximately with ages 12,13,14 
suspend 62 72 84 87 and 15 respectively. 
*symbol 54 73 84 91 
**symmetrical 23 35 48 60 
system 70 77 85 84 
systematic 78 93 94 93 
table 80 88 95 95 
tabulate 75 78 89 93 
*tank 43 56 56 65 
temporary 66 73 80 90 
tend 82 87 94 94 
tension 75 78 87 93 
*textbook 55 63 66 80 
theory 67 78 78 74 
thrust 69 77 83 88 
tide 77 82 92 90 
topic 48 59 61 66 
trace 85 90 91 92 
transform 78 85 91 88 
transmit 85 84 95 96 
treatment 67 75 79 86 
trough 85 86 91 95 
tube 77 83 91 90 
tweezers 81 81 92 93 
typical 77 87 93 97 
uniform 73 87 87 96 
upset 85 94 94 96 
**valid 30 50 65 79 
variable 80 90 93 96 
variety 87 93 96 97 
vertical 64 72 84 87 
*vessel 56 70 78 90 
vigorous 82 84 92 93 
violent 84 89 96 96 
vital 61 75 85 91 
vocal 71 83 91 94 
weed 80 86 91 90 
wilt 78 82 90 90 
* Students at first form level scored 40-60% 
correct on the item testing t he word. 
** Students at first form level scored less 
than 40% on the item testing the word. 
A4.2 Special Vocabulary in Subject Fxplanations 
Occurrences of Technical and Special Non-Technical Words: 
Mathematics Selling price 	 Profit 	 Represents 
Cost price 	 Loss 	 Plus 
Percentage 	 Dropped 	 Cancel 
Multiply 	 Marked 
Hundred per cent 	 Reduced 
Physics 	 Frictional force 	 Conditions 	 Reading 
Atomic Scale 	 Apparatus 	 Joints 
Microscope 	 Constant 	 Attraction 
Solid 	 Nature 	 Appear 
Force 	 Overcome 	 Rests 
Molecules 	 Peaks 	 Causes 
Spring Balance 	 Troughs 	 Apparently 
Atoms 	 Surfaces 	 Prevent 
Operation 	 Supported 
Motion 	 Contact 
Chemistry Acids 	 Salts 	 Evolution 
Alkalis 	 Liquids 	 Substance 
Chemical 	 Properties 	 Generates 
Litmus 	 Neutral 	 Definitions 
Sodium Hydroxide 	 Category 	 Form 
Metal 
	 Depend 	 Information 
Hydroxil 	 Test 	 Dissolve 
Hydrogen 	 Burn 	 Gas 
Ions 	 Corrode 
Biology 
	
Digestion 	 Small intestine Relative 
Saliva 	 Results 	 Evidence 
Starch 	 Tested 	 Indicate 
Sugar 	 Teeth 	 Absorbed 
Solution 	 Process 	 Wall 
Parchment 
diffusion shell 	 Broken down 	 State 
Molecules 	 Product 	 Mouth 
Iodine 	 Moistens 
Fehlings 
	
Purpose 
436 
Occurrences of Technical and Special Non-Technical Words 
Geography Energy 	 Radiates Produces 
Fossil 	 Creates 	 Reflected 
Tonnes 	 Clouds 	 Sources 
Upper atmosphere 	 Winds 	 Space 
Temperature 	 Ocean Currents Million 
Forms 	 Waves 	 Indirectly 
Alternative 	 Harners 
	
Absorbs 
Fuel 	 Evaporation 	 Power 
Release 	 Directed 	 Equivalent 
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